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ABSTRACT
The project National Identity in the Era o f Globalisation is a research on the 
nature of national identity and its potentials in the era of globalisation. National 
identity is approached by psychoanalysis and by political analysis. Psychoanalysis 
offers us some insight on identity and the process of identification, a process that 
shapes the individual personality -and identities- since birth. Identification is 
essential for understanding how people identify themselves and how they are 
mobilised by other people, groups etc. It also reveals the role of the others 
(outgroups, foreigners, etc), who are also important to the extent that they act as 
reference points of identification, including negative identification; to a large extent 
their presence is essential for the coherence of the national group as the nation’s 
aggressiveness is directed outwards, acting as a stabiliser for the cohesion of the 
group.
National identity occurs out of identification with the national group, so its 
peculiar characteristics are defined by the nation. Nationalism inevitably comes to 
the fore, not only as the force that has forged the nation-state, but also as a mass 
mobilising ideology that determines the aspirations of the ‘nationals’. As it will be 
argued in this thesis, nationalism changes national identities to ‘nationalistic 
identities’, and signifies the nation with new characteristics. Most significantly, 
nationalism appeals strongly to the human unconscious, and accounts for the 
seemingly ‘irrational’ characteristics of national identity. Thus, national identity 
partly derives its strength, prevalence and ferocity from nationalism.
What are the prospects, then, of national identity in the era of globalisation? In 
order to answer this, we must define globalisation and examine the position and 
strength of the national state in the current globalising era. Also, the prevalence of 
nationalism as a political force and ideology that signifies the nation and national 
identity to a large extent must be explored in the era of globalisation. As 
globalisation seems to provoke national awakenings and enhance existing 
nationalisms, the potentials for national identities to be strengthened or rendered 
obsolete will be examined.
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INTRODUCTION
The object of this thesis is national identity. The aim of this thesis is the deep 
comprehension of the nature of national identity, its mechanisms, its potency and 
potentials. While this object may seem general, it is quite precise: my object is 
national identity as such, and not a particular -in time and place- national identity. 
That is because, while the particular offers a deep insight on a case and an 
interpretation of its distinctive characteristic elements, my attempt is to identify the 
fundamentals of national identity, to grasp its common denominator in each 
particular case. So, I am not preoccupied with the elements that comprise a specific 
nation’s national identity, be it religion, language or other, but my main concern is to 
identify the mechanisms that lead a person and a group to national identification. The 
methodology I use to approach my object is defined by the object itself. National 
identity is comprised by the national and the identity component; each of these 
elements have to be analysed separately before they can be explained in conjunction. 
Hence the need for a multidimensional approach.
Initially I turned to social psychology, as the science that defines as its object 
of analysis the ‘frontier’ where the social and individual meet. The relation between 
self and society appears to be a central one from the standpoint of social psychology, 
which focuses on their interaction, but it mostly stands at their borderline and does 
not touch analytically each component separately. The main standpoint of the 
classics of social psychology (Mead, Cooley, Jenkins and others) is that identity must 
be seen as the outcome of a continuous interaction between society and the self, 
which is a process rather than a stable, solid outcome. Yet, the details of this process 
are not explained, although some of its characteristics are identified1. So, a deep 
insight into the issue of national identity requires the analysis and understanding of 
this process, the process of identification. Also, in order to understand better the 
interaction of the individual and societal components we must first have a clear 
insight of each of the components on their own account. Thus, I turned to the 
discipline that deals with the individual and the process of identification:
1 Such as reciprocity of meaning, response to familiar attitudes and symbols, the distinction between ‘se lf and 
‘I’, or the subjective and reflective self (Mead), the construction o f identity through language and communicative 
life (Cooley), or the construction of identity through similarity and difference (Jenkins).
2psychoanalysis. In the sequel, I placed the individual in its wider social, historical 
and political environment in order to explain the nature and potentials of national 
identification.
Psychoanalysis focuses on the process of identification and explains the 
attribution of identities in detail. In addition, it offers a full account of the inner self, 
the unconscious mechanisms and drives that dictate one’s actions. However, 
psychoanalysis does not analyse the self in isolation to its social environment, be it 
the family or a larger group; it deals with individuals inside a group and their 
determinative relationship with the others too. Thus, psychoanalysis is an extremely 
useful tool in the socio-political analysis of national identity. National identity is a 
particular form of social identity that is acquired through interaction with other 
people (family, teachers, friends etc.) within a given social environment -the nation. 
Nevertheless national identity has become so pervasive and so powerful in 
mobilising people that it renders a necessity to search for the reasons of this 
pervasiveness. In this aim, psychoanalysis is an essential complementary approach to 
social and political analyses. National identity is a political identity too, as it is 
influenced by the political ideology of nationalism. As Schopflin remarks, 
nationalism persists even though dismissed as ‘irrational’; so, it must “operate by 
rules of its own, rules that are rational in its own context” (1995:55). Those rules and 
that context are to be explained by psychoanalysis, which renders national identity 
and the phenomenon of nationalism much more comprehensible to the scholars in the 
field: it offers a deep insight into the forces and mechanisms operating within the 
self, those that provoke reactions and phenomena that appear to be irrational, but are 
clearly explainable and reasonable (thus “rational” in Schopflin terms) if analysed 
within their own context. It also offers a deep insight into the ways that the ‘internal’ 
and ‘external’ interact. Psychoanalysis tries to explain human behaviour and is, thus, 
a preferable tool in this analysis.
The applicability of Freud’s theory to social and political phenomena is 
stressed by several scientists. Talcott Parsons, for example, in an article titled ‘Social 
Structure and the Development of Personality: Freud’s Contribution to the 
Integration of Psychology and Sociology’ (1970) tried to show the relation of 
psychoanalysis and sociology. However, Freud himself has argued that, “what 
characterises psychoanalysis as a science is not the material which it handles but the
3technique with which it works. It can be applied to the history of civilisation, to the 
science of religion... What it aims and achieves at is... what is unconscious in mental 
life” (1917c:436), individual or social. While in a group, the individual acts in a 
much more instinctual and unconscious way; for that reason, psychoanalysis, the 
science that introduced the unconscious and analysed its mechanisms, can be equally 
used in explaining social phenomena, meaning individual behaviours within society. 
So, we should see psychoanalysis as a method for explaining individual pathologies 
regardless of the context. Freud stressed this explicitly:
It is true that, individual psychology is concerned with the individual man and 
explores the paths by which he seeks to find satisfaction for his instinctual 
impulses; but only rarely and under certain exceptional conditions is individual 
psychology in a position to disregard the relations o f this individual to others. In 
the individual’s mental life someone else is invariably involved; and so from the 
very first individual psychology, in this extended but entirely justifiable sense o f  
the words, is at the same time social psychology as w ell (1921:95).
Although psychoanalysis is appropriate to understand the internal mechanisms 
and the process of identification, by illuminating the interaction of the ‘internal’ and 
the ‘external’, it is not adequate to grasp the complexity of social and political 
phenomena. Those phenomena require political analysis, as many of the issues under 
consideration are political phenomena and ideologies that determine social activity 
and political structures. By political analysis I mean the critical study, explanation 
and evaluation of issues that are political, meaning that they involve the individual 
and its society but also the institutional constitution and regulation of society. In 
addition, the object of national identity involves an analysis of politics, of political 
ideologies and of the process of ‘ideologisation’ of certain political variables that 
determine social and political life. Multidisciplinarity is still significant, though, 
because of the complexity of the issue. Thus, political analysis necessarily requires 
the contribution of history and historical sociology. Historical sociology is 
particularly indispensable in regard to nationalism, the national state and national 
identity, because these are cultural and historical phenomena, and their course and 
development through history must be the basis of analysis: it is those and their 
history that we try to understand and can further illuminate our object, national 
identity.
4Some scholars that have used psychoanalysis to approach political phenomena 
have used a specific name for their approach. Ross (1995) for example uses the term 
‘psychocultural interpretation’, and Volkan (1995, 1998) and Lipowatz (1990) the 
term ‘political psychology’, by which they refer to the psychoanalytic explanation of 
society. Without considering these terms inappropriate, I will not use any of them 
because my attempt is not at explaining society psychoanalytically. Rather, my 
attempt is to explain social and political phenomena from the widest perspective 
possible. Psychoanalysis is one of the tools chosen for that, though a basic one; yet, it 
is not adequate alone to explain such complex sociopolitical phenomena. So, my 
attempt is not to psychoanalytically explain national identity, but rather to explain 
national identity in general, that is, to explain it through those approaches that can 
best and in conjunction provide the fullest analysis possible. To the extent that I 
emphasise on psychoanalysis during my study that is not due to a belief that it is the 
most important perspective compared to others; it is rather due to the fact that, 
although it is essential and indispensable for a complete analysis of (national) 
identity, it is neglected or underestimated as irrelevant by many scholars in the field. 
In overall, this is a multidisciplinary analysis.
This research on national identity has followed three main paths, three thematic 
units that have been considered as significant in the understanding of national 
identity. These are the three parts that this thesis is divided in and concern 
Identification, Nationalism, and Globalisation -the three components of the research 
on National Identity in the era of Globalisation, as the title itself indicates. The first 
part comprises the basis for the subsequent analysis, for it provides the basic 
understandings of the individual unconscious mental life, which is the prerequisite 
for the political analysis that will follow. Chapter 1 is basically introductory to 
psychoanalysis. As I am addressing an issue of the social and political sciences, I 
cannot but assume a lack of familiarity with psychoanalysis. So, the first chapter is 
an introduction to the basic concepts of psychoanalytic theory -such as the 
unconscious, the drives, the pleasure and the reality principles, as well as the process 
of identification, mainly first identification- and a short description of the Freudian 
tradition, the different schools and the criticisms to psychoanalytic theory. The 
second chapter is concerned mostly with secondary identifications and, in particular, 
group identifications and the mechanisms by which the same (national) identity is
5attributed to a group of people. Here, psychoanalysis provides an explanation to 
group psychology and its pathologies as they relate to group identification in general 
and national identity in particular. Such pathologies are the ‘need’ to have enemies 
and its relation to aggression drive, or the construction of a group through similarity 
and difference.
These two psychoanalytic chapters provide the basic understandings on 
identity and the process of identification that is required in order to proceed in 
specifying the social and political characteristics of national identity. Thereafter, 
psychoanalysis leaves the foreground as the basic or sole approach to political 
analysis and historical sociology, but it nevertheless remains the complementary 
approach, as its explanations of the unconscious mental life will serve as our basic 
understanding of individual behaviour within a group. For example, it is this 
understanding that offers an explanation for the appeal of nationalism to individuals, 
or the potentials for political manipulation of the human drives. So, with these 
understandings in mind we then proceed to the second part, where we are mostly 
concerned with nationalism, and the national state, and the influence of nationalism 
on national identity. The second part/thematic unit on nationalism take up an equal 
space in the thesis as the unit on Globalisation, and for that reason its title could also 
be ‘National Identity in the Era of Nationalism and Globalisation’. Yet, that title was 
not preferred in order to avoid the near-tautology of ‘national identity and 
nationalism’, as a theoretical analysis of national identity necessarily involves an 
analysis of nationalism.
In chapter 3 I address the question, why is national, among all other social 
identities, so prevalent and appealing within modernity. The answer to this relies on 
the signification of national identity by the political ideology of nationalism, which 
renders it both a national and a ‘nationalistic’ identity. This chapter begins by 
defining nationalism and explaining its significance as an ideology, and analysing the 
attribution of a particular value and quality to the national state by it. It proceeds with 
the distinction between nationalism and patriotism and an evaluation of different 
types of nationalism and their common denominator. In the context of nationalism, 
(national) identity acquires peculiar characteristics, which I try to define towards the 
end of the chapter. Yet, my main concern is with the imaginary character of 
nationalism and the specific reasons for its strong psychological appeal. In chapter 4,
6I am trying to locate this psychological appeal within time and identify the particular 
circumstances that facilitate the generation and spread of nationalistic feelings -be 
they political, social, historical and/or economic. Thus, since psychological 
predispositions are not confined in place and time, the following questions arise and 
search for an answer in chapter 4: is nationalism new and, also, why and when did it 
emerge? Is the national state an exclusively modem phenomenon? What is the 
relation between national and ethnic identities? What are the specific reasons that 
account for the emergence of exclusionary and actively aggressive forms of 
nationalism?
The first two parts on Identification and Nationalism provide a clear idea about 
national identity, its nature, its distinctive characteristics, and the circumstances 
under which it becomes stronger or remains latent. Thus, having acquired a deep 
knowledge on national identity I proceed to the third and last part on globalisation 
and its impact on national identity. The study of national identity in the era of 
globalisation is not only a study of national identity in a particular context but, also, 
its study in the contemporary environment. Globalisation is, in a sense, the 
contemporary era, the period that we currently live in. So, having analysed national 
identity as such, although keeping modernity as the particular reference, the next step 
is to examine its prospects in the light of most recent developments -in late- 
modemity, to use Beck’s term.
Globalisation is said to produce new forms of social and political change both 
within and between nations, to produce new sources and forms of conflict as well, 
and to raise new issues about identity and culture, issues that can be interpreted and 
evaluated anew. Initially, we must examine the accuracy and extend of these claims. 
For example, on one hand, it is argued that economic globalisation, which weakens 
the nation-state, is backed up by a globalisation of culture, while the continuity of 
generations has begun to fray and teenagers are influenced by their counterparts in 
other societies. On the other hand, it is counterargued that, the more people 
communicate with each other, the more they find out what is peculiar about 
themselves and may tend to evaluate it as a distinctive barrier. So, globalisation and 
the debate about it raise questions about national identity, about its contemporary and 
future prospects. A number of questions arise: What are the prospects of national 
identity as -and if- the world becomes a ‘small village’? Where are individual and
7national identities rooted as local, regional and global cultures interact, and how are 
they re-shaped by increasing geographical and cultural mobility? A few more issues 
are raised regarding nationalism. The most important concern national awakenings,
i
conflicts etc.: are they an outcome of globalisation, or rather of nationalism? Why 
have they become so apparent in the age of globalisation? What is the future of 
nationalism in the era of globalisation?
These are all important and inter-related questions, and they will be answered 
in chapters 5, 6 and 7. In chapter 5 I first provide a brief introduction to the debate 
and a working definition on globalisation; in that sense, chapter 5 is the introduction 
to our discussion on globalisation. Then, in chapter 6 we refer in detail to the 
arguments and counterarguments as to whether the national state is going to be 
rendered obsolete by the process of globalisation. As the national state is comprised 
by the state and the national component, this chapter will address the issue of the 
changes of states in the era of globalisation, and then it will examine whether 
globalisation has generated any changes thus far regarding the 
construction/ascription/acquisition of national identity. Thus, in chapter 6 we shall 
examine whether the state has been significantly undermined in the era of 
globalisation, and whether the mechanisms that operate within it and produce 
identification with it have undergone any alteration. My main concern is to identify 
the prevalent tendency as far as the direction of changes is concerned, and to give a 
reasonable estimation for the prospects of national identity in the context that 
globalisation delineates. This is also my main concern in the next and last chapter: 
chapter 7 will be preoccupied with the prospects of national-as-collective 
identification within globalisation. That is, the prospects of identification will not be 
analysed in sole reference to the national state and its changes (which is the aim of 
chapter 6), but in relation to globalisation in general. In that sense, we shall examine 
the perceptions and images of globalisation for individuals and groups, so as to 
identify possible trends in the development of collective identification in that 
context.
As indicated at the beginning, my attempt during this research has been to 
achieve the greatest comprehension possible on national identity. This attempt has 
led me to examine it within different contexts and to raise quite a few questions, 
questions that may initially seem distracting and diverting. However, the issues
8involved and the questions raised have been to a large degree interrelated (ie, 
nationalism and globalisation), while they have been drawn in direct reference to the 
issue of national identity. Each of these different contexts (Psychoanalysis, 
Nationalism, Globalisation) constitute large debates on their own, with many sub­
debates as well; so, each of these three thematic units can be separated in areas of 
specialised study. At the same time, though, each of them includes as an area of 
study the issue of national identity. So, the study of national identity through these 
diverse and yet interrelated thematic units would offer the opportunity of its most 
complete comprehension. Certainly, one runs the risk of losing sight of the objective 
of research, or getting lost in a vast and unending literature. Indeed, this was a major 
challenge during my research. Each of the thematic units opened up unending 
possibilities of research, aspects that I found equally interesting and stimulating. But, 
had I followed any of these specialised areas of research, I would have limited my 
research on a particular case of national identity, on a specific aspect of it. Not that 
this would be any less interesting, but it would divert me from my original aim, 
which is to understand national identity and to answer a common question posed by 
many scholars who specialise on issues of nationalism and nationality: why is it so 
prevalent among identities today, why does it, occasionally, show the ferocity that it 
shows, and what are its prospects in the contemporary ‘globalised’ era? Hence, I 
followed multidisciplinarity as it is the key for understanding a large number of 
complex social and political phenomena.
Thus, comprehension of national identity required its analysis through the 
examination of individual identification, the development of nationalism, and the 
current prospects and reactions that the current era of globalisation poses. In order to 
handle the vast literature I focused on the ‘classics’, meaning that I concentrated my 
study of literature to the books and articles that are widely considered as 
indispensable readings, and I used particularised researches only when published in a 
reputable edition or journal. Fortunately, my background helped a lot, as my master’s 
specialisation was on issues of nationalism and identity, while I had some moderate 
familiarisation with the way psychoanalysis can be connected to political and social 
phenomena. It was this initial knowledge and specialisation that I wished to broaden 
and make concrete with my doctorate research, which I anticipate to make a useful 
contribution to the debate on national identity. In a similar way, it is this further
9doctorate specialisation that has already become the initiative for some additional 
research in the future. For the moment, I hope that I have succeeded in my present 
task: to elaborate a research that will answer the questions of nature, strength and 
potentials of national identity.
PART ONE 
Identification, and the Tool of Psychoanalysis
In the first two chapters of this thesis our main attempt will be to understand 
individual psychology and the process by which individuals acquire their identities. 
For that reason, our methodological tool will be psychoanalysis. The first chapter 
will be an introduction to psychoanalysis, to the main psychoanalytic concepts as 
initiated by Freud and further developed by the Freudian school (mainly the orthodox 
Freudians), along with a brief reference to the development of the Freudian tradition. 
Particular attention will be paid on the analytical concept of identification, as it is the 
process by which individuals form their personal and collective identities. In chapter 
2 we shall analyse collective identifications and group psychology, so as to 
understand the mechanisms that operate in the process of group formation and group 
identification. The nation will be the major example used as far as groups are 
concerned in this chapter, so that particular reference will be made to national 
identification.
C H A P T E R  1: P S Y C H O A N A L Y S I S  A N D
I D E N T I F I C A T I O N
This chapter is an introduction to the basic concepts of psychoanalysis, with a 
particular focus on the process of identification. This analysis is based on the 
classical psychoanalytic tradition as it is founded by Freud. The Freudian theory 
entails the foundational elements of psychoanalysis and offers the tools for 
understanding the human psyche, or at least the mechanisms that determine the 
mental and sentimental life, tools and mechanisms that have initially been discovered 
through Freud’s clinical research. Although there are certain points and concepts that 
he did not elaborate in detail, the ‘father’ of psychoanalysis has provided the 
explanatory tools for the approach of unconscious mental life. The interests of 
Freud’s research, for example, were determined by the fact that he was at the 
beginning of new discoveries and, more significantly, his activities were determined 
by the period he lived in. So, his clinical research was initiated from and focused on 
hysteria, while today the interest of psychoanalysis has moved towards other issues, 
such as depression and psychosis. It is, thus, of great importance to apprehend the 
mechanisms and possess the tools for understanding the fundamentals of human 
behaviour; such knowledge can then be applied to the particular issues of our 
interest.
We shall first proceed with the analysis of the basic psychoanalytic concepts 
that will also gives us an insight of the terminology that will be used in the sequel. 
Identification will be separately explained in more detail, while some psychoanalytic 
concepts will be analysed in direct reference to it. At the end of this chapter I will 
make a brief reference to the Freudian tradition and some basic criticisms that have 
been advanced against his theory; this reference is, I believe, essential to an 
introductory presentation of the theory that will be an essential explanatory tool for 
the rest of this thesis.
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BASIC PSYCHOANALYTIC CONCEPTS
In the Freudian tradition, the term usually employed is identification instead of 
identity. The use of this word has a particular meaning: that is to emphasise the 
continuity of the process that is going on throughout someone’s life, particularly until 
late-adolescence. Identity has a more static connotation and, thus, it is not preferred. 
Identification is the mechanism, the whole process through which an identity is 
acquired, and offers us a clear idea of the very basis, the ‘solid core’ upon which 
every identity is formulated.
Before we proceed to an analysis of identification, it is necessary to explain 
some basic psychoanalytic terms. Not all of what is important in psychoanalysis can 
be explained at this point, because that would need much more than a chapter (more 
than a thesis indeed); a reference will be made solely to those concepts that are 
essential in psychoanalytic theory and, also, those that are necessary for the 
understanding of identification. So, some of these concepts will be analysed 
independently at first, while some will be further explained in direct reference to 
identification. Thus, this section will be divided in two parts: the first will be an 
description of some basic psychoanalytic ideas, and the second will deal with the 
concept of identification.
Basic Concepts
The central psychoanalytic concept is that of the unconscious. The unconscious 
is Freud’s most important and innovative discovery -discovery in the sense of the 
first concrete elaboration and presentation of the unconscious as an analytical 
concept, and not just as a broad idea or speculation, as it was referred to until that 
time, particularly in philosophical circles. Hierarchically, therefore, it should be our 
point of departure. Nevertheless, it would be extremely confusing to refer to the 
unconscious without first having an insight into the drives or instincts1, for it is -
1 The German word translated in English as ‘instinct’ is ‘Trieb’, which means ‘drive’. The word ‘Instinkt’ 
(‘instinct’ in English) is used by Freud only referring to animals: “...the instincts of animals”, on Moses and 
Monotheism, p.346 (see also footnote 1 in Moses and Monotheism, p.346). Let us quote here an editorial 
footnote about the passage word ‘Trieb’ from the New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis: “Literary 
‘drive’. The German word is often so translated, but, for reasons of style and grammar and to avoid anachronistic 
misrepresentation of Freud’s ideas, ‘instinct’ has been used throughout the Standard Edition” (1933b, footnote 1, 
p. 129). Nevertheless, this mistranslation of the term is not without importance, because the two terms have
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partly- through the drives, and their repression, that we come to know about the 
unconscious2. So, for the sake of clarity, let us begin with the drives.
The drives are “the representatives of all the forces originating in the interior of 
the body and transmitted to the mental apparatus” (Freud, 1920:306)3. The use of the 
term, as introduced by Freud, has no relevant connotations to the traditionally used 
“animal instinct”. It is rather the psychical representative that originates from the 
organism, and, thus, stands at the borderline of the mental and the physical. The aim 
of the drives is satisfaction; they seek for pleasure in every instance, even when 
different paths to this aim may show intermediate aims. In reality, the drives serve 
the pleasure principle, meaning that they strive for pleasure/satisfaction (the pleasure 
principle shall be referred to in detail later on). Their objects are those things, and 
persons, through which they can achieve their aims, things that act as mediators in a 
sense. This act of selection of a person, object etc. as love-object is described by the 
term object-cathexis or object-choice. In certain cases there is a particularly close 
attachment to the object; when this happens, the object becomes more like an aim 
itself than a mediator. These cases are pathological, and the term fixation is used to 
describe this close attachment or obsession with an object.
Freud, in his later writings, classified the drives in two large categories: the life 
drives and the death drives, Eros and Thanatos or Death4. The death drives, or drives 
of destruction, or aggressive drives, seek to destroy and kill; they are “striving to 
bring men to ruin and reduce life to its original condition of inanimate matter”5: as 
inanimate things existed before living ones, to strive to return to that condition is to
different connotations. The drive is more an impulse, an urge to do something. The instinct is unavoidable in any 
case and cannot become the object of mental elaboration. It has a purely biological connotation, and it applies 
more appropriately when referring to the ‘instinct for nutrition’. The instincts cannot be social mediated, which 
is a significant characteristic of the drives and accounts for their sublimation. Here I shall use the accurate term 
‘drive’ in general, except from quotations from original texts or references to authors who use this term, but 
always put in inverted commas, and when I refer to the ‘animal instinct’.
2 The other way through which we know about the unconscious is through the study of the dreams.
3 In my quotations and references to Freud’s books, I wifi use the original date of publication of the book or 
article in question. I will do so exceptionally for Freud’s quotations for the sake of convenience in directly 
identifying his works, and because I want to keep the temporal development of his thinking in mind Yet, in the 
Bibliography I mention the details of the publication I am using.
4 Here, I refer to his later categorisations, made in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920). In his earlier works he 
talked of two groups of primal drives: the ego or self-preservative drives and the sexual drives (in Instincts and 
their Vicissitudes, 1915, p. 121). These two groups still hold in Freud’s theory, but in 1920 they became part of a 
broader categorisation, that of Eros. This may be connected, to some extend, with the fact that, in his earlier 
works, he laid much more emphasis on the sexual drive than he did later on.
5 Freud (1933) Why War?, p.357. The concept of the “compulsion to repeat” was first introduced in Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle, and is described as a general tendency o f the unconscious, usually observed in hysterics, and 
not explicitly related to the Death drive.
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strive for death. When it is directed outwards, to the external world, it seeks to 
destroy everything surrounding the individual, and is manifested with aggressiveness 
and hostility towards other people; when directed inwards, it leads to self- 
destruction. In his correspondence with Einstein6, Freud placed this drive at the core 
of his pessimistic view about a future without wars and conflicts, for he believed it 
was impossible for humans to get rid of their aggressive drives. He stressed, 
however, that this aggressiveness could be diverted, by civilisation and science, to 
such extend as to avoid wars (the process through which a drive can be diverted is 
called sublimation and we shall refer to it later on).
Most analysts, however, avoid referring to Thanatos or Death, even though 
they do not reject it as such. In reality, most psychoanalysts accept the aggression 
drives as basic within psychoanalytic theories. It is rather the concept of death 
directed aggression that has raised strong protest even among orthodox supporters. 
These protests, however, are mostly based on moral disapproval. The most 
reasonable criticism, as quoted by Brown, is Ferenzi’s, who argued that “Freud had 
confused two entirely separate concepts: the first, that aggression is innate in man 
and its dynamics are as described, based as they are on clinical findings; the second, 
that because all men die and all behaviour is striving, they must also be striving for 
death”(Brown, 1961:28), which is a metapsychological view. In general, due to the 
moral oppositions and to absence of adequate clinical data connecting aggressiveness 
with death-striving behaviour, the dual schema of Life and Death is rarely referred 
to; however, their components -aggression, sexual, etc. drives- remain at the core of 
psychoanalytic theory. Freud himself, without rejecting it, did not elaborate it any 
further, and he did not even use it again; in his New Introductory Lectures o f 
Psychoanalysis, he categorised the drives into sexual, or Eros (that is, the life drives), 
and aggressive ones (still aiming at destruction, either directed outwards or inwards) 
(Freud, 1933b: 136). A characteristic of the drives that he did maintain, though, is the 
“compulsion to repeat” (Freud, 1933b: 139-140), expressing a conservative nature of 
the drives, which reveals an effort to restore an earlier state of things and satisfy the
6 See Why War?, 1933.
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pleasure principle7. In the present analysis we shall keep this analytically valid and 
broadly accepted categorisation into life and aggression drives.
The life drives -Eros- are those that bind people and bring them together in 
common living. The most significant among them are the ego, or self-preservation8 
drives, and the sexual drives. The self-preservation drives are associated with bodily 
functions necessary for the individual’s living (hunger is a usual example of those). 
These drives also provoke social attachments: since human beings are not 
independent and autonomous when they are bom, they need a protective surrounding 
for their self preservation -the smallest being the family. These drives, however, are 
much more egoistic in nature than the others9. The sexual drives, on the other hand, 
are those aiming for the satisfaction of a bodily organ - ‘organ pleasure’. But, they 
are more than that: they also include whatever comprises under the word “love”, as 
for example love relationships, emotional ties etc. It is the love drive, which has 
sexual love at its nucleus, that stands at the core of any group-formation. In love 
relationships between two people the sexual drive has a directly sexual aim; in 
groups, however, the drive is diverted (inhibited would be the Freudian term) in its 
aim, and the libidinal10 ties between people maintain their original energy, which 
creates a group attachment instead of a sexual relationship. The internal need for 
communication, that Cooley (1902) has identified, exists in people indeed, and its 
energy is derived by the love or sexual drive.
In the beginning, Freud used the word “sex” in its everyday use, but later on he 
gave it the “much wider connotation to apply to any pleasurable sensation relating to 
the body functions, and also, through the concept of sublimation [a process by which 
the aim of a drive is diverted to another one], to such feelings as tenderness, pleasure 
in work, and friendship. In other words, he used the word to refer to what would 
originally be described as ‘desire’” (Brown, 1961:20). Desire is a very significant 
concept that stands at the core of every drive; it is the wish that requires its
7 The pleasure principle is one o f the two governing principles of mental functioning (the other being the reality 
principle), and it strives at obtaining pleasure and satisfaction. We shall refer to the two principles in more detail 
in the sequel.
8 In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud interrogated whether the self-preservation drives actually belong to 
the death or life drives, but he abandoned this question as a mere speculation, having no clinical support.
9 We can also speculate that it is because of the drives that aim at self-preservation that the aggression drives are 
usually directed outwards than inwards.
10 Libido is the name of the force by which a drive manifests itself, the energy behind a drive (see Freud, 
1917c:355). It is usually associated with the sexual drive. The notion of libido, though a basic one, is quite 
perplexing and complicated; for that reason, it is better not to include it in the current analysis.
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fulfillment, the initiative for the drives to strive for their satisfaction. This is also why 
drives can be socially mediated; because, desire can be both constructed and 
mediated by the surrounding social environment. “According to Freud, unconscious 
desire is the organising principle of all human thought, action, and social relations”, 
Elliot argues (1999:15).
According to Elliott, moreover, desire arises out of the relation with an other -  
usually the mother. In the beginning, it emerges out of the biological need for 
nutrition: the infant’s sucking at its mother’s breast for nutrition provokes the desire 
for pleasure derived from sucking. The striving to obtain pleasure independently of 
nourishment is to be termed ‘sexual’. Sexuality is thus bom as a new libidinal 
relation with the other arises. This is how the unconscious desire is bom. It is 
Lacan’s contribution to psychoanalysis that “desire begins to take shape in the 
margin in which demand becomes separated from need” (Elliot, 1999:119). The 
presence of the other, as well as of speech, is essential for the expression of desire 
(language functions as a vehicle for desire). Desire goes beyond the objects that 
satisfy it; it stands at the core of every drive and is never ending. What is particularly 
interesting about desire is that, as Szpilka (1999) argues, it is directed primarily “not 
towards a given positive object, but towards another wish”, as for example the wish 
to be loved and acknowledged; in that sense, “human history is thus ultimately the 
history of wished-for wishes” (p. 1176).
The drives are sometimes difficult to be discerned because they often undergo 
certain vicissitudes. The vicissitudes a drive may undergo are: a) reversal into the 
opposite, b) turning around upon the subjects own self, c) repression11, and d) 
sublimation. Reversal into the opposite may be a change from activity to passivity 
(i.e. sadism and masochism), or reversal of its content (love-hate). The meaning of 
turning around the subject's own self is that there is a change of object, while the aim 
remains the same. Repression and sublimation are very important concepts for 
psychoanalysis and, therefore, will be explained in more detail. Repression is the 
operation that “attempts to repel, or confine, to the unconscious representations 
(thoughts, images, memories) which are bound to a drive. Repression occurs when 
the satisfaction of a drive -though likely to be pleasurable in itself- would incur the
11 The English word ‘repression’ has a double meaning: it means coercion, oppression on the one hand, and 
suppression, inhibition, exclusion from conscious awareness, on the other hand. The term is used in 
psychoanalysis with its second meaning.
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risk of provoking unpleasure because of other requirements” (Laplanche and 
Pontalis, 1973:390), such as social. Repression is a defense mechanism, which denies 
certain psychical representatives o f the drives12 to access consciousness. When a 
drive is repressed, it usually remains attached to the representative in question 
(fixation). The force that institutes and maintains repression is resistance, which 
emanates from the ego13. When the repressed tries to come to the conscious and 
manages to overcome resistance somehow, it has to pass through the censorship of 
the latter; if it manages to come to the fore, it is usually distorted. So, where there is 
unsuccessful repression, distortion takes place and transforms the repressed 
representations into symptoms, so as to make them unidentifiable. Dreams, slips of 
the tongue, jokes etc. are everyday examples of repressed drives that come to 
consciousness distorted; their true meaning can only be found through 
psychoanalytic treatment. Also, t4the amount of repression that human beings are able 
to sustain depends on many factors, such as the subject’s inner world, psychic 
creativity and...their place within the structure of social and economic relationships” 
(Elliot, 1999:19). This means that some people are more vulnerable to repressions, 
and are most likely to become frustrated or even psychically ill than others who are 
able to sustain a larger amount of psychical pressure.
Sublimation is the process by which the aim or the object of a drive is diverted 
to another one. Let us stress an example: if a youngster is prohibited from having 
sexual relationships, a large amount of libidinal energy would stay trapped inside 
him, seeking to be set free. In order to avoid frustration, among other possible 
symptoms, his libido can be directed towards other activities, such as sports, studying 
etc. In such case, we say that the sexual drive is inhibited in its aim, though it still 
holds its libidinal energy. So, sublimation helps the subject to divert his libido in 
such way as to avoid frustration and anxiety, and, more significantly at this point, to 
avoid socially destructive impulses. Freud believed that sublimation could be mostly 
achieved, for the sake of civilisation, through the arts, literature and science. The 
process of sublimation is extremely important for the maintenance of social order 
and peaceful coexistence. As will be shown in the following chapters, it is important
12 The drives cannot become conscious as such, but only through certain representative ideas, as for example the 
instinct for nutrition reveals itself to the conscious through the sentiment of hunger. They also come to the fore 
through representative words.
13 This is, perhaps, where the other meaning of the English word ‘repression, that is coercion, can be seen as 
applicable.
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for the conflict resolution process for it has the potentials to direct the drives for 
aggression to non-socially destructive aims.
Having examined the drives, we can now proceed to the analysis of the 
unconscious14. But, why was not that possible before? The reason is that, as Freud 
tells us, “we obtain our concept of the unconscious from the theory of 
repression...The repressed is the prototype of the unconscious for us” (Freud, 
1923:353). So, before having an insight on the drives (repression is, as we have seen, 
a vicissitude of them), we would not be able to understand the contents of the 
unconscious. Everything repressed is unconscious, but the unconscious is more than 
that. The unconscious comprises of latent acts and repressed ones. The drives are 
always unconscious, and can have access to the conscious through representative 
ideas. Freud made another classification, that of the preconscious, which is the 
system that contains whatever is “capable of becoming conscious” (Freud, 
1915d: 175). This, however, applies only to the representative ideas, because, as it has 
already been mentioned, the drives themselves are always unconscious. The 
preconscious representations are unconscious, for they have not reached 
consciousness yet (and they may never do), but are the only ones that could or might 
become conscious: they are in a state of latency. We must not get confused, however, 
as Rieff warns, by Freud’s imprecise use of the term ‘unconscious’ as both noun and 
adjective, for “the word properly denotes a quality of, not a place inside the mind” 
(Rieff, 1960:22).
While a psychical act passes through the systems it has to pass a kind of 
testing, a censorship, so that what finally becomes conscious may be strongly 
distorted. In fact, most of the mental activity is unconscious, and only certain 
portions are conscious. The popular hypothesis that the latent, unconscious ideas are 
weak, and become stronger as they grow conscious is not correct. Clinical research 
and experience has proved that, not only unconscious ideas are stronger, but, also, 
they occupy a much greater space of our mental activity. This is perfectly illustrated 
in the shape of the pyramid. In a schematic representation, we can imagine the 
mental apparatus as a pyramid, whose basis is the unconscious, further up there is the 
preconscious, and on the top there is the, relatively smallest part, of the conscious.
14 Unconscious is the appropriate Freudian term, and not the usually uttered ‘subconscious’. The latter implies 
that there is some mental activity lying ‘under’ consciousness, occupying lesser space and significance, while the 
former shows the existence o f a mental activity that is not conscious.
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The unconscious is not a wastebasket of unimportant memories and ideas, but a vivid 
pot containing all the energy and motivation for what appears as a conscious action. 
It is indicative that, even the ego is partly unconscious (Freud, 1923:355-6).
t
The unconscious has certain particular characteristics that channel the way 
people act. Hence, in order to understand human behaviour, it is important to identify 
and comprehend these characteristics. A first characteristic of the unconscious is 
negation and exemption from mutual contradiction. For example, the unconscious 
denies death, cannot separate falsehood from truth, and it accommodates ambivalent 
feelings at the same time (typical example is the coexistence of love and hate for the 
same object). The myths of the living dead (the ‘zombies’ for example), the 
characterisation of certain -dead- heroes as immortal originates here. Another basic 
trait of the unconscious, closely connected to that of negation, is the replacement o f 
external by psychical reality. The unconscious may deny external reality, either 
social or natural, if it is unpleasant, and it is solely oriented towards pleasure and 
enjoyment. As a consequence, it does not acknowledge any lack, but lives in an 
illusion of wholeness and completeness. Timelessness is another characteristic of the 
unconscious: it does have its own history, but it does not acknowledge any temporal, 
or even logical, order in it. An important consequence of that is regression, that is the 
return of the psychical apparatus to an earlier point of its development. A usual 
example is the pathological regression to a libidinal fixation, or the regression to 
infantile identifications. In addition, the unconscious is characterised by a continuous 
mobility and mutability of the drives15.
The above characteristic introduces us to the important distinction between the 
pleasure principle and the reality principle, the two principles that govern the whole 
of mental functioning16. As it was indicated earlier, the pleasure principle is the 
governing purpose of the unconscious, the aim of the drives, and it represents the 
internal, psychical ‘reality’ that strive towards obtaining pleasure and/or avoiding 
unpleasure. The reality principle, on the other hand, is the representative of the 
external, social and natural reality, of what is real and usually not agreeable. The 
pleasure principle is more prevalent and more often satisfied until the end of infantile 
period, that is, until the child achieves complete physical detachment from his
15 These characteristics are described in Freud, 1915d, p. 191-192; see also Lipowatz, 1990:59-60
16 See on the matter Freud’s Formulations on the Two Principles o f the Mental Functioning (1911), and Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle (1920); also, Lipowatz, 1990:154-156.
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parents. Then, when the child starts its own social contacts away from the parenting 
persons, the reality principle mediates individuals’ activities to a larger extent.
The two principles are not isolated from each other; on the contrary, they 
communicate, while being completely autonomous. It is the reality principle, though, 
that, while striving for what is useful, acts also as a safeguard of the pleasure 
principle. A momentous pleasure, for instance, may be given up for an assured later 
one. According to Freud, this is the basis of the religious doctrine of reward in the 
after-life, which makes every-day sacrifices worthwhile. In any case, the individual 
is always divided between the two, and the transition from one to the other is always 
problematic. Repression, for instance, is the flight from something that produces 
unpleasure. The ‘surrender’ of the pleasure to the reality principle, however, is a kind 
of decoy: individual desires remain always in a search for fulfilment as repressed 
wishes will always strive to come to consciousness (and they usually manage to do 
so through distorted ‘messages’, dreams, etc).
The statement made a few paragraphs above -that the ego is partly 
unconscious17-  needs some clarification. Freud discerned three regions of the mental 
apparatus: the ego, the super-ego, and the id. The id is the “inaccessible part of the 
personality” (Freud, 1933b: 105), the one containing all the drives and libidinal 
energy; it strives to bring satisfaction to the drives under the surveillance of the 
pleasure principle, and is wholly unconscious. The ego is the portion of the id that 
has been modified by the proximity of the external world: it has been separated from 
the id by taking on the task to represent to it the external world. ‘The ego stands for 
reason and good sense while the id stands for the untamed passions” (Freud, 
1933b: 109). A large part of the ego is unconscious as well, as for example are ego’s 
defence mechanisms. Last, the super-ego, which is mostly unconscious, emerges out 
of separation from the ego. Its task is to observe the ego so as to conform to the 
demands of external reality, and resist the demands of the id. So, the ego, driven by 
the id and confined by the super-ego, tries to bring about harmony among the forces
15?working in and upon it .
Thus far, we have examined the three more important concepts in 
psychoanalysis, the unconscious -Freud’s most influential discovery-, the drives,
17 See below, p. 11.
18 See on the ego, superego and the id, Freud, 1933b: 110-111.
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and the reality and pleasure principle. Some more will emerge while analysing the 
concept of identification, and will be dealt with when they emerge and in direct 
connection to identification. We should now proceed to the core psychoanalytic 
concept relating to this thesis, namely identification.
Identification
As it was indicated above, in groups we are concerned with love drives that 
have been diverted from their original, sexual aim. Other mechanisms, apart from 
object-cathexis, that create emotional ties are identifications. Identification is “a 
psychological process whereby the subject assimilates an aspect, property or attitude 
of the other and is transformed, wholly or partially, after the model the other 
provides. It is by means of a series of identifications that the personality is 
constituted and specified” (Laplanch and Pontalis, 1973:205). Also, as Elliot argues, 
a unified ego is not present at birth, but is only developed through the process of 
identification (1999:113). The most important feature we should keep from this 
definition is the word ‘process’, for identification is exactly that: a process that 
constantly enriches one’s identity. In addition, all identifications in a subject’s life 
correspond to the model of the first identifications of the infant19, and so it is 
important to focus on first identifications.
First Identifications
It is most common in psychoanalytic literature to begin with the Oedipus 
complex when referring to identification. The Oedipus complex involves the 
expression of hostile and affectionate feelings towards one’s parents, and it is usually 
evolved between the ages of three to five years. It is described as follows -  for the 
sake of the argument, we can use here the example of a little boy. The boy’s sexual 
drive during the Oedipal phase is oriented towards his mother, whom he loves and 
sees as his sexual object. He realises, though, that his father stands in his way with 
his mother and, so, the boy expresses hostility towards him. But, at the same time, he 
loves his father and admires him for all the qualities he has that make the mother
19 By first identifications I refer to identifications that occur in the first 4-5 years of life.
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love him. That provokes ambivalence in his feelings. The boy’s internal conflict due 
to this ambivalence is overcome by identification: he identifies with the father, that 
is, he identifies with what he would like to be. In that way, he overcomes his hostility 
towards the father that is provoked by his wish to keep his mother as a sexual object. 
Nevertheless, at the same time the mother is usually given up as a sexual object and 
the boy finds other substitutes for her. A similar process applies in inverse proportion 
to the girl.
This, however, is a simplistic presentation of the Oedipus dilemmas. The case 
is not as easy as that, for if it were, then we might be able to develop a ‘rule’ in 
psychoanalysis saying that, the boy identifies with the father and the girl with the 
mother. Such a rule, for better or worse, does not exist, and the issue of first 
identifications is much more complicated. Firstly, the process described above is the 
simplest form, but not the only one. The boy (keeping the same example) could 
express a feminine attitude and take up the father as the sexual object and identify 
with the mother. That would not be strange or abnormal because infants are not in a 
position to understand sex differences yet and, also, they do not acknowledge any 
difference or contradiction, as they are still dominated by the pleasure principle 
(unconscious). As a result, they often express homosexual attachments. Secondly, 
identification, according to Freud, may be of another kind, meaning with what he 
would like to have (Freud, 1921:134). In that case, the child identifies with the love- 
object, and the boy with his mother.
In connection to this second kind of identification (identification with what he 
would like to have) is the following. The Oedipus phase is generally placed between 
three and five years, but the process of identification has already occurred during the 
course of the child’s three years life. These identifications basically involve the 
mother (the symbolic mother, the mothering person), as the first person that 
generates satisfaction to the infant. The mother becomes the first love-object and the 
earliest identification occurs because of the emotional ties developed with that 
object. So, at the very beginning (oral phase), identification and object-cathexis (or 
object-choice) are indistinguishable from each other. It is often the case that, a sexual 
object is ‘given up’ by identifying with it, as if this introjection -meaning, 
unconscious incorporation- of the object into the ego makes it easier to be given up. 
Yet, one acquires/internalises a number of characteristics of the object of
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identification. It should be remarked that introjection and identification are often 
mixed up and even equated. Freud has occasionally used the terms interchangeably, 
and Melanie Klein has defined identification as “a sequel to introjection” (1988:141). 
To be more accurate, though, we should view introjection as a process through which 
identification occurs.
Klein’s influential research has shown that, during the earliest months of life, 
the child makes no distinction between the self and the surrounding world: it 
experiences the external world (mainly the mother) as part of itself. At the same 
time, at this stage of primary narcissism, the child is unable to bear tension -with a 
small change of situation it converts a pleasant stimulus to an unpleasant one. “As 
the young child experiences the frustrating reality of the external world’s less than 
perfect response to his needs, he begins to differentiate himself from it” (Post, 
1986:678), meaning that it begins to separate the ‘me’ from the ‘not me’. Because a 
child attributes the emotional responses called out by external objects to the objects 
themselves and experiences those objects as part of itself, it feels surrounded with 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ objects. It solves this problem with the defence mechanism of 
splitting. Thus, it integrates all the good aspects and externalises all the bad ones, and 
maintains in this way its ideal narcissistic self. Furthermore, its loved objects -  
mainly the mother- are cathected, that is infused, with narcissistic libido/energy and 
internalised through identification. The processes of taking in and giving out, that is 
introjection and projection, are of dominant importance here.
Klein and object relations theory distinguish between introjective and 
projective identification. The former is a process whereby an external object captures 
over the subject’s ego and enriches it with its properties. The latter describes 
identification with other people because one has attributed/projected qualities or 
attitudes of his own to them. Moreover, projection is particularly significant, because 
it is through projection that the child gets rid of the ‘bad’ -self and object- images. 
This process describes negative identification, where it is our ‘bad’ properties and 
wishes that we project on to the other. So, initially, identification occurs as a defence 
mechanism in the service of narcissism: it emerges as a means for the child to 
maintain the ideal image of itself. Idealisation of the parent, as part of the self, occurs 
symptomatically, but proves to be of particular importance in latter life and fixture 
identifications.
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First identification, thus, arises as a defense in connection to narcissism. 
Nevertheless, it is also a defense mechanism that facilitates the subject to deal with 
the external world and the frustration that it may provoke. The child usually develops 
aggressiveness and hostile feelings against the authority that prevents it from having 
its first satisfactions. Then, by means of identification, it takes the unattackable 
authority into itself and enters into possession of all the aggressiveness that it would 
like to exercise against this external authority (Freud, 1930:322). Thus, for instance, 
the little boy comes into possession of his hostility against the father by identifying 
with him and manages to control and tolerate it. We can see identification as a 
defense in many more instances; the two subsequent examples are usually stressed. 
First, usually children are afraid of the dentist and try to avoid any visit to him. This, 
however, is above their power, since they have to do what their parents tell them to. 
A common way they use in order to control their fear of the dentist is the play: they 
play the dentist between them. So, by (temporarily) identifying with him, they 
possess his qualities in a symbolic way that helps them deal with their fear. A second 
example is that of those primitive tribes who, being afraid of the ‘bad spirits’, dress 
up like them in certain rituals, as a way of exorcising them.
The function of identification as a defense mechanism and its close connection 
to narcissism is a primary source of identification. As Freud argued in Totem and 
Taboo, the initial “narcissistic organisation is never wholly abandoned. A human 
being remains to some extend narcissistic, even after he has found external objects 
for his libido” (Freud, 1913:147). In that sense, ‘Oedipus’ modelled early love- 
cathexes and defence identifications are substantially connected to and derived from 
narcissism. This will be further explained.
Identification and Narcissism
Freud defines narcissism as “the attitude of a person who treats his own body 
in the same way in which the body of a sexual object is ordinarily treated” (Freud, 
1914:65); in other words, it is “love directed towards the image of oneself’ 
(Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973:255). In narcissism, libido withdraws from the external 
world and directs towards the ego. “Narcissism is our first erotic disposition”, argues 
Rieff, as “libido is directed originally toward the self’; so, in a way, “satisfaction
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from an object is but a devious means of self-love” (Rieff, 1960:157-8). Narcissistic 
identifications, however, are not merely identifications made according to the ego- 
model, but more than that. In infancy and early childhood the subject lives in 
‘narcissistic perfection’, meaning a state where the narcissistically perfect image of 
one’s own self prevails. The admonitions of others and the awakening of his critical 
judgement destroy this perfection. In order to retain perfection, the subject identifies 
with those others, or uses as his ideal a substitute, on which he projects his 
narcissistic ideal. It is also in that context that Klein’s introjective and projective 
identifications function as a defence of the perfectly narcissistic image of the self.
In the early years of life, the object of identification is usually the love-object. 
Regarding the object-choice, Freud distinguished between two types: the ‘anaclitic ’ 
or attachment type, and the narcissistic type of object-choice20. According to the first 
type, a person may love either the person who feeds him (i.e. the mother), or the 
person who protects him (i.e. the father). According to the second type, a person may 
love: first, what he himself is, second, what he himself was, third, what he would like 
to be, and fourth, what was once part of himself. We can see, however, that even the 
anaclitic object-choice can fall under the narcissistic one. Let us examine that 
closely.
Identification with the person that feeds the infant, to begin with, is usually the 
mother21, who happens to be the first love-object in most cases. According to H. 
Hart, “one of the first acts of identification would seem to be the sucking of the 
thumb following breast feeding”, an act observed in almost every infant. What is 
revealed by this act is the “unwillingness of the infantile self to accept a need for 
something or someone outside of the self’ (Hart, 1947:275), and thus supply it by 
itself. The infant’s narcissistic perfection is hurt by the idea that it is dependent on 
the mother and misses her breasts after she stops providing them for feeding; so, he 
masters those feelings by identifying her (her breasts) with the thumb. In that way it 
retains the illusion of self-sufficiency, for she becomes a part of its own self and it is 
no longer dependent upon her.
In the same manner, by identifying with the person who protects it, the infant 
retains the perfection of its own self. As Balint argues, children usually wish to do
20 On these two types, see Freud, 1914, p. 84.
21 By ‘mother’ we should also understand any ‘mothering person’.
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the opposite from what they are told to; that is because their narcissism is incapable 
of tolerating a command. So, by identifying with the adults, they become prepared to 
will, rather than obey, what their parents require them to do. By internalising 
commands and prohibitions, making them part of themselves, “obedience takes place 
not through understanding but through identification” (Balint, 1945:329). If 
identification would not take place frustration might emerge, thus provoking 
aggression. We can say that, identification as a defense mechanism is in reality a 
defense of narcissism. In Balint’s words, “identification always operates in the 
interest of narcissism and does what it can to defend narcissism...” (1945:332)22.
Thus, we can see that, while the ‘anaclitic’ type of object-choice of 
identification is derived by the love drives and attachment felt towards the parenting 
persons, it is also largely related to narcissism and the narcissistic type of object- 
choice. The two are not in contradiction anyway; on the contrary, they are both 
related to the first two types of identification that Freud defined, which is 
identification with what one would like to be and identification with what one would 
like to have. In Group Psychology and the Analysis o f the Ego (1921) Freud clarified 
further these two types of identification and added a third one. He argued that: “first, 
identification is the original and earliest form of emotional tie with an object; 
secondly, in a regressive way it becomes substitute for a libidinal object-tie...; and 
thirdly, it may arise with a new perception of a common quality shared with some 
other person who is not the object of the sexual instinct” (1921:137).
The third type of identification that Freud referred to arises with a new 
perception of common quality shared with some other person who is not a sexual 
object, and it is “based upon an important emotional common quality” (Freud, 
1921:137); identification with the leader, and also with members of a group (with 
people that have something in common), comes under this type. We can see that this 
third type of identification is closely connected to the narcissistic type of object 
choice too, for it is identification with someone ‘similar’ to the self or with someone 
ideal to the self. But, it also serves another need: the sense o f belonging. We should 
regard the sense of belonging as, firstly, a direct derivative of the love-drive in its
22 The same applies, more or less, to the Oedipus complex. Identification emerges as a protective mechanism 
against the aggression that the child feels against the parent who stands in its way, against the ambivalent 
feelings it has for this parent, and against frustration and sadness it may feel because o f his prohibited sexual 
object.
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inhibited form, which is responsible for the communal ties of people, and secondly, a 
need to be protected by familiar faces, images etc., against an unfamiliar and, thus, 
frightening reality. Within that context, the sense of belonging serves the need to 
avoid unpleasure and protect the self from unfamiliarity (thus it serves the pleasure 
principle). So, I would suggest that this third type of identification is a process that 
serves the sense of belonging. Family and group identifications fall under this type. 
According to Bar-Tal, the sense of belonging is the basis upon which social identity 
is constructed, and identification with a social group serves this as well. As he 
argues, “identification with a social group is a psychological state very different from 
merely being designated as falling into one social category or another”; for example, 
“patriotic beliefs do not only strengthen the sense of belonging, but also support the 
definition of an individual’s social identity” (1993:55).
It is important to remark at this point the close connection of identification with 
the concept of familiarity. As Balint explains, a small child can only identify with 
what it is familiar with. She interpreted this finding by stating that, familiarity as a 
prerequisite to discover the unknown, the external world, means that the latter has to 
be akin to the ego: “in the last resort, a child wishes to meet only his beloved self’ 
(Balint, 1945:320). This finding clearly supports the close connection of narcissism 
and identification. Moreover, she argues that “identificatory thinking is employed for 
the purpose of avoiding what is unpleasurable and obtaining what is pleasurable, and 
it aims at transforming a strange and consequently frightening external world into 
one that is familiar and enjoyable” (1945:318). Indeed, children love their parents, 
for example, because they bring them pleasure and gratification, and they identify 
with them as being the powerful representatives of the frustrating external world23.
Several authors have distinguished between two types of identification, without 
proposing the same distinction, though. Moscovicci (1985) distinguishes between 
restricted and general identification24. Restricted refers to first identifications that 
occur within the family, in the model of what one would like to be or what one would 
like to have, to which we have already referred. General identification, he argues, is 
free of all ties to the libido and “instinctual drives” (p.256), and is expressed in the 
act of imitating and the feeling of attachment. A feeling of attachment, however,
23 We can infer that, identification is regulated by the pleasure principle.
24 See his reference to types of identification in Moscovici, 1985:257-265
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cannot be separated from the ‘instinctual drive’ behind it25. His idea about general 
identifications is close to that of social identifications that we make later on in our 
lives, which are nevertheless modeled according to first identifications that he calls 
restricted. Scheidlinger talks of primary and secondary identification, a distinction 
made quite often (Scheidlinger, 1971:19-23). The former refers to the unconscious 
desire to be like another person, which we have already mentioned. The latter refers 
to the replacement of a discarded object-cathexis with another object, which is set up 
within the ego. But, since libidinal impulses are characterised by mobility, certain 
transformations of the libidinal cathexis occur in any case. Moreover, in the case that 
secondary identifications occur as a way for the ego to deal with a loss of an object, 
or regression from an unsatisfactory object-tie, as Scheidlinger describes, then 
identification comes as a defense mechanism. Last, but not least, Winnicott (1971, 
particularly chapter 10) and Klein (1988) have, among others, distinguished between 
projective and introjective identification, as referred above. The identificatory 
mechanisms they describe, however, are based on the defence mechanisms of the 
unconscious and the preservation of ‘narcissistic perfection’. In general, we should 
keep in mind that the unconscious mechanisms are directed by the pleasure principle, 
which dominates mental life during the process of first identifications26.
The Super-Ego
We should lastly refer to the super-ego, which is another basic concept and 
particularly significant for the understanding of group identifications. The super-ego 
is in a sense an outcome of the identification process. It is one of the agencies of the 
personality (the other two being the ego and the id), it is separated from the ego and 
it acts as an internal ‘judge’ or censor for the ego. Among its functions are 
conscience, self-observation and formation of ideals (Laplanche and Pontalis, 
1973:435).
25 It is most likely that, Moscovici connected libidinal ties with sexual-objects, and remised the fact that the 
sexual drive can also be inhibited in its aim.
26 Whatever»the partial classifications may be, we must not forget that, as Elliott argues, Freud had, throughout 
his life, “isolated the mechanisms of narcissism and identification as fundamental to ego formation” (1999:28). 
This is very important in understanding later identifications and group formation. Although the reality principle 
moderates the predominance of the pleasure principle soon after the infancy, first identifications remain the 
model of every identification in later life.
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According to the classical Freudian conception, the super-ego arises out of the 
child’s first identifications; Freud considered it as the heir of the Oedipus complex. 
As soon as the child realises that its Oedipal wishes cannot be fulfilled, it identifies 
with the parent(s). That means that it also internalises their prohibitions, morals, 
values, commands, etc. All these compose the super-ego, which is now an internal 
agent controlling and mastering the ego. The super-ego is, in reality, the part of the 
ego that has been introjected with these properties and then detached from it. One 
part of the ego is thus set against the other, producing a conflict. This conflict is, 
also, the origin of the sense of guilt, which arises out of the tension between the 
demands of conscience and the desires of the id. The super-ego is, in this sense, the 
most severe agent, because it is internal and the ego cannot hide from it.
It is not yet agreed at which stage the super-ego was first introduced. The 
Kleinians, for example, place its first formulation at the first introjections of ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ objects, during the early oral stage (first two years of life). Nevertheless, as 
Laplanche and Pontalis argue, “if we consider the different forms of identification, it 
is difficult to decide which specific ones play the most part in the formation of the 
super-ego...’ (1973:437). Since it is clearly formulated through identification, 
though, its formation starts during the first years of life, perhaps even before the 
Oedipus phase27. We should mention that, the ego ideal is often used interchangeably 
with the super-ego. Freud argued that the super-ego is “the vehicle of the ego 
ideal...whose demand for greater perfection it strives to fulfil” (1933b:96), thus 
almost identifying the two. However, some authors refer to the ego ideal as the more 
conscious, better-integrated aspect of the super-ego, usually placed after adolescence. 
Some other distinguish between ego ideal/super-ego, the punitive and demanding 
agency, and ideal ego, which is the ideal in the subject’s aspirations and desires for 
narcissistic perfection28. At present, we shall use the terms as synonymous, following 
Loewald’s argument that, the ideal ego, ego ideal, and super-ego are “successive 
stages in the development toward super-ego structure” (1962:265), which is also 
consistent with the way Freud developed the concept. Behind the origin of the ego 
ideal, argues Freud, lies the most important identification, that with the father, and so
27 As Hart argues, “a considerable part of our early and unconscious identification forms the super-ego and ego- 
ideal”, 1947:287.
28 See also on this matter the three articles under the same title ‘The Super Ego and the Ego Ideal’, By 
Rosenfeld, Loewald, and Weigert, in International Journal o f  Psychoanalysis, Vol.43, 1962.
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it serves as the idealised image of the parents (1923:370). Before that, in On 
Narcissism (1914), Freud related it to a substitution of our lost narcissism in which 
we were our own ideal.
The formation of the super-ego comes from the first introduction of the child 
into the social order. The role of the father (the symbolic father, which can be any 
person that plays the role of the father) is very important as intervening in the child- 
mother dyad. His intervention severs the child from the imaginary plenitude of the 
maternal body, as his presence is “this parental prohibition...which at one stroke 
constitutes repressed desire and the social order” (Elliott, 1999:34). The symbolic 
father, thus, introduces the Law (the concept of a prohibiting and regulating rule), as 
the child, because of fear of punishment, represses its desire29; the Law is founded on 
the repressed desire and the realisation on behalf of the child that there are things it is 
not allowed to do, things prohibited. This is the moment when all subjects become 
socialised. This is, according to Elliott, the founding moment of psychical 
differentiation and individuation. Nevertheless, we should not confuse the super-ego 
with some kind of moral agent. As Jones points out, “the superego is not moral, for it 
may dictate an act of murder. It is an ‘oughtness’, a categorical imperative, not 
morally dictated in its earlier stages” (1948:43). Morality is guarded by conscience, 
which is only a part of the super-ego.
The super-ego is not static and unchangeable, but it is enriched throughout life, 
along with the continuous identifications. “As the child grows up, the role of the 
father is carried on by teachers and others in authority; their instructions and 
prohibitions remain powerful in the ego ideal and continue, in the form of 
conscience, to exercise the moral censorship” (Freud, 1923:376). This is a crucial 
linkage between ego ideal and group psychology, because of its social side; the ego 
ideal is “also the common ideal of a family, a class, or a nation” (Freud, 1914:96).
Later Identifications - Identity Formation
Thus far we have been preoccupied with first identifications, their nature and 
derivatives. It is particularly important to fully understand this process, for the simple
29 This, in boys, is expressed as a ‘fear of castration’.
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reason that it constitutes the model after which later identifications occur. The 
meaning of this is twofold. First, that the mechanism is the same: every 
identification, first or later ones, occur after the same mechanism that operates 
internally. Second, and even more important, the first identifications themselves (not 
as a process) constitute the model for the later ones. Parental identifications, as the 
basis of the metamorphosis of the parental relations into the super-ego, are the first 
ones, and are long lasting, in the sense that they remain the prototype for the later 
ones. In that sense, internalisation of a good or bad object, or identification with a 
despotic father, and so on, will have a direct and lasting impact on the person’s 
choices as a grown up and on his or her identifications with other people, groups, etc. 
The effects of childhood identifications are general and lasting and affect the 
attitudes and personality of the adults (Freud, 1923:370). For instance, in a survey 
made by Brunswik and Sanford (1947) on ‘anti-Semitic personality’ it was found 
that girls who were highly influenced by anti-Semitic ideas showed an uncritical 
devotion to their parents. At the same time, devotion and obedience was not only 
manifested toward parents, but toward authority in general (Brunswik and Sanford, 
1947:249-254).
Later identifications include social contacts with larger groups than the family, 
like peer-groups, classes, nations etc. A person’s group identity becomes more 
crystallised in adolescence, after spending his/her childhood in a given culture and 
acquiring its ways and attitudes. Volkan argues that “the concrete character that 
develops when the child passes through early and mid-adolescence is not the sum 
total of childhood character traits but the end result of the amalgamation of modified, 
weakened, or strengthened traits to which new traits have been added as a result of 
new identifications of important others in this phase of life” (1988:37). Identity is the 
outcome of multiple group identifications and it is very important, not only because 
it answers the individual’s interrogation ‘Who am I?’, but also regulates the 
individual’s social relations and satisfies his/her belonging to a group while 
answering the question ‘Where do I belong to?’. So, identity formation is in a way 
the consequence of the setting of an agency within the self, like a controlling super­
ego: as in earlier identifications, so in later ones, the subject takes into his/her super­
ego the values, prohibitions etc. of the group(s). These are the roots of conformity; 
people behave in the ‘proper’ way, as the social environment demands, so as to
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secure their belonging to a group, and because these are now their own ‘demands’ 
too.
Not every group identification becomes important, or equally important, in 
someone’s life: the less important it is, the less traits it will leave in someone’s 
character and identity formation. In addition, we must bear in mind that, new 
identifications occur constantly in adults’ life, for this is an endless process. 
However, their significance depends on the duration and intensity of the presence in 
a group and identification with it. So, by ‘crystallisation’ of identity we do not mean 
one stable and solid identity, but only an identity that its most solid and important 
parts have been introduced, although the process continues. According to Erikson 
(1968), identity is achieved in late adolescence as a result of exploration and 
experimentation, which leads to a decision. Alternatively, he argues, they absorb 
ethnic, religious and other attitudes from their parents. Indeed, this is the period 
when such explorations are made, but we should not overestimate the capacity of the 
adolescents to make such decisions. The individuals are not tabula rasa at this time 
of their lives and, even though they seek for their own identity, the previous, 
unconscious registrations cannot be deleted. Ethnic or religious identities, for 
example, are more a matter of long standing internalisations than choice: these are 
groups that people (learn to) participate to since their infancy. Erikson also 
developed an ‘identity-health’30 model, in the sense that identity was considered as 
essential for a healthy personality. This is rejected by psychoanalysis, for identity is a 
prerequisite for any personality: everybody has an identity, but identity does not 
provide with inner stability by definition, for identifications vary significantly.
Freud made very few references to adolescence. He rather focused on the 
relationship with parents which, as the first social integration tie, provides the first 
sense of identity. Nevertheless, as Leao argues, the central task of adolescence is “the 
search for identity, which corresponds to the search for cohesion, integration and 
continuity of the self’ (1986:67). In her article ‘Identification and its Vicissitudes as 
Observed in Adolescence’, Leao summarises the essential contributions in the theory 
of adolescence as follows. Adolescence, with the reactivation of the Oedipus 
complex, is a recapitulation of the vicissitudes of childhood development and its 
disturbances; there is a prevalence of action over verbalisation; an increase of
30 A term Sharon Macdonald uses (1993:7).
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narcissistic libido; detachment of the libido from the parents and cathexis to new 
objects; “peer group formation is of outmost importance during this libidinal 
detachment and re-cathexis of objects” (1986:70); reorganisation of personality, 
involving detachment of archaic object ties and old identifications in favor of new 
identifications with new objects or ideals; an increase of narcissism and its 
vicissitudes. These appear, according to Leao, to be the central tasks of adolescence.
There would be a lot more to say about the issue of later identifications, which 
interests us more as it involves social and group identifications. Nevertheless, we 
shall leave this discussion for the next chapter, where it will be explained and 
analysed in particular reference to the issue of ethnic and national identifications. In 
the meantime, it will be helpful to take a brief look on the elaborations and 
deviations from Freud’s theory, not only to acquire an insight on the psychoanalytic 
perspective, but, also, to identify those psychoanalytic concepts that are most broadly 
articulated.
THE FREUD/AN TRADITION
The first secessions from Freud’s circle took place in the early 1910’s, with A. 
Adler and C.G. Jung. The former found that factors other than sexual can also lead to 
internal conflict, such as aggression, and tried to explain human behaviour in terms 
of a struggle for power in order to overcome feelings of inferiority. Jung was also 
opposed to Freud’s emphasis on sex, and elaborated a different aspect of the 
unconscious, based more on philosophy and metapsychology. Neither of the two 
maintained a broad influence after their death. What is very interesting to know, 
however, is that Freud had already started to pay attention to the ego and to non- 
sexual factors at that time, which led him to re-elaborate his theory after new 
investigation and clinical research. During the 1920’s some more disciples broke 
away or just disagreed, including O. Rank and S. Ferenczi, who both implemented a 
psychotherapeutic treatment that was shorter and more affectionate towards the 
patient. Freud disapproved of this ‘showing affection to the patient’ attitude, which 
proved to be less successful in the end. In addition, Rank broke up with Freud 
because of the ‘birth trauma’ (the separation of the baby from the mother at birth and
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the anxiety it produces) and the importance he attributed to it. Ironically enough, 
Freud was himself ready to acknowledge the importance of it at the time, as similarly 
happened with Adler and Jung and their controversy with Freud over the importance 
of sexual drives.
After Freud’s death, and after the Second World War, the centres of 
psychoanalysis moved from Vienna, Budapest and Berlin, and were divided between 
Britain and the United States. Two main schools were formed, respectively: the 
Orthodox Freudians and the Neo-Freudians. This is not to say, however, that there 
were not any disagreements within these schools; within the Orthodox there were 
different points of interest, while, for example, there were a number of analysts in 
Britain who utilised Freudian concepts, but did not accept the theory as a whole 
(known as ‘the eclectics’, including the famous psychoanalyst I.D. Suttie). 
Nevertheless, those two schools were the two main ones formed at the time. In 
general, “in post-Freudian psychoanalytic emphasis was shifted from conflicts within 
a fully formed self to disruptions in the very development of the self -  ffom...Oedipal 
conflicts... to attachment, separation, and individuation with mothers...(earliest 
months and years)” (Caspary, 1993:417). This major theoretical revision opened up 
significant new possibilities for explaining ‘irrational’ causes of conflict and war, as 
Caspary has pointed out.
The Orthodox Freudians (E. Jones, W. Stekel, Anna Freud, and M. Klein being 
the most prominent among them) followed the core of Freud’s theory and accepted 
the majority of his findings. Nevertheless, or exactly because of this ‘loyalty’, some 
of them have offered to psychoanalysis very stimulating and broadly accepted 
theories. Anna Freud, for example, focused her analysis on the ego (instead of the 
‘id’ that was her father’s focus), and she stressed the need for attaching relatively 
greater significance to the ego and its defense mechanisms; one of those defense 
mechanisms, identification with the aggressor, has been equally influential with other 
Freudian concepts. On the top of the orthodox Freudians, though, one would not 
hesitate to put Melanie Klein -perhaps the most important psychoanalyst after 
Freud- and object relations theory. In general, she thought aggressive drives as more 
important than sexual ones, she examined very young children (i.e., through play), 
and attached more significance to biological than environmental factors. She traced
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the super-ego back to the earliest months of life, and put introjection and projection 
at the core of her theory.
The Neo-Freudian school developed in the US, mainly by analysts who 
emigrated there after the Second World War, and had at their ranks scholars such as 
A. Kardiner, K. Homey, E. Fromm, and H.S. Sullivan. Though differing in detail, 
they generally believed in the following: that sociocultural, rather than biological, 
factors are basic; that the drive, libido and Oedipus theories are not universal, and are 
modified by cultural factors; that interpersonal relationships form the character, 
anxieties and neurosis; and that character determines sexual behaviour and not the 
other way round. These issues certainly provoke a long and stimulating debate that is 
not relevant at the moment. However, in relation to the two aforementioned schools 
Brown remarks that, “by far the greatest number of analysts in the US remain more 
or less orthodox Freudians” (1961:201), while the impact of the Neo-Freudians in 
Europe is nil.
A third school of thought that became very influential after the 1960s in France 
(initially and mainly) was the Lacanians. Lacan has been a famous and very 
controversial scholar. His initiative was to elaborate Freud’s writings further and 
another school of thought emerged out of his effort. In Lacan’s triadic thinking we 
find the Imaginary, the Symbolic, and the Real, which were not mental forces but 
orders that serve to position the individual into a continuity; the unconscious does not 
exist before language (the unconscious is structured like language, is his famous 
postulate) and the instantiation of the symbolic order. Two of his most valuable 
contributions to psychoanalysis are his concepts about desire as constituting element 
of the self, as well as his concepts about the importance of language as the vehicle of 
desire that facilitates the mediation of the imaginary through the symbolic. Also, his 
triadic thinking provided the ground for further elaborations on the Imaginary and 
the Symbolic.
There are much more stilted approaches, mainly rising out of the merging of 
psychoanalysis with other disciplines, such as anthropology, biology, genetics and 
others. My psychoanalytic approach follows Freud’s writings and the orthodox 
school, and is based on the basic psychoanalytic concepts as described above. 
However, the contribution of other theorists will be taken under consideration,
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particularly when they advance points of interest relevant to this research and can 
contribute to our understanding of national identity.
Criticisms bv Freudians
Much of the criticism directed against the Freudian theory is concerned with 
the ‘self as opposed to society, an issue addressed by other related disciplines (i.e. 
social psychology). In this matter, it has been largely an opposition of the neo- 
Freudians and the orthodox Freudian school. The main point of view of the Neo- 
Freudians is that personality is structured by society. The modem Neo-Freudian 
schools, although acknowledging the fact that neurotic and normal human behaviour 
differ in degree rather than kind, they raise the question of cultural influences in 
determining what is to be regarded as normal or abnormal, arguing that the sources 
of internal conflict are not necessarily universal. They argue that cultural and 
environmental factors largely determine biological phenomena, and that different 
ways of living in each society tend to produce different personality types. One way 
by which they sustain this view is by the use of anthropological findings that 
demonstrate the flexibility of human nature when observed in different cultural 
backgrounds.
In addition, the conclusion that personality appears to change throughout life 
has led Neo-Freudians to disagreement with the two Freudian postulates of biological 
orientation and libido theory. They tend to deny the biological basis of the drives and 
their crucial determining the development of personality for the first five years of 
life. They rather argue that personality is a cultural product which, although uses 
biological energy, is not determined by it. They more intensely oppose the biological 
foundation of aggression, mostly because of the pessimism it implies. On this, they 
diverge a lot from Freudian theory. J.F. Brown criticises Freud and his use of 
ccbiological instincts theory...since there are no basic instincts in man which lead to 
definite behaviour independent of the existing environment. Most psychologists 
today...are quite prepared to accept the facts of erotic and aggressive behaviour, but 
they attribute these behaviours to a combination of biological and cultural 
differences. This is a matter of some importance for, if aggression is innate, war is
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presumably inevitable, and if it is not innate but due rather to the frustration of 
constructive impulses, then there is still hope”31.
Freud had been severely criticised initially on the grounds of a deliberate 
abstention from moral judgments when he first introduced the sexual drive and 
talked about infantile sexuality. Equally based on moral grounds is the criticism 
against the aggressive drive. Nevertheless, these findings cannot be rejected based on 
‘moral’ criteria. Unwillingness to accept an unpleasant fact or moral objections 
cannot constitute an argument; let alone that such an argument would classify those 
who adhere to psychoanalysis as pro-warfare personalities. The wish to see a world 
without wars and conflicts may be present and widespread, but self-delusion is not 
the way. Rieff, in his book on Freud and psychoanalysis after him, has argued, 
referring to the Neo-Freudian school, that “the liberal revisers of Freud, in their 
efforts to avoid the pessimistic implications of his genetic reasoning, tend to let the 
idea of the individual be absorbed into the social, or at best to permit it a vague and 
harried existence” (1960:33). It is true that Freud himself had reservations at first to 
confirm the existence of such a destructive impulse within humans. It was only after 
his clinical findings verified his first hypotheses that he incorporated it into his 
theory. It was these findings, moreover, that made him the pessimist he was in his 
latter years of life.
Anthropological findings have been important in the examination of human 
behaviour. Melford Spiro (1990), for example, has published in his article ‘Culture 
and Human Nature’ the findings of two fieldworks related to the issue of 
aggressiveness. The first one was conducted in Ifaluk, Micronesia, where Spiro 
found no manifest incidence of aggression. Since Ifaluk had -among other things- a 
cooperative system and an ethos stressing the value of non-aggression, it seemed to 
follow that, aggression is culturally determined and not an attribute of human nature. 
Nevertheless, further observations indicated that, the absence of aggression (a 
behavioral, observable variable) did not infer absence of hostility (motivation and 
affective variables, such as anger, rage, etc.). Spiro noticed that, every morning 
custom required that babies being bathed in the chilly waters of a lagoon. After that, 
he directed his research to children, and he found out that they had indeed other 
frustrating, even traumatic experiences. But, hostile feelings were not manifested in
31 Quoted in Brown (1961), p. 175.
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observable social aggression. So, why was hostility not expressed in aggressiveness? 
Spiro made two hypotheses providing for an answer. First, the Ifaluk religion 
believed in a class of spirits who were purely evil and their sole aim was to produce 
human suffering; these spirits were ‘‘isomorphic with those of the parents of their 
childhood” (p.27). So, he inferred that, hostility of the Ifaluk was both projected and 
displaced on these spirits. Moreover, since they had rituals to drive away the evil 
spirits, their hostility was discharged through these aggressive rituals. So, through 
this projective system, “Ifaluk seemed to afford one avenue for the expression of 
hostility” (1990:27). The second hypothesis is related to the institution of hereditary 
chieftainship. In Ifaluk, the chiefs were moral mentors who exhorted people to 
behave well, in accordance to the ethos of non-aggression, and periodically 
monitored their behaviour. They were called the ‘fathers’ of the people, and they 
were “in the people’s eyes, benevolent parental figures, whose approval was of vital 
importance for their self-esteem and positive self-image. Desire for the approval of 
chiefs, and fear of their disapproval, seemed to be the most important social 
determinant of the Ifaluk adherence to the ethos of non-aggression” (1990:28).
The second fieldwork took place in Israel, in a Kibbutz reservation (communal 
farming settlement). Kibbutz children, according to Spiro, were raised in a totally 
communal, cooperative, non-competitive system and socialisation techniques were 
mild, loving and permissive. Nevertheless, children did not wish to share scarce 
goods. As Spiro reports, they “view as rivals those with whom they are obliged to 
share, and they aggress against those who frustrate their desires to monopolise (or at 
least to maximise) these scarce goods...Although they learn to view aggression as 
wrong, when they are frustrated they become angry, and their anger -when not 
controlled- leads to overtly aggressive behaviour” (1990:30).
Other anthropological findings have presented data indicating that aggression 
may not be innate in humans. Such an example are the findings of Margaret Mead32, 
whose research in the Arapesh tribe in New Guinea appear to indicate the existence 
of no aggression -the Arapesh showed no aggression at all, and were particularly 
gentle towards their children. This optimistic interpretation, however, is not enough, 
because gentleness within a group can be sustained by diffusion of aggressiveness to 
the outsiders, for example towards other neighboring tribes. So, anthropological
32 In Brown, 1961, p. 121.
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fieldwork can most accurately answer the question of aggressiveness, for example, 
when adequately searching for possible alternative outlets beyond the apparent 
behaviour.
The Neo-Freudians tend to omit the space and time between birth and social 
interaction. They thus show a misunderstanding of the drives, which are biologically 
determined but socially mediated at the same time (in contrast to animal instincts). 
Freud did see moving elements in character, as ‘conflict’ or their ‘dynamic’ character 
implies. From the duality of drives, ambivalence, and their being convertible into the 
opposite, “characters of opposite kind may arise out of the same instinct or organ 
fixation” (Rieff, 1960:53). Also, the drives are influenced by social pressures under \ f
s   v
the course of upbringing. So, the drives are biologically grounded and socially 
mediated. This misunderstanding could also be a matter of terminological confusion. 
For example, Klein and Anna Freud, both belonging to the orthodox tradition, were 
in opposition because the former believed that environmental factors are less 
important, while the latter believed that that they are equally important with the 
drives. Nevertheless, A. Freud termed environmental factors the parents’ attitudes 
toward the child and the course of upbringing; Klein was preoccupied with the 
(earlier) relations of the infant to the parents, especially the mother, thus focusing on 
the interrelation of infants with their mothers. In that respect, their opposition was 
more strongly articulated than real.
The universality of Freud’s findings is another peculiar matter. Certainly, ( /
there are huge differences among the diverse parts of the world, culturally, socially, 
economically, etc. Nevertheless, there are certain similarities that concern all 
humans, and these similarities have to do with biological determinants of the human 
species, determinants that affect their upbringing to a large extenf. The most basic sj
determinant is the helplessness of the newborns and their dependency on the parents, 
or the parenting persons. Fenichel (an orthodox Freudian) argues in favour of the 
Oedipus complex, its biological foundation and, therefore, its universabifity, by v/ 
saying: “the human infant is biologically more helpless than other mammalian 
offspring and therefore needs prolonged care and love; ...he will always ask for love 
from the nursing and protecting adults around him, and develop hate and jealousy of 
persons who take this love away from him. If this is called Oedipus complex, ...the 
Oedipus complex is undoubtedly a product of family influence. If the institution of
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the family were to change, the pattern of the Oedipus complex would necessarily 
change too”33. The form that the Oedipus complex takes varies from one culture to 
the other, but it does not disappear; similarly, the expression of the drives will not be 
the same everywhere, but they will follow the existing outlets.
It all boils down to the old problem: ‘does the hen come from the egg or the \ j  
egg from the hen?’ The argument supported thus far is that biological and social 
determinants are not in opposition to each other, while certainly social relationships 
are very crucial. However, by social, we do not mean ‘societal’ relationships, that is 
relations with(in) society. We rather mean relations where there is some interaction 
with at least one person. In that sense, relationships with the parents are included in 
social relationships, and they are the most determinative as well. Let us finish this 
discussion with Brown’s remark: “practically speaking, there is no difference 
between the proposition that hostility is innate and the proposition that it is not but 
that it is a natural response to frustration... Frustration is and always will be 
universal, so hostility whether innate or not is also universal, and since the individual 
man only becomes a human being within society the antithesis between the two is 
unreal” (1961:16).
33 In Brown (1961), p. 185.
C H A P T E R  2: C O L L E C T I V E  I D E N T I F I C A T I O N  
A N D  N A T I O N A L  I D E N T I T Y
As it was argued in the previous chapter, identification is not just an individual 
process but involves a certain interaction with the social (and political) surroundings. 
Individual psychology is at the same time social psychology, because someone else 
is always involved with the individual’s mental life, whose relations to other people 
(parents, loved ones, etc.) are social phenomena too, in a broad sense. In addition, 
individuals, apart from forming an identity through social interaction, ‘participate’ in 
certain social identities, meaning that they participate in several social groups -class, 
religious etc.- and identify with them, and their members to a larger or lesser extent, 
thus acquiring particular social identities. National identity is one of those social 
identities and conies out of identification with one’s national group, the nation. The 
nation includes numerous other groups (from families to churches) and, to a large 
extent, national identities embrace the respective identities of these groups (i.e. 
religious, class and other).
Identity is pervasive and ubiquitous in politics. As Hoover argues, “what 
formal political systems do is to institutionalise procedures and policies that shape 
and manage identities so as to serve some concept of common good’’  ^1997:6;. He 
also argues that, “people create whole nation-statesr jusrto make the point about who 
they are and how they are different from the people on the other side of the border” 
(1997:3). It is quite obvious, though, that even if it is not people (the popular masses) 
who ‘create’ nation-states, as he says, and if nation building is a good way of seizing 
power too, the latter clearly satisfy people’s.need to identify with a group and 
delineate ‘us’ from ‘them’. So, we could say that, national identity is alsv, a political 
identity or a social one that is politically manageable and usually exploited so as to 
mobilise people towards certain political ends.
National identity is a social identity that is collectively attributed to individuals 
through organised means and procedures that will be analysed in the next chapter. At 
present, we have to Understand why most individuals, if hot all, acquire the national 
identity attributed to them. So, we shall refer to the mechanisms of collective 
identification, with particular reference to ihe national group. We shall begin with the
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description o f the individual when entering a group and the changes o f his/her 
behaviour. This field o f interest is often referred to as group psychology, for it refers 
to fhe psychology o f a group, or rather to psychology wiihin a group as it is the 
individual that can have a psychology, although somewhat altered when forming and 
participating in a group. That is because, while individual psychology is concerned 
with an individual and its pathology, group psychology is still con ’ -  ' 
individual, though this time as a member o f a social group, nation vrieud , 
1921:95-98). It is not the psychology o f a ‘group mind’, because such a thing d o ^  
not exist. It is rather the psychology o f the individual mind when entering , t>, 
and the explanations o f the alterations that their behaviour undergo , hen entering a 
group. In that sense, that individual psychology is not different from group or social 
psychology.
Before proceeding in this analysis we should explain the statement that ‘a 
group mind does not exist’. Masses are not a mere collection o f individuals, for 
individuals behave in a somewhat different way when isolated, than in a group. In 
the later case, their attitudes are more uniform and even predictable, wmle reason and 
logic seems to withdraw. “Individuals have to  be convinced, masses have to  be 
swayed” argues Moscovici (1985:33), who believes that their sharing a high belief 
and identity, turns a collection o f individuals into a collective individual. 
Nevertheless, we should not confuse this collective individual with any perception o f 
collective mind. The phrase ‘collective individual’ should be perceived as a 
metaphor indicating the uniformity and identification of individuals when in a group, 
which results in their acting as one individual. It also makes clear that, a deep 
knowledge o f the group psychology cannot start but from the individual itself.
To be accurate, Freud has used the term ‘collective unconscious’. This term 
refers to traces o f archaic heritage and important past events that may survive and 
influence people today. The collective unconscious is apparent in fixed symbolism, 
mythology, fairy tails, religion, history etc. Freud’s belief, as Brown argues, is that 
“during the course o f  development o f civilisation it became necessary to repress 
primitive drives and wishes which nevertheless continued to press upwards towards 
satisfaction and fulfilment. These wishes -aggressive, sexual, and incestuous- had to 
be disguised according to the degree o f civilisation attained at any particular period, 
and in their disguised form are to be f  nd in mythology” (Brown, 1961:114).
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Freud’s collective unconscious is different from a perception of a ‘group mind’ in 
that it is a historically determined concept, and it lacks any meta-psychological 
connotations. Freud’s idea was that a group, like individuals, may retain “an 
impression of the past in unconscious memory traces”; in addition, he defined 
tradition as the “prototypal content of the mass unconscious”1. So, the ‘collective 
unconscious’ of a nation contains elements of its traditions, its history etc., elements 
that may be selectively ‘chosen’ and attributed to each person through the process of 
social upbringing (which includes a continuous transmition of images through rituals, 
myths, education, etc); it contains elements of the history and development of the 
collectivity in question, elements that each person learns and internalises. So, the 
term ‘collective unconscious’ should not be taken literally, connoting one collective 
mind2.
We shall begin this analysis with the description of the changes that individual 
behaviour undergo when entering a group. That will serve two purposes: first, it will 
specify the unconscious dynamics that operate while in a group, and second, it will 
throw light on the problem of nationalism -which is not the object of this chapter, 
but certain aspects of it will be indirectly illuminated now, and will be directly 
explained in the following chapter. Then, we will provide the explanations for these 
changes in individual behaviour, and in the sequel we will refer to the role of 
enemies in group’s cohesion and the perceived difference with them as opposed to 
the perceived sameness with the members of the group. These are essential for the 
understanding of group, and particularly national, identification, but also for the 
explanation of inter-group aggressiveness and intra-group discrimination.
1 In R ieff, 1960:200.
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THE INDIVIDUAL WITHIN A GROUP  -  GROUP 
PSYCHOLOGY
It is of great importance to understand the changes that individuals undergo 
when entering a group. This will provide a more clear understanding of their 
identification with a nation and, also, of the unconscious mechanisms that are in 
operation when someone (re)acts in reference to his/her own nation or ethnic group. 
The most influential contribution to group psychology was probably made by Gustav 
Le Bon and his Psychologie des Foules (originally published in 1895); also, very 
important is Me DougalTs The Group Mind (1920). The presentation that will follow 
in this section will be based on Freud (1921), Moscovici (1985), and Lipowatz 
(1990), their readings on the aforementioned writers, and their further elaborations 
on group psychology.
To begin with, we should specify our working definition of the word ‘group’. 
Group is a number of people held together by something in common. This, however, 
is a necessary and constituent but not sufficient condition, because whoever has 
something in common (i.e. professional groups) would be considered a group, which 
is not the case. Groups must also have a degree of organisation, which offers the 
group a certain degree of stability; a random gathering of individuals cannot be 
called ‘group’. The members of a group must not be indifferent to each other. There 
must be something that unites them, something in common that is also sustained by 
collective will and/or organisation, and some preconditions of continuity for a group 
to be formed. The common thing is the reference point that makes individuals have a 
mutual influence, an interaction, but also a sentimental attachment. The reference 
point in groups that Freud was concerned about is usually the leader, but it can also 
be a leading idea as a point of rallying; more emphasis is given, though, on the 
existence of a leader. Lipowatz explains this by arguing that it is important that there 
is one (or more) leading person(s), apart from an idea, because an identity cannot be 
formulated but only by idealisation and identification with another person (1990:84). 
Groups also offer their members a sense of belonging and a sense of identity. 
Individuals become sentimentally attached to their groups, as the latter are essential 
reference points for their personal identity. So, groups must have a consistency and
2 We shall return to this issue in chapter 3.
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continuity as well. In addition, the larger the group, the more intense its 
characteristics and manifestations are. For that reason, the description and analysis of 
group psychology made by Freud has taken as prior examples the Army and the 
Church: that is, groups with a large degree of organisation, coherency and continuity, 
and a leader and/or leading idea3. It is to such groups that the subsequent analysis 
will mostly apply, as it is those that interest us in this research (on national groups), 
but also accumulate most of the characteristics that group psychology specifies.
When individuals are placed within their group they start acting in a somewhat 
different way. They often express certain ideas and feelings that would not express 
alone -with actions- but only when in a group. Freud describes some basic 
characteristics of the groups as follows. “A group is extraordinarily credulous and 
open to influence, it has no critical faculty, and the improbable does not exist for it” 
(Freud, 1921:104). The notion of impossibility does not exist for the individuals in a 
group, who feel omnipotent, and have no doubt or uncertainty. Their feelings are 
very simple and exaggerated, and can go directly towards the extremes. So, a simple 
rumour can be instantly changed into an unquestioned certainty, and sympathy or 
antipathy can be transformed into love or hatred.
If someone wanted to influence a group, they should produce an excessive 
stimulus, appeal to the sentiments and morals of individuals, exaggerate and repeat 
again and again. Groups can easily lose their critical faculty, for they are highly 
suggestible; simple words/messages and visions can be projected to them. According 
to Le Bon, they are “subject to the truly magical power of words...Reason and 
arguments are incapable of combating certain words and formulas”4. As Moscovici 
argues, masses are better awakened by memories than by reason. We can notice here 
that these are also the methods of propaganda, while nationalistic discourse uses the 
same tools too: nations are mobilised through simple words that become slogans by 
repetition, by visual symbols (the flag being at the top of the list), by simplified 
images, like monasteries, statues etc., and by collective memories, shared myths etc.
Groups do not necessarily strive for the truth and often prefer illusions, group 
psychology postulates. They perceive these illusions, however, as the truth, for they
3 Such groups are usually quite numerous; perhaps it is for that reason that organisation, continuity and, most 
importantly, a leadership is indispensable for their existence.
4 Freud, 1921:107, quoting from the English translation of Le Bon, G. (1920): The Crowd: a Study o f the 
Popular Mind, London, p. 117.
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are more pleasant and reassuring for the group’s integrity. Freud argues that, the 
“predominance of the life of fantasy and of the illusion bom out of an unfulfilled 
wish is the mling factor in the psychology of neurosis” (1921:107). In that way, he 
draws the parallels between this group characteristic and the behaviour of neurotic 
patients. This could shed some light on the use of myths and tales that are often part 
of the nationalistic rhetoric. Their origin and liability is never questioned; they are 
perceived as solid parts of national identity. Groups accept what they perceive to be 
tme, and not necessarily what is true.
According to Moscovici, there are three basic traits of the groups: indifference 
to their own contradictions, vividness, and repetitiveness (1985:97-101). The first 
point, that groups do not understand their own contradictions has as a consequence 
the coexistence of contradictory ideas without provoking any logical conflict, as for 
example in the rhetoric coexistence of socialism and nationalism or of ethnic 
cleansing and democracy. Second, vividness, or liveliness makes it possible to select 
the decisive idea among a mass of possible ones that calls up familiar memories and 
creates enthusiasm. This idea is, thirdly, changed by repetition into an ideational 
image and is reduced to a simplistic formula that captures imagination and provokes 
mobilisation. We should bear in mind that, following the Freudian theory, all three 
traits are fundamental characteristics of the unconscious5.
As far as the morals of the group are concerned, they are characterised by 
extremes too. On the one hand, individual inhibitions tend to fall away, and brutal 
and destructive instincts are stirred up. In that respect, individuals in a group are 
capable of the most disdainful and condemning actions, actions that they would not 
perform alone. But, on the other hand, groups are also capable of high achievements 
under suggestion. While the usual motive for individual action is personal interest, 
this is rarely the case with groups that are unselfish and easily devote to an ideal. 
When the ideal is a ‘good’ one only acts of merit will occur; if not, they can provoke 
disaster. Groups are in either case devoted to their ideal, and intend to serve it with 
all their means because they always perceive it as good. Of course, when we talk 
about nations, politics are involved: then a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ ideal can be a matter of 
time, space and other circumstances. For example, when in 1821 the Greeks revolted
5 These unconscious’ characteristics are, exemption from mutual contradiction, mobility and mutability, and
timelessness (Freud, 1915d: 191-2), along with the compulsion to repeat that characterises the drives (Freud,
1933b: 139-140). These have been described in chapter 1, pp. 13-14,19.
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against the Ottoman Empire and claimed for their own state, that was a good ideal, 
the ideal of self-determination, which was also the norm in Western Europe at the 
time which supported them. A century later, however, the ideal of a ‘Great Greece’, 
seeking to expand ‘Hellenism’ towards the north and the east, was against the odds, 
since the political circumstances were very different and international contingencies 
did not favour the development of this idea. In either case, however, the Greeks were 
equally committed to their ideal. Finally, critical judgment and evaluation can easily 
wither away or fall under suggestion in a group. In Freud’s words, “whereas the 
intellectual capacity of a group is always far below that of the individual, its ethical 
conduct may rise as high above his as it may sink deep below it” (1921:106).
These characteristics of groups can find expression in diverse manifestations, 
either peaceful and benign, or disastrous and malign. Nevertheless, someone might 
interrogate whether certain group characteristics -such as groups have no critical 
faculty, do not strive for the truth, are highly suggestible, etc.- account for group 
manifestations such as pro-democratic manifestations in the former Soviet Union, or 
peaceful protest against the Vietnam War in the US in the sixties. The answer to this 
would be twofold. First, the above are not examples of groups in the sense specified 
above, but rather mass-gatherings. They concern individuals who gather for a 
particular reason, who have something in common, like groups have, but only for a 
limited time, that is for the purpose of the manifestations. In addition, they lack any 
further organisation, coherency and continuity, in many cases leadership, and also 
those sentimental ties that would glue them together beyond the particular 
demonstration and serve as a basis for identity and, also, self-evaluation6. Thus, since 
identification does not take place in these cases, their solidarity lasts for as long as 
they demonstrate for the particular cause they believe in. Certainly, a certain amount 
of the analysis of group psychology can be applied to a number of mass gatherings as 
well. However, not every mass gathering can be considered a group, as in that case 
the term would lose its specificity and could possibly be applied to every gathering 
of numerous individuals: from protesters to football fans and gig audiences. Second, 
as it has been mentioned, groups are no less capable of high achievements. Group 
psychology stresses the capability of individuals for the most extreme and 
contradictory actions, either good or bad, and their higher potential to do so when
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their ‘fellows’ surround them. The content of their actions is socially and politically 
determined. Analysis of group psychology rather explains why, to follow our 
example, the anti-regime protests in the former Soviet Union occurred so massively 
and in every country of the Union simultaneously, than why the content was 
democratic and the manifestations peaceful. A full explanation of the particular 
demonstrations would have to be done in a complementary way: it would require 
political analysis of the particular circumstances in conjunction to psychoanalytic 
explanations.
Le Bon, and Me Dougall have offered significant contributions to group 
psychology, in the direction of description though. We should still have in mind, 
however, the historical framework of the time these works were written, a time of 
\ J  general disappointment on ‘the masses’ and democracy, originated to a large extent 
the French Commune7. In that context, and mostly Le Bon, interpreted this 
description of the characteristics of groups in such a way as to regard groups as 
largely barbaric, in opposition to individual capacities. This is not correct, to the 
extent that groups are only individuals gathered together and their barbaric 
propensities “derive from the literally hypnotic stimulus of the emotional 
environment, with its protective anonymity, upon the uncritical/suggestible part of 
each individual” (Rieff, 1960:232). So, although the description is quite accurate, it 
leads to a misunderstanding and a sharp distinction of the groups and the individuals 
that compose them. For that reason, the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of group behaviour, as 
described above, still need an explanation; this is the contribution of Freudian 
analysis. Freud tried to understand and explain the reasons for such behaviours: for 
that reason, his, and subsequent, analyses (i.e. by Moscovici and Lipowatz) are clear 
from moral interpretations of these findings. So, with Freudian psychoanalysis we 
search for certain explanations as to why individuals can behave in the way described 
when they are in a group instead of adhering to interpretations that characterise 
groups as barbaric or else. As Adorno has written referring to Group Psychology and
6 This is not to say that there are no feelings derived by the fact that they demonstrate for the same cause, but 
that these feelings are much looser and temporal than feelings derived from identification.
7 Moscovici mentions that Le Bon’s book was addressed to politicians, in the same way that Machiavelli was 
addressed to Kings and Monarchs, and had actually influenced many military circles and its principles were put 
into practice by Mussolini and Hitler (1985:53-63). If that is correct, and considering the destructive influence 
and suggestive power o f Hitler upon the German national group, it is imperative to understand the 
individual/group psychology and the reasons for this influence.
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the Analysis o f the Ego, “the method of Freud’s book is that of a dynamic
o
interpretation of Le Bon’s description of the mass mind” .
Psychoanalytic Interpretations
Libidinal Identifications
Group psychology is merely descriptive and, thus, raises the question ‘Why?’ 
This is where psychoanalysis must come to the fore. Freud’s fundamental book on 
this subject is Group Psychology and the Analysis o f the Ego; the title itself indicates 
that, it is through the ego, through understanding individual psychology, that we can 
acquire a deeper knowledge of group psychology. The individual is still in focus. So, 
psychoanalysis will offer an insight into the deeper reasons for the vicissitudes of 
individuals’ behaviour and, also, will help us understand the way individuals acquire 
the same identity and -occasionally- behave uniformly.
We will start with Freud’s criticisms on the explanations provided by Le Bon. 
Le Bon’s view is that, individuals in a group display new characteristics due to three 
factors: anonymity, contagion, and suggestibility. Firstly, the group is anonymous 
and thus acquires a sense of invisible power. So, the individual feels free to yield to 
instincts which, had he/she been alone, would have been restrained. Secondly, in a 
group eveiy sentiment and act is contagious to such a degree that the individual 
readily sacrifices his/her personal interests to the collective ones. Thirdly, in 
suggestion, like in hypnosis, the individual is no longer conscious of his acts and 
obeys all the suggestions made to him. According to Freud, the above are not the 
explanations for this phenomenon but only its expressions: certain conditions are met 
in a group that facilitate the expression of these characteristics, conditions that “allow 
him [the individual] to throw off the repression of his unconscious instinctual 
impulses” (1921:101). It seems, however, that the above is not in contradiction with 
the spirit of Le Bon’s writing since he has argued that what is conscious in mental 
life is of small importance in comparison to the unconscious life, although he had no 
concrete knowledge of the mechanisms that operate and explain such phenomena. As
8 In Moscovici, 1985:57, quoting from Adorno (1972), VIII, p. 411.
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far as suggestibility is concerned, Freud believed that, not only it could not provide 
an explanation, but also it needed to be explained itself. The analytical concept Freud 
used to explain group psychology is libido.
Libido is “the energy, regarded as a quantitative magnitude (though not 
actually measurable), of those instincts which have to do with all that may be 
comprised under the word love” (Freud, 1921:119)9. The nucleus of love is sexual 
love, and love drives are called sexual drives. The essence of the group, argues 
Freud, is love relationships -love in its wider sense- and emotional ties. An 
individual will give up his/her distinctiveness in a group because he/she wants to be 
in harmony with them -for the love of them. Initially, it is emotional ties that bring a 
group together; they are soon replaced by identifications, which hold them together 
and maintain the coherence of the group.
This whole process of libidinal identifications was explained in detail in the 
previous chapter, so we can now proceed with two illustrations of the existence of 
love attachments with the examples of the Church and the Army, the two basic 
examples used by Freud (1921). In both Church and Army, he argues, everything 
depends on the illusion of a head (Christ, Commander-in-Chief) who loves all 
members with an equal love. The head is the image of the father, who loves every 
member of the family and justifies with his love his commands (prohibitions, 
commands etc. help maintain the integrity of the family). Groups are modelled after 
the family. In that sense, believers are like brothers, as their love for Christ unites 
them. Christ’s love for them is of more importance, it may be suggested, than their 
love for him: it is the greatest taboo, the biggest sin, to ever question his love, for this 
would question the foundations of the Church, the very libidinal ties that glue them 
together. In the same way, soldiers are comrades, who are united under love, not for 
the Commander-in-Chief, as Freud thought, but for the nation (the Commander is a 
mediator, who also identifies with the leading idea of the nation).
Let us examine another example, the example of panic, which best illustrates 
that the essence of a group lies in the libidinal ties10. Panic arises if a group 
disintegrates or it comes under threat. When in panic, individuals act on their own
9 In the previous chapter (footnote 10) we used Freud’s definition of libido as the name of the force by which 
instincts manifest themselves (Freud, 1917c:355), in which Freud referred to libido as usually connected to the 
sexual instinct. We can see at the definition given now that libido is defined as related to this instinct exclusively.
10 On panic see Freud, 1921:125-126.
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account, without consideration for the rest. That is because the libidinal ties that 
bound them together cease to exist as soon as the group disintegrates or self- 
preservation becomes imperative. A senseless fear is set free because of panic, and 
not the other way round. Panic is not necessarily related to danger: it can emerge 
independently of the presence of a danger. If we take panic in the sense of collective 
fear, argues Freud, we can establish a very interesting and far-reaching analogy. In 
individuals, fear can be provoked either by increasing danger or by cessation of 
emotional ties. In the latter case, we talk about neurotic fear or anxiety. In the same 
analogy, panic comes to the fore either by increase of common danger, or by 
disappearance -or fear of disappearance- of the emotional ties that hold the group 
together. The latter case is analogous to neurotic anxiety. But, why would the loss of 
libidinal ties provoke a panic reaction? Because, as the libidinal ties are the nucleus 
out of which identification with the group occurs, disintegration of the group would 
provoke an identity crisis. That is to be translated to loss of security, certainty and 
sense of belonging. The disintegration of the group can be experienced, in that sense, 
as a bad development or even a disaster for individuals.
Following that, we can throw some light on the importance of national identity 
for people, and the obsession with it that is apparent to most nationalistic and, 
usually, extreme right political circles (an obsession expressed in their constant fear 
that the nation is under threat). Anxiety can be provoked by the constant fear of 
danger or by fear of disappearance of emotional ties, as previously mentioned. In 
group psychology that would mean the fear of disintegration of the group, meaning 
fear for the loss of their national identity. Nationalists always see their nation as 
being in constant danger, surrounded by enemies who are all-evil and have designs 
on it. Their greatest fear is the loss of territory, which equals for them to a personal 
loss, to castration. This is to be traced back to the castration complex during the 
Oedipal phase, a castration feared as a punishment for the erotic and aggressive 
feelings the children had for each of their parents. Not every one becomes a 
nationalist, though, and national identity is not of equal importance for everyone -at 
least not in peaceful, tranquil periods. The above would apply more intensely to 
those individuals who have not managed to reach of individuation and, also, their 
first identifications paved the way for more problematic later ones. Education and 
diversity make the individuals less prone to mass influences. Nevertheless, as
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Lipowatz (1990:84-87) argues, human beings are quite fragile: a period of weakness 
and instability can make them regress and become subject to the nationalistic 
discourse. j
We must bear in mind that it is easier, and much more pleasurable, for an 
individual to inhibit his/her judgement and follow his/her instincts than be reasonable 
and contained. In that sense, there is a potential nationalist, racist etc. in every one of 
us who can react in the same manner within a group, under certain circumstances. 
The particular acquirements of individuals can become obliterated in a group; “the 
mental infrastructure, the development of which in individuals shows such 
dissimilarities, is removed, and the unconscious foundations, which are similar to 
everyone, stand exposed to view” (Freud, 1921:100). This characteristic explains 
how a peaceful and democratic nation can become, under certain circumstances and 
for a specific time, aggressive, racists etc. The fact that individuals within a group 
react towards a -perceived or real- external danger in an excessive and irrational 
way has to do with the fact that, they react like children. Any excessive reaction is 
absolutely normal for children, for their actions are largely dictated by the 
unconscious. Someone might argue that, if the danger is real and not perceived, then 
the reaction described above (a nationalist, xenophobic etc. reaction) is not an 
irrational one. However, not every reaction to a threat can claim to be a rational one 
on the basis of just being ea reaction’ of defence. Responses to threats vary 
significantly, thus rendering important to distinguish between extreme and 
reactionary, and mild and rationalised reactions. So, an extreme reaction can be 
explained and understood, but not justified and excused.
The initial interpretation through libido led us to identifications and to a 
common identity. But, we have not directly addressed the question of the formation 
of a common identity, even though national identity has been briefly referred to. This 
will be our concern in the next paragraphs.
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Common Identity: First and Secondary identifications11
How do people who merely have a common point of reference acquire a 
common identity? First, individuals identify themselves with the leader, who “offers
• I ?an answer to their questions and gives a name to their anonymity” . Groups, 
Moscovici argues, have a spontaneous tendency towards despotism: they need a 
strong leader, who expresses no weaknesses and appears to be omnipotent. It is 
indicative that charismatic leaders, who usually make an appeal to emotions rather 
than to reason, gain the public support and sympathy, usually along with the vote of 
the electorate. This tendency towards despotism can be explained through the model 
of first identifications. Masses need a leader, like a family needs a father (a head, a 
leading person). The father13 is the unquestionable authority of the family, someone 
whom the children love, admire and respect, but also fear and see as omnipotent. So, 
too, the masses identify with the leader, who is both the model and the ideal, and 
perceive a feeling of omnipotence too.
In explaining the spontaneous tendency of the groups towards despotism, 
towards authority to be more accurate, we should not forget that latter identifications 
are qualitatively similar to the first ones. Identification first occurs with the authority 
of the parental image. This results initially because of the child’s dependence upon 
the parents, since it is bom long before it can survive alone (without a caring person), 
and because of its affectionate feelings towards them. Identification is the 
mechanism of all implicit authority and is derived by the model submission to the 
parents. Rieff argues that the foundations for individual’s tendency to fixate upon the 
first relation to authority lay in “the earliest and original form of emotional tie, 
preceding sexual feeling” (1960:160). Sexuality, though, arises as a mode of
11 This distinction does not relate to the distinction made in the previous chapter between first and later 
identifications (which was a temporal distinction). The context here is later identifications, as it involves group 
identifications that take place within a social environment. The distinction refers to first identification of each 
individual with the leader or leading idea, and to secondary identification among those individuals that have 
identified with the same leading object. So, secondary identifications emerge as a result of first identifications, as 
it will be analytically explained in this section.
12 Moscovici, 1985:38. About the importance of naming, see later on this chapter.
13 I would like to lay emphasis on an important issue, that of the father as the authority of the family. One cannot 
ignore the surrounding social and political circumstances, those that determine the sociopolitical environment 
within which it tries to offer an analysis. This is why I refer to the father as the parental authority. It could be any 
other as head of a family, but, since the father is the general example of parental authority, we refer to him as 
such. The same is applicable to politics, where we usually refer to the leaders because they are the most usual 
case, even in contemporary societies of respect and equality. However, the dominance of the examples as the 
‘heads’ of sociopolitical structures is not a coincidence, as it is the family model is the central and determining 
one.
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liberation from parental authority: originally, “love is authoritarian; sexuality -like 
liberty- is a latter achievement, always in danger of being overwhelmed by our 
deeper inclinations toward submissiveness and domination” (Rieff, 1960:159). So, 
according to Rieff, order and rebelliousness are present in every culture, because the 
dualistic form of the Oedipus complex carries them within it. Society, thus, has more 
options than being authoritarian, but it has always a latent tendency to be so. But, 
also, society can be sustained by the authority of Law and respect for it, as the 
Lacanian tradition has emphasised.
In politics, the authority that mostly resembles and, to some extent, reproduces 
the initial parental authority is the leader. The leader must exhibit “a precise and 
commanding way of speaking, simplicity of judgment and quickness in making 
decisions”, argues Moscovici (1985:132), particularly so in peculiar circumstances, 
such as warfare or other threatening conditions where he has to exhibit strength as 
people rely on him. Not every politician can become a successful leader, though: it is 
important that he has charisma or prestige14. If this charisma is questioned, it is no 
longer charisma; this is why some dead leaders remain influential, for they keep their 
charisma intact. This is not to say that leaders who are not charismatic cannot be 
successful, but they are more likely to be questioned: this is what happens with 
contemporary democratic leaders. But, then, why is not the world dominated by 
charismatic leaderships, as one might logically conclude from the above? Also, how 
can we explain the very existence of democratic leaderships, whether charismatic or 
not, and the will for democracy (when it is expressed) since individuals are prone to 
authority? Certainly, an authority does not necessarily need to be despotic or 
totalitarian by definition; a democratic authority does not cease to be an authority 
because of its democratic ruling, as it still sets the rules that must be respected in the 
given democratic environment. In addition, groups’ wish to be ruled does not mean 
that they want a despotic ruling, in the same way that -to keep the analogy in mind- 
children want a father but not a punitive and coercing one. On the one hand, 
“authority is experienced and introjected largely in unconscious ways” but, on the 
other hand, “Freud’s work is [also] concerned...with the unconscious processes that 
work against domination and social power” (Elliott, 1999:38,43), such as the
14 Moscovici defines charisma as “a kind of spell based on admiration and respect that paralysed the critical 
faculties” (1985:129), and it is a quality that cannot be acquired (it is a gift).
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ambivalence of affect that is due to hatred against paternal authority. That is because, 
to the extent that leaders resemble and reproduce parental authority, they also 
reproduce certain feelings associated with the relation of children with their parents. 
This extends to the ambivalence felt towards parental authority too: on the one hand, 
there is affection and appeal, but on the other hand there is the wish to repudiate it, to 
get rid of it.
Charismatic leaders have existed within democracies, and usually have much 
higher influence towards groups. Yet, their presence in the political scene and their 
success in it is also a matter of politics and contingencies. This does not imply that 
un-charismatic leaderships are not successful or not inspiring. In contemporary 
national states, for instance, leaders are influenced by and are committed to serve an 
ideal: the national idea, and ideal. This ideal is internalised by all co-nationals, 
including people and leaderships, who share the same ideal -that is to say that the 
same properties have captured their super-ego. In a (national) group everybody is 
identified with the same object (the nation) and, secondarily, with each other. In 
Freud’s words, a group “is a number of individuals who have put one and the same 
object in the place of their ego ideal and have consequently identified themselves 
with one another in their ego” (1921:147). Thus, identification with a leader in this 
case resembles secondary identification as it occurs because of both the leader’s and 
the individuals’ first identification with their nation. In that sense, leaders are 
influencing and appealing only for as long as they (are perceived to) serve the 
national interests and the common national idea(l).
Both leaders and leading ideas use a symbol which extracts intense sentimental 
reactions. In nations, the leading idea is at the core of national identifications, an idea 
that constitutes the ideal for every leader of the nation, who inspires individuals 
under his leadership as long as he serves the nation. This is also partly why, political 
leaderships often adduce serious national matters in order to rally their party and, 
even, the nation. The number one symbol of a nation is its flag, the most respected 
and sentimentally loaded object of attachment. The burning of a flag, for example, is 
a symbolic action of enmity and/or repudiation; that happens because the flag 
constitutes a symbolic object of national unity and national identity. So, a common 
identity is acquired by, first individually identifying with the leader, or a leading 
idea(l), and then forming secondary identifications with each other.
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A significant remark is that the more people share a symbol the more intense 
the feeling is (Lipowatz, 1990:83). This is what Me Dougall calls the ‘exaltation or 
intensification of emotion’ or ‘emotional contagion’15, which means that mutual 
interaction intensifies the affective charge of the individuals. This mutual interaction 
must be related to Freud’s finding that, “the unconscious of one human being can 
react upon that of another, without passing through the conscious” (Freud, 
1915d: 198). Emotional contagion is the impartation of emotions through direct or 
indirect contact of a person or a group with someone else. It is also referred to the 
infants’ reception of their parents’ feelings, even though not verbally expressed. It 
usually results in similarity of feelings and/or attitudes within a group. Imitation and 
ritualisation can result because of emotional contagion: they have been observed in 
children as simple, even primitive, mechanisms of adaptation, through which the ego 
can adapt using much less energy than defence mechanisms do (which demand much 
energy to free the ego from the demands of the drives) (Parin, 1988:104). We should 
not neglect, however, the role of fear and conformism in producing emotional 
contagion and being produced by it, in a vicious-circle like process. Let us stress an 
example that Moscovici uses in order to illustrate this argument. Usually people in a 
public space look for familiar faces, same age-groups etc. That is for two reasons. 
First, to protect themselves against others’ hostility, or even their own hostility 
towards the others. Second, because that way they economise on effort: they can 
conform much more easily to the familiar group’s attitude than any strange or new 
one. This is why, he argues, foreigners (not within their group) tend to assimilate and 
even exaggerate some characteristics of the group they enter -being more royalist 
than the king. This attitude corresponds to a need for defence (Moscovici, 1985:258- 
9).
Groups and Equality
An interesting characteristic of the groups is equality of their members -  
equality that can be real or apparent. The nature of the groups is based on equality, 
argues Moscovici (1985:42). Equality of the individuals within a group is originated 
into the libidinal ties that brought them together in the first place. Individuals are
15 In Freud, 1921:112-113, quoted form Me Dougal (1920): The Group Mind, Cambridge, p.22.
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united through the libidinal love for the leader (leading idea), who loves them all and 
favours no one. The very basis and explanation for this is to be found in family. All 
individuals wish to be loved; children in particular, because of their ‘narcissistic 
perfection’, want to be the only ones to be loved. When a ‘rival’ arrives -a  brother or 
sister- they feel hostility and jealousy towards the newcomer that claims their 
parents’ love as well. Since this (mutual) hostility cannot be expressed and, 
moreover, damages the self, it declines and gives place to coalition and, later on, to 
mutual identification. Nevertheless, this is accompanied by the claim for equal 
amount of love from their parents.
This is another reason why identification occurs out of this jealousy. When 
children realise that their parents love their rival, they want to become like him/her 
so as to claim for an equal amount of love; for, if they are different, they may be 
loved less. Children cannot realise that parents will love them anyway, but think that 
they love them because of certain qualities they may have. The appropriation of the 
same qualities as the ‘rival’ would guarantee them an equal distribution of parental 
love. So, identification occurs out of the claim for equal love. This also explains why 
children address their aggressiveness to the brother or sister who is favoured by any 
of the parents.
In the same way, the group spirit is partly derived by what was originally envy. 
If one cannot be favoured, no one else should. This is the origin of the demand for 
justice and equal treatment for all, Freud argues (1921:151-2). The demand for 
equality applies only to the members and not to the leader/leadership. The leader is 
the person who unites all the rest by loving them equally; it is for his love that 
individuals identify with each other. In a democracy, particularly when the leader 
(president) is not a charismatic person, there is an intense demand for justice for all 
in front of the state and its apparatuses. The uniting bond is love for the country. All 
the above, however, apply only to the members of the group, as opposed to the non- 
members. The non-members, the outsiders, become the receivers of the aggression 
that is ‘trapped’ in the individuals because they cannot externalise it within the 
group. Freud gives a very tangible example, with religion. Religion, he says, is a 
religion of love only to its members: it can be very hard and unloving to those who 
do not belong to it. The strengthening of group-ties increases intolerance towards the 
outsiders; wars of religion are such an example. In that sense, non-believers and
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people indifferent are much better off psychologically in the matter of cruelty and 
intolerance than the believers of another religious system, in the sense that they 
receive less hostility (Freud, 1921:128). This example is so tangible exactly because 
religions are (supposed to be) professing the un-reciprocated love.
We will stress another example, that of national states and minorities. Most 
national states declare, even in their constitution, that they strive for democracy, 
equality and freedom. That should mean for all, otherwise it is pointless. 
Nevertheless, the whole discussion about the minorities’ rights, their integration into 
and acceptance from the majority group implies that in reality this is not the case. 
Minorities are ‘different’ and, consequently, their presence is a threat for the 
cohesion of the nation’s identity, an identity built on (the perceived) similarity of the 
group. If minorities claim for equal love (in political terms that means equal 
treatment and lack of any discrimination) while being different, then, in the eyes of 
the/some members of the nation the nation runs the risk of being dissolved. We 
should not forget that they are united together under the equal love of the ‘Mother- 
Country’. This is why a nation’s identity is felt to be in danger when immigrants 
enter the country: they actually enter their ‘family’. In addition, we should not 
underestimate the fact that minorities and immigrants are perceived to be so different 
by definition, without even questioning whether they are really so different from the 
group. That happens because, in questioning that, individuals might realise that, 
either the immigrants are not so different from the others, or that the members of the 
nation are not so similar after all, or both. This would put their national identity at 
risk too.
There is, however, inequality even within the members of a group as well as 
certain hierarchies. There are different classes, for example, within a society, and 
some of them are less favoured than the others. As it will be explained right below, 
their belonging to a nation compensates for that because it satisfies their narcissism; 
equality itself as a characteristic of the masses is based on narcissism too. The 
following section will shed some light on those issues.
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Narcissism o f the Groups
Identifications and attachments that unconsciously structure a group have a 
narcissistic dimension; as Ulman and Abse argue, “the group’s conscious and 
unconscious images of itself often coalesce in a grandiose and exhibitionistic group 
self’(1983:645). The claim for equality is, to some extend, a narcissistic one too16. 
Individuals find unbearable the possibility of someone else been favoured instead of 
them, and this is the reason that makes them ‘compromise’ with equal love. Their 
identification with other people in a group is a defence mechanism derived from self- 
love. Individuals within groups acquire an identity through ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ 
identifications. They identify with the ideal image of the leader, or an idea, by 
projecting on him all their good properties or by internalising those qualities they 
would like to have. In that way, he (and it) becomes an extension of their self: loving 
him is a kind of self-love. At the same time, they repudiate the image of the Other, 
the stranger, to whom they project their own bad properties. The presence of the 
Other destroys the perfect image of the group, because he is an outsider. His 
presence is absolutely necessary, though, for the cohesion of the group, because he 
becomes the receiver of the individual’s aggression. In the same sense, the leader or 
leading idea can be negative: hatred can be unifying too (Freud, 1921:129).
So, in narcissism the individual wants to keep his/her libido for him/herself, 
and identification is a way to do so. By extension, “this exaltation of the subject of 
his own ego and his own body developed into an exclusive love over a wider area, 
such as that of the inhabitants of a town for their place of residence, ...that of the 
citizens for their country...”, as Moscovici argues (1985:247). The fellow feelings 
often expressed toward other persons of the same national group is a narcissistic 
attachment for ourselves, since we have identified with them (through secondary 
identifications), and love for our country is love for what is ours. “The combination 
of fellow-feeling for ‘us’ and antipathy for ‘them’ had the corollary of a feeling that 
‘we’ are superior”. Xenophobia, racism and nationalism are, thus, “the poisonous 
fruits of narcissism” (Moscovici, 1985:247). Identification as a defence mechanism 
is therefore a derivative of narcissism and can be quite pathological. The loss of an 
identified object is experienced as a loss of a part of the self, as an ego loss. In the
16 Not always, though, because equality is also an Idea and an Ideal: it entails a moral Law. The claim for 
equality is narcissistic when it is involved in the process of identification.
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case of national identity, where the identifying object is the nation (including its 
past), both past losses and present threats upon its integrity are being experienced as 
ego losses and threats upon ego integrity, respectively; this is why they provoke such 
intense feelings of exaltation.
Freud’s argument about cultural groups, such as ethnic groups and nations, is 
that they always strive towards an ideal, or claim to serve a superior goal or purpose; 
these ideals give to the participants of the groups a satisfaction of narcissistic nature, 
that is pride of what has been achieved. To complete their satisfaction, they compare 
with other cultures that have aimed toward different achievements. “On the strength 
of these differences every culture claims the right to look down on the rest. In this 
way, cultural ideals become a source of enmity between different cultural units, as 
can be seen most clearly in the case of nations” (Freud, 1927:192). The accuracy of 
this can be simply noticed in nationalistic rhetoric. Most ethnic groups and nations 
have the same rhetoric about cultural superiority, higher achievements etc., which is 
perceived by them as an unquestionable and profound truth. They all share this same 
truth because they all have a narcissistic ideal ego, which is now the target of self- 
love. This way, “the subject’s narcissism makes its appearance displaced on to this 
new ideal ego” (Freud, 1914:88).
The Group for Advancement of Psychiatry (GAP) in the US conducted a 
research between 1972 and 1977, on the causes of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the 
Middle East. The GAP report states that,
our land, nation, country, and state are part o f  our extended self. Damage to our 
country is felt as damage to our own self. Each side feels and believes that its hurts 
were caused by the other side but in reality is also mired in a conflict with its own 
self. The group narcissism o f  each side is badly injured, and each side strives to 
repair its own self image...The root cause o f  the conflict [must be searched for] in 
the internal conflicts o f  each side, not in external circumstances17.
Individuals and groups thus create the illusion of the ‘grandiose group self, an 
illusion of might and right that develops as a defence against feelings of inferiority 
and helplessness. The grandiose self first emerges in the first years of life, when the 
infant internalises all the good aspects of itself and the others in an attempt to 
preserve for itself an ideal image of value and omnipotence. “The grandiose group
17 Quoted in Falk, 1992:225.
61
self and narcissism”, Falk argues, “whether personal or national, develop as defences 
against deep, painful feelings of helplessness and worthlessness” (1992:224).
The issue of inequality within a group as expressed in class differences has 
been left unexplained, though. The Freudian explanation is that narcissistic 
satisfaction is a force that combats successfully hostility to culture within a cultural 
unit. “This satisfaction can be shared in not only by the favoured classes, which 
enjoy the benefits of the culture, but also by the suppressed ones, since the right to 
despise the people outside it compensates them for the wrongs they suffer within 
their own unit” (Freud, 1927:192). On the other hand, the suppressed classes can be 
emotionally attached to their masters and see them as their ideals. This is not, of 
course, the only applicable explanation that can be given to this issue, but only the 
psychoanalytic one; this explanation points to the fact that, nationalistic rhetoric can 
unite different and conflicting sub-groups within a nation, for it exploits the 
individuals’ emotions and addresses to the unconscious, thus minimising their 
differences. It is often the case in politics that, when social instability within a 
country occurs and, also, dissatisfaction for the government arises too, a potential 
external danger is stressed and overemphasised. This provokes ‘national awakening’, 
which has proved to be an effective way to disorientate the national group from their 
internal social and political problems. In the same way, oppositions often accuse the 
governing party for treachery as the more effective way to rally their voters and, also, 
the governing party’s disappointed supporters.
The Aggression Instinct and The Need to Have Enemies
It is not only narcissistic identifications that dictate the distinction between ‘us’ 
and ‘them’ and the hostility directed towards them but, also, the aggression instinct. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter18, aggression can be directed inwards, to the 
self, and outwards, to others. It is the second case that interests us here. Individuals, 
Freud argues, have such a powerful share of aggressiveness that makes them regard 
every neighbour as a potential object of exploitation, humiliation, wounding and 
even killing. Then, someone would logically ask, how is it possible to maintain a 
group’s cohesion, since its members are inclined to aggression towards everybody,
18 Chapter 1, p. 13-14.
62
even their love objects? Freud’s answer is that “it is always possible to bind together 
a considerable number of people in love, so long as there are other people left over to 
receive the manifestations of theif aggressiveness. The advantage that a 
comparatively small cultural group offers of allowing this instinct an outlet in the 
form of hostility against intruders is not to be despised” (1930:305). This partly 
explains why national or ethnic groups are so aggressive to each other: their integrity 
is maintained to a large extend by diffusing their hostility towards other groups. 
Linda Colley offers a characteristic example in her book Britons, Forging the Nation, 
where she is concerned with the making of the British identity. Going back in the late 
eighteenth century, she argues that the massive wars and empire building of that 
period of Britain against all the others -Americans, French, Indians, Africans, and so 
on- brought the English, the Welsh, the Scots, and the Irish in unprecedented contact 
and made them perceive what they had in common. So, she remarks that “if the 
inhabitants of the United Kingdom are now more conscious of their internal 
divisions, this conversely is part of the price they pay for peace and the end of the 
world-power status. They are no longer under the same obligation to unite under a 
hostile Other, against the outside” (1992:164).
This brings Volkan and his book The Need to Have Enemies and Allies (1988) 
into the discussion, where he is dealing with the issues of conflicts, nationalities etc. 
from the perspective of psychoanalysis. His main argument is that individuals and 
groups need enemies in order to create and maintain a sense of identity and self 
control, enemies that act as external stabilisers. At the same time, individuals need 
allies to provide and secure an identity, as internal stabilisers. Throughout his work, 
Volkan tries to show the implications of that need on ethnicity and nationalism. His 
method of analysis is largely influenced by the Kleinian analysis of the early infant’s 
object relations.
One of the early tasks of the ego, Volkan argues, is the integration of certain 
opposing -good and bad, self and/or object- images. Some of them still persist, 
though, unintegrated, while laden with aggressive and libidinal drives. These create 
an internal conflict and, for that reason, it is very important that they be diffused 
somehow outside the self. So, the ego externalises those unintegrated, good and bad, 
self and object, images into “certain durable, shared reservoirs under the influence of 
the mothering person” (Volcan, 1988:31). He calls these reservoirs ‘suitable targets
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of extemalisation’, and they can also include, apart from one’s own images, 
internalised images of others (which also become his, since they are internalised). 
“The suitable targets of extemalisation sponsored for children by important others in 
their group (who share identical investments on them) make children alike in as 
much they all draw from the same reservoir (1988:32). It is the extemalisation of the 
good images that makes the allies and, respectively, that of the bad ones that makes 
the enemies. The members of a group share the same targets; it is those that ‘glue’ 
them together. The search for and identification with good and bad targets is initially 
provoked under the influence of the family, but later on by the peer group, educators 
etc. Volkan’s theory shows explicitly the close connection of the polarisation 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’ as the ‘good’ and the ‘evil’, to the ‘all good’ and ‘all bad’ 
representations of the infant that occur out of narcissistic identifications with the 
other (who is indistinguishable from the self at this phase)19. As Bromberg argues, 
“one special form that this evasion may take...is the displacement of the whole 
interpersonal conflict on the more impersonal arena of conflict of political 
ideologies” (1960:33).
The concept of suitable targets of extemalisation presents certain similarities 
with the concept of the super-ego. There are many parallels in their formation and the 
internalisation of their composing elements is a long lasting process that starts in 
early infancy and continues through adolescence. As the members of a group have 
similar ‘registrations’ in their super-ego, influenced by a common background, so 
their ‘suitable targets of extemalisation’ are similar and attributed by their parents, 
their teachers, peer-groups, and even their group(s) leader. A nation, to follow our 
example, influences the super-ego of its members equally in enhancing their national 
affiliation and determining the ‘suitable targets of extemalisation’ with large scale 
mechanisms, such as the education system, the military, the mass media, etc. Also, 
we should not forget that parents, who influence them first, have themselves grown 
up and lived in the same nation and have, thus, acquired many of the group 
properties that form national identity20. This is not to eliminate individual differences
19 Oversimplification is a trait of the unconscious that accounts for the tendency to perceive one self and the 
others as either/or (either good, or bad, that is totally good and totally bad)).
20 Members of a national state acquire similar ‘targets of extemalisation’ also because of their collective 
unconscious and their common history, that is the history of their nation that is ascribed to all of them. The issue 
of collective unconscious (as well that of ‘collective traumas’) will be analysed in the next chapter.
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but to stress that the super-ego is an important agent of the unconscious and it is also 
formed through identification with national ideals21.
Volkan argues that the suitable targets of extemalisation are often determined 
by one’s ethnicity and nationality , while affirming it at the same time. In late 
adolescence, a person’s group identity is crystallised after spending his/her childhood 
in a given culture; this culture is embodied in him/her. This provides an 
understanding on how national identity is acquired and why it is of such importance 
for individuals. Since someone is bom and bred within a given ethnic or national 
group, the crystallisation of his social identities will no doubt include his 
ethnic/national identity too. It is his group, the people whom he identifies with; “by 
identifying with others in one’s own group...one identifies with their investment in 
religion, ethnicity, etc.” (Volkan, 1988:49). Also, from that perspective, ethnic and 
national identities are similar, in the sense that they are of equal psychological 
importance and their formation passes through the same unconscious channels. The 
use of the two terms interchangeably is not intended to disregard the differences 
between ethnic and national groups, but to point out that the two identities, ethnic 
and national, have similar psychological foundations and importance and can in that 
respect be considered as similar23.
It would be useful to make two remarks. One is that, multiple and conflicting 
identifications may provoke an internal conflict and, maybe, identity crisis. When 
someone simultaneously invests in more than one group that are in conflict with each 
other, his/her sense of self may suffer in case they constitute conflicting identities. 
Second, we should not underestimate the influence of love relationships in late 
adolescence. Whether the partner, for example, is of the same or other ethnic group 
may significantly affect the person’s attachment to the group’s reservoirs. Personal 
relations are more influential during adolescence, says Volkan, although group 
identifications are still very significant.
21 Rieff argues, in relation to war and violent acts, that “mass murder often presupposes a strong superego and 
positive identification with national ideals” (1960:250).
22 Later on though Volkan says that ethnicity and nationality are themselves targets.
23 The differences and similarities of ‘ethnic’ and ‘national’ will be considered in detail in chapter 4; there we 
shall deal with the issue from a multidimensional perspective.
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Castoriadis’ view, as expressed in his article ‘The Roots of Hatred’ (1999) , is 
quite interesting and relevant here. He argues that the two expressions of psychic 
hatred -hatred for the other and hatred for the self- have the same root, which is the 
inability of the psychism to acknowledge what is unfamiliar, alien to it. Through the 
process of socialisation some energy of this hatred is bridled and directed to 
constructive outlets, but not all of it. The remaining energy is in a state of latency, 
meaning that it waits for the opportunity to be externalised. War is an 
institutionalised outlet of aggression, and, although hatred is not the cause of war, it 
is certainly an essential and necessary condition for it. When the reservoir of hate 
does not find a way out in war, it is manifested in the more disguised form of 
contempt, xenophobia and racism. In racism, for example, the other is viewed as 
having natural (biological), unchangeable characteristics that are the objectified 
receivers of aggression. But, this extreme manifestation of hatred is connected with a 
deep, unknown hatred: hatred for the self.
The disastrous aggressive drives of individuals, Castoriadis continues his 
argument, are in accordance with the need of each society to strengthen its laws, 
rules and values, presenting them simultaneously as the best, as the ones serving the 
truth and the just purposes of the whole group, while anything beyond that is 
presented as inferior disgusting, evil. When individuals form their social identity, 
they perceive the group and its values as theirs, and whatever alien as ugly and 
inconsistent. For them, any threat against the -institutionalised- groups to which they 
belong is identified as equally or more serious than a life threat against them; it is a 
threat against their identity and integrity. As an example Castoriadis mentions that, in 
capitalistic societies the collapse of traditional -and supporting for the individual- 
communal values resulted in the rallying of individuals around religion, nation, or 
race, in a search for identity.
Sameness or Difference?
When the issue at stake is inter-group relations it is often thought or said that 
the others become the receivers of aggression because they are different. However,
24 Article published after his death in Le Monde, and reappeared in the Greek newspaper To Vima under the title 
‘I Rizes Tou Misous’ (Roots of Hatred); 24 January, 1999, Nees Epohes section, p.3.
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this is not really the case. The others are distinguished not because they are different, 
but because they do not belong to the group; as it was mentioned earlier, their 
presence is a threat to the group's integrity and identity. What is very important and, 
even, striking at first is the fact that those others that usually become the receivers of 
aggression are not so different in reality. It is most often the case, in addition, that the 
more different the others are the less aggressiveness is addressed towards them or the 
less vivid stereotypes concern them. We are all familiar with antipathies and conflicts 
between neighbourhoods of a city, or between towns within the same country as well 
as between neighbouring countries. One explanation for this is the fact that, the 
closer people are and the better they know each other, the more reasons may arise to 
provoke a conflict. While this is true, there is an additional explanation, inferred 
from Volkan’s argument that “conflict refers not only to our relationship with 
external enemies but... to our internal representations of them” (1988:95). The more 
two groups resemble each other, while differing in minor aspects, the more they tend 
to project upon and hate the other group. ‘Projection is a very crucial factor in the 
causation of wars’, argues Falk, who continues:
The enemy makes it possible for us to externalise all the bad aspects o f  our group 
self upon it. All the evil figures o f  our childhood, witches and demons, are 
projected upon the enemy. The Arabs see Israel and Zionism as the symbol o f  Evil.
The late Ayatollah Khomeini saw the United States as the Great Satan. Turks and 
Greeks in Cyprus see each other as the embodiment o f  Evil. This also happens 
between Muslims and Hindus in India, Catholics and Protestants in Ulster, 
Flemings and Walloons in Belgium, Viets and Khmers in Indochina, and so on 
throughout the world. The enemy, the stranger, the foreigner, make ideal objects 
for projection and extemalisation (1992:234).
Thus, the enemy is a suitable target of extemalisation, of projection of one’s own 
disturbing realities. Yet, most of the pairs mentioned above have much more to unite 
them that separate them. So, the question remains as to why familiarity between 
groups is more likely to provoke aggression? Proximity is certainly one reason, as 
there are more issues and disputes to be resolved between neighbouring countries 
than remote ones. At the same time, proximity necessitates some familiarity, in the 
sense of sameness, that is more apparent between regions that may encompass a few 
countries.
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Volkan argues that there is sameness between the enemy and ourselves because
the enemy is the reservoir of our unwanted self and object bad representations: we
externalise and project on the enemy our own unintegrated images. There is an
unconscious likeness that binds us together, but we consciously see huge differences
that support our sense of self and group membership. We perceive the enemy as
different, but our hatred or antipathy for ‘him’ is derived from the fact that we see all
the bad unintegrated images of ourselves projected on ‘his face’; we project on the
Other all our internal negativity. In addition, Volkan argues, we consciously need to
be distant from the enemy, to have a ‘psychological gap’, but this necessity
establishes a connection in a negative way (negative identification)25. Thus,
• 26difference is merely an excuse for hostility .
From an other point of view, Charles Cooley has argued that hostility requires 
“a union of likeness with difference” (1902:235), and he associates it with ‘highly 
imaginative personal ideas’, in the sense that we cannot feel hostile towards someone 
totally unlike us because they are totally unimaginable and have no interest for us. 
He talks about ‘hostile sympathy’27: “we enter by sympathy or personal imagination 
into the state of mind of others...and if the thoughts we find there are injurious to or 
uncongenial with the ideas we are already cherishing, we feel a movement of anger”. 
However, the thoughts we find and provoke our anger can also be projections of our 
own thoughts. So, in order to justify our anger, Cooley argues, “we input to the other 
person an injurious thought regarding something we cherish as a part of our self...” 
(1902:237), and then we can more openly express our aggressiveness. In nationalistic 
discourse, for example, there is always a perception of the nation being in danger and 
surrounded by enemies who have designs on it; quite conversely, it is most 
commonly the nationalists and their thoughts and designs who cherish a bigger 
territory or wish to subordinate other populations etc.
25 Also relevant to this is ‘pseudospeciation’, a term coined by Erikson, to emphasise that we lower our 
inhibitions against killing our own kind by identifying the enemy as less human, or as evil. See the reference in 
Caspaiy, 1993:420.
26 It is important to note that, it is not just sameness and the attribution of someone’s bad images to the Other 
that makes ‘him’ an enemy. There are multiple reasons, particularly as politics are involved, but sameness, that is 
familiarity, makes the Other a more suitable target and a potential enemy than ‘he’ would be if  ‘he’ were 
unimanigable.
27 Sympathy is used by Cooley in the sense of ‘communion’, meaning relation, contact etc.
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As far as conflicts are concerned, Volkan uses Freud’s term ‘narcissism of 
minor differences’28 to indicate the fact that, there are extremely minor differences 
that may even be invisible to an external observer, but which play an extremely 
important role as barriers and differentiating features. Three points are important 
here. First, minor differences exist, no matter how alike two groups may seem. 
Second, each group has certain rituals that maintain (or even celebrate?) these 
differences and absorb the flow of aggression; it is exactly these rituals that are 
considered particularly significant parts of national identity. Third, when these rituals 
cease, for any reason, attack comes to the fore. In clinical practice, Volkan remarks, 
rituals reflect defences against anxiety. The rituals are playful and keep aggression 
under control: when tension between groups increases, the playfulness of rituals 
decreases. Also, when (and if) war occurs, the individual experiences a discharge of 
aggressiveness, a strengthening of the self, of group sense and of ‘group narcissism’. 
Cooley has argued that, refinement, culture and taste have no necessary ability to 
diminish hostility: “they make a richer and finer sympathy possible, but at the same 
time multiply the possible occasions of antipathy’ (Cooley, 1902:237).
Finally, I would like to refer briefly to a last point that is often apparent in 
many conflicts and it regards naming. Nations and ethnic groups are often involved 
in conflicts about the name of a territory, which they claim to be theirs, about the 
group’s name etc, and it often strike us as absurd that hostility, skirmishes, or even 
military encounters occur for a simple name. Nevertheless, it seems that the issue is 
not simply the name; what is at stake is the very issue of identity. Naming is very 
important, for it both confers and imposes an identity (Moscovici, 1985:372). Laclau 
has argued that the very identity of an object “is the retroactive effect of naming 
itself: it is the name itself, the signifier, which supports the identity of an object”29. In 
that sense, naming of an object is “discursively constructing it” (ibid). Conflicts 
about a name are actually conflicts on identity. Thus, labelling and language are very 
significant aspects of the issue of national identity, too.
Lipowatz argues (in relation to propaganda) that, although sounds and images 
can have a more direct access to individuals’ unconscious, it is only words that can 
coherently structure a suggestive message. Words have a suggestive power and they
28 The notion of ‘narcissism of minor differences’ is referred to in Freud, 1921:131 and Freud, 1930:305; also, 
see Volcan, 1988:103-118.
29 See Ernesto Laclau’s preface in Zizek, 1989, p. xiii.
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infer a whole world of symbolic images and contents (Lipowatz, 1990:97). They are 
not just what is said but, also, what is signified and understood under a given word. 
We can thus see labelling as an attempt to identify ‘us’ and ‘them’, but also as an act 
of stereotyping and of ignoring the differences. For example, when referring to other 
members of a particular national/ethnic group, people often use the single instead of 
the plural tense: for example, they say ‘the German’ instead of the Germans. This 
practice indicates the fact that, the word ‘German’ (Turk, Indian, etc) is connected 
with certain properties that are attributed to all Germans alike, as if they were just 
one person (the single tense indicates one person). This is a common way of referring 
to others in the nationalistic discourse. Similar examples indicating the categorisation 
of the others exist in the Japanese and Thai description of the Western (and white) 
people as gaijin and farcing respectively. Creighton argues about Japan that, “the 
social construction of gaijin denies the individual uniqueness of Westerners, 
transforming all Caucasians into an essentialised category that reduces the complex 
variations among them”, while the same applies to Thailand according to Nedpogaeo 
(2001)30.
Sublimation
We should close this chapter with a reference to the social mediation of the 
drives, particularly the aggressive ones, meaning the possibilities and conditions that 
drives be diverted to socially constructive goals. We will once more start with the 
individual and neurotic anxiety. Freud argues that “a person only falls ill of a 
neurosis if his ego has lost its capacity to allocate his libido in some way” 
(1917c:434). There are two types of anxiety: the one is realistic anxiety, which is a 
reaction to an external danger, and the other is neurotic anxiety, in which danger 
plays no real part. In neurotic anxiety the patient is in constant fear of a danger, 
whether the danger exists or not. It has been argued earlier in this chapter31 that 
nationalism is somehow related to neurotic anxiety. In neurotic anxiety the patient 
forms symptoms as a means to escape an otherwise unavoidable generation of
30 Quoted, and analysed in Nedpogaeo, 2001:105. The essay on the Japanese example that he refers to is 
Creighton, M. R. (1995): ‘Imaging the Other in Japanese Advertising Campaigns’, in Carrier, J. G. (ed): 
Occidentalism: Images o f  the West, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 3 7.
31 Chapter 2, page 50-1.
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anxiety. In the same analogy, nationalism is a symptom of a neurotic society, as it is 
also racism, xenophobia etc. A neurotic society can be one that suffers from 
persecution phobias, a society in which insecurity and uncertainty rises because of 
major social and/or economic changes, and so on. The rural population, for example, 
has been most prone to nationalism since urbanisation posed a clear threat to their 
stability and security. Big changes, in general, produce symptoms that are quite 
dangerous for a society. Another example is Nazi Germany, where Hitler used the 
latent, to some extend realistic, anxiety of the defeated post-war Germans and 
transformed it into neurotic and persecutory anxiety by using hatred against a 
‘common enemy’, the Jews. The means to achieve that were terror32 and propaganda. 
The Jews, interestingly enough, have always been a target because they have been 
perceived as powerful and successful: thus, they ‘provoke’ envy and negative 
identification (Lipowatz, 1990:193-4).
A neurotic society could potentially get rid of its neurotic symptoms if it could 
provide with alternative means for allocating libido. That is, by means of 
sublimation, which is the Freudian term describing the transfer of libidinal energy to 
different objects. This is not an easy task, though, because neurotic symptoms offer 
pleasure as they satisfy their repressed ego. Thus, the outlets for aggression, for 
example, must be offered long before a given society/group come close to anxiety. 
Individuation is thus important as, the more differentiated individuals are the more 
resistant they are to social anxieties. But, identification with a group is also 
inevitable, as it is also part of the socialisation process. Education, science, art and 
sports could possibly mediate the drives and direct their energy to competitiveness in 
fields that cannot be destructive for humanity. Another way that Freud has suggested 
is love33, in the sense of libidinal ties with other people. Love could diminish egoistic 
and self-feelings because “love for oneself knows only one barrier -  love for others, 
love for objects” (1921:131). Love can act as a civilising factor, for it can make the 
change from egoism to altruism, from narcissism and antisocial tendencies to love as 
a desire for union.
The extent to which narcissism is antisocial needs a further clarification. On 
the one hand, group narcissism is antisocial in the sense that it leads to discrimination
32 Terror is the panic directed towards the people outside the group. Panic is directed to the group itself.
33 Freud, in Why War? (1933a), proposes love and identification. It is not clear, however, how can the latter
serve as a sublimation process, for it provokes the distinction of “us” and “them” that is responsible for conflicts.
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against the others, those who are not like ‘us’. On the other hand, it is both social 
because it brings individuals together in groups, society etc. Nevertheless, we have to 
acknowledge that it does not bring them together because of social feelings but, 
instead, because of an egoistic attachment to what is considered to be ‘ours’ (through 
identifications). We could assume that this may be the reason why this apparent 
socialness has destructive, antisocial outcomes, such as conflicts, wars etc. However, 
the tendency to exclude others could be mediated (not disappear) if, for instance, 
education were oriented to that aim.
Education is particularly important in directing children’s activities towards 
constructive aims. Beyond education, however, the wider political environment and 
the discourse transmitted from politicians and the media is also important. To the 
extent that politics, for example, are as defined by Moscovici, meaning “the rational 
form of exploiting the irrational substance of the masses” (1985:37), and the 
maintenance of power is of first priority for politicians, educational and other 
‘civilisational’ outlets lose much of their effectiveness. Since individuals tend to 
regress to infantile fixations and seek for instinctual satisfactions, the issue is to 
manage, through effective sublimation, to direct desire (the ‘vehicle’ of all drives) 
towards less destructing alternatives. This, though, requires strong political will and 
commitment, as well as social surveillance and a constant effort towards this 
direction. The reason is that, as Freud has argued, the instinctual inclination to 
aggression forces civilisation to such an expenditure of energy that “civilisation has 
to use its utmost efforts in order to set limits to man’s aggressive instincts” 
(1930:302). This is not an easy task for it requires a continuous process and effort, 
while it can never be an achievement in the sense of being a stable accomplishment. 
The constant tendency of unconscious drives to manifest themselves free from 
inhibition is one major difficulty for sublimation. Yet, the other significant difficulty 
towards this aim is that these unconscious drives are manipulated at the collective 
level and even occasionally cultivated. Thus, the issue is not whether collective 
sublimation will be effective but whether it can exist in the first place. We shall 
return to this issue in subsequent chapters because this is also a matter of political 
analysis.
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Limitations to Psychoanalytic Approach?
Ross, in an article titled ‘Psychocultural Interpretation Theory and 
Peacemaking in Ethnic Conflicts’ (19p5), tries to offer an explanation of ethnic 
conflicts through what he introduces as ‘psychocultural interpretation theory’, which 
he defines as the implementation of psychoanalytic theory to issues of ethnic 
conflicts. His analysis is followed by a last section where he discuses the limitations 
of psychoanalytic approach in explaining phenomena related to group psychology. It 
is important to see these limitations that Ross identifies because they express not 
only his own but more general misunderstandings about the way psychoanalysis can 
be connected to the analysis of political and social phenomena, and also because a 
response to them will help clarify the need for a multidimensional approach. So, to 
begin with, Ross defines as the first limit of psychoanalytic approach the fact that it 
gives a secondary role to concrete interests and power differences. This may be true 
if one exaggerates the importance of this theory and ignore that sociopolitical issues 
involve other dynamics as well. Beyond this exaggeration, though, it is not true that 
power relations are considered secondary because most scholars view psychoanalysis 
as an additional, although not secondary, dimension. So, when psychoanalytic 
explanations are presented in relation to social/political phenomena they cannot be 
presented as the only explanation. Ross’s second argument is that “psychocultural 
accounts, even if they have some merit, offer a more complex explanation than is 
often required, ignoring proximate causes of disputes in favour of more remote ones. 
Why...worry about long-term developmental forces when much more obvious causes 
of conflict are clear to all?” (1995:540). However, the ‘more obvious causes’ that he 
mentions do not offer a full explanation, because if they did, then nationalism and 
national identity would not be broadly dismissed as irrational and paradoxical34. 
Political, economic and other specific explanations explain part of the conflict and 
can be concrete only when referring to a given case, while the individual dimension 
remains unexplored. There are more dynamics involved than the ‘obvious’ ones, and 
the contribution of psychoanalytic approach is towards a deeper explanation.
Ross ascribes to psychocultural theory vagueness in specifying the targets of 
hostile impulses, forgetting that these targets are socially and politically determined.
34 On the perception of nationalism as resurgence of primitive and irrational instincts, but also for an explanation 
of the reasons for such perceptions that goes back to 19th century thinkers, see Berlin, 1990.
73
Likewise, he says that, “the theory is not very precise about how particular 
dispositions are invoked in situations where alternative dispositions might direct 
behaviour in different directions” (1995:540). But, psychoanalytical interpretations 
explain the existence within individuals of those drives that determine the tendencies 
of their behaviour. Individuals need an outlet of aggression, for example: which of 
the many available they will pick up is not to be answered by psychoanalysis. The 
outlets available and individuals’ and groups’ social behaviour are determined by the 
social structures, the political situation and historical period they live in -coincidence 
being also another, underestimated variable. The theory of unconscious mechanisms 
that direct individual actions needs political and historical analyses as indispensable 
in examining specific cases. This is the reason why I initially argued in favour of a 
multidimensional understanding of these perplexing issues. Thus, an answer to 
Ross’s limitations would generally be that, in issues that both individuals and 
society/politics are involved, an adequate and complete comprehension requires the 
analysis of all dynamics -individual and collective. In particular regarding national 
identity, we shall refer to political, social and other circumstances that affect 
individual and group behaviour in the following two chapters (particularly in chapter 
4).
*  *  *
Our analysis up to this point has led us to a psychoanalytic understanding of 
individual’s psychology, their potentials within a group, as well as an understanding 
of the constitution of common identity among members of a group; particular 
reference has been made to the formation of national identities. Yet, a number of 
issues need to be further clarified. For example, as national identity is one of the 
several identities one acquires, why is it so prevalent within modernity and, also, 
how does it relate to other types of group and individual identity? This question 
would help us illuminate the question why is national identity so pervasive in world 
politics in the modem era. In order to address national identity we need to address, 
not only the process of identification but, also, the characteristics of ‘national’ 
identification. So, we need to analyse nationalism because it has signified the nation
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with certain characteristics that determine the nature of national identification. Also, 
nationalism has appeared in modernity, which is exactly the context of reference of 
the debate on national identity. In addition, as nationalism was refereed to in a few 
instances in this chapter in relation to its pathological forms, we need to understand 
what makes nationalism manifest itself in a pathological way because there are 
several types of nationalism, such as liberating, defensive, and so on. Thus, one of 
the questions addressed will be whether there are benign forms of nationalism. These 
questions are important as national identity is mostly influenced by the existing 
nationalistic rhetoric.
So, in the sequel of this thesis we shall confine our discussion to national 
identity. In particular, the context of reference will be modernity and nationalism, 
while in the last chapters we will come closer to contemporary era and examine 
national identity in relation to late-modemity’s globalisation. In the next chapter I 
will begin by addressing the questions posed in the last paragraph and examine 
national identity in accordance to nationalism.
PART TWO
National Identity and its Signification by Nationalism
In part two, the main concept in our analysis of national identity will be 
nationalism. As it will be argued, nationalism is a prevalent ideology within 
modernity and also an ideology that has signified the nation and people’s 
identification with it to a large extent. Thus, an analysis of national identity requires 
a respective analysis of nationalism and the national state. In chapter 3 we shall 
proceed in the definition of nationalism and explain the reasons for its success and 
prevalence in the modem era. On the grounds of this analysis we shall make a 
schematic distinction between national and ‘nationalistic’ identity, which is the 
identity that comes out of identification with the national state as signified by 
nationalism. In the sequel, in chapter 4 we shall examine the initial emergence of 
nationalism in modernity and the subsequent nationalistic manifestations throughout 
modernity. That means that, we shall first examine the reasons for its initial 
emergence as a prevalent ideology and movement in the modem era, but also the 
particular circumstances that result in the emergence of nationalism or its 
transformation into different types (i.e. militant, moderate etc) through different 
times and places within modernity. The analysis of the initial emergence of 
nationalism in modernity will also involve the question of the existence of national 
groups before modernity and their distinction from ethnic groups.
C H A P T E R  3:  N A T I O N A L  I D E N T I T Y  I N THE  
ERA OF N A T I O N A L I S M
We examined in the previous chapters the inner mechanisms of 
identification and the psychological dynamics of group identification, with 
particular reference to ethnic and national groups. We analysed the changes 
that individual psychology undergoes when they become members of a group, 
and the unconscious determinants in acquiring a group’s identity. We have, in a 
sense, explored the ‘subjective’, the psychological dimension of national 
identity, its identity component. But, as is has also been mentioned, national 
identity is a social and political identity as well: social, as it is formed through 
the interaction with other people and groups, and political, for it is a social 
identity that is collectively attributed to people through highly organised 
means, procedures and political structures. As a political identity, however, it is 
necessarily social, as the political dimension directly refers to a social 
environment, group, etc; so, emphasis will be laid on the political aspect of 
national identity. An additional reason for this is that national identity is 
influenced and signified by the political ideology of nationalism. So, in order to 
explore the socio-political dimension of national identity, its national 
component, emphasis will be shifted from identity per se and will be put on the 
political dimension of national identity in order to explain its influence by 
nationalism and the fact that national identity is politically manageable and 
easily exploited so as to mobilise people towards certain political ends.
In this chapter psychoanalysis will act as a complementary tool in 
approaching political and historical phenomena. As it has been argued, the 
complexity of national identity requires a multidimensional perspective for its 
deeper understanding. In the previous chapters we were introduced to the main 
psychoanalytic concepts and showed their applicability in issues regarding the 
individual as a social being, and in particular regarding its group identification. 
Now, having acquired a deeper knowledge of the individuals we can add to the 
examination of national identity the standpoint of political analysis.
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The basic question still remains: ‘Why national identity?’ What makes it 
so prominent and appealing among other identities? What accounts for such a 
strong sentimental attachment to the nation, what renders individuals so highly 
‘mobilisable’ for the sake of their nation? Why does reason seem to withdraw 
along with any personal interest -  that is, more accurately, why are personal 
interests identified with national ones? In order to answer these questions it is 
important to examine nationalism. On the one hand, nationalism (re)defines the 
nation with certain characteristics that determine in their turn the nature of 
identification with it. On the other hand, nationalism creates a context that fits 
and accommodates the mechanisms and structures of identity, as they were 
analysed in the previous chapters. Also important is that the questions we want 
to answer about national identity are questions posed in the context of 
modernity, and nationalism is a modem ideology. Thus, nationalism is 
indispensable in explaining national identity. Throughout this chapter, the main 
concept, and context, in our analysis of national identity will be nationalism.
Nationalism
Nationalism is a huge topic in itself, with diverse parameters and 
multiple points to focus on. The relevant bibliography is quite rich and an 
increasing number of scholars address this issue. Certainly, not every sub-issue 
of the debate on nationalism can be referred to in this chapter, nor is it my 
intention to offer a brief summary of it. In reality, as this research is addressed 
to scholars of the field, it may be assumed that the reader has some minimum 
familiarity with the debate on nationalism, and national identity, and a basic 
knowledge of the issues involved.
As this analysis of nationalism is motivated by the study on national 
identity, any reference to nationalism will be made in that context. 
Consequently I will elaborate those aspects of nationalism that I have estimated 
as more important in explaining national identity -its prevalence in the modem 
era and its perceived irrationality- without insinuating that other aspects are
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not, or are less, important in general. Thus, in the following sections we will 
define nationalism and elaborate it further through its definitional 
characteristics, and then we will refer to its dominance within modernity in an 
effort to explain its presence and ubiquitousness.
Definition of Nationalism
As it is very often the case with complex sociological and political 
concepts, so with nationalism there is not a broadly accepted definition. The 
multiplicity of definitions has to do with the intricacy of nationalism itself and 
its diverse manifestations that scholars in the field try to address. Nevertheless, 
several elements of the existing definitions overlap or are closely connected 
and a general consensus can be inferred on several aspects. At the same time, 
however, the particular focus of each analysis is usually implicit and results in 
the absence of some other elements. So, I will propose a definition of 
nationalism that, although it was not intended to be a synopsis of most 
definitions, it finally integrates much of its definitional characteristics. My 
intention was to develop a definition of nationalism that would entail most of 
its elements, certainly the most crucial ones, and those that are generally 
omitted, though important. Specifically, my initial concern was to include in 
the definition of nationalism those elements that are disregarded in a number of 
analyses but are nevertheless indispensable for its understanding. At the same 
time this definition had to be accurate and, for the sake of methodological 
precision, should be valid beyond the strict context of the current research. Yet, 
these two concerns did not come in contradiction to each other. So, the 
proposed definition will be one that identifies those elements of nationalism 
that constitute its definitional characteristics and accurately identify its most 
important and indispensable elements.
To the extent that the aim of a definition is to provide an understanding 
and a clarification, a ‘Nationalism is...’ sentence is not clarifying without a 
more concrete elaboration of the definitional characteristics. For that reason, 
the following paragraphs will serve as a definition of nationalism.
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Nationalism is an ideology, a discourse, a movement, and a sentiment\
As an ideology, nationalism appears in the modem era and it holds that 
the world is divided into distinct nations, each of which should find political 
expression in its own sovereign state2; it also holds that their interests are of 
primary importance before any other interest, value or loyalty, and the state’s 
role is to secure these interests. The aim of ‘self-determination’ in a state is the 
initial concept; nevertheless, several movements have claimed for some degree 
of autonomy within existing ‘nation-states’3. This deviation from the norm is a 
political or tactical compromise, and it more often emerges in contemporary 
politics. As an ideology, nationalism rationalises the external world and 
addresses reason; but, by systematising thinking, it can also block the 
development of argumentation and obstruct the mediation between individuals 
and their social environment (Lipowatz & Demertzis, 1994:139).
Nationalism is a political ideology that creates and sustains mobilisation 
with three basic ideological mechanisms: generalisation, naturalisation, and 
identification4. These ideological mechanisms are highly mobilising because 
they appeal strongly to the unconscious desires and they result in the creation 
of powerful identities. Through generalisation, the particular appears as 
universal, as general, and the interests of a group appear as public interests. So, 
too, the interests of a nation derive general validity through nationalism and are
1 This sentence alone could be applied to several other ideologies; if it was intended to serve as a 
complete definition of nationalism it could read as nationalism is an ideology, a discourse, a movement, 
and a sentiment that represents a world o f  nations as being natural and inevitable. However, the chosen 
phrasing outlines the basic axes around which nationalism’s definition will evolve, and the next three 
pages will serve as a full definition of nationalism.
As to the defining elements/axes of nationalism themselves, Gellner’s definition of nationalism as a 
“political doctrine, a movement and a sentiment” (1993:1) seems quite similar but he defines sentiment in 
quite narrow terms as “the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the principle, or the feeling of 
satisfaction aroused by its fulfilment” (p.l). Smith (1995a) also defines it as an ‘ideology and a 
movement’, and Hastings (1997) as a ‘political theory and a practice’. Also, nationalism has not merely 
been defined as a negative force: for example, Breuilly (1993) defines it as a form of politics and 
considers the current views of nationalism as ideas, sentiments etc. as a loosening of the specific meaning 
of nationalism.
2 As Gellner put it, nationalism is “a political doctrine, which holds that the political and the national unit 
should be congruent” (1993:1).
3 I put the term ‘nation-state’ in inverted commas because the vast majority of existing states are not 
nation-states in the sense of one-nation in one-state. I rather prefer the more accurate term that Smith 
introduces: national state. This will be further explained in more detail in chapter 4.
4 In Lipowatz & Demertzis, 1994:97-100. These are mobilizing mechanisms of ideologies, in general, 
and thus apply to nationalism as well.
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thus given supreme priority. Naturalisation is a mechanism by which the social 
and the political appear natural, given, unchosen. Naturalisation is largely used 
by nationalism, through which each nation is seen as an ‘eternal’ social 
category. In Barthes words, “ideology speaks with the ‘Voice of Nature’... 
nationalism is the ideology by which the world of nations has come to seem the 
natural world”5. Naturalisation is closely connected to legitimation, a 
fundamental function of ideologies6, for what is natural becomes automatically 
excused, justified and, in the end, legitimised. The third mechanism, 
identification, makes the ideology unconsciously internalised and formulates 
individual and collective identities. When nationalism is internalised, national 
identity is ascribed to the individuals who, thereafter, tend to identify -wholly 
or partially- their interests with their nation’s and naturally act out for their 
defence. According to Breuilly, there exists in the modem world a general need 
for identity expressed as a general need for ideology, and he stresses that, 
“nationalist ideology is a particularly powerful response to this need” because 
it is both abstract (in the ways of achieving its goals) and repudiating of the 
depersonalising character of modernity (1993:381-2). So, the success of 
nationalistic ideology is connected to its quality of providing strong identities. 
This success is not only related to the aspiring type of identities that 
nationalism advances, but also with its claim for a state that will accommodate 
a national unit: the modem state apparatus possesses the means to largely 
ascribe and systematise collective identities and thus make them stronger .
Nationalism provides with strong identities because its ideologisation 
goes through these processes -generalisation, naturalisation and identification- 
that further account for its high mobilising quality; in particular, its widespread 
ideological appeal is not irrelevant to its ability to present the particular as 
universally valid. This process, for example, generates a perception of the 
‘world’ as a unitary and homogeneous whole, which satisfies the need to deny 
external reality and the unconscious search for pleasure through an imaginary
5 Barthes, R. (1977): Roland Barthes, Basingstoke: Macmillan, p.47, quoted in Billing 1997:37.
6 According to Breuilly, the three functions of ideology within a political movement are co-ordination, 
mobilisation, and legitimation (1993:93)
1 The function of the modem state in relation to the success of nationalism will be analysed in the sequel 
of this chapter, pp.92-93.
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return to ‘the natural state of things’8. Thus, identification with the nation 
becomes a particularly gratifying process. Although the three mechanisms are 
interrelated, generalisation is particularly important for the ideologisation of 
nationalism (as it gives universal validity to a particular idea), while we can 
most clearly see the mechanisms of naturalisation and identification 
functioning through nationalism as movement and sentiment respectively.
Nationalism is a discourse too, a discourse that expresses the ideology of 
nationalism and its basic principles (as they were defined above) through 
nationalistic rhetoric. It is more than that, however: it is a universal discourse 
comprised out of particularistic elements. Its universality is twofold. First, 
nationalism is the regulatory principle of modernity, according to which the 
international order and the relations of the nations and the states are 
established. Second, it is a discourse that can be traced in all existing nations, 
and ethnic groups, even in those that have their own sovereign state. To the 
extend that nationalistic rhetoric is used even when the aim (of ‘self- 
determination’) is accomplished, it usually serves so as to maintain national 
coherence; it is doing so both by ‘reminding’ nationhood (to use Billing’s 
term), and by helping to diffuse aggression outside the national group (i.e. 
through verbally expressed aggression against other national groups). The 
simultaneous particularism of nationalistic discourse is expressed in the way 
people address their own ethnic and national group, and in the idea that each 
such group holds for itself. This -universally articulated- particularistic 
discourse is characterised by almost every nation’s self-estimation that its 
distinctive characteristics are unique and of a superior or distinctive value and 
merit. In other words, it is a discourse that flatters the group and satisfies its 
narcissism. It is also a discourse that is used by both extreme nationalists and 
‘mild’ political leaders. It is, for example, very common to hear political 
leaders addressing their national group as the “greatest nation in the world”, as 
Bush and Clinton, Thatcher9, along with Milosevic and others have done. Also,
8 These characteristics of the unconscious are described by Freud, 1915d:191-192; they are also
described in this thesis in chapter 1, p. 19.
9 Billing (1995) quotes several examples of the nationalistic rhetoric used by political leaders, especially
in the US and the UK; see particularly his introduction, pages 87-91, and chapter five.
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a contemptuous attitude towards other nations is usually implicit in 
nationalistic discourse, and occasionally explicit. This contemptuous attitude is 
directly relevant to the high self-evaluation of each nation, and they are both 
explainable through the process of identification: during identification, 
individuals internalise external images that please their self-image and, thus, 
they project their unwanted selfrgroup images to the others10. In that sense, the 
positive image for one’s selfrnation and the negative image of the others -  
particularly the neighbouring and familiar others- are the two sides of the same 
coin.
A common reference in nationalistic rhetoric is made to a ‘Golden Age’, 
a time in ‘antiquity’ when the nation was glorious, powerful, and capable of 
high achievements; or, it can be the time of its ‘birth’. Anthony Smith, in a 
study on ‘The Golden Age and National Renewal’, argues that, the use of the 
Golden Age in nationalism fulfils six main functions: to satisfy the “quest for 
authenticity”, to locate and “re-root the community”, to “establish a sense of 
continuity”, to “remind the members of a community of their past greatness 
and hence their inner worth”, to “proclaim an imminent status reversal”, and to 
mirror and point towards a glorious destiny (1997, pp.48-51). These functions 
directly relate to basic particularistic discursive elements of nationalism that 
formulate much of its discourse, a discourse that points to the future looking 
backwards. Thus, nationalism traces the nations’ origins to the past and 
establishes continuity with the present, a continuity either uninterrupted or 
interrupted by ‘external’ and ‘evil’ forces; either way, the promise to restore 
the nation’s former glory is always manifest, thus pointing to the future. In this 
discourse, the search for authenticity represents an effort to answer the question 
‘where do we come from?’, to find our origins, to identify ourselves and the 
others. The ‘Golden Age’ discourse is particularly appealing because it refers 
to the initial narcissistic perfection and bliss of the infant, to a wholeness that is 
gradually interrupted and distanced as it grows up. So, the nationalistic 
discourse about a ‘Golden Age’ derives its strength and appeal from the pre­
existing structures of personality and the promise to ‘repair’ or compensate for
10 As it was explained in chapter 1, p.22-23 and chapter 2, pp.61-69 of this thesis, based on the theories
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the lost paradise, hence rendering it one of the most generally employed and 
successful nationalistic discourses. In the example of the ‘Golden Age’ we see 
nationalism functioning as an ideological discourse that serves all three 
processes of generalisation, naturalisation, and identification.
Nationalism as a movement is the activation of nations and ethnic groups 
in order to achieve political expression in their ‘nation-state’ and to have their 
independence and autonomy recognised within the international arena of 
national states. In this sense it is connected to the right of ‘self-determination’, 
which is mainly used in connection to liberation nationalisms, but it also 
includes secessionist movements of ethnic groups and minorities within 
established national states which may make claims for an autonomous status 
within the existing state in which they operate. Nationalism as a movement 
also includes the operation of established national states towards their 
expansion and, as a consequence, glorification. These nationalisms are usually 
characterised by the appearance of the adjective ‘great’ in their name and 
rhetoric (i.e. ‘Great Albania’, ‘Great Germany’, etc), and they are often 
explicitly militaristic.
The ideological mechanisms of generalisation and naturalisation have 
boosted the claims of nationalistic movements because they justify them and 
make them appear obvious, natural. That happens because, in an age where the 
ideology of nationalism prevails and the ‘nation-state’ is recognised as the 
supreme conveyor of sovereignty and an higher value as well (at least until 
very recently11), the wish of a nation to participate in this international order on 
equal terms is not only justified, but it is also created by nationalism itself. 
Also, the connection of a nation or an ethnic community with antiquity, which 
ascribes to it an eternal value, renders the claims of these movements natural 
and enriches them with an ethical quality.
Nationalism as a sentiment is the feeling of pride and self-esteem arising 
out of belonging to a nation, which is perceived as the primary form of
of Volcan (1988) and Klein (1988).
11 In chapter 5 I will refer to globalisation and the relevant discussion about the repudiation or not of the 
national state within the global era.
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belonging, and engendered by its present and/or past glorious achievements; it 
is also the sorrow, shame and anger arising out of the nations’ misdeeds and 
misfortunes; and, it is the higher self-evaluation of the national group as 
opposed to other national groups, for whom contempt is occasionally shown. 
As membership in a group contributes to the fulfilment of the emotional needs 
of individuals, the positive evaluation of one’s nation is the natural outcome of 
participation in it; its ‘great accomplishments’ serve as a rationalisation, a 
justification for that. But, as there are other nations surrounding one’s own, 
self-elevation often comes through comparison, and looking down on other 
nations can be a prerequisite for sustaining feelings of self-worth. 
Extemalisation of unwanted aspects and characteristics of nations as an 
outcome of collective identification is also relevant here, as already explained. 
In addition, the misfortunes in a nation’s history most commonly provoke 
aggression and anger against others, for it is usually external forces that are 
blamed for the nations’ sufferings. This is not to deny that, in politics, it is 
often the case that certain national states interfere into the affairs of others, 
often with dramatic consequences. Psychologically, however, people tend to 
project unconscious feelings, such as anger and aggressiveness, against others 
and then to use these projections as justifications for their discrimination 
against them.
It is not only identification with a nation but, also, its being considered as 
the ultimate ‘communal’ grouping that makes it the primary form of 
belonging12. Only the Family is of a similar importance -sometimes of less 
importance in extreme nationalistic discourses. It is not a coincidence that 
people often refer to the nation as ‘a family’, to co-nationals as ‘brothers’ and 
‘sisters’, and to the country as the ‘motherland’ or ‘fatherland’. “A nation is a 
large scale solidarity”, writes Renan (1996:53), expressing this particularity of 
belonging to a nation. Thus, identification with a nation, and with the co­
nationals, creates a family-bond; and national identity derives its strength from
12 The sense of belonging is an essential feeling of nationalism as a sentiment and closely connected to 
the ideological mechanism of identification, which directly engenders national identification. However, 
the sense of belonging is not distinctive of nationalism; it is the claim that the nation is the ultimate form 
of communal belonging that is highly distinctive of nationalism, which also makes belonging to it so 
important.
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it. That is because these new family-bonds exert similar psychological appeal 
to the powerful unconscious desires that determine the psychological 
constitution of individuals, and they act as a ‘simulation’ of real family-bonds 
(which are the stronger bonds for every individual).
*  *  *
Now that we have defined nationalism it would be useful to refer to its 
dominance and strength as an ideology and practice that is prevalent for the last 
two hundred years.
A Dominant Ideology Within Modernity
“The world is divided between nations and states; if nationalism is the 
ideology which maintains these nation-states as nation-states, then ‘nationalism 
is the most successful ideology in human history’”13. Birch is certainly right 
about the success of nationalistic ideology, considering that it is confined to 
modernity: modernity is the age when the very term of ideology was initiated 
in order to correspond to a new, modem concept, as this is the time when 
ideologies came to the fore14. The success of nationalism can be observed 
through three main manifestations. The first is that the ‘nation-state’ has gained 
universal recognition as the basic and legitimate body of exertion of authority 
and power; second, that nationalism claims and attracts extreme loyalty to the 
nation and belief in the ideal of ‘nation-state’ (of statehood of the nation); and 
third, that nationalism combines with theories and practices that may be 
opposed to each other without been in contradiction to itself or to them.
The first observation is closely related to the particular and universal 
character of nationalistic discourse. As Billing argues, “if ‘our’ nation is to be 
imagined in all its particularity, it must be imagined as a nation amongst other 
nations” (1995:83). An independent and sovereign national state is one that is
13 Birch (1989), Nationalism and National Integration, p.3, quoted in Billing (1995), p.22.
14 See on ideology Lipowatz and Demertzis (1994), particularly p.47.
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acknowledged as such in an international environment, meaning by other 
national states; “the emergence of nation-states coincides with the emergence 
of international relations” (Billing, 1995:83). The modem era is exactly an era 
of national states, whose status and particularity is either recognised or leads to 
conflicts and/or war, and which (particularity) is self-evaluated by each one as 
superior; this is a consequence of nationalism. For instance, Kristeva shows 
that in the Declaration of Man and Citizen the ‘natural’ man is immediately 
political and national (1991:148-9). And that provokes Kristeva to ask: what 
about peoples with no homeland? Where do their rights come from, since even 
one of the most liberal and humanistic of declarations ascribes to them 
universal rights only so long as they are part of a specific political unit, the 
national unit?
The second observation that manifests the success of nationalism within 
modernity is also manifest in the strong commitment and loyalty people feel 
towards their ethnic and national community, just as nationalism postulates, 
and the continuous effort of those who are ‘unsettled’ towards statehood. The 
making of national states that started massively in the late 18th century is a 
prospect still appealing for those ethnic communities that are a minority within 
a state; it also proved appealing for the several new nations that emerged right 
after the brake-up of the former USSR. For them, but also for all other nations 
in the world that already enjoy statehood, the ‘nation-state’ is an aspiration or a 
reality, respectively, that captures their imagination and gives them the will to 
sacrifice.
The third important observation on nationalism and its success is that it 
can express itself through various and diverse manifestations; this is a 
consequence of its being an all-encompassing ideology. We have witnessed all 
kinds of nationalistic movements and rhetoric: liberationist, integrative, 
expansionist, chauvinist, liberal, socialistic, fascistic, etc. Nationalism can be 
combined with other political ideologies and practices without been in 
contradiction to itself, largely because it does not specify the means by which 
the nation should acquire its own state, neither does it specify who shall belong 
to it. It is exactly because it does not specify the means, but only the end, that
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nationalism is so flexibly combined with other theories. Jenkins and Sofos 
argue that the ambiguity of nationalism is due to the potential coexistence of 
democratic and authoritarian elements, which render it both ambiguous and 
malleable (1996:19). They are not right, though, in specifying the order of 
cause and effect: nationalism is inherently ambiguous (exactly because it does 
not specify either the means or the content of its aim, meaning the means to 
capture the state and the content/character that this state will have), and it is 
this ambiguity that allows for the potential coexistence of democratic and 
authoritarian elements, not the other way round. It is this characteristic that 
makes it compatible with other trends, religions, ideologies. In Billing’s words, 
“Liberalism and Marxism have been territorially limited, as was Christendom 
or Islam in the Middle Ages, but nationalism is an international ideology” 
(1995:22, emphasis added). It is this characteristic of nationalism, its inherent 
ambiguity, that also finds fertile ground on the unconscious structures and 
desires15, which allow for the unproblematic coexistence of contradictory and 
even conflicting elements.
It is very interesting to note that nationalism is not incompatible with 
religion either. Religion is often argued to constitute an integral part of national 
identity, of a nation’s history, and a sustaining value. What is more peculiar, in 
addition, is that religion can equally ‘speak’ in nationalistic terms. Let us take 
the example of Rached Gannouchi, leading intellectual of the Tunisian Islamist 
movement, who expressed the view that “the only way to accede to modernity 
is by our own path, that which has been traced for us by our religion, our 
history, and our civilisation”16. What is important in this quote is that ‘our’ can 
equally refer to the nation (Tunisian Islamic Movement) and to the religion 
(Tunisian Islamic Movement) and still have an appeal without loosing its 
coherence -despite the obvious contradiction of the combination of 
nationalism’s cultural particularity and Islamic religion’s universality17. This is
15 Such as timelessness and exemption form mutual contradiction (defined in chapter 1, p. 19).
16 Interview with Jeune Afrique, in July 1990. Quoted in Castells, 1997:13.
17 It is remarkable that, although, theoretically, Christianity and Islam should be incompatible with the 
particularism of nationalism, in practice they have been combined, to a larger or lesser extent. The fact 
that this significant contradiction is not only acknowledged but, on the contrary, disregarded by the bulk 
of believers and ‘nationals’ is indicative of the ability of the unconscious to accommodate contradicting 
postulates -to the extent that they offer pleasure and satisfaction.
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only one of many instances where religious leaders use nationalistic rhetoric -  
or nationalist leaders use religious rhetoric? Indeed, the relation is often 
reversed as nationalism ‘speaks’ in religious terms too. For example, it 
sanctifies the origins, the starting point of a nation, it eternalises the national 
community beyond life and death (of its members), and it maximises the value 
of the nation by attributing to it a metaphysical substance. Lipowatz and 
Demertzis (1994:49) argue that ideologies, in general, differ from religions in 
that they are not a regulating representation of the world, and they do not refer 
to a metaphysical being. They do have the capacity, though, to function in a 
religious way, and nationalism is a characteristic example of that. Thus, 
nationalism appears as a “secular political religion”, in Demertzis’ words 
(1996:148-9).
So, nationalism has been one of the more lasting, penetrating, and 
aspiring ideologies of modernity. How can this success be explained? Let us 
see the proposed explanations of two important scholars in the field: Gellner 
and Smith. Like several scholars, Gellner (1983) refers to more concrete 
explanations and tangible characteristics of nationalism. Gellner, for example, 
examines language as a cultural trait definitive of a nation seeking statehood 
(language as a criterion of ethnicity and thus of potential nationalism), and 
argues that there are n potential nationalisms for every successful one18. This 
way, however, he reduces the success of nationalism in all its characteristics to 
its success as a movement to actually establish a national state. Thus, 
nationalistic aspirations and even failed movements do not account for Gellner 
as an indication of nationalism’s predominance and nationalism is reduced to 
certain tangible characteristics. Smith, on the other hand, argues that the 
success of nationalism as a movement “depends on specific cultural and 
historical contexts...and pre-existing and highly particularised cultural heritages 
and ethnic formations”; at the same time, he distinguishes nationalism as an 
ideology, which “can take root only if it strikes a popular chord...” (1995a, 
preface p.viii). He connects the possibility of ‘striking a popular chord’, 
however, solely with these specific cultural contexts and pre-existing heritages.
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Regarding Smith’s explanation, we could make two remarks. One is that, to the 
cultural and historical contexts that Smith defines, we should add the role of 
specific political circumstances and internal or external policies (governmental 
policies, international interventions etc) that may give rise and facilitate the 
spread of nationalism and its success towards statehood. The second remark is 
that nationalism has the potentials to strike a chord to several individuals 
because of their inner predispositions, independently of the specific cultural 
and historical context19.
Regarding the success of nationalism I would propose two explanations: 
the first stresses the psychological reasons for its success and the second 
stresses the political explanation. The first is a set of three sub-explanations 
which are interrelated to a large extent and together account for the 
psychological explanation. These are: that nationalism has a strong 
psychological appeal and it finds support in peoples’ unconscious, that it 
provides a sense of ‘wholeness’, a complete explanation of the surrounding 
world -a  secular explanation of course, and that it provides people with strong 
and fulfilling identities. The second explanation is related to the changing 
character and functions of the state in modernity20. Let’s see each of these 
causes separately.
The first, psychological explanation for nationalism’s success that will be 
supported in this study relates to the psychical foundations of human beings -  
certain aspects of which wave been mentioned in the process, but it would not 
be superficial to systematise them here. One psychological aspect that explains 
nationalism’s success is that it finds supporting ground in the human psyche by 
its strong appeal to the unconscious. Nationalism appeals to the unconscious 
drives mainly in two ways: it satisfies and enhances individual and group 
narcissism, and it offers guilt-free outlets of aggression. To begin with, 
nationalism as a sentiment is narcissistic and its narcissistic character is
18 Meaning that there are much more languages, and thus potential nationalisms, than effective ones. See 
Gellner (1983), pp.44-45.
19 Or, perhaps, we could say that, because of these individual psychic predispositions, the cultural and 
historical context that facilitate nationalism can exist in all nations in specific periods of time.
20 A political explanation, as it concerns the changing character of the state, but also one with economic 
connotations as well, as these changes were also necessitated by economic changes.
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supported by the ideology and discourse of nationalism too; nationalism is 
often described in the readings of political psychology as “defensive group 
narcissism” (Falk, 1992:227). That is because it flatters the group as a whole 
and individuals separately. Nationalism presents each particular nation as 
having an inherent, and inherited, worth and value, and it elevates the self­
esteem of its members. In its extreme forms, especially when it is combined 
with racism, it directly and openly addresses a nation as superior and is, 
simultaneously, militant against the outsiders (i.e. Hitler’s nationalism). Thus, 
through its connection to narcissism, nationalism is particularly appealing. 
Simultaneously, nationalism finds also fertile ground on the unconscious as it 
‘justifies’ offence and, thus, liberates the unconscious drives, aggression in 
particular. In its discursive form, nationalism allows for aggressive utterances 
against the others and, as a movement, it allows for physical violence. 
Individuals have an urge to externalise their aggression drives but, at the same 
time, they try to inhibit and divert them towards more constructive ends so as 
to be accepted within a social environment. Nationalism, however, blocks this 
process by ‘generously’ offering an alibi, a ‘legitimate’ way out to aggression. 
It is, to that extent, largely antisocial -just like narcissism is. So, for example, 
when politicians use nationalistic rhetoric (although repudiating violence), they 
provoke a significant retrogression in people’s efforts to accommodate their 
drives within society: they do so by allowing and provoking unconscious 
regression, since they legitimise nationalistic reactions by rendering them 
acceptable within the social environment.
Nevertheless, even if nationalism is to the extent just mentioned largely 
antisocial, it is not wholly antisocial if we examine it from another perspective. 
Nationalism also appeals to the love, self-preservation drives. Therefore, it 
provides a given society with a strong cause to live and work together, as a 
‘community’. So, nationalism is antisocial to those who are beyond the 
community, but it has also a uniting appeal to those who are included21. 
Therefore, I would like to add the love drives to the drives of aggression and 
narcissism as an additional, although contradictory, way by which nationalism
21 Nationalism is, in that sense, ‘anti inter-social’, or ‘anti-international’, although universally applied.
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strongly appeals to the unconscious. I suggest that it is this quality, of being 
social and anti-social at the same time, of matching the contrary, that makes it 
so inspiring.
A second aspect of nationalism’s psychological appeal that explain its 
success is that it provides individuals with a sense of completeness that, 
however illusionary, is essential for their being. This completeness corresponds 
to the narcissistic perfection and ‘autonomy’ in which infants live, a perfection 
that has been interrupted as they have been gradually denied the gratification of 
their narcissistic desires, and the dominance of the pleasure principle has been 
mediated or seriously undermined by the reality principle. In addition, 
nationalism locates individuals within a broader environment of space and 
time, it makes them feel they are at the centre of this environment and that they 
serve an upper value, a superior cause. “Nations... always loom out of an 
immemorial past, and, still more important, glide into a limitless future”, as 
Anderson argues (1991:11). This way, they give an answer to ‘Who we are?’ 
and delineate peoples’ origins and future: ‘Where do we come from?’, and 
‘Where are we going?’. People have always been asking about their origins, 
their point of departure, and this has given rise to multiple religions and 
dogmas. Nationalism serves the same need, but in secular terms: it transforms 
nations into metaphysical entities, it gives them a point of departure and a 
limitless future22. And this is an experience that all co-nationals can participate 
in. Thus, it gives them the feeling that, by supporting their nation and acting for 
its defence, they participate in an everlasting experience, a life before and after 
death. We should keep the analogies in mind, though, and not equate 
nationalism and religion.
The third aspect of the psychological appeal of nationalism is that it 
provides individuals with strong and fulfilling identities. This is a way by 
which ideologies become broadly acceptable and mobilising: by formulating 
individual and collective identities. Identification occurs as nationalism unifies
22 In a world more secular than before (before nationalism came to the fore), nationalism is analogous to 
religion, it is a ‘secular political religion’, as it was indicated earlier. And, if Hastings is right that Islam, a 
non-secular world, is less influenced by nationalism than the West, we can infer that, the rise of
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a given collectivity through shared past and common destiny. It also dictates 
that members of a national unit will act with equal commitment and 
determination for the well being of the community, which is their well being as 
well. No prosperity can be imagined outside the nation, for love for the country 
is felt as the ultimate value. These identities are, thus, very strong and 
fulfilling: they provide a sense of belonging, an identity for the self, and a 
timeless orientation towards the past and the future.
These three aspects of the psychological appeal of nationalism stress the 
psychological explanation for nationalism’s success within modernity. 
However, as indicated, national identity is also a political identity that is 
derived through identification with the nation as ‘nation-state’ -existing or 
aspired. So, a second explanation, a political one, is needed too so as to account 
for the success of nationalism. This explanation is the changing function of the 
state in modernity. Among its various changes, the one that concerns us here is 
the unification of social, economic, administrative, judicial and political 
functions of the local and peripheral authorities with the central authorities. In 
pre-modem times the state existed as a central authority that was detached from 
the segmented local provinces and communities -which had a relative 
autonomy regarding the social, administrative and other spheres- and had a 
remote role, as tax-collector for example. With the oncoming modernisation of 
the state, this relationship changed significantly23. The state penetrated the 
periphery and it united the local communities in a common large ‘community’, 
the national community. Thus, the spheres of organisation of each community 
were now common, as they were common with the so important administrative 
and other spheres of the central state too. In addition, this process coincided, or 
rather resulted in, the development of mass politics. As a consequence, the 
state synchronised and systematised the various localisms and local/regional 
identities into one single national identity shared by all members of the national 
state.
nationalism in modernity, an age when religion declined, provides a ‘substitute’ for religion, to the extent 
that it answers our origins and provides us with a sense of community.
23 As also changed the ‘central’ and the ‘local’ in the sense that, within an empire, for example, the 
central and the local expressed much different concepts themselves.
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So, the modem state was a determinant in the success of nationalism as it 
organised and united the qualitatively similar desires and identities of dispersed
i
peoples and communities into ‘one people’ and ‘one community’. This process 
also strengthened the feelings that are associated with nationalism because of 
the increased number of people sharing them. This strengthening of 
nationalistic sentiments can be explained by the notion of ‘emotional 
contagion’ (or ‘exaltation or intensification of emotion’), which means that 
impartation of emotions through direct of indirect contact intensifies the 
emotional charge of individuals24.
The explanation about the success of nationalism because of the 
transformation of the state is limited, however, by two inherent requirements of 
this explanation. First, it applies only to those cases where there is a national 
state and, second, it concerns mostly the states that followed the path of 
modernisation. At the same time, however, these requirements verify the 
validity of this explanation, meaning that nationalism was initiated and was 
most powerful exactly in those regions and periods that these requirements 
were (first) met. If we examine the history of nationalism we can see that it was 
initiated and first became powerful in Europe, particularly where there was a 
state in the process of modernisation and a national state further on. After its 
initial emergence, nationalism became a prevalent force in most places of the 
world in the twentieth century as decolonisation proceeded and nations claimed 
for their own state as well. In these later cases nationalism was ‘imported’ by 
the dominant colonising powers or western-educated elites25. In this later 
phase, however, where nationalism is imported and reproduced, the prevalence 
of nationalism seems to be relatively independent of the transformation of the 
state, even independent from the existence of a state. So, for example, the 
success or failure of certain states to modernise did not question the overall 
success of nationalism; perhaps it is in those cases that tribalism or localism are 
still relatively significant and powerful. On the other hand, there are certain 
cases of nationalisms that are strong and lasting despite the fact that the
24 This concept was analysed in chapter 2, p.56.
25 This is the ‘secondary reproduction’ after its initial emergence in Europe, which will be analysed in 
chapter 4, under the heading ‘Why has Nationalism Appeared in Modernity?’, p. 168-173.
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countries concerned never had states, let alone modernised ones (i.e. Kurdish 
and Tibetan nationalisms). In such cases, the national state remains an 
aspiration, whose appeal and strength indicates the overall success of 
nationalism26.
*  *  *
Now that the basic, indicative lines have been mentioned, and we have 
defined our context, the context of nationalism, we can proceed to the analysis 
of national identity, as a social identity and as a political identity influenced by 
nationalism, and directly answer the question ‘Why national identity?’, and 
why does it occasionally appear so ferocious.
National and  ' Nationalistic '  Identity
It was argued in the introduction of the current and the previous chapters 
that national identity is a social and a political identity. This is a peculiarity that 
is responsible for much of the complexity and misunderstanding regarding 
national identity. So, the analysis and description of national identity must take 
under consideration this dual characteristic, its being both a social and a 
political identity, in order to comprehend its peculiarity. At the same time, it is 
important to grasp the emotional depth of national identity. In the present 
analysis we shall proceed with a schematic distinction between national and 
‘nationalistic’ identity, that is a division between its social and political aspect.
26 This second, political explanation of nationalism’s success is no less significant than the psychological 
ones; however, it has occupied less space in the present analysis. The reason is solely that, the ‘state’ and 
its transformation have been analysed extensively by several scholars thus far. In particular reference to 
nationalism and the transformation of the state see, Gellner (1983), chapters 2 and 3; Greenfeld (1992), 
for the cases of Britain, France, Russia, Germany and America; and Breuilly (1993), for detailed analyses 
of several specific case-studies and the development of nationalism in relation to state’s transformations.
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National identity
Sociologically, national identity is the identity a person acquires out of 
identification with the nation/social group he/she is bom and bred in. It is one 
of the multiple identities one obtains because of participation in a group, the 
national group, and identification with it. Even as a social identity, however, it 
has a particularity that distinguishes it from most other identities: it is not 
voluntary, in the sense that it is not elective but ascriptive. Firstly, the nation is 
not like any other group that one decides to enter for ideological, cultural or 
any other reason. The nation is a group that we find ourselves living in and 
with. This is a characteristic found in few other identities, like familial and, to 
some extent, religious; the similarities of these identities with national identity 
is indicative. The non-voluntary character of national identification lays in that 
there is no choice of the nation we find ourselves living in. Even when 
someone leaves, permanently or not, his/her country, either as an economic 
immigrant, or as a student, or because of love, or just because it was narrowing 
his/her potential, his/her national identity remains a reference point for external 
categorisation, but also self-categorisation. Also, when one makes a choice of 
another place, this is more likely to be a choice of another state than of another 
nation, and it is usually accompanied with nostalgia. Secondly, national 
identity is not voluntary because, we have no choice of whether we are going 
to be part of any nation (or ethnic group) at all. As a group categorisation, it is 
one that we do not evaluate before entering, and there is no way out either: 
even if we wanted to ‘repudiate’ our, or all, nations, he might find ourselves 
either externally identified as Greeks, Germans, or whatever our origin was, or 
socially isolated/marginalised. Thus, such a decision has been 
practically/realistically improbable -though not theoretically impossible .
So, national identity is, in a sense, inherited: it is the identity of our 
parents, and of the group we found ourselves living in. This is even more 
evident in the example of persons who have two national identities. These are
27 An exception to this could be a cosmopolitan outlook, along with the simultaneous repudiation of 
nations in that context. The exception consists in that such a choice would not necessarily result in social 
marginalisation of the person that might confer such view (unless one repudiated the state as well),
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most commonly the cases of the children of mixed marriages, whose dual 
identities are the national identities of their parents. Certain factors will 
determine which of the two identities will be most significant, such as the place 
of residence (it is most likely, for example, that identification with a group 
through everyday interaction and socialisation will render this national group 
more important than the distant one), or the relationship with the parents. Thus, 
national identities are inherited by the parents. National identity in the USA 
offer a significant example of the importance people ascribe to family 
heritance. The choice of this particular example is made because the USA is a 
nation constituted by voluntary immigration and it is a successful example of 
strong national identification, no less strong than other ‘historical’ nations. Yet, 
the ‘Americans’ tend to remember their old and distant origins and to 
occasionally call themselves and/or the others according to them: African- 
American, Greek-American, Irish-American, etc. Let alone that this also 
happens with second, third etc generation immigrants, who only know about 
this other country through family narratives or from occasional visits. Even so, 
the sense alone that there is a family bond with another country creates a 
sentimental attachment or even (loose) identification. This is not to say that 
these remote identities are more important that the ‘American’ identity, but 
only to stress the fact that these family/national affiliations remain important 
for many ‘Americans’28.
While national identity is inherited from the parents, it may nevertheless 
not be the same as our parents’, in the sense that it may not be comprised out of 
the same elements. For example, religion is for some a fundamental component 
of their national identity, while for others it may not be a component at all. 
This, however, does not diminish their sense of nationhood: the appeal of 
national identity is independent from the perception individuals may have 
about its constitutive components. The sense of identity is developed within the 
context of upbringing and the familiar environment, which is unique for each
although this view itself is marginal, meaning a minority view. Nevertheless, even in such case, one 
would not avoid the external identification/categorisation according to his/her nationality of origin.
28 The inverted commas connote the inaccuracy in the self- and external definition of the national identity 
of the USA as American despite the fact that this national state is just one of the several national states of 
the American continent.
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one; beliefs and ideologies play a significant role in the making of identity and 
its constitutive elements for each individual, yet national identity as a sentiment 
and identification with the nation has the potentials to apply to all co-nationals. 
That is due to its flexible, encompassing character that makes it not to 
contradict with other identities, but also to integrate them. As Demertzis 
argues, it appeals to everybody without losing its coherence (1996:77).
A consequence of being part of a nation without a choice, a priori -  
without having evaluated it, its characteristics and its members before 
becoming part of it- is the high valuation of it a posteriori, in retrospect. The 
additional factor of being, not just a member but an integral part of a nation -  
because we are part of it since birth, and our actions are connected to its image 
and destiny- makes its positive valuation a ‘compelled’ necessity. A necessity 
because, as one identifies with the nation and its members, the nation’s 
valuation is self-valuation as well. National identification also provides one 
with a sense of belonging essential for the elementary constitution of 
personality and a sense of security. Thus, national identity becomes a very 
significant identity29.
‘Nationalistic Identity ’
The social aspect of national identity explains partly why national 
identity is so important among identities. Nevertheless, national identity has a 
political aspect as well, one that further illuminates its persistence, its supposed 
‘irrationality’, and its emotional depth. The political aspect of national identity 
is derived by its being influenced and determined by the political doctrine of 
nationalism, along with its systematisation by the modem state apparatus as 
argued above, whenever there is a national state. National identity is not only 
the product of identification with the nation, but it has peculiar characteristics
29 We should not forget that, “identification in all its forms is the repetition of an infantile narcissistic 
rite” (Bowie, 1991:37): an effort to high self-esteem and a defence against anxiety. Identification is a 
process that, primarily, helps us distinguish our selves and the others and, to identify those who are 
familiar and, thus, reassuring. In addition, as identification serves the individual need to belong, which 
serves the pleasure principle as well, identification with the nation is primary source for the sense of 
belonging.
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arising out of the particular character that nationalism attributes to the national 
group. More specifically, under the influence of nationalism, the national group 
is not (viewed as) any group, as it is considered to be of utmost importance and 
value; so, too, national identity is ascribed more importance than other 
identities. The more influential nationalism is, the more importance is ascribed 
to national identity. Thus, in its political aspect, national identity is a 
‘nationalistic identity’.
In addition, the prevalence of nationalism throughout modernity directly 
explains the strength and prevalence of national identities in modernity -partly 
though, if we add the psychological reasons as well. Nevertheless, the 
psychological reasons, however important, are not confined in modernity. In 
addition, they apply to other identities as well, such as local and religious. For 
these reasons we have argued that the prevalence of nationalism and the 
transformation of national to ‘nationalistic’ identities that follow is the 
determining reason behind the prevalence and importance of national 
identification in the modem era30. Let us now see certain important 
characteristics of ‘nationalistic’ identity, in relation to the nation as signified by 
nationalism.
The nation is imagined as a community, “as a deep, horizontal 
comradeship”, argues Anderson in Imagined Communities (1991:7). It is 
imagined, though, as even more than that: it is imagined as a big ‘brotherhood’, 
an extended ‘family’, to cite only some of the usual rhetoric. As in a real 
family, the uniting symbols of such imagined communities are derived from 
parenthood. Thus, for example, Grant tells us how the Americans, while 
searching for unifying national symbols, proclaimed George Washington as 
“the Father of his Country”31, their first ideal figure. The parental figure best 
serves as a unifying point of reference, a symbol conferring the strongest 
appeal. That is because it directly appeals to the unconscious memories and
30 The shift of emphasis from religious (in the Middle Ages) to national -that is territorial- identities (in 
modernity) is due to political transformations to power control. Beyond that, the reasons behind the 
success and strong appeal of nationalism to individuals are both psychological and political, as it was 
stressed above (current chapter, pp.89-94).
31 Grant, 1997:93. Her study concentrates in the USA and its founding myths. It is very illuminating 
regarding current perceptions of the American National Identity and their consequences.
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infantile identifications, the most important and lasting in an individual’s life. 
The potentials of national identity in mobilising the co-nationals sometimes
i
provoke astonishment. Nobody, though, would deny defending their family and 
act for its interests, which are their interests too. This is an additional reason 
why ‘nationalistic identity’ is today one of the most appealing kinds of 
attachment: it resembles a family bond.
Connected to the above is the territorial specification of the nation as 
‘nation-state’. The territorial specification of the nation -and of the state it 
finds political expression in- is presumed to be absolute and nonnegotiable. 
Borders can change only through wars or treaties -that are usually agreed and 
signed after a war (Demertzis, 1996:106). The territory within the borders is 
‘the holy land of the ancestors’, the ‘fatherland’ or ‘motherland’. That means 
that there can be no nation without a territory as the home of the nation, and as 
a reference point as well. As a ‘home’, it is the dominion within which the 
nation finds political expression, the national state. As a point of reference, it 
means that same national state (the ‘home’) for the Diaspora of a particular 
nation (i.e., the Italians outside Italy); it also means the birthplace of a people 
with no national state at all (i.e., the Jews until the mid-20th century, the 
Kurds); or it means the ‘still un-redeemed territories’, as is North Ireland for 
both Britain and Ireland. The case of the Jews is characteristic here. The Jews 
had retained their national/religious identity for long, even though they had 
no land, no state of their own. At some point, however, as nationalism 
developed as a powerful force and ‘nation-states’ became the norm of political 
organisation, the political movement of Zionism emerged, demanding 
resettlement in the land of Israel. The nationalistic political order in the world 
proved so powerful that, as Hastings argues, it ‘forced’ the Jews, who had long 
retained their national identity through their religion, to act against their 
scriptures and claim political expression; for, “Jewish religion was fully 
acclimatised in a diaspora existence and was in fact for long highly
32 It is difficult to decide whether the Jewish identity should be defined as religious or national. On the 
one hand, it is unquestionably a religious identity; on the other hand, the Jews developed a distinctiveness 
as a ‘people’ and thus a national identity, based on that religious identity however. Therefore, it is both.
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unsympathetic towards Zionism” (Hastings, 1997:186). The new identity that 
Zionism delineates is a ‘nationalistic identity’.
So, national land is a basic component of ‘nationalistic identity’, which 
partly explains why people are so easily mobilised when their territory is 
threatened, or perceived to be under threat. Another thing that should be 
mentioned regarding national territory is its naming. As indicated in the 
previous chapter, the name of an ‘object’ is the discursive formation of it. The 
name of a nation is its identity, its members’ identity, a name that is given to 
them as well (the Israelites, the French, the Indians). In this line of argument, 
Billing argues that, “if we are to imagine ‘ourselves’ as unique, ‘we’ need a 
name to do so” (1995:73), a name that is unique too. For example, the recent 
conflict between FYROM and Greece provoked anger between the two 
peoples (while it provoked irony among the external observers, who considered 
the matter trivial). The reason is that, in Billing words, “the world is too small 
to bear two homelands with the name ‘Macedonia’, even if clear borders 
between the two are agreed. Each homeland must be considered a special 
place, separated physically and metaphorically from other homelands” 
(1995:75).
Another peculiarity of national identity in an era of nationalism is the 
discovery of a unique identity. It is derived by the narrative of the ‘chosen 
nation’, which ascribes to the given nation holiness and special destiny. 
Hastings connects this to the way Christianity has shaped nation-formation and 
he argues that nationalism makes use of Old Testament’s predilection to one 
nation so as to provide the sense that each people can be chosen by God, just 
like Israel. “The root of the more extreme wing of European nationalisms lies 
precisely here, in a widely held Christian assumption that there can be only one 
fully elect nation, one’s own, the true successor to ancient Israel”(Hastings, 
1997:198). So, Hastings argues, the more one nation identifies itself as chosen, 
the more it wants to eliminate the first chosen nation, the Jews. This
33 A conflict over the name ‘Macedonia’, among other things. Macedonia has been the name of a large 
territory, half of which is part of Greece, and the other half was divided between former Yugoslavia and 
Bulgaria. The Greek slogan ‘Macedonia is Greek’ was referring to the northern Greek province, that was
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combination of nationalism and anti-Semitism found a terrible expression in 
Nazi Germany -which is why the ‘Aryan race’ wanted to exterminate their 
own citizens, the Jews.
The ‘chosen nation’ rhetoric is found in most extreme nationalistic 
movements, but it is also implicit in many milder nationalisms. We can assume 
that most people can recall hearing, not from extremist circles but in every day 
life, that their nation is unique in this or that characteristic, that no other nation 
is similar or as distinct, that it has a Great history, or that it ought (because of 
its greatness?) to redeem an exemplary future. Let us give some examples, 
mainly from countries whose governments usually condemn nationalism. In the 
American myths of national construction there is the central assumption that 
“the ultimate victory of the Americans over the British and, later, the North 
over the South, was in some way preordained, that a nation destined to provide 
guidance for the rest of mankind could not have failed to emerge the way it 
did... as a ‘nation under God\ as a Redeemer nation” (Grant, 1997:91, 
emphasis added). On the other side of the Atlantic, the British think that they 
have a stronger sense of national identity, because they are the oldest nation -  
along with all the rest who think the same. Last, a personal example that has 
greatly astonish me is that of an acquaintance, a mild and moderate person who 
had travelled a lot and lived abroad as well, who told me many years ago with 
an equally mild and confident tone that, “We Greeks are superior, aristocrats, 
because... we are not racists”!
Last, but not least, ‘nationalistic identity’ is an identity of loyalty to the 
nation. This loyalty is expressed in various ways. In general, it is expressed in 
peoples’ willingness to act for the interests of the nation and to defend their 
national identity. For example, they “resist changing their identities, even when 
they expect to benefit” (Stem, 1995:223) by adopting another identity (that of 
the host country, in the case of an immigrant34, etc). Loyalty is easily
called that way. In Yugoslavia, too, the same name was given for its Macedonian part and, so, after the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia, they wanted to keep the same name as their country’s name.
34 Usually, first generation immigrants are veiy willing to integrate and adapt to the host countiy, while 
second and third generation immigrants tend to explore their origins. However, even first generation 
immigrants do not abandon their national identity and keep their cultural distinctiveness, which then 
passes on to their children.
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manipulated, however, usually in order to mobilise or to gain obedience. 
Loyalty is a determinant for assenting to war too, argues Caspary, who says 
that, obedience during war (by both soldiers and non-combatants) “can be 
achieved by manipulating in-group loyalty and out-group enmity...” 
(1993:423).
*  *  *
The distinction between national and nationalistic identity is a schematic, 
descriptive one, because in reality the two appear as one. To begin with, the 
one includes the other. To be accurate, ‘nationalistic identity’ necessarily 
includes national identity as it is a political identity and, thus, a social identity 
as well. The reverse does not apply, though: national identity could stand as a 
social identity without any further connotations. The presence -and 
prevalence- of nationalism, however, has had the implication for national 
identity to entail the ‘nationalistic identity’ in most national states in their 
course of time. This can be better explained by the fact that, in the era of 
nationalism, national and nationalistic identities appear interchangeably. This 
means that, as national identity is inevitably formed, under certain 
circumstances it gives its place to ‘nationalistic identity’. It ‘regresses’ in a 
sense, for it becomes more liable to unconscious drives and characteristics. 
Ulman and Abse have argued that there are two aspects of collective 
regression. The one is, regression of an individual when placed in a group; 
individuals “regress to the level of a child in relation to a parent”, whose 
strength and superiority provide an answer to feelings of frustration. The other 
is, regression of the group (of all the members of the nation simultaneously and 
as a whole): “members of a group replace their ego ideal with that of the leader 
because the individual member is repeating an unconscious psychic process 
already completed during childhood” (1983:648-9). The circumstances under 
which a nation may regress can be both internal and external, such as political 
mobilisation on behalf of a party, or extreme nationalisms that come to the fore 
in neighbouring countries and, therefore, cannot be indifferent to one’s own.
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But, because regression to nationalism or to extreme forms of nationalism is 
also an individual process, individuation plays an important role: individuals 
are influenced in different ways from ideologies and can ascribe more or less 
importance to some issues or can react differently to mobilisation. In addition, 
although we have defined above the main characteristics that national and 
‘nationalistic’ identities may assume, it is not necessary that any such identity 
(or nationalism) will possess all of them. Nationalism, however, is particularly 
influencing because it appeals strongly to the unconscious drives, which 
always strive for expression and is waiting in a latency to (re)appear. Also, it 
provokes ‘emotional contagion’ and, so, the more people fall under its sway 
even more people are attracted by it.
As it has been argued so far, ‘nationalistic identity’ is the national 
identity as influenced by nationalism. For the rest of this thesis we shall use the 
term national identity in general and, unless otherwise indicated35, it will mean 
the identity that includes all those elements that characterise national and 
nationalistic identities, all those elements that constitute the ‘reservoir’ of 
nationalistic ideas and discourses. Thus, each time the term national identity is 
used we put emphasis on the latency of ‘nationalistic identity’. Thus, I will 
define national identity as follows: national identity is the outcome o f the 
constant process o f identification with a nation, and the sentiment aroused by 
this identification. In the modem era, the nation is signified by nationalism. So, 
the sentiment aroused by identification with the nation is, most likely, the 
nationalistic sentiment, and the nation, with which one identifies, is whatever is 
comprised under the word ‘nation’: shared origins, myths, common language, 
etc. This is quite a flexible definition, but very precise as well. Its precision is 
due to its flexibility: it does not define national identity according to certain 
tangible characteristics, which appear interchangeably any way, or some may 
not appear at all. It emphasises the subjectivity of the process, and 
individuation. It also leaves ground for different significations of the nation and 
national identity that appear in different times and places. National identity
35 That is, if I refer to national and ‘nationalistic’ identity explicitly this will be done in order to
emphasise on the distinction between the two, on the explicit regression of national identity. Otherwise, I
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does not necessarily become a nationalistic identity, like nationalism is not a 
necessary phenomenon; but, since it has occurred, it tends to shape -and it has 
shaped- national identifications in a nationalistic way. So, according to this 
definition, national identity is not defined by the tangible characteristics that 
define each nation but by the feelings aroused out of identification with it. We 
shall return to the nation and the national state in the next chapter. For now, let 
us discuss some additional elements about nationalism and national identity.
Symbolic and Imaginary Identification
Symbolic and imaginary identification provide an additional dimension 
to the understanding of national identity, and nationalism. Symbolic 
identification is the identification with someone or something or a particular 
characteristic that facilitates the subject’s effort to constitute an identity and a 
sense of being. In this effort, the object of identification is simply a medium, a 
‘transitory’ object in a sense, that the subject steps on for a while during the 
course of his/her search for an identity. Imaginary identification, on the other 
hand, is when in a search for identity the subject uses the objects of 
identification not as mediums but as a continuation of the self. In this case, the 
object captures the ego and becomes fully internalised and felt as part of the 
self. Thus, the self-image of the subject depends on the image of the object of 
identification. In imaginary identification narcissism makes an idealised image 
of the self and its surroundings, with which someone identifies while, 
simultaneously, regresses into that image. The ideal image that captures one’s 
imagination is an imaginary one, one that finally traps the self within it37.
shall refer indiscriminately to national identity, thus emphasising on its continuous potential to be both 
national and ‘nationalistic’.
36 The symbolic and the imaginary are not used here in the Lacanian sense, as two orders of the psyche, 
the one of which (the imaginary) exists before the unconscious is brought into existence. They are rather 
two ways to symbolise: the symbolic way uses symbolism as a medium, as an example and a metaphor, 
while the imaginary uses the symbol as real, it disregards the symbolic aspect of a paradigm and use it as 
the real case.
37 See also Lipowatz and Demertzis, 1994:110-1.
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Symbolic and the imaginary identifications are not either-or situations, 
that either characterise an individual or not: there is a constant ambivalence and 
oscillation between the two, unconscious though. The symbolic aspect, in 
general, represents the mediation of society, an effort to understand the 
surrounding world. The imaginary represents the anxieties of a narcissistic ego 
to fulfil a holistic and complete view of itself, to verify its phantasies of 
independence and omnipotence. Both of them use symbols -symbols can easily 
transmit a certain meaning because they comprise a wide range of experiences 
condensed in one image38. However, the distinction of the symbolic and 
imaginary identification and of the use of a symbol in a symbolic or in an 
imaginary way is often quite obscure. Castoriadis argues that the imaginary 
necessarily passes through the symbolic, both to express itself and, mainly, to 
become something more; the imaginary is in a sense a regression from the 
symbolic (1985:189). In the imaginary “the symbol ceases to be a symbol and 
‘takes over the full functions of the thing it symbolises’”39.
Nationalism provides an imaginary relation of individuals with the world 
of national states, a view of the world that is idealised40. But, nationalism is 
imaginary also because of its narcissistic characteristics, of its illusions of 
perfectness that have already been mentioned. So, what happens when people 
identify with the nation? Is their identification the product of imaginary or 
symbolic identification? Let us for a moment bring to the discussion Benedict 
Anderson and his famous definition of the nation as an ‘imagined community’. 
There is a wide misunderstanding that by ‘imagined’ he meant ‘fabricated’, 
‘illusionary constructed’ (he even criticises Gellner on that
38 See Caspary, 1993:428-9. Also, this is connected to Mead’s concept of the significant symbol. This 
symbol tends to call out in the other a group of reactions. This is the meaning or significance of a symbol: 
it is the common response of individuals that constitute the meaning of an object, conscious or 
unconscious: “Awareness or consciousness is not necessary to the presence of meaning in the process of 
social experience” (Mead, 1967:77).
39 Freud, The Uncanny, S.E..17, p.244, quoted in Kristeva, 1991:186. The distinction of the symbolic and 
the imaginaiy identification, and symbolism, will be further clarified as we shall apply a few more 
tangible illustrations.
40 Althouser’s view that “ideology is the imaginary relation of individuals to their real conditions of 
social existence” (in Elliott, 1999:148), which means that it provides an idealised view of the world, finds 
an illustration in our discussion on nationalism.
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misunderstanding41), perhaps because Anderson does indeed support the 
argument that nations are constructed. By ‘imagined’, however, he means 
‘conceived’. As he explains, in such large communities, where we do not know 
most of our fellow-members, we imagine in our mind their communion; “in 
fact”, he argues, “all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to- 
face contact (and perhaps even them) are imagined” (1991:6). So, imagining 
the nation is having a picture of it in our mind. Imagining this ‘community’, the 
nation, can be either symbolic or imaginary. Nevertheless, the nation is not just 
any sociological category; it is rather a ‘comradeship’, a special union, as 
nationalism signifies it. The nation is a group to which one owes loyalty, and 
that means that one gives special weight to the interests of co-nationals. This is 
when identification with the nation has an imaginary dimension, for one 
‘imagines’ the co-nationals as part of the self, and results in ascribing to them 
special rights and duties. So, ‘nationalistic’ identity (that is, national identity 
under the influence of nationalism) is mainly characterised by an imaginary 
identification to the nation -even more so in turbulent periods or other 
particular circumstances. Symbolic identification, on the other hand, is mostly 
apparent in the formation of national identity (in contrast to nationalistic one), 
in identification with the national-as-social group.
Let us explain further the imaginary -and narcissistic- identification with 
the nation as it is particularly manifest in the attitudes toward outgroups: 
foreigners, immigrants, minorities, or simply the other nations and ethnic 
groups.
National Identity as a Distinctive Barrier
It has been shown throughout this study, and it should perhaps be 
repeated here, that identity is more an issue about boundaries between 
individuals and between groups rather than what the term ‘identity’ often 
brings to mind, meaning a perception of self. Kyper (1999), in an
41 He writes: “...Gelner is so anxious to show that nationalism masquerades under false pretences that he
assimilates ‘invention’ to ‘fabrication’ and ‘falsity’, rather than to ‘imagining’ and ‘creation’” (Anderson,
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anthropological study about culture and cultural identity, argues that, “the term 
identity is an oxymoron used in relation to an individual, since how can an 
individual not correspond to -be identical to- himself of herself?” (p.234-5). 
Identity implies “identity with others” when “the inner self finds its home by 
participating in the identity of a collectivity” (p.235)42. In that sense, individual 
identity is the identity composed of the traits one (often selectively) internalises 
out of identification with a collectivity.
National identity, in turn, is an identity of national sameness and 
difference, whatever this ‘national’ may include (usually cultural, civic, 
religious or other). It is an identity of sameness with a particular national group 
and of difference with all the rest43. Thus, it requires ‘the rest’ for its existence; 
it presupposes the distinction of ‘us’ and ‘them’. It is this distinction, symbolic 
or imaginary, upon which the distinctiveness of a given national group rests. 
This distinction is a symbolic one when it is just an acknowledgement of 
certain differences that account for the constitution of a distinct social group, 
and it doesn’t stand in the way when it comes to the recognition of certain 
similarities as well. It is a symbolic sameness, as well, when one does not 
identify wholly and uncritically with a group. This distinction is imaginary, 
however, when it necessarily generates negative sentiments toward other 
nations who are perceived as different by definition and, also, it is constitutive 
for the cohesion of the national group. Additionally, it is an imaginary 
sameness when it deletes the existing differences within the nation. But, this 
distinction is not a fixed one, meaning either symbolic or imaginary at all 
times, as it can change due to political or even other contingent events. 
Nationalism plays a significant role in transforming symbolic into imaginary, 
for it always involves an other ethnicity/nationality, usually a rival one. This is 
its relational characteristic, as Demertzis argues, its being in relation to some
1991:6).
42 See Kyper’s anthropological study on culture, with significant references on American perceptions on 
culture.
43 Although some of the rest are less different and others are more different than all the nations in 
general; these are the allies and the enemies respectively.
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other nations and nationalisms (1996:163)44. Symbolic identification is largely 
manifest in ‘normal’ periods of relative (economic, political, etc) tranquillity, 
except for extreme nationalistic circles, the members of which usually have an 
internal reason (i.e. anger) for their imaginary reception of external reality. 
Imaginary identification (and ‘nationalistic’ identity) is most likely to replace 
the symbolic one when the surrounding circumstances change and put 
individuals into uneasiness and anxiety or even rage.
Beyond the relational characteristic of nationalism (the need for other 
nations as reference points), national identity acts as a distinctive barrier with 
particular harshness against individuals (foreigners) and groups (minorities) 
within the nation. Foreigners are the ones who do not belong to the group, as 
Kristeva (1991:95) defines them, a definition made in a negative fashion 
(emphasising negative identification). They are discriminated against for 
several reasons. First, they are a constant reminder of ‘our’ lack, of the lack of 
purity and wholeness of ‘our’ national group. The others are usually accused of 
contaminating the purity of ‘our’ nation, but in reality they dispel the 
imaginary image of purity that nationalism holds for each nation -an image 
that each individual holds for itself. This is related to the second reason, that 
the presumed similarity of ‘us’ and difference with ‘them’ cannot be logically 
sustained when we contact the others, because then we come to realise that we 
-the co-nationals- are not so similar per se, and that we -the co-nationals and 
the others- are not so different after all. In this sense, the Other poses a threat 
for the group’s cohesion. It is indicative, for example, that American 
conservatives worry that multiculturalism, and multicultural critique, will pose 
a threat to their national coherence45.
Billing argues that we exclude foreigners not because we perceive 
ourselves as intolerant, but because we believe ‘we are tolerant’ and we are 
threatened by ‘their intolerance’. This is the third reason why we discriminate 
the others: projection. We project on others all our bad feelings and internal
44 As Shafer argues, nationalism unites a people by separating the peoples (Shafer, B.C. (1972), Faces o f  
Nationalism: New Realities and Old Myths, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, p. 19, as referred to in 
Demertzis, 1996:164).
45 On this example, see Kyper, 1999:234.
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perceptions (i.e. intolerance), giving ourselves simultaneously the perfect alibi 
(that the others are intolerant). In the same line of argument Kristeva (1991) 
writes that hatred for the others is a defensive reaction originated into “hatred 
for oneself’, for “our own foreignness”, for we are all strangers to ourselves 
(p.24). She also argues that, immigrants in particular, provoke both our 
contempt and, mostly, our jealousy for having abandoned their motherland, 
their origins in a sense, in a search for new ones. But, if foreigners are 
excluded, she rhetorically asks, why don’t they unite? The answer she gives is 
characteristic of the unconscious dynamics that determine much of peoples 
attitudes: “one must take into consideration the domination/exclusion phantasy 
characteristic of everyone: just because one is a foreigner does not mean one is 
without one’s own foreigner...In France, Italians call the Spaniards foreigners, 
the Spaniards call it out on the Portuguese, the Portuguese on the Arabs, the 
Arabs on the blacks, and so forth and vice versa” (p.24). This explicitly reveals 
that the imaginary phantasies of exclusion are not only related to nationalism, 
but also originate in our unconscious predispositions.
In order to understand better the concept of the imaginary, it would be 
useful to refer to the unconscious desires that nationalism satisfies in direct 
reference to its imaginary characteristics. For that reason, we shall analyse 
further what has been briefly referred to earlier on about the ‘Golden Age’ 
discourse46.
‘Return to the Womb’
Why is it that, by returning to the past, leaders and elites appeal more to 
the emotions of the people? “Why, in a post-Cold War, post-industrialist world, 
conjoined by multinational economies and electronic mass media, do we 
mediate our present as an interruption, an iteration of the shibboleths of a past 
age?” (Bhabha, 1994:202). The instrumentalists argue that reference to a 
common ancestral past is essential in order to mobilise the masses. They do not 
explain ‘Why’, though; what effect the past has on people.
46 Current chapter, page 82.
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Let us analyse what was previously briefly explained about the 
psychological appeal of the past. The return to the past of the nation should be 
seen in analogy to the unconscious return of individuals to their infancy. There 
has been a time that the newborn was living in a state of ‘narcissistic 
perfection’, when no frustration could disturb its perfect narcissistic image. As 
soon as the external world begun to pose ‘threats’ to the infant’s sense of 
‘wholeness’, the infant started an effort to control them with defence 
mechanisms, identification being one of them. It is a characteristic of human 
psychology that, thereafter and throughout their life, individuals will have the 
tendency to regress mentally to a former state of wholeness and security, to 
long in a sense for this psychological time in their life. This tendency emanates 
from the ‘compulsion to repeat’ of the drives, as well as their striving for 
pleasure. Nationalism and the rhetoric of a past Golden Age appeals strongly to 
the unconscious desire to restore an earlier order of things, as we have already 
explained. This past order for an individual means also one that the infant’s 
drives were granted full satisfaction and were free of inhibition or repression. 
The nation’s past can be viewed, in a metaphoric analogy, as the nation’s 
infancy. For, the return to the past is a return to a glorious past, which 
represents the time when the nation was living in all its perfection, pure and 
uncontaminated, when no one was standing in its way and it was let free to 
accomplish its glorious destiny. But, why is it that, as Smith argues, “the 
collective appropriation of antiquity, and especially of shared memories of the 
‘Golden Age’, contributes significantly to the formation of nations” (1997:39)? 
Because, I would argue, the narrative of the national past resembles closely the 
individuals’ infancy and, by discursively returning to the national past, they 
imaginary return to their own past as well. This return to the past is a ‘return to 
the womb’.
The success of nationalism, however, is not only its nostalgic, backward 
looking, but also its simultaneous orientation to the future. This seemingly 
strange particularity of nationalism encompasses the real meaning of the phrase 
‘return to the womb’. For, ‘return to the womb’ is the return to perfection, to 
wholeness, to narcissistic completeness, to absence of lack. By referring
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simultaneously to the past and the future, nationalism invites people to restore 
the ‘right’ order of things, a time of great achievements in the future. This 
future, however, must not be distanced from the present in order to be 
appealing. So, nationalism invites people to work now, to do what it takes in 
the present, so as to enjoy their blissful longing in the near future. This is the 
power of nationalism in mobilising the people: it generates the strongest 
identifications that people can form apart from their family, and promises a 
future that restores the past. Thus, each individual can imagine, imaginary and 
not symbolically, his/her return to an uninterrupted union with the Mother -as 
this is what the womb symbolises. So, the rhetorical manipulation of the past 
and future of a nation in the present gives strength to nationalism as a 
movement47.
*  *  *
After analysing symbolic and imaginary identification and their 
implications in conjunction with nationalism, let us move on to another subject. 
There is an issue left open even from the previous chapter, regarding malign 
and benign types or manifestations of nationalism. We have referred to 
nationalism without making any such distinction and, so, it would be useful to 
refer to that matter now.
Benign or Malign Nationalism
There are many typologies of nationalism, most of which originate in or 
explicitly specify diverse types of nationalistic movements (i.e., liberation, 
imperialistic, pan- nationalism). These typologies occasionally infer a moral 
evaluation; for example, the distinction between nationalism of existing states
41 The reference to the past (and the future) of the nation can be made in another way when a great past 
history is lacking. Then the others, external forces are blamed for the misdeeds, or the suffering, and 
negative identification becomes even more prevalent.
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and that of nationalistic movements has often been regarded, as Jenkins and 
Sofos argue (1996:19), as a distinction of conservative and exclusionist as 
opposed to progressive and democratic nationalisms respectively. The most 
basic typology used in contemporary literature, however, is the distinction 
between civic and ethnic nationalism. These two types are often regarded as 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ pairs of opposites, thus themselves inferring a moral 
evaluation. Let us examine these two types of nationalism in relation to the 
question whether they actually correspond to a distinction between benign and 
malign manifestations of nationalism.
Civic and Ethnic Nationalism
Civic and ethnic nationalisms are two types of nationalism that originate 
in the formations of particular national states in Europe in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth century and they were first expressed in respective 
movements. Civic nationalism “envisages the nation as a community of equal, 
rights-bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political 
practices and values” (Ignatieff, 1993:3). This is also called the ‘citizenship 
model’ because it holds that everybody, regardless of race, gender, religion and 
ethnicity, can be part of the nation as soon as they “subscribe to the nation’s 
political creed” (Ignatieff, 1993:3). It is considered to be democratic by 
definition because, it “vests sovereignty in all of the people”, and provides the 
idea of respect of other nations48. Civic nationalism is also known as the 
French model, for it originates in the citizenship criteria of the French 
Revolution, according to which nationality is voluntarily acquired based on 
residence. These criteria emanate from the Constitution of 1790 and the liberal 
decree stipulating that foreigners, residing for five years in France and owing 
some property, could be naturalised and ascribed full citizenship rights49.
Ethnic nationalism, on the other hand, envisages the nation as a cultural, 
ethnic, linguistic etc. group, attachment to which is not voluntary but inherited.
48 In Ignatieff, 1993:3. See also Jenkins and Sofos, 1996:21-2.
49 See Kristeva, 1991:155.
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Membership, according to the ethnic model, is derived by common descent, 
language, tradition, and even religion. It is considered to be authoritarian and 
exclusionist, because it vindicates the rights of a particular group. It is 
otherwise known as the German model, for it emerged among the German 
romanticists, partly as a reaction to the French revolution. Full citizenship 
rights in Germany were automatically ascribed only to those who had the 
German nationality by birth until recently, even to those ethnic Germans that 
were bom outside Germany, while the children of immigrants that were bom in 
Germany could not have the German citizenship before the naturalising period 
passed; thus, there was a direct link between German blood ties and nationality 
(full citizenship rights and nationality go hand in hand in this instance). This 
changed in spring of 1999 with the new citizenship law that automatically 
grants full citizenship rights to foreigners’ children that are bom in Germany 
and reduces the naturalising period from fifteen to eight years for foreign 
residents. Nevertheless, these children must make a decision by the age of 23 
as to which nationality to keep officially (their parents’ or the German), as they 
are asked to relinquish one of the two passports.
The argument that will be supported in this thesis regarding civic and 
ethnic nationalism is that the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism, 
beyond its analytical utility and validity, does not correspond to a clear-cut 
distinction in practical terms. As we will see, there are many instances where 
civic and ethnic elements coexist in a given nationalism. In addition, and more 
importantly, their analytical distinction cannot be equated with a distinction 
between benign and malign manifestations of nationalism or as a distinction 
between democracy and authoritarianism. Civic and ethnic types of nationalism 
are distinguished by the fact that the former emphasises on citizenship criteria 
and while the latter on blood ties. This is an existing and analytical distinction, 
but it should not be confused with any other distinction associated with them. 
Let us develop the argumentation for these claims -argumentation that is to a 
large extent interrelated.
The analytical utility of this typology can, if it becomes a classificatory 
tool for existing cases, lead to misinterpretation of these particular cases. That
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is because, in practical terms, the distinction between types of nationalism is 
not so clear-cut as it is in theor^. The analytical utility of this distinction 
between civic and ethnic lays in that it helps identify and classify different 
characteristics of nationalisms and, also, accounts for its historical and political 
diversity. However, the taxonomy of a case-study in either type of nationalism 
can lead to a confusing schematisation, a caricature of these two types that 
ignores internal variations and subtle successions and coexistences of ethnic 
and civic elements of nationalism. As stressed, the reason is that civic 
nationalism, for instance, is usually one where civic elements prevail, yet they 
are not the only ones -and vice versa. For example, Catalan nationalism is one 
that stresses the cultural and linguistic particularity of the Catalans, but it is 
also assimilative in the sense of the recognised and desired coexistence within 
the Spanish state and with the Spanish people, with whom they acknowledge 
their similarities and differences as well.
If we consider the definitional characteristics of ethnic and civic 
nationalism as defined above by Ignatieff (and Jenkins and Sofos), we shall be 
led to regard civic nationalism as highly integrating and assimilating, while 
ethnic nationalism as exclusionist and discriminatory by definition. However, 
if we carefully examine the criteria set for assimilation we can see that ethnic 
elements of nationalism are always implicit in civic nationalism almost by 
definition, even though they may not be manifest and explicitly uttered in their 
nationalistic discourse. Citizenship is acquired by membership to ‘a people’, 
which is often used as a synonymous to a nation. Participation to ‘a people’, 
however, is made with criteria of sameness and of ‘voluntary’ abandonment of 
one’s own particularity in order to ascribe to another particularity. Being 
different is in reality an issue even for civic nationalism; its rhetoric appears to 
be tolerant, while in essence it is not by definition more or less tolerant than 
ethnic nationalism. In a similar vein, Smith indicatively argues:
from the standpoint o f  affected minorities, [civic] nationalism is neither 
tolerant nor as unbiased as its self-image suggests. In fact, it can be every bit as 
severe and uncompromising as ethnic nationalisms. For civic nationalisms 
often demand, as the price for receiving citizenship and its benefits, the 
surrender o f  ethnic community and individuality, the privatisation o f  ethnic
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religion and the marginalisation o f  the ethnic culture and heritage o f minorities 
within the borders o f  the national state; for example, to become citizens o f  
France, [Jews and blacks] were compelled to become black or Jewish 
Frenchmen... [for] their cultures and heritages were depreciated, their 
traditional religions were despised and privatised or suppressed, and their 
ethnicity striped away from them (Smith, 1995a: 101).
In that sense, civic nationalism can be as harsh as ethnic nationalism is 
considered to be. The nation is the upper form of social affiliation and the main 
body of legitimacy and belonging for both civic and ethnic nationalism. Thus, 
nationality and fu ll citizenship essentially go hand in hand -full, meaning on 
absolutely equal terms. At the same time, however, we must stress the 
definitional difference of civic and ethnic nationalism: while they can both 
have exclusionary expressions, the former allows outgroups to become 
members of the nation, even by abandonment of their national particularity, 
and the latter does not allow it by definition. This difference is very important, 
but it does not apply to all known cases of civic nationalism by definition: its 
essence has to be verified case by case.
There are not, I argue, two kinds of nationalism, but only one, comprised 
out of civic and ethnic elements, each of which is emphasised or eradicated 
according to the political and historical circumstances. The reason lies behind 
nationalism’s postulate that the nation ought to find political expression in its 
own state: this is the ‘nation-state’. The civic elements set the political, 
administrative, judicial and economic criteria of being part of the national 
state, which are common legal and political rights and duties for all members, 
common economy, residence within the country and territorial mobility, etc. 
These are in reality citizenship criteria, but they have become a prerequisite for 
the determination of the nation as nation-sfarfe, which nationalism dictates to be 
the consummation of an ethnic/national group. So, the criteria for participation 
in a state have come to merge with the definition of the nation as a social and 
cultural group. The ethnic elements of nationalism, on the other hand, set the 
cultural criteria that determine the nation’s distinctiveness, which are common 
language, tradition, myths and historical memories, a homeland, religion etc, 
and can appear either selectively or all together. Thus, according to the
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nationalistic ideology, both civic (that is, political) and ethnic (that is, cultural) 
elements are those that constitute and define the national state. Certain 
nationalisms may emphasise more on the civic or ethnic criteria, an emphasis 
often affected by the nations’ origins and history. For example, in France the 
state had predated the nation to a large extent, and so the civic criteria are more 
emphasised; in Germany, the process was inverted, and an appeal was made to 
ethnic criteria in order to unify the diverse kingdoms. The emphasis on each 
kind of criteria, though, is also a matter of other circumstances. It is 
characteristic that, in France of 1793, three years after the enactment of the 
liberal Constitution of 1790, French citizens were discriminated against and 
were used as scapegoats according to their nationality. Kristeva points out how 
foreigners were blamed for the bad news coming from the battlefields: “on 
April 5, 1793, Robespiere asks the Jacobins ‘to expel all foreign generals 
whom we have unwisely entrusted with the command of the army’” 
(1991:157). So, my argument is that civic and ethnic are two dimensions 
constitutive of nationalism, and also two analytical concepts within 
nationalism.
This lead us to my main argument that the distinction between civic and 
ethnic nationalism does not correspond to a distinction between benign and 
malign nationalism -where benign means democratic, integrative and tolerant, 
and malign means militant, authoritarian and exclusionary50. Nationalism is not 
a program of political conduct, but an ideology of national (self)determination: 
as indicated earlier51, whether the state is democratic, authoritarian or anything 
else is indifferent to nationalism. It is the political ideology of the government, 
economic factors and historical and other circumstances that determine the 
regime and the exercise of power. It would be more accurate to argue that this 
political power further determines the use of nationalistic rhetoric and practice 
that will be used in order to implement the politics chosen. This means that the 
policies of the state are chosen and/or justified in the name of the nation’s 
interests. Thus, the choice of whether the civic or ethnic dimension will be
50 The view that civic nationalism is democratic and tolerant while the ethnic one is authoritarian and 
exclusionist is widely expressed. See, for example, Ignatieff, 1993:3-6, and Jenkins & Sofos, 1996:21.
51 Current chapter, p.86.
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emphasised depends on the political tradition of the country but also on the 
contemporary circumstances and the choices of the leadership. Czech 
nationalism is considered as an example of ethnic nationalism but is both 
peaceful and democratic. Also, Pilsudski’s nationalism was inclusive as a 
movement, while also during his ruling in interwar Poland (from 1926 to 1935) 
all groups were attributed equal rights and duties within the state; however, 
Pilsudski was a virtual dictator who had come into power with a coup d’etat in 
1926.
Ignatieff argues that civic nationalism is democratic because it ‘Vests 
sovereignty in all of the people”, and that ethnic nationalism is more 
authoritative because it is a “form of democracy conducted in the interests of 
the ethnic majority” (Ignatieff, 1993:3,5). Such a categorisation is 
dysfunctional, however, because it merges the ideology of self-determination 
with the political ideology and the ruling of the government, with the direct 
consequence that many cases cannot be classified according to this dichotomy. 
If civic nationalism and democracy go hand in hand, then Pilsudski’s 
nationalism remains out of this typology for example. The same applies to 
democratic governments that do not ascribe full citizenship and political rights 
to their immigrants with a permanent residence (such as Germany and Greece 
until 1999). So, I would argue that the connection of certain qualities of 
nationalism with the political system or ideology of the government is not only 
irrelevant (as the ideology of nationalism can be accommodated within every 
other political ideology) but also dysfunctional, because it obscures the 
classification52 between civic and ethnic types of nationalism by setting 
additional criteria (criteria irrelevant to nationalistic ideology).
A last point that should be made regarding the categorisation of countries 
into this or the other type of nationalism is that these classifications must not be 
regarded as fixed categories. Czech nationalism may be today characterised as 
peaceful, but this is not a ‘fixed’ characteristic. It was only half a century ago, 
right after World War II, that the Czechs (the Czechoslovaks, to be accurate)
52 A classification already obscured because, as we saw, it is not easy to find examples of nationalism 
that are clearly civic or ethnic.
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begun their violent ethnic cleansing of the Sudeten Germans, which resulted in 
the expulsion of three million people. Similarly Germany, which generated 
WWII and provoked the cleansing and extermination of millions of Jews and 
Romas, is now a democratic country that respects human rights and works 
towards their implementation, in Germany and elsewhere. An other example is 
Yugoslavia, which was constituted as a multiethnic federation with relative 
success under a peculiar communist ruling, the collapse of which was 
accompanied with the destructive wars and genocides that erupted in the early 
1990s. These examples also illustrate my argument that both civic and ethnic 
nationalisms have benign and malign manifestations and outbreaks. This is not 
to deny that nationalism manifests itself in different ways while some of them 
are clearly preferable, but rather to emphasise that no type of nationalism is 
purely benign or malign, neither can they be a constant and given reality. The 
above examples illustrate that benign or malign manifestations of nationalism 
are not the property of any national state, political system etc, and that certain 
particular circumstances determine the type of nationalistic or other reactions 
that will prevail. Therefore, the fixed taxonomy of countries and case-studies 
into those two types of nationalism without regard to their temporal accuracy 
can deprive the existing typologies from their analytical validity and empirical 
utility.
As argued, the manifestations of nationalism are not a constant reality. 
Nationalism has always the inherent potentials to become militant or 
exclusionist, or to become democratic and inclusionary, whether its civic or 
ethnic elements prevail. That is because it unites ‘a people’ by separating the 
people: it is based on both positive and negative identifications, meaning 
positive self-image and negative image of the others. We can identify three 
cases in the swift of nationalistic manifestation. One is that, a case of civic 
nationalism (where civic elements prevail, meaning civic criteria of 
citizenship) may be replaced by ethnic nationalism, that is the ethnic elements 
may come to prevail. Another case is that a predominantly ethnic nationalism 
may evolve to predominantly civic. A third case is that, even when there is no 
swift in the type of nationalism, the national state may become militant against
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other states; thus, civic and ethnic nationalisms can both have militant 
outbreaks, whether in the name of their civic culture and tolerant civilisation or 
in the name of blood ties. The UK is considered as a characteristic example of 
civic nationalism with respect to multiculturalism, but it fought the Falklands 
war in the early 1980s in the name of the national ‘soil’ and interests. This 
example, however, should not be considered as characteristic of civic 
nationalism, but mainly characteristic of the easy exploitation of nationalistic 
rhetoric when ‘needed’, that is when the state’s leadership decides the 
implementation of a specific project -be it military, economic, or other. This is 
directly connected to my argument that the manifestations of nationalism are 
largely determined by the political ideology of the ruling elites and by specific 
policies that these elites want to implement. Yet, the easy manipulation of 
nationalistic rhetoric and sentiments in such cases53 is due to the psychological 
importance of the sentiments that nationalism appeals to.
Here lays the importance of the type of regime and government, and their 
choice of nationalistic rhetoric that will be used. As argued, nationalism 
satisfies the unconscious desires, particularly the desire to maintain the self- 
image uninterrupted and to exclude the Other, for the Other is a constant 
reminder of the impossibility to do that exactly. An individual has always the 
inherent potential to regress to a more destructive or exclusionist manifestation. 
For that reason, it is very important that the ruling elites do not take advantage 
of this psychological feature, or do not ‘regress’ themselves to their own 
inherent psychological desires. In that sense, the distinction between civic and 
ethnic types of nationalism is significant in describing the prevailing elements 
in a given nationalism54.
Consequently, a distinction between civic and ethnic nationalisms as 
benign and malign types is a misconception of nationalism. Some nationalistic 
movements are more militant or more extreme than others, but we should not 
equate nationalism with movements solely: it is also an ideology, a discourse
53 Here I refer to established national states. In the case of i.e. liberating nationalistic movements the 
political necessity is no less important than the psychological appeal of nationalism.
4 Only that, let us repeat this point, such typologies must not me treated as absolute categories, but as 
flexible ones, in time and space.
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and a sentiment, that may exist even when it is not severely demonstrated. 
‘Good’ and ‘bad’ nationalism is also a projection, of the good aspects ascribed 
to us, and the bad aspects projected bn to the others. These two features of the 
customary use of nationalism -first that it is not always manifest and 
recognised, and second that it is projected on others- are very important and 
need some further explanation and elaboration, as they have serious 
implications in understanding today’s politics. To clarify those, we shall refer 
to the significant contribution made by Michael Billing and his book Banal 
Nationalism.
B ill ina ’s Banal Nationalism
In his book Banal Nationalism, published in 1995, Michael Billing deals 
with the problem of everyday nationalism that passes through unnoticed, and 
he emphasises on Western states’ nationalism and the fact that it remains 
largely ignored in scholarship and everyday rhetoric. According to customary 
usage, Billing argues, nationalists are considered the separatists or the extreme 
rightists, and this view locates nationalism on the periphery -the periphery of 
the state (guerrilla) or the periphery of the West. This view is misleading 
because “it overlooks the nationalism of West’s nation-states. In a world of 
nation-states, nationalism cannot be confined to the peripheries” (1995:5). So, 
he analyses nationalism and its manifestations in established states of the 
Western world. The national states, once created/emerged, are reproduced in 
between times and are sustained as the ultimate body of loyalty and legitimacy. 
Not only the creation but also the reproduction of the national states is a sequel 
of nationalism and its constant function. Banal nationalism is the term Billing 
introduces to describe “the ideological habits which enable the established 
nations of the West to be reproduced” (1995:6). Banal nationalism reproduces 
habits of practice and belief, as well as sentiments, that perpetuate nationhood. 
Symbols that are used to symbolise the sacred character of the nation, like 
national flags outside public buildings, are “flagging” the nation and 
nationhood “unflaggingly”, that is, through a mild and unnoticed activity.
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Throughout his book Billing cites many examples of Western politicians 
who ‘play the patriotic card’, like the nationalistic rhetoric used by Bush and 
Thatcher during the Gulf and the Falklands wars respectively, and although 
they have used the rhetoric of nationhood repeatedly, they spot nationalistic 
feelings and manifestations beyond their rhetoric and their countries. Billing 
draws our attention on this: “Gaps in political language are rarely innocent. 
The case of nationalism is no exception. By being semantically restricted to 
small sizes and exotic colours, ‘nationalism’ becomes identified as problem: it 
occurs ‘there’ on the periphery, not ‘here’ at the centre. The separatists, the 
fascists and the guerrillas are the problem of nationalism. The ideological 
habits by which ‘our’ nations are reproduced as nations are unnamed and, 
thereby, unnoticed” (1995:6). So, he argues, there are two types of theorising 
about nationalism, the projecting and the naturalising theories of nationalism -  
which usually go hand in hand. Projecting theories equate nationalism with 
nationalistic movements and extreme irrational emotions. They take the world 
of ‘nation-states’ for granted, and they view nationalism as a disruption of our 
tranquillity by others. So, these theories are ‘rhetorical projections’: 
“nationalism as a condition is projected on to ‘others’; ‘ours’ is overlooked, 
forgotten, even theoretically denied” (1995:16). Naturalising theories of 
nationalism regard national loyalty as endemic to human condition; as such, 
“banal nationalism not only ceases to be nationalism, but it ceases to be a 
problem of investigation” (1995:16).
Thus, Billing’s insight offers a discerning account of the reality of 
nationalism in today’s politics because he does not confine nationalism to a 
movement or to extreme reactions. Nationalism is an everyday phenomenon 
that has, of course, its eruptions but it is not confined to them. It is, however, 
identified as something ‘bad’, a destructive force and a discriminatory feeling, 
and for that matter no one is willing to accept it for oneself, one’s nation, etc. 
On the contrary, there is a tendency to ascribe it to other people and nations; 
this way, one gets the extra satisfaction of being ‘more than good’ because, not 
only one is ‘good’, but the others are ‘bad’ at the same time55. Thus, I would
55 That is to get a positive self-evaluation through comparison, as argued earlier on this chapter, p.84.
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argue that this projection of nationalism finds a moderate expression in the 
distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism as a distinction between 
benign and malign forms of nationalism. This distinction is not real, as it has 
been explained thus far. Let us recapitulate the three main reasons. First, both 
civic and ethnic nationalisms divide individuals and peoples according to a set 
of criteria, whether political, economic or cultural56. Those criteria, however, 
are both civic and ethnic, for the two have merged under the influence of 
nationalism and its claim that the political and the cultural be congruent -  in 
the form of nation-cmd-state. So, the second reason is that civic and ethnic 
elements coexist in most nationalisms, not equally but also not in a stable 
analogy -o f  course, the analogy is important in rendering a given nationalism 
more integrative than another. Third, ‘civic nationalism’ can become as severe 
and harsh as other forms of nationalism, and it can prepare the ground for more 
militant manifestations. On this last remark, I would like to quote Billing and 
his view about banal nationalism, the everyday and unnoticed nationalism of 
Western national states, that are most commonly regarded as civic.
It would be wrong to assume that ‘banal nationalism’ is ‘benign’ because it 
seems to possess a reassuring normality, or because it appears to lack the 
violent passions of the extreme right... banality is not synonymous with 
harmlessness. In the case of the Western nation-states, banal nationalism can 
hardly be innocent: it is reproducing institutions which possess vast 
armaments. As the Gulf and the Falklands Wars indicated, forces can be 
mobilised without lengthy campaigns of political preparation. The armaments 
are primed, ready for use in battle. And the national populations appear also to 
be primed, ready to support the use of those armaments (1995:7).
56 One could rightly interrogate whether which of these criteria will be set is of importance, particularly 
in terms of the potentials for integration and peace. In theory, or rather in normative terms, the choice of 
the criteria used should make a difference in the final outcome and in making a type of nationalism less 
malign than another. In practice, however, ‘civic’ criteria can become equally discriminating and 
destructive as ‘criteria of blood’ are. For example, the political criterion of liberal as opposed to 
communist governance during the Cold War served as an exclusionary discriminating barrier between the 
Western allies and the ‘Great Satan’ (the USSR); in the US, in particular, an American communist was 
equated to a traitor. Also, in multicultural Canada, Quebec has a strong secessionist movement which 
forward claims at preserving their cultural and linguistic distinctiveness. In addition, in France the so- 
called ‘war on chador’ ( ‘la guerre de chador’) was initiated in 1989 when three Muslim girls were 
expelled from school because they were wearing the traditional chador. The examples stressed here are 
chosen from national states that are civic, so as to clearly show that even within them there are criteria 
and reasons for exclusion, secessions, etc.
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Banal nationalism is the reason why people are mobilisable without any 
lengthy campaigns: it is an everyday campaign of loyalty and commitment to 
the nation and its interests.
Because nationalism is identified as a negative concept, patriotism is 
used much more freely and broadly, since the latter is identified as a positive 
value. Of course, patriotism is a large issue itself, but it is largely connected to 
nationalism and should be viewed in connection to it. At present, we shall refer 
to patriotism in relation to nationalism, and particularly in relation to the point 
of discussion, which is benign and malign nationalism and nationalism as 
projection.
Patriotism and Nationalism
The word patriotism derives from the Greek pater, which means father, 
and patria (patrida) means the place of birth, the fatherland; patriotism is the 
“love and devotion to one’s own country”, as defined in the Oxford English 
Dictionary57. In this sense, it is a feeling of loyalty to the familiar environment, 
and it can be found in any ethnographic group, as Bar-Tal argues (1993:48). 
Patriotism is considered as a positive and desirable value, fundamental for the 
nation. It reflects beliefs and emotions, and it provides with a sense of 
belonging.
Patriotism is often used as opposed to other concepts, nationalism being 
one of them. The distinction made between patriotism and nationalism is a 
common one, although the terms used by scholars to describe them vary. So, 
we can find a distinction between patriotism and ethnocentrism or chauvinism 
(Bar-Tal, 1993:51), between constructive and blind patriotism (Schatz et all, 
1999:153), between genuine patriotism and pseudopatriotism (Adorno et all)58, 
or simply between patriotism and nationalism (Gellner, 1993:138). In essence, 
I argue, the distinction is between the positive and negative aspects that both 
nationalistic and patriotic feelings confer because both patriotism and
57 Oxford English Dictionary (1953), cited in Bar-Tal, 1993:46.
58 The term used by Adorno, Flenkel-Brunswik, Levinson and Sanford (The Authoritarian Personality,
New York: Harper, 1950) to describe ‘blind attachment to certain national cultural values, uncritical
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nationalism can be defined as ‘love and devotion to one’s own country’. So, on 
the one hand, genuine, constructive patriotism is regarded as love for the 
country and attachment to national values; it is characterised by “critical 
loyalty” (Schatz, 1999:153) and criticism driven by a desire for positive 
change, as well as respect for other nations and tolerance towards outgroups. 
Nationalism, chauvinism, ethnocentrism and blind patriotism, on the other 
hand, are described as the blind attachment to national values, characterised by 
uncritical positive evaluation, intolerance of criticism and rejection of other 
nations. We can clearly see that, patriotism and nationalism are both described 
as attachment to the nation, the country and the people, and devotion to the 
national values. They represent the two sides of the same coin: patriotism 
describes all the positive outcomes of such an attachment, while nationalism all 
the negative. Is such an acute dichotomisation correct, or is it perhaps an 
oversimplification?
I believe that the distinction between patriotism and nationalism is not so 
clear-cut. We must bear in mind the distinction between national and 
‘nationalistic’ identity, because the distinction between patriotism and 
nationalism is analogous. Patriotism describes feelings and beliefs that derive 
from attachment to a country. It is a natural attachment with the place one is 
bom and is familiar with, an identification with the ‘fatherland’ that has always 
been appealing for peoples’ sentiments, as it has been widely expressed 
through songs, narratives, poems, and through history as well. It is a ‘natural’ 
attachment in the sense that identification with the patria is a primary 
sentiment of affiliation with what is familiar and, also, connected with the first 
experiences in life. It is also the milieu where other attachments and 
identifications take place.
Love for the country, and love for the patriots (the fellow countrymen) 
that comes as a secondary identification, are positively evaluated qualities. 
Patriotism, however, can have some negative aspects, mainly derived by the 
need to evaluate the country and the group members positively. Thus, self-
conformity with the prevailing group ways, and rejection of other nations as outgroups” (p. 107). It is cited 
in Bar-Tal, 1993:47.
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criticism, aiming at the amelioration and positive change, is welcomed, while 
the same is not true when the criticism comes from outgroups; their motives 
are usually questioned and their judgment denied. Patriotism is connected to 
national identity, to its social aspect, and is characterised by all the positives 
and negatives that characterise national identity. For example, it provides with 
a sense of belonging, but it also delineates ‘us’ and ‘them’. It is the same 
psychological attachment as regionalism and localism: s feeling of attachment 
towards the particular place of origin (town island, region) within a country.
Nationalism has an analogous relation with patriotism as ‘nationalistic 
identity’ with national identity. It is not something different from patriotism, 
but it is something more. It is a sentiment, like patriotism is, but it is also an 
ideology and a movement and thus it has an additional nuance. Nationalism 
absorbs patriotism, for it identifies the country with the nation, as Demertzis 
argues (1996:202). As a political ideology, it transforms the social attachment 
to a country into a value that is obligatory -if you are not loyal to your 
country/nation you are a traitor! It also transforms the nation into a political 
unit, the ‘nation-state’, that is ascribed the ultimate value and importance. 
According to Deutch, the difference is that, patriotism appeals to all the 
inhabitants of a country, irrespective of ethnic origin, while nationalism 
appeals to all members of a national and ethnic community, irrespective of 
their country of residence59. This is an important distinction but not so clear- 
cut: both have a territorial aspect, for it is the country of origin that counts as a 
criterion. Also, patriotism as Deutch describes it is quite similar to ‘civic 
nationalism’.
Billing argues that “there is no direct psychological evidence to 
distinguish the rational state of patriotism and the irrational force of 
nationalism” (1995:56). Indeed, they have the same psychological foundations. 
Sacrifice, for instance, is a ‘heroic’ value, a merit that a good patriot, and all 
nationalists, ought to possess -nationalists must be good patriots by definition, 
although in reality their actions may harm the nation. Identification and group 
attachment are essential for nationalism (as sentiment) and patriotism; only that
59 Quoted in Demertzis, 1996:204.
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the former is differentiated by its political dimension. It is important to note 
that in most cases they appear interchangeably, like national and ‘nationalistic’ 
identity do. Patriotism is a necessary prerequisite of nationalism: it is the first 
step towards sentimental attachment with one’s place of origin. Patriotic 
feelings may easily regress to nationalistic feelings -and actions- under certain 
circumstances and the necessary influence (nationalistic rhetoric).
The greatest difference between patriotism and nationalism is functional: 
it is derived by their use in everyday rhetoric and propaganda. Patriotism is 
considered as a healthy identification with the nation, as a rational state of 
mind that generates positive sentiments and great deeds. Nationalism is 
considered as a pathological fusion with the nation, as an irrational force that 
generates discrimination, violence and exclusion. As a consequence, 
individuals, movements and nations often reserve the term ‘patriotist’ for 
themselves, and easily ascribe the term ‘nationalist’ to others. As Billing 
argues, “‘our’ loyalties to ‘our’ nation can be defended, even praised. A 
rhetorical distinction is necessary for accomplishing this defence. ‘Our’ 
nationalism is not presented as nationalism, which is dangerously irrational, 
surplus and alien... ‘Our’ nationalism appears as ‘patriotism’ -a  beneficial, 
necessary...force” (1955:55, emphasis added). Let us stress an example. In 
January 1996, British newspapers commented ironically on the dispute of 
Greece and Turkey over the Imia (a tiny island/rock), which they thought 
incomprehensible and irrational, and also nationalistic. Most of the same 
newspapers, however, supported the war in the Falklands, a tiny territory miles 
away from Britain, as a defence of their national identity, as a reasonable and 
patriotic operation that intended to ‘do justice’. This is an example of how 
people, without difficulty, identify the others as nationalists, when they 
(believe that they) act irrationally, but at the same time they perceive their own 
actions as rational and fully justifiable in every instance.
* *
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Having finished with the above constants that relate to the issue of 
‘benign or malign nationalism’, I would like to add the following concluding 
remarks. It has been argued thus far that the distinction between benign and 
malign types of nationalism is incorrect. Conceptually, civic nationalism is 
more assimilating and less serious in its consequences that ethnic nationalism 
is60. However, this does not mean that civic nationalism is benign nationalism, 
but only that it is normatively preferable in comparison to ethnic nationalism. 
So, however comparatively preferable at the normative level, civic nationalism 
is not benign nationalism. Civic and ethnic are two sub-categories of 
nationalism, and not two independent categories themselves. In that sense, I 
have refrained from referring to any type of nationalism in a positive way. In 
practical terms, we can see that the distinction between civic and ethnic 
nationalism and their consequences is even weaker, not only in the sense that 
civic nationalism can also have disastrous outcomes, but also in the sense that 
the distinction itself is not practically useful. The reason is that, there are very 
few countries that could be considered as cases of civic nationalism -  
considering as civic cases not only those that are exclusively civic but also 
those where civic characteristics prevail significantly for a considerable time. 
Such cases are the USA, Australia, Holland, France; also, Canada, UK, Spain -  
although the latter have recently had ‘ethnic type’ problems because of the 
cases of Quebec, Scotland, and Basque country61. Perhaps it would not be an 
exaggeration to say that clear civic cases are a minority compared to the overall 
number of national states that exist today (taking into account the 189 member 
states of the UN). Ethnic and civic elements are most likely to intermingle and 
coexist, however in different proportions; and, if we add the various regime 
types that combine with any one of these nationalisms, it is certainly invalid to 
connect specific types of nationalisms and regimes together in fixed categories.
Certainly, there are more and less disastrous manifestations of 
nationalism. War is certainly more devastating than looking down on a
60 I refer here to consequences concerning tolerance and integration, and not to the regime-type that is 
usually associated with it: as argued, we should not consider that democracy or any other political system 
is connected to any type of nationalism.
61 Canada, in particular, has nullified the assumption that law, tolerance, economic growth etc account 
for stable, successful civic nationalisms.
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foreigner, and ethnic cleansing more ferocious than banal nationalism. Of 
course we consider verbal discrimination less harmful than killing, national 
pride than racism, but they too are closely connected: the one precedes the 
other. The ‘Aryan race’ is an extreme manifestation of national pride, and 
genocide an excessive conception of the other as an enemy. Thus, what seems 
to be a benign nationalism can actually be the precondition for more extreme 
manifestations to come to the fore and, as we can see from multiple historical 
examples, they actually do come to the fore -and vice versa. So, we should 
refrain from referring to good and bad nationalisms, both because such a 
distinction is misleading (as nationalism includes both good and bad 
manifestations), and because it escapes a deeper understanding of nationalism 
and of the reasons that make it appear so diverse. Nationalism is an ideology, a 
discourse and a sentiment that paves the way for nationalistic movements. The 
Second World War, for instance, was the peak of the iceberg; an analysis of the 
causes has to search for what lies beneath, even if it is not so destructively 
manifested. Also, we have to look beyond the evident political expressions and 
search for their appeal to the people. For example, although Pilsudski’s 
nationalism was integrative, it was only few years after his death that three 
million Jews were executed in Poland62. Thus an analysis of nationalism, and 
national identity, has to take under consideration every aspect of it -  
particularly the seemingly innocent ones. Hence the need to avoid such 
conceptions o f ‘good’ and ‘bad’, especially as far as nationalism is concerned.
Not all of us become extreme nationalists, of course. Individuation and 
personal history plays an important role in that. Education, culture, social 
activities, etc. shape different personalities and different needs. Childhood and 
personal history -meaning first identifications, childhood traumas, repressed 
desires, and fixations- are of utmost importance for the personal leanings 
towards nationalism of each individual. Similar factors, by analogy, apply to 
nations as well. Such factors are the level of education and cultivation, the 
political institutions, but also the past history of a nation: collective traumas
62 Certainly, Poland was under the German occupation; however, the extent of Jewish genocide is
connected with the underlying Polish anti-Semitism. There is much evidence today that, while in other
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and historical facts that have ‘stigmatised’ the collective unconscious of the 
nation. Many of them can be found in myths and narratives. However, as far as 
collectivities are concerned, these factors are not so important per se, meaning 
that they cannot provoke nationalistic reactions in a remote present if emphasis 
is not laid upon them. For example, a past event can acquire significance if and 
when it becomes the centre of successful nationalistic propaganda. Here lays 
the major determinant for the kind of nationalism that will be developed or 
articulated, and for the swift from mild and tolerant to aggressive 
manifestations of nationalism: whether emphasis will be laid upon them. This 
is a political determinant that refers to the state apparatus and its leadership, the 
role of the ruling government and the political movements that may develop 
within the national state. Psychological determinants are very important, as we 
have seen, but the major cause in the swift from one political condition and 
expression to another is the goal aimed at and the means chosen to achieve 
them. Also, there are other circumstances or contingencies that can account for 
a nationalistic revival. Such circumstances include the political and economic 
situation of the nation, international circumstances (for example, if a 
neighbouring country articulates nationalistic rhetoric that may give rise to 
similar reactions in one’s country), as well as social and political coincidences. 
These can be best analysed and explained when we have a particular 
nation/region on focus and, thus, we can answer the reasons for a nationalistic 
reaction in a given place and time63.
Let me stress an example regarding the political determinant of the ruling 
government. It was a political decision of Thatcher’s government to employ a 
highly nationalistic discourse during the Falklands war in order to gain support 
for the military means used to achieve that political (and economic) decision. 
In the same country, almost two decades later, the current government of the 
Labour party tries to gain support for another decision (to join the Economic 
and Monetary Union in the EU) with the use of several arguments, some of 
them with conflicting logics from the standpoint of our discussion about civic
European occupied countries many Jews were hided or helped to escape by the locals, in Poland this was 
not the case. The scale of genocide in Poland verifies these subsequent findings.
63 These ‘particular circumstances’ will be analysed in the following chapter.
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and ethnic elements: on the one hand, the support is invited in the name of 
Europe’s further integration and economic (and political) cooperation with 
members of the EU, while on the other hand support is invited in the name of 
the preservation of the British interests, of a stronger Britain within the EU64. 
Thus, the argumentation used each time is usually the one considered to be 
more successful, with no particular commitment to civic criteria by definition 
even from considerably civic national states. So, what really triggers a 
nationalistic reaction is the political decision to manipulate the national(istic) 
feelings of the national group, a decision based on the realisation that the 
appeal to national identity is particularly successful.
Thus, the political determinant, that is the choices of the ‘state’, of the 
leadership of the national state, is the one that makes a substantial difference in 
the transformation or the swift of emphasis towards a more or less nationalistic 
rhetoric (or practice)65 -without disregard for other, particular circumstances 
(as will be analysed in the following chapter). Hence the various roles and uses 
of nationalism in different political and historical contexts66. It is interesting to 
see, however, how a nationalistic rhetoric manages to appeal to the members of 
a nation or movement. It was mentioned a few paragraphs above that, by 
analogy to individual fixations, the nation’s history is important for its leanings 
towards nationalism. Collective traumas in particular can often explain to a 
certain extend the success of a nationalistic movement or the spread of 
nationalistic discourse within a given nation or ethnic group. So, it would be
64 See the press conference of the Prime Minister Tony Blair on the 20th of June 2002.
65 ‘Nationalistic’ here does not need any other qualification (i.e. civic, ethnic or other) as the term is 
always used to describe practices that would be described as ethnic. In practical terms, the 
characterisation of a national state as nationalistic means that it emphasises its ethnic components; civic 
nationalism is no even referred to as nationalism. For example, a nationalist leader is not every leader of a 
national state, but the one that expresses an intense ethnic nationalistic discourse (meaning that, no 
distinction is made saying ‘He is a nationalist, yet a civic one’; similarly, when we characterise a national 
state as nationalistic, we never qualify whether we mean civic or ethnic). So, the distinction between civic 
and ethnic nationalism seems like a distinction between non-nationalism and nationalism (in the every 
day use of the terms in politics, in journalism, even in academia). This brings to the fore once more the 
projection argument described before: that is, by distinguishing between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ nationalism, 
and preserving the ‘good’ one for oneself, one projects the whole ideal that nationalism expresses onto the 
others. It is indicative that those countries that are considered to be civic instances are to a large extent a 
(loose) alliance and they also tend to define the very terms of civic and ethnic.
66 For a detailed analysis of various nationalisms and the contexts within which they emerged see 
Breuilly (1993).
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useful to end this chapter by explaining the meaning of nations’ ‘childhood’ 
and of common traumas in their history.
Collective Unconscious
The course of a nation is celebrated in historical documents, narratives, 
myths, songs, etc. These are its history, its past, and they are inscribed in the 
minds of its members. This is a past that only members can get hold of, for it 
includes all the perceptions the nation has for itself and the others, along with 
its culture and mentality. This past can be totally held only by members of a 
nation because it is quite different from the knowledge one has for other 
countries, knowledge that comes from genuine interest, visits and/or study of 
historiography. It includes this knowledge as well, but it is more than that: it is 
also the mentality generated by this knowledge and by other perceptions, 
myths, narratives and lived experiences. This is the collective unconscious of a 
nation. As it has been indicated earlier on this thesis67, Freud has used the term 
collective unconscious to describe an archaic heritage whose traces are to be 
found in a “collective mind, in which mental processes occur just as they do in 
the mind of an individual” (Freud, 1913:220). The word ‘collective 
unconscious’ should not become subject to misinterpretation and be understood 
as referring to one unconscious, group mind, that ‘we all’ collectively possess, 
which is not the meaning that Freud had specified. He rather talked about the 
appropriation of the same elements in the unconscious of each member, 
individually, elements that are commonly held because of identification. These 
elements include the history of the nation, its relation to other nations, its 
traditions, its language etc, which are elements that can easily identified and 
described, but also myths, narratives, perceptions and certain mentalities that 
are acquired and understood mainly through the experience of common living. 
So, the collective unconscious rather connotes the existence or knowledge
67 I have referred to the ‘collective unconscious’ in chapter 2, p.42-43. See references on the same subject 
in Brown, 1961:108.
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within each individual of these elements that are common for all members of 
the nation -or simply the capability to identify and understand them.
Parts of the collective unconscious of a nation are major unpleasant 
events, disasters, defeats etc. that -occasionally and under certain 
circumstances- can be experienced in the present as traumatic events. As in 
individual cases, when the past is experienced as a trauma it generates extreme 
and pathological attitudes. Like a person, a whole nation may regress in a 
pathological situation, where it will seek to boost self-esteem and repair earlier 
narcissistic damage to national image -which is self-image as well68. Falk 
analyses this in his article ‘Unconscious Aspects of the Arab-Israeli Conflict’, 
where he argues that major traumas in the history of the Jews and the 
Palestinians have affected their present situation and led into a conflict. 
“Zionists”, he argues, “wished to restore to the Jews their great historical 
losses...They wished to make sure that the Jewish future was not like the past, 
yet they longed for past glories at the same time...From the psychoanalytic 
viewpoint the Zionist longing was like that of a child for its split-off Great 
Good Early Mother, which exists only in the child’s phantasy...Those who 
came in Palestine longed for a new life in a new motherland...They certainly 
did not wish to find brothers or cousins in Palestine who would be their rivals 
for the love of their ideal motherland”. Arab historiography, on the other hand, 
blamed external forces for their failures and defeats, and many of them “still 
wish to turn back the historical clock and restore the medieval Arab glory” 
(Falk, 1992:216-7, 218). This last comment, about the wish to restore a 
glorious past, is common in many cases of nationalistic exaltations.
Berlin argues that nationalism “usually seems to be caused by wounds, 
some form of collective humiliation” (1990:245). Past losses in a nation’s 
history become traumas and have an unpleasant effect because -and when- 
they are experienced as present losses. These we can call collective traumas, 
because these are not traumas that each member of the nation necessarily has 
(although this can also be the case), but they are traumas that the nation has, as 
a collectivity, as part of its history. By making this distinction I intend to allow
68 Ulman & Abse (1982) refer to the individual regression in group pathology. See particularly p. 638.
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an outlet for individuation: for, a common trauma is one that everybody within 
the nation has, while a collective one is one that the nation as a collectivity has 
and someone can distance him/herself from. Such traumas can be 
(re)experienced in the present when the past is imaginary experienced as 
present (Castoriadis, 1985:197)69. Similarly, Castoriadis argues that an incident 
is not traumatic by itself (with the exception of marginal events), and it is 
experienced as traumatic only if an individual ascribes to it extreme importance 
(1985:200)70. The same applies to collective traumas of an ethnic group or a 
nation. If a charismatic leader or an influential group that can exercise 
propaganda have experienced a past loss as a major traumatic event, they can 
transmit their perception to the nation, at least to a large part of it, provided that 
it is indeed a major event that provokes sorrow to them. In periods of crises this 
can become a reference point with mortal consequences. In the Serbian 
propaganda, for example, the ‘Kosovo myth’, which referred to a major 
traumatic event in the Serbian history, exercised great emotional appeal to the 
Serbian people, particularly in a time of violent turbulences and change.
Nations try to keep their memories ‘alive’ through the creation of 
monuments and commemorations. These are like symptoms in individuals, 
which are not always traumatic but reveal their history or important parts of it. 
The function and significance of these commemorations varies from person to 
person, as it varies for the nation as a whole in different periods. These 
commemorations can be symbolic representations of an event that is 
considered as a landmark in the nation’s history (like a revolution), and its 
celebration may signify the foundation of its modem history, a great 
achievement, a significant loss etc. These symbolic representations can take an
69 Marx underlined in The Capital that, the memoiy of past generations puts an extraordinaiy weight in 
the consciousness of the living, as Castoriadis refers in 1985:197.
70 This argument closely relates to Freud’s ‘economic’ factor in explaining the individual’s formation of 
symptoms. He argues in Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis that the formations of symptoms and 
libido’s regress to repressed fixations need an additional determinant to be explained, a quantitative 
condition (1917c:420). According to this “economic line of approach” (p.421), an individual may fall into 
‘mental illness’ when he/she reach the amount of cathexis that can tolerate and cannot master an 
additional amount of excitation. So, the difference is made when more cathexis is required and the 
individual cannot correspond to it; this quantitative factor is different among individuals. This economic 
approach is indispensable in order to explain conflicting situations and must accompany the dynamic ones 
(which can be summarised in the qualitatively endeavour to obtain pleasure and avoid unpleasure). See 
Freud, 1917c: 420-422.
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imaginary significance, and be experienced as a present misdeed or as a past 
glory that has to be restored. Freud has shown how an event can be 
experienced quite differently, individually, in relation to his hysterical patients. 
He writes in Five Lectures o f Psychoanalysis'.
our hysterical patients suffer from reminiscences. Their symptoms are residues 
and mnemic symbols of particular (traumatic) experiences. We may perhaps 
obtain a deeper understanding of this kind of symbolism if we compare them 
with other mnemic symbols in other fields. The monuments and memorials 
with which large cities are adorned are also mnemic symbols...[i.e. in London 
the Charing Cross, and the Monument]. These monuments, then, resemble 
hysterical symptoms in being mnemic symbols; up to that point the comparison 
seems justifiable. But, what should we think of a Londoner who paused to-day 
in deep melancholy before the memorial of Queen Eleanor’s funeral [Charring 
Cross]...or of a Londoner who shed tears before the Monument that 
commemorates the reduction of his beloved metropolis to ashes although it has 
long risen again in far greater brilliance? Yet, every single hysteric and 
neurotic behaves like these two unpractical Londoners. Not only do they 
remember painful experiences of the remote past, but they still cling to it 
emotionally; they cannot get free o f the past and for its sake they neglect what 
is real and immediate. This fixation of mental life to pathogenic traumas is one 
of the most significant and practically important characteristics of neurosis 
(1910a: 16, emphasis added).
Thus, we can see how the commemoration of the same event can be the origin 
for surpassing it through its symbolic representation, while it can also function 
as an imaginary re-experiencing of the past for some people or for a whole 
nation in a given period. Nationalism resembles a pathology that is collectively 
experienced by members of a nation: it enhances group self-esteem and it 
intensifies emotions, exactly because it appeals to a collectivity rather than a 
person. Particularly in periods of nationalistic exaltations, past memories and 
traumas become hysterical symptoms, and members of a nation regress to them 
collectively, meaning each one separately but all together simultaneously. In 
‘normal’ conditions, common traumatic experiences and nationalistic rhetoric 
appeal mainly to individuals whose own personal history is traumatic and they 
seek for an outlet for aggression, a sense of ‘whole’, etc.
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It has been argued before that a common characteristic of most 
nationalisms is the wish to restore a glorious past. Another common 
characteristic, connected to this one, is the denial of the past loses. This is a 
fundamental characteristic of the unconscious: denial of unpleasant facts that 
disturb the pleasure principle71. Thus, frustration provoked by an event 
combined with the inability to accept it has as a result its denial. A 
consequence of this is the inability to mourn. Mourning is a process that has a 
cathartic effect. It requires, however, that one first acknowledges a problem 
and accepts its existence, which is a prerequisite for mourning for it and, in the 
sequel, for getting over it. Mourning has a regenerative role in our lives, argues 
Falk, as without mourning our losses we are stuck in the past (1992:238-240). 
Without mourning (or with ineffective mourning) we keep being overwhelmed 
by feelings associated to a specific event, such as anxiety, guilt, anger or 
sorrow. ‘There is no moving beyond without some experience of mourning” 
(1995:537), argues Ross, a process by which an individual or group comes to 
terms with a significant loss.
Volkan has suggested that objects and processes, like monuments and 
rituals, that link the past to the present -and to the future- can assist group 
mourning. Thus, monuments to the victims of Holocaust, for example, have 
also a cleansing, therapeutic effect72. ‘Also’ means that they can have another 
effect as well. So, Ross argues that “communal rituals of mourning can also 
exacerbate tension and communicate intense threat, for what is celebrated as a 
victory by one side is often marked as a bitter defeat by another” (1995:538). 
This is also true because monuments and rituals can have a symbolic meaning 
or an imaginary one for certain people or for a nation as a whole (for example, 
they can just remind a historical event, or generate emotional exaltation about 
it). Particularly about rituals, Schopflin has suggested that, “acceptance of and 
participation in [it]...is vital, if not obligatory, if the system is to be sustained, 
but belief in the ritual is less important...” (1997:21); rituals provide for a sense 
of strengthening of the community and the individual’s role in it, without
71 See the analysis of this point in chapter 1, page 19-20; also Freud, 1911,1915d, and 1920.
72 The example is stressed by Ben-Amos, 1999:298.
imposing uniformity of belief. By analogy to the children, we can say that 
ritualisation is a useful, adoptive mechanism; nevertheless, excessive 
ritualisation is a manifestation of anxiety, as Parin argues (1988:101-102). For 
example, in an era of nationalism, national parades, commemorations, 
monuments etc. have always the potential to regress into hysteric symptoms. In 
any case, as Anderson argues, “no more arresting emblems of the modern 
culture of nationalism exist than cenotaphs and tombs of Unknown Soldiers” 
(1991:9). These are the heroic ancestors, with whom one -the members of a 
nation- identifies, either symbolically or imaginary, and their tombs are 
unificatory symbols, full of significance and emotional fascination.
Significant tumpoints in the history of a nation are inscribed in myths 
and narratives. These myths can also be manipulated for reasons of political 
expediency. For that reason, they are usually part of nationalistic rhetoric.
Myths and N ational Identity
Myths have a particularly strong and mostly unconscious influence in 
peoples’ (national) identity, as they contain much of the perceptions a nation 
has for itself, and for nationhood in particular. A myth is a “legendary narrative 
that represents part of the beliefs of the people or explains natural phenomena 
[;]...it does not require empirical proof...The original purpose of a myth is to 
provide meaning” (Schutz, 1993:96). A myth is a narrative rich in ideas, 
images and phantasies, and it is thus attractive to everybody. Lipowatz and 
Demertzis explain that the myth is an autonomous necessity of the human 
psyche: it does not try to clarify meaning, but to symbolically mediate humans 
and their world and to familiarise them with their own contradictions (1994:52- 
53). It is interesting that primitive myths show remarkable similarity in content. 
As Brown argues, “accounts of patricide and incest with the mother, castration, 
punishment and reparation, matricide, cannibalism, and dismemberment, form 
part of the mythology of all people”; psychoanalysis explains that by noting 
that “such phantasies are universal during the earlier years of life” (1961:115). 
Otto Rank has similarly argued that myths on national heroes are “especially
137
invested with fantastic features, which, in different peoples, even though 
widely separated by space and entirely independent of each other, present a 
baffling similarity and...a literal conformity” (emphasis added)73.
Myths reveal peoples’ self perceptions, wishes and fears; so does fixation 
on certain myths. Fixation on myths does not tell us the ‘true’ story of a people, 
but reveals those elements that are of particular importance, those that 
influence most their self-perceptions and mentality. Myths are not historical 
truths anyway; they contain contradictions and usually naturalise the facts. 
Thus, they are “immune to criticism” (Schutz, 1993:96). In addition, they 
appeal to emotions and not to rational thinking. These characteristics make 
them easy to use for mass manipulation and demagoguery. Their use in the 
public sphere for propaganda is also due to their uncritical acceptance because 
people do not understand the metaphor and take it literally; this way, they 
confuse its symbolic use with reality (Lipowatz & Demertzis, 1994:55).
In a taxonomy of the myths of nationhood, Schopflin refers to the 
following categories of myths, categories that may overlap and even co-exist. 
Myths of territory (of motherland, the land of purity; they are usually 
connected with myths of a ‘Golden Age’); myths of redemption and suffering 
(in which the suffering will soon come to an end and the nation “will be 
redeemed or, indeed, redeem the world” [1997:29]); myths of unjust treatment 
(mistreatment that has caused the suffering); myths of election and civilising 
mission (‘chosen nation’, for any reason, meaning because God chose us, 
because of ‘civic qualities’, because ‘we are not racists’ etc.); myths of military 
valour (emphasises heroism); myths of ethnogenesis and antiquity; myths of 
kinship and shared descent (genetic transmission of the group’s qualities). 
These myths that Schopflin mentions are all integral part of nationalistic 
rhetoric and are used widely by all national states. Smith (1997:48-51) includes 
some of their content as the functions of the ‘Golden Age’: their function is to 
enhance integrity and cohesion. These myths are also widely used in political 
campaigns, to the extent that the best way to influence the electorate has 
proved to be the appeal to emotions. As an example, in a thirty minutes film
73 Rank, Otto (1914): The Myth and the Birth o f the Hero, New York, p.l; in Freud, 1939:247.
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produced for Reagan’s election campaign in 1984, analysed by Schutz, Reagan 
appears as “an ‘American Hero’ who personifies traditional values such as 
religious beliefs, patriotism, happy family, life and liberty, in other words as a 
true representative of the American Dream. That picture is painted against a 
background that shows America as a strong nation which has regained the 
military and economic power it once had’ (1993:97, emphasis added).
The above example is not only one of a specific myth used in order to 
mobilise an ethnic or national group. It is rather a usual nationalistic mythology 
found in the nationalistic rhetoric -presented as patriotic- of most established 
national states. Particular myths are used in more specific circumstances, and 
they are understood only by, or they appeal only to the national group. The 
myth of Kosovo is an example of a myth used effectively by Milosevic, for it 
was a myth that had influenced to a large extend and had shaped the feeling of 
a constant threat to the Serbian national identity. It was also a myth with a clear 
demarcation of ‘us’ and ‘them’, and it could be used to present clear parallels 
to the given conflictual situation during the 1990s. In addition, it referred to a 
great loss, a loss not only articulated and used by Milosevic, but felt as such by 
the Serbians as well (which is prerequisite for a loss to be experienced as a 
collective trauma and, thus, be mobilising, as indicated earlier)74. So, a myth 
can be effective in mobilising people only if it is still ‘alive’ in the collective 
unconscious of the group (and will be chosen if it meets political interests). Of 
course, other factors matter, factors that cannot be generalised, as they are apt 
to the particular space and time.
A last issue that should be stressed at this point concerns the selective 
‘forgetting’ and ‘remembering’ of certain aspects in the collective unconscious 
of a nation that conveniently allow national narratives, myths, history etc. to be 
presented without contradictions75.
74 For more details on this myth see Hastings, 1997:190.
75 As it was argued about myths, the unconscious has the ability to overlook contradictions. However, the 
process of selective memory and stereotyping that will be mentioned now refers to an additional process 
that creates a unitary historical narrative, which can include history and myths that suppresses 
contradictions even to the conscious thinking.
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Selective  M em ory and Stereotypes
Members of a nation have a collective unconscious, that is the memory of 
the nation’s past. The formation of this collective unconscious involves 
collective remembering and forgetting. It resembles, by analogy, childhood 
memories, memories that an individual has of his/her childhood. Childhood 
memories, Freud has argued, are often mere phantasies formed in a later date; 
they are memories “elicited at a later age, when childhood is already past”, and 
they are often falsified because they “are put into the service of later trends”. 
Similarly, he argues about nations, contemporary writing of a nation’s past is 
inevitably influenced by present perceptions, beliefs and wishes, “for many 
things had been dropped from the nation’s memory, while others were 
distorted, and some remains of the past were given a wrong interpretation in 
order to fit in with contemporary ideas” (1910b:83). Thus, Freud argues that “a 
man’s conscious memory of the events of his maturity is in every way 
comparable to the first kind of historical writing [as a chronicle of current 
events], while the memories that he has of his childhood correspond, as far as 
their origins and reliability is concerned, to the history of a nation’s earliest 
days, which was compiled later for tendentious reasons” (1910b: 84). However, 
he stresses, we should not reject those phantasies, or the legends and traditions 
of a nation, because they do present some reality of the past, on which latter 
distortions (‘forgettings’) have occurred.
Shared memory is produced through ‘calendar custom’ or ‘ritualised 
rememberance’, as Noys and Abrahams (1999), and Zerubavel (1995) have 
called it respectively. It is the collective repetition of practices that produces 
common customs and common memories, which are mainly defined by these 
practices. Rituals, commemorations, museums etc. safeguard peoples’ memory 
and create stronger bonds in the community of the nation. Shared memory is a 
“complex dialectic of remembering and forgetting” (Billing, 1995:37), which 
involves keeping the memories that sustain ‘our good self-image’ for our 
group/ nation, and remembering the ‘bad’ aspects of other nations’ history. 
Renan calls forgetting an historical error (1996:45). An error that is not 
contingent, as its name indicates: what is usually ‘forgotten’ is the violent
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origin and past actions of the nation that are occasionally glorified while
7 f \simultaneously condemned in other nations’ history . Thus, a nation’s 
perceptions about itself and the others are formed through a selective
appropriation of history and sustained through the selective ritualisation of its 
memories. Political and historical myths are created and advertised through this 
process as well.
A consequence of this selective appropriation of history is stereotyping. 
Stereotypes are “shared cultural perceptions of social groups” (Billing,
1995:80), both about themselves and about other groups. They are, however, 
mostly ascribed to outgroups, as Billing argues, because ‘our’ group is usually 
considered as the standard, the ‘normal’. This way groups maintain a positive 
group identity by comparison to contrasting others. Stereotypes are not static, 
however, and their content may change through a constant process of 
(re)defining ourselves and the others. Stereotyping is linked to categorisation 
and self-categorisation, which is divisive. “The theory of self-categorisation”, 
Billing argues, “focuses upon the first person singular: it is connected with the 
declarations of identity which ‘I’ make about myself...Nationalism is, above 
all, an ideology of the first person plural” (Billing, 1995:70).
National stereotypes concern a perception of one’s nation and of other
nations. It is important to note that stereotypes are usually self-confirming, as
Lipman has argued and recent studies confirm. Hirsberg (1993) conducted a 
study upon US university students and their national perceptions, which 
confirmed the view that people tend to recall stereotype-consistence 
information and to forget stereotype-inconsistent information. The results of 
this survey are very interesting. The vast majority of the Americans appear to 
be proud to be Americans, as Hirsberg concludes, with basic elements of 
American image to be freedom and democracy. Events and criticisms that have 
threatened their patriotic self-image (like the coup-d’etat in Guatemala or the
76 Whole nations tend to ‘forget’ their own history and nationalisms and criticise that of the others. For 
example, Western countries often criticise the nationalistic eruptions and conflicts in Eastern Europe after 
1989 as representative of a lower level of civil society, democratisation, education, etc. Nevertheless, they 
forget this way, firstly, that Western nation-states were not formed in a more civilised way but they 
followed similar paths more than a century ago, and secondly, that similar nationalisms and conflicts 
within Western countries are constantly to the fore (Northern Ireland, Quebec, Catalonia, Belgium, etc).
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Vietnam war) were rarely remembered or interpreted as antidemocratic or 
oppressive. Subjects of the survey “recalled stereotype-consistent information 
(US support for democracy or opposition to communism) far more readily than 
they recalled inconsistent information [US antidemocratic interventions]”. 
Information given was interpreted in such a way as not to threaten the national 
image these students had for their nation and themselves. So, “helpful 
behaviour [i.e. airlifting supplies] was considered to be naturally American and 
voluntary, while a harmful act [i.e. bombs dropping] tended to be viewed as 
uncharacteristic behaviour the US had been forced to engage in” (Hirsberg, 
1993:96). As this survey shows most clearly, stereotyping has serious political 
implications, as it can be used in order to secure support for domestic and 
external policies, for mass mobilisation, and for political propaganda.
*  *  *
To conclude, I would like to make a brief remark. Thus far, we have 
referred to almost every aspect of nationalism, and national identity, at least all 
those estimated to be of utmost importance. Yet, it is not my intention to make 
a caricature of nationalism but, instead, to analyse and explain its most 
important aspects. This is not to say that all of these aspects and characteristics 
will appear in every specific case of nationalism. Rather, that most of these 
elements are manifest in many nationalisms if we examine them in the course 
of time. For example, ‘banal’, everyday mild nationalism has a number of 
characteristics, as defined above, but they are not ‘fixed’: there is no historical 
evidence to suggest that it cannot be replaced, or ‘enriched’ with militant and 
extreme manifestations. In fact, every nation has been subject to aggressive 
manifestations in the course of its history. Psychological conditions change, as 
also -or because- the external conditions change; each particular nation has 
been subject to such changes. What is, more or less, stable is the internal, 
psychological predisposition of individuals to become influenced by 
destructive influences and rhetoric (be they racist, nationalistic, or other). What 
is also important is the deliberate attempt of leaders and elites to take
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advantage of these predispositions and address peoples’ unconscious drives 
and dynamics. Unfortunately, the deeper knowledge of individuals and their 
inner psyche since the late 19th century has provided the means for mass 
manipulation and exploitation, instead of facilitating the effort towards a more 
peaceful and harmonious living.
In the next chapter we will proceed with a further elaboration of issues 
concerning nationalism and national identity. Specifically, we shall refer to the 
distinction between ethnic and national identity, to the emergence of the nation 
and nationalism, and to the particular circumstances that account for the launch 
of actively aggressive and extreme manifestations of nationalism.
C H A P T E R  4:  THE E M E R G E N C E  OF
N A T I O N A L I S M
In the previous chapter we analysed the close relation between 
nationalism and national identity. There, we made the distinction between 
national and nationalistic identity and analysed the imaginary character of 
nationalism and the specific reasons for its strong psychological appeal. In 
addition, we referred to the commonplace distinction between civic and ethnic 
types of nationalism as benign and malign forms of nationalism, which it was 
argued that is misleading and due to projection. There is a gap left, however, in 
the development of the argument, and this must be filled, so as to have a more 
complete picture of national identity.
One of the issues raised thus far is that, since human psychological 
foundations are not confined in space and time, then can we argue that nations, 
nationalism and national identity have existed in earlier times? Is nationalism 
and national identity new? The second issue is that, as it has been argued in the 
previous chapter, the influence and success of nationalism depends on specific 
political circumstances and internal or external policies, along with existing 
cultural and historical contexts; but if nationalism has the potentials to strike a 
chord to all individuals, it is because of their inner predispositions. The appeal 
of nationalism on the unconscious has been further analysed, but the first 
prerequisite, that of political, economic and other circumstances that match and 
facilitate the spread and appeal of nationalism has still been left unanswered. 
The study of these circumstances is thus indispensable for the comprehension 
of the political and social aspects of the issue. Their study is required so as to 
complement and complete the analysis of the previous chapter. This will also 
provide an additional answer to the relevant and inferred question of what 
accounts for extreme manifestations of nationalism1, that is, what makes a 
nation adopt an actively aggressive nationalism? These questions have 
emerged from the previous analysis and need an answer. So, in this chapter we
1 Additional to the psychological and political determinants that we analysed in chapter 3.
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shall deal with those two issues, which are also a thematic continuation of the 
previous one.
Is Nationalism and National Identity New?
The following questions have to be answered: are nationalism and 
national identity new phenomena? Have they first appeared in modernity? 
These questions inevitably emerge because nationalism is considered by many 
scholars2 to be a new phenomenon, confined in modernity; the same applies to 
the nation, and national identity too. But, in the previous chapters we have 
referred to ethnic and national identities interchangeably, providing a 
psychological explanation for them that was quite similar. So, these issues need 
some further clarification.
Nationalistic Attitudes Throughout History
History is full of instances of ‘nationalistic’ attitudes and discriminatory 
behaviours based on similarity and difference. In Herodotus it is referred that 
Egyptians looked down on Greeks because they were not undergoing 
circumcision3. Ancient Greeks, in their turn, believed that ‘non-Greeks are 
barbarians’. Also, in the late Hellenistic period the Pauline church offered 
favourable material and legal conditions to poor and foreign people, including 
Christian hospitality in hospita and xenodohia placed at the entrance of the city 
and nearby the churches; this generosity, though, was reserved only for 
Christians, and a Christian passport attesting Christianity (that was used since 
the apostolic times) became generalised (Kristeva, 1991:86-87). Discrimination 
based on belonging and a specific identity is not new in history irrespectively
2 The most prominent of which are Gellner (1993), Anderson (1991), Hobsbawm (1990), Kedourie 
(1994), and others, whose argument (the modernist argument -the modernists) is the most influencing in 
the studies of nationalism and national identity.
3 Herodotus (1921): History, Vol.I, London/New York: Loeb Classical Library, pp.36-47, translation by 
A.D.Godley from Book II; referred in Freud, 1939:269.
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of the criteria used each time, whether religious, cultural or other. Are these 
enough, however, so as to talk about nationalism in the Middle Ages or in 
antiquity? i
Nationalism as an explicit claim that the nation has an upper value and 
loyalty demands and that it must have its own sovereign state is new in history 
and confined in modernity. Thus, nationalism as an ideology and a movement 
is clearly a characteristic of modernity. Nationalism as a sentiment and, partly, 
as a discourse, though, is very similar to many appearances throughout history. 
This is not to argue that it is the same now and then because, certainly, 
nationalistic ideology has ‘enriched’ both the nationalistic sentiment and, 
mostly, the discourse with new elements and a more concrete orientation (i.e. 
the claim for a ‘nation-state’ is an explicit one in nationalistic ideology). 
Nevertheless, certain nationalistic elements (that is, certain elements that we 
find in nationalistic sentiments and discourses) are not new in modernity, nor is 
the backwards orientation of societies and ethnic and national communities (i.e. 
the rhetoric of a “Golden Age”). Smith refers to classical ancient Greeks -a  
society highly idealised today-, their idealising of their “great past” and of 
heroes of Homeric epics, and after mentioning several examples he concludes 
that: “the ideal of a ‘Golden Age’ is not a creation of the nationalists and the 
Romantics. It can be found among several people in the ancient world” 
(1997:40). Neither is it a characteristic of modernity the sentiment of pride and 
high self-esteem, the sense of belonging and the identity one acquires out of 
participation in an ethnic or national group. Gellner mentions that people have 
always lived in groups, many of which have persisted in time; “one important 
factor in their persistence was the loyalty men felt for these groups, and the fact 
that they identified with them” (1993:138, emphasis added). Nevertheless, he 
denies that nationalism, even as a sentiment, has existed before modernity. He 
argues that, “if one calls this factor [loyalty and identity], generically, 
‘patriotism’, then it is no part of my intention to deny that some measure of 
such patriotism is indeed part of human life”, and he adds that “nationalism is a 
very distinct species of patriotism...” (1993:138), distinguished because of few 
but important features: homogeneity, literacy, anonymity. Following the
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argument elaborated in chapter 3 (about the similarities of patriotism and 
nationalism and the use of patriotism as a ‘good’ aspect of nationalism), I 
would argue that nationalism is indeed a modem phenomenon -as an ideology 
and a movement-, but nationalistic/localistic/chauvinistic attitudes have been 
apparent since antiquity. Nationalism as group chauvinism has existed before.
One can go so far as to argue that, nationalism as a sentiment is not a 
derivative of the ideology of nationalism, at least exclusively, because such 
sentiments have been expressed several times throughout history, but it is only 
enriched and specified by it. Patriotism, chauvinism (which the Oxford 
Dictionary defines as “exaggerated or aggressive patriotism”)4, racism, 
localism, ethnocentrism, regionalism: all these terms describe attitudes, 
behaviours and sentiments originated in attachment to the patria and the group. 
Such attachments are both universal and extend from archaic times to 
modernity. One of the oldest epics, the Odyssey of the Homeric epics, for 
example, describes the effort and longing of Odysseus (Ulysses) to return to his 
beloved homeland. Such attachments and attitudes have found explicit 
expression today in nationalism, which not only describes such attitudes and 
sentiments but also systematises them and enriches them with new elements 
and qualities. For this reason it might be misleading to argue that nationalism, 
as defined in the previous chapter, has existed before: that could cause 
misunderstandings, because nationalism is also a modem ideology and form of 
politics. But, certainly, nationalism as a sentiment and, partly, discourse5 is 
quite similar, even identical, to analogous sentiments, such as regionalism, 
chauvinism etc., which have all existed before.
The refutation of nationalistic (as patriotic and chauvinistic) attitudes in 
the pre-modem era is connected to the denial that nations have existed before 
modernity (because the prevailing modernist argument is that nationalism 
forged the nations for the first time). Inevitably, so, the nation comes to the 
fore. It is not my intention to address here the huge debate about the creation of
4 Oxford Dictionary and Thesaurus, Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1995, p.240.
5 I say ‘partly’ about the discourse because it also refers to the explicit claims to national determination, 
which characterise the modem era and the ideology of nationalism.
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nations, but to refer to the re-signification of the word ‘nation’ in modernity. 
My contribution to this debate will be as limited as needed in order to address 
the main question about national identity and its relation to ethnic identity.
When Does an Ethnic Group Become a Nation?
There is a general question regarding whether the nation is an artifact 
created by nationalism. This view is broadly accepted as its supporters 
(Hobsbawm, Gellner, Kedourie, Anderson, etc) and the modernist paradigm 
are the most prominent and largely influencing in the study of the nation, 
nationalism and national identity. What is going to be argued in this section is 
that, because of the emergence of nationalism, the nation is attributed a 
different meaning and definition. This modem definition has created, in its 
turn, two different problems: one is the confusion and merging of the definition 
of the nation with that of the state and, second, the ‘search’ in pre-modem 
times for nations by using this modified, modem definition.
Nationalism as a political ideology postulates that the nation and the state 
should be congruent, merged as a ‘nation-state’. Thus, the nationalistic practice 
during the last two centuries has been to claim for and to establish ‘nation­
states’. Nevertheless, it should be remarked that this ideological claim has not 
led to the establishment of real national states -real in the sense of the union of 
one nation with one state. In 1970, of a total of 132 states, only the 9,1% were 
totally homogeneous and 18,9% had the 90% of the population belonging to 
one ethnic group (data in Connor, 1994:29-30). Nevertheless, even the 
remaining 72% with more than two significant ethnic groups composing their 
population are called ‘nation-states’. Thus, Smith has accurately proposed the 
term ‘national state’6, to connote the composition of current states by more 
than one nations and ethnic groups. So, the nation has been signified by 
nationalism as a ‘nation-state’. This signification of the nation by nationalism,
6 Smith, 1995a:86. Following Smith’s argument, I refer throughout this thesis to national states, or use 
the term ‘nation-states’ in inverted commas and mainly when I want to refer to nationalistic claims or to 
‘nation-state’ as a normative paradigm within modernity.
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that prevails for as long as nationalism has been prevalent, has rendered the 
notion of the nation as ‘nation-state’ an accepter norm, a concrete knowledge 
that many scholars do not question today. This is the reason why definitional 
elements of the state form part of the definition of the nation; for example, 
mass public culture, political rights and duties, economic articulation and 
mobility, and possession of military apparatus (that is, elements that define the 
state) are now considered integral parts of the definition of nations, along with 
the shared memories, myths and cultures.
A consequence of the above is that, it is difficult for scholars to identify 
any nation existing in the past, prior to modernity. Anthony Smith (1995a), 
who seeks to critically assess these perspectives, the growth of national
thsentiments can be traced back to 15 century or even earlier; however, he 
cannot find any group in much earlier times that would fit the definition of the 
nation because he rigorously applies the current perception of the nation to 
other epochs. He writes, for example, referring to the city-states in ancient 
Greece that they “might well be described as precocious or small scale 
nations”, as the size of ancient Athens was the same of the size of modem 
Iceland (200,000 citizens). “On the other hand”, he continuous, “only the 
30000 adult male Athenians were citizens; metics, women and slaves were 
excluded” (1995a: 169, endnote 7). Thus, he confines nations to modem mass 
phenomena and mass citizenry, which today are “much more numerous than 
the politically active membership of pre-modem ethnies or city-states” 
(1995a: 54). In the same context, however, he does not question the 
‘nationness’ of many Western national states whose half population (women) 
was excluded from full political participation until very recently (for example, 
general suffrage rights were not introduced in Belgium until 1948, and in 
Switzerland until 1971). In the same example of ancient Athens, Smith objects 
its ‘nationness’ with the assessment that, from the nationalist standpoint, the 
city-states “lacked the key component of cultural individuality... Athenian 
culture was a variant of a wider Ionian ethnic, and still wider cultural, network” 
(1995a: 169, endnote 7). Yet, this argument is as if, keeping the analogies in 
mind, we questioned today the German or Spanish ‘nationness’ on the basis of
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their being part of a wider European network and culture. Thus, Smith’s 
argument is a projection of today’s criteria of mass-nations to another time, a 
time where the scales of communication were smaller but analogous. In 
addition, city-states did not lack the organisation and functions of more recent 
national states. In essence, Smith acknowledges these facts by saying that the 
ethnic state is the pre-modem equivalent of modem nations but, nevertheless, 
argues that we can best call them ethnies but not nations (1995a:57-8).
So, the re-signification of the word ‘nation’ in modernity can itself lead 
to the perception that there were not nations in pre-modem times while, at the 
same time, calling them ethnic states/ethnies is enough to make a qualitative 
difference. Certainly, to the extent that modernity is a different epoch its 
structures will have differences as well. This, however, should not result in a 
perception of a cutting-edge dichotomy in-between times, in a perception that 
not even nation-like entities have existed before modernity. There is a certain 
continuity based on similarities, and these similarities have to be acknowledged 
-along with differences as well. Certainly, Smith makes this acknowledgement 
but, since his stance is a critical one against the modernist paradigm, it is also 
indicative of the widespread perception that argues for the novelty of nations as 
a result of nationalism.
Perhaps it is also the case that the reluctance to recognise any existence 
of nations in the past is due to the perception that by doing so one might 
support nationalistic claims and arguments. This is another issue, though, as the 
one does not presuppose the other. Demertzis argues that it is a nationalistic 
bias to confuse the nation with ethnicity and to believe that it exists from 
antiquity (1996:62). It is true that nationalists are thus biased. It is also true, 
however, that it is a bias not to identify a nation before modernity because that 
might support the claims of nationalists. So, we can suggest that no nation has 
been ‘found’ in the past because it is searched for with modem criteria, and 
with a reluctance to find it. Castoriadis calls this ‘reflective projection’: the 
languages of different societies (different in terms of both space and time) do 
not correspond to identical codifications, because beneath their formulation lay 
different images and desires. So, Castoriadis argues that the Western claim
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towards the constitution of a ‘whole’ and complete explanation of other 
societies is doomed to fail if it only reflects the history and ideas of Western 
societies (1985:242). This in particular means that, if we use examples of the 
past but analyse them according to the exact present criteria (without even 
keeping the analogies in mind), it is natural that we will not find any nations in 
these so distant and different times.
The term nation, however, is quite old, and its meaning is not so distant 
from contemporary concepts on nations (not as ‘nation-states though). It 
appears in the Old Testament, and in many citations in subsequent years 
(Hastings, 1997:14-19). Hastings cites from Regino of Prum’s Chronicon, of 
about 900 ac., the following passage (which sets the Christian view of society): 
“just as different people (diversae nationes populorum) differ between 
themselves in descent, manners, language and laws... so the holy and universal 
church throughout the world, although joined in the unity of faith, nevertheless 
varies its ecclesiastical customs among them” (1997:195, emphasis added). 
Hastings also criticises Kedourie and Hobsbawm for their reference on the 
Latin usage of the word ‘nation’ as division of students into universities, and he 
mentions that in the Middle Ages the word was used in the sense “of a people 
distinct by language, laws, habits, modes of judgment and 
customs...”(1997:17).
In an illuminating study titled ‘Nation: the History of a Word’, Guido 
Zematto (1944) analyses the use of the word nation in different periods, 
starting with the Latin natio which means to be born. He argues that “a word is 
like a coin” (1944:351), whose value changes as people’s lives change. In the 
Roman times, for example, “in ordinary speech a natio was understood to be a 
group of men who belonged together in some way because of similarity of 
birth” (1944:352). Natio, however, connoted a community of foreigners, and 
was ascribed to foreigners who were bound together in the large cities and 
ports in order to speak their own language. In the Middle Ages, nationes was 
indeed referred to university students gathered in small towns. Nevertheless, it 
did not simply mean divisions of students into universities, but it referred to 
unions that expressed the distinctiveness between students who were foreigners
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there. Later on these nationes came to connote a ‘community of opinion’, and 
this was the first significant change of the initial meaning, as Zematto argues. 
After the 13th century and until the 18th, the word nation underwent a second 
important change of meaning from foreigners to representatives: “...a nation 
came to mean above all a representative body, whose chief characteristic was 
that it was assumed that a certain loose bond of territorial origin existed among 
the individual members of this body. A representative body is however ...a 
select group of men, an elite” (1944:361). A third major shift of meaning 
occurred from the late 18th century onwards, when the term lost its 
distinguishing connotation between the aristocrats -the elite (nation)- and the 
people -the plebs- and it encompassed all citizens of the state. “With this mass 
concept begins the new sense of the word nation” (1944366), Zematto argues.
The terms used today to describe national groups before nationalism are 
ethnic groups, ethnicities7, or ethnie . These, however, originate in the Greek 
word ethnos, which means nation. The word ethnos originates in the word 
ethos, which in ancient Greek means habit/tradition/manners. We actually meet 
the word ethnos in the Homeric epics, where it means the sum of a population 
living together, where it also applies to animals. In Thukydides it connotes the 
race, and similarly in Plato it connotes the race and the distinct social group8. It 
is quite interesting that the word, as it appeared in the plural tense (ethn e, 
which means nations in contemporary Greek) had a specific meaning in the 
Old Testament: it meant the idolater, pagan ethn e (nations) as opposed to the 
chosen ethnos (nation) of Israel9. In the New Testament the word ethn e 
continued to apply to idolaters, but it became synonymous to Greeks; soon 
after the distinction was overcome10. So, as in Latin, the word signified a
7 Ethnicity is not an accurate term, as it does not mean the ethnic group but the attribution of ethnic 
identity on members o f the group (like nationality).
8 It should be noted that in ancient Greek the race did not have the current biological connotation of the 
word, but it referred to different groups of people with distinct characteristics, be they biological, social, 
cultural or other.
9 It is interesting that those people of pagan ethnie who adopted Judaism were called prosiliti, which 
means converts.
10 I have found and verified these data through search in a number of dictionaries of the Greek and 
ancient Greek language. Indicatively, I will refer here the following three most known: Encyclopaedia 
Papiros Larrousse Britannica, Athens: Papiros publicatons, 1984, Vol.22; Hydria: Grand General 
Encyclopaedia, Greek and Universal, Athens: Ettairia Ellinikon Ekdoseon, 1982, Vol.22; Stamatakos, 
Ioannis (1999): Dictionary o f  the Ancient Greek Language, Athens: Bibliopromitheftiki.
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population with common characteristics (with unspecified criteria though), but 
it referred to other groups and not to one’s own. In the contemporary use of the 
word ethnos has the modem meaning of the word nation; the only ‘paradox’ is 
that, in the absence of a word to translate in Greek the word ethn e (that is 
introduced in English and originates in the Greek ethnos), another word was 
invented, the word ethnotites. This process of inventing new words is also 
apparent in other terms widely used in English bibliography, such as 
‘ethnonationalism’ that describes nationalism of ethnic groups instead of 
nations.
The above analyses shows how the meaning of a word -the nation- has 
changed and how these changes are provoked in the course of time by 
changing conditions. It also reveals that the word nation has been used to 
describe groups of people that, no matter how loosely defined, had certain 
similarities, most common of which similarity of birth. This does not tell us 
that there were nations as we define them today in earlier times. But it does tell 
us two things. Firstly, that the meaning of the nation as used today is not a 
modem invention and it is not irrelevant to its roots, that is to criteria of 
sameness by birth, language etc. Secondly, irrespective of the term used, group 
categorisation according to, primarily, territorial origin, and then language or 
other criteria of similarity is a characteristic ubiquitous in human societies. 
This is also an external categorisation but we can suggest that it is due to the 
initial self-identification with the patria and the familiar group -which then 
provokes external categorisation. This means that people highly evaluate their 
origin (as sentimentally important), and thus consider it important when 
defining other people as well.
Let us now consider for a while the distinction between nations and 
ethm  . According to the common use of the words, nations have a “designated 
homeland” and “mass public culture”, while ethn® have “some link with a 
historic territory” (Smith, 1995a: 56-7); the former have common economy and 
equal rights and duties for all members, which the latter lack; nations have a 
particular language, while ethm  have dialects (Hastings, 1997:12); also, 
members of national groups are self-aware of their distinctiveness and
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recognise each other as members of the same nation, while the ethnic group is 
not a self-conscious group (Connor, 1994:43). At the same time, what 
characterises both is common cultural identity, shared myths and historical 
memories, common language (or dialect?) and often religion. We can see from 
the differences and similarities mentioned above that their major distinction is 
made because the nation is defined as ‘nation-state’: it is more organised and 
systematised as a result of been congruent with the modem state.
It follows that what distinguishes the nation and the ethnic group is the 
‘merging’ of the former with the state. This is not a trivial, inconsequential 
distinction. The state is not solely the agency that monopolises violence within 
society (as Weber and Giddens define it); it also organises the law system and 
citizenship rights, and the economic function within a specifically delineated 
area, and it systematises the diffusion of a single common language and public 
culture to a mass population. Thus, the fusion with the modem state renders the 
nation a more concrete and stable community. It protects it from external threat 
and internal erosion; it systematises and transmits its language; and, it 
organises and regulates the common living of the nation, which is more loose 
and fluid for an ethnic group. This fluidity becomes a threat for ethnic groups 
in a world of national states as it renders them ‘fragile’. This distinction 
between nations and ethnic groups is of great importance, as it makes a big 
difference for two cultural groups if the one is ‘merged’ with a state 
apparatus11. Let alone the importance of such merging with the modem state: 
as argued elsewhere12, the transformation of the state in modernity was an 
important factor in the success of nationalism itself, a success largely due to the 
organisation and systematisation of dispersed communities and fluid cultural 
groups in one nation.
Another distinguishing factor between the nation and the ethnic group is 
the aspiration to merge with one’s own state. This is the self-consciousness of 
the group: a nation does not exist if its members are not aware of it, of its 
existence, or of their distinctiveness (Connor, 1994:43). In modernity when a
11 There are also consequences for people’s identities as well, but we shall refer to them in the following 
section.
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group identifies itself as a nation it usually wants to receive international 
recognition, and thus aspires to capture its own state (i.e. the Basques and the 
Kurds), or to have some degree of political autonomy within a state (i.e. the 
Catalans, the Scots). An ethnie is in a sense a community that precedes the 
nation, and the ‘nation-state’. Smith argues that there is “a continuing 
relevance and power of pre-modem ethnic ties and sentiments in providing a 
firm base for the nation-to-be” (1995a:40). In a similar line Hastings argues 
that nations come from certain ethnicities and that “ethnicities naturally turn 
into nations or integral elements within nations” when vernacular becomes 
written language (Hastings, 1997:12). To the extent, however, that the nation is 
in essence identified as ethnicity-and-state in one, as ‘nation-state’, we can 
argue that the nation is an ethnic group internationally recognised as a nation, 
as having its ‘own’ modem state, or been justified in claiming for one, or being 
part of a multi-national state. Self-consciousness, that turns ethnu into
t
nations, can come from ‘bel/ow’, from an augmented self-awareness of the V 
group; it may not come at all, though, and then the ethnic group may vanish or 
be absorbed. But, it can also come from above, when the state precedes the 
nation and appeals to national or ethnic identities in order to gain loyalty. In 
this case it is not self-awareness, however, but imposed or ascribed 
‘awareness’.
As Connor argues, nations cannot be defined in reference to their 
tangible characteristics, such as language, religion, territory etc, which are 
symptoms of the nations and not their essence. Nations, he argues, are self­
defined groups of people who believe they are ancestrally related. “The essence 
of a nation is intangible... This essence is a psychological bond that joins a 
people and differentiates it, in the subconscious13 of its members, from all other 
people in a most vital way” (Connor, 1994:92). This strong psychological bond 
inscribed in the unconscious of individuals is rather their national identity, we 
would suggest, their own self-categorisation and understanding of being part of 
a nation. It is also the essence of national identity that is intangible. The nation
12 Chapter 3, pp.92-93.
13 The term “subconscious” is a mistaken popularisation of the proper Freudian term “unconscious”.
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is defined by certain characteristics but they are not essential for the national 
identity one acquires, meaning that identification with the nation is not 
provoked because of these tangible characteristics. Identity is grounded on the 
constitutive structures of individuals themselves and influenced by external 
circumstances; but these circumstances are subject to a number of political and 
other criteria and, thus, do not apply to all people alike. As it was indicated 
earlier14, a particular religion may be historically attached to a nation, but one 
who is not a believer will not be less attached to his/her nation than those who 
are. Identification with the nation one is bom and bred in comes irrespectively 
of the definitive characteristics of the nation. So, language, territory, (perceived 
or real) common ancestry, common myths and history, shared customs and 
religious or other beliefs are the definitive characteristics of a particular nation 
each time -some of them or all of them simultaneously- but not the definitive 
characteristics of a person’s national identity.
National and Ethnic Identity
In the previous chapter on identification, the terms national and ethnic 
identities were often used as if they were the same. That is because of two 
reasons. First, the mechanisms of identification are the same for all individuals; 
there may be different forms and expressions through time and space, but 
individual subjectivity is universal. Second, both identities serve the same 
needs and desires: sense of belonging, sense of self-worth and value, protection 
from external threats, etc. Thus, by using them interchangeably I intended to 
stress the psychological similarity of identification with an ethnic and national 
group that generates family-type attachments. Nevertheless, national identity in 
modernity, which is also an era of nationalism, is somewhat different from 
ethnic identity. Identification with the nation as nation-state differs from 
identification with the nation as ethnic group, and their greatest differences 
come from the institutionalised character of national identity.
14 In chapter 3, page 96.
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In the era of nationalism and of ‘nation-states’, national identity is not 
just a derivative of social and group identifications: it is a process highly 
organised and systematised through political organisation. That is because, and 
largely when, the nation is fused with the state. Nations that aspire for self- 
determination can have a high sense of national identity, as the Kurdish and 
Tibetan examples indicate, but the actual realisation of their aspiration is a 
great leap forward. As the greatest difference of nations and ethnic groups lays 
in the formers’ capturing (or being captured by) the state, this also accounts for 
the greatest difference of national and ethnic identities. National identity is 
attributed in a sense and then constantly reminded by the organised means of 
the national state. National states often capture large territories, where common 
identities cannot be formed by local, direct contact; thus, it is the 
institutionalisation of the nation as national state and the constant scheduling of 
its maintenance and continuation that makes national identity not really 
something essentially different, but certainly something more than ethnic 
identity. Some initial elements -crucial though- of one’s national identity are 
internalised by the parents and the direct social environment of the infant 
during its first years of life. Thereafter, when the state undertakes the role to 
induce children with a stable, solid identity, it enhances and strengthens the 
whole process of national identification. This is mainly done so through 
education. Largely influencing are the mass media too, which both form and 
remind nationhood. In addition, the military apparatus and men’s (in most 
cases) military service, literature, political rhetoric etc. fulfill this role.
Let us briefly refer to education, the mass media and the elites as the 
main providers and/or manipulators of people’s national identity. Main, of 
course, only when referring to an age of five and more, because the parents and 
the relation with them are of most importance before that age. In general, the 
parents themselves transmit a number of familiar images of their own 
childhood and upbringing.
Education
Education is unquestionably one of the most important processes in 
someone’s life, as it provides a space for socialisation, and it is in many ways
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responsible for the qualities and qualifications people have in their lives. Mass 
education, specifically, is a recent development, that started in about the late 
18th and early 19th century. As mas£ education has become a concern of the 
national state, it provides -directly or not- the means for identification with the 
national group. In fact, through education in all levels, the state contributes 
significantly to the formation of national identity. We shall refer here to three 
aspects of national-oriented education: school teaching, language, and sports15.
As Zerubavel argues, “schools play a prominent role in the socialisation 
of national traditions” (1995:6). In early childhood education (from nurseries to 
first grade schools), children “learn about major historical figures and events 
from stories, poems, school plays and songs. These genres often blend facts 
with fiction and history with legend, for this colorful blend is believed to blend 
literature more appealing for the very young. These commemorations 
contribute to the early formation of sentiments and ideas about the past that 
might persist even in the face of a latter exposure to history” (1995:6). This 
shows that the collective unconscious of a nation is not just the one they learn 
from history courses, but also the perceptions they have of it since childhood.
Apart from perceptions of national history one may have from narratives 
and myths, history taught in latter classes (i.e. high school) is mostly subjective 
and nation-oriented when it refers to national issues; in fact, it does not come in 
contradiction to myths and perceptions one may have from nurseries. In real 
history it is rarely the case that one side is always and totally right or always 
good. However, national histories tend to present those aspects that are in 
favour of the national group. This happens through certain omissions and 
modifications brought about in the presentation of the facts that result in the 
schematisation of perceptions towards a specifically determined view that 
favours the nation -each given nation. Christos Katsikas16 (2002), in his article
15 All of three aspects can be relevant, or contain elements that are also relevant in the life of a grown-up, 
beyond education. Sports, for example, is not only an aspect of education, in the sense that they may 
concern everybody; however, they are initially introduced to children and, so, we shall analyse it in the 
context of education.
16 Christos Katsikas is the author of several books concerning education, and the Greek educational 
system in particular; the most relevant to our subject are Dodeka Mythi tis Ekpaidefsis (Twelve Myths of 
Education), Tramakia publications (199?), and Ta Paramythia tis Shotilds mas Zois (The Tales of our 
School Lives), Ellinika Gramata publications, 1999.
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concerning ‘The Image of the Other: the 1921 Revolution in the History 
Textbooks of Greece and Turkey’, argues that wars, massacres and injustices 
are presented as a national characteristic of the Other (nation). According to 
Katsikas, despite the tendency towards amelioration of history textbooks 
according to UNESCO’s recommendations17, the contemptuous description 
that constructs the image of the other, hostile nation as ‘a nation of evil’ is 
evident to the eyes of the analyst. In that way, autarchic governments, 
imperialism, violence etc. are naturalised as characteristics of the ‘bad’ enemy 
instead of been presented as social and historical phenomena. History is thus 
displaced and substituted by memory -a  memory selective, that uses hyperbole 
in certain aspects and events or keeps silent in others, as Katsikas describes- 
which becomes a commonly used word that serves the need of the present and 
is determined by present relations between nations. For example, the Greek 
revolution of 1921, that led to the creation of the Greek national state and 
largely initiated the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, is presented in Greek 
textbooks as the absolute expression of freedom and self-determination of an 
oppressed nation by the barbaric ‘Turk’; the same event is presented in Turkish 
textbooks as the result of foreign intervention in the affairs of the Empire, but 
also as an initiative of a nation that was the most privileged and affluent in the 
Empire and, hence, the most ungrateful and greedy, bellicose and expansionist 
by definition.
Such perceptions are enhanced and supported through rituals and myths. 
Rituals involve national anniversaries, celebrations and parades where children 
are invited to say poems that glorify the national cause, to sing songs that pay 
tribute to the ‘great heroes’, and to march behind the waving flag. Myths and 
narratives render the desired message more appealing, while they contribute to 
its effortless reception in the unconscious, as history is presented in a way that 
can be easily ‘accommodated’ in the unconscious structures. It is interesting to 
remark at this point that, while these myths and rituals are present through 
education (along with history teaching), they are also apparent in latter life as
17 In the Recommendation for education (article 15,1974), UNESCO stresses that history textbooks must 
present all the determinants behind a dispute or conflict among nations so as to reveal the real interests of 
nations and groups that monopolise economic and political power and foster conflicts.
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well, where they serve to ‘remind nationhood’ and maintain attachment to the 
nation in the whole life of an individual. These rituals and anniversaries, such 
as USA’s and Myanmar’s Independence Day (4th of July, 4th of January), 
Norway’s Constitution Day (17th of May), China’s Grand National Day (18th of 
September), involve parades and other celebrations, which are organised by the 
state and in which schools and the army are most commonly involved. Indeed, 
almost all of the contemporary national states hold such celebrations and 
rituals, with the exceptions of Russia, Yugoslavia, East Timor and Belarus 
(which are newly-born, but hold several local celebrations and rituals), Western 
Sahara (whose legal status of the territory is still unresolved), a few Pacific- 
island states (Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, Tuvalu), and the notable exception of 
Britain.
So, we see in history learning three main processes. One is the 
modification or selective presentation of historical facts in a way that conceals 
those aspects that are not in favour or are controversial for the nation. Second, 
there is a reconstruction of historical myths and narratives that strongly appeals 
to the unconscious drives as they create a good image for ‘us’ and bad image 
for ‘them’, idolise persons and make them heroes who manage to defeat the -  
usually much more numerous and barbaric- others. Third, rituals and 
commemorations help foster and maintain these images. The specific message 
conveyed depends on the context and historical period that it is employed. For 
example, in the early 19th century Britain, education was celebrating masculine
l O
heroism as an expression of Britishness , while in 20 century Myanmar 
children take part in the celebrations of the Independence Day (that start on the 
4th of January and last for a week), a national holiday in memory of gaining 
independence from the British colonial reign19.
Education fosters nationhood in an additional way: through language. 
Language does not only provide the means for communication and the means 
to educate a given population: it is by itself a “fundamental attribute of self-
18 For an analysis of the transition from private to mass education in Britain, see Colley, 1992, chapter 4.
19 These two examples are selectively chosen so as to show the connection between events and 
perceptions among countries, irrespective of their temporal and spatial remoteness.
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recognition” (1997:52), as Castells argues, and the most distinctive barrier of 
nationality. It is very important because it conveys our desires and it acts as a 
‘vehicle’ that transports people’s wishes to the outside world: “it provides a 
linkage between the private and the public sphere” (Castells, 1997:52). It is 
also the first determinant, the first distinctive element of one’s nationality. As 
Anderson (1991) argues, language is the external and visible badge of these 
differences that distinguish one nation form another, and the most important 
criterion by which a nation is recognised to exist.
Language is of major importance not only as an attribute of self­
recognition, but also as a means of socialisation for children into speaking a 
single or common national language. For example, the translation of the Bible 
by Luther, which became very popular in a very short time, facilitated German 
unification because it provided the Germans with a single German language 
(Wittels, 1954:271-7). The transmission of one communication code, a 
language, among the members of a delineated territory is essential for their 
unification in a single state, and in a single nation too20. Certainly, there are 
several examples where there is one common official language and yet the 
coherence or existence of the given national state is questioned (i.e. Spain, UK, 
Canada). However, these cases -mainly instances of multinational/multiethnic 
states- actually verify the argument that language is an important unifying 
factor for a state and a nation, only that the two are not equated in practice, 
meaning that most states are composed by more than one nations. More 
explicitly, in these cases the states are unified under a single language; 
however, their national coherence and unity is undermined by other, existing 
languages (or dialects?) that serve as uniting bonds for the nations within these 
multinational states. This importance of language in uniting nations can be 
shown, for example, in Quebecois’ perceptions and claims to national 
distinctiveness: the French language is a distinctive barrier for those who 
perceive themselves as distinct from the rest of Canadians, but also a uniting 
bond among the Quebecois. On the other hand, there are few cases where there
20 Hastings (1997) and Anderson (1991) are two prominent scholars that have analysed the function of 
language as a factor contributing to national unification.
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are two officially recognised languages (i.e. The Netherlands) and yet the 
national coherence is not undermined. Thus, language serves as a feature that 
socialises and integrates people into their nations; yet, its efficacy varies 
according to the character of the state and the existence or not of multiple 
nations within it.
Languages are former dialects, or a combination of dialects. Their 
difference is that languages are written and so they can be transmitted outside 
the borders of a local community. As stressed by the German example (the 
translation of the Bible by Luther), the more a written language develops a 
literature, the more it can unite a nation. According to Renan (1996), language 
does not necessarily unite people, however, as the examples of US and Britain, 
and Latin America or even Spain show. Not necessarily indeed, for other 
factors play a significant role. But, the transition from dialects to written 
vernaculars has been a unifying process that largely contributed to the 
formation of the national state. Contingency has played its role in this process 
to a large extend, for the criteria out of which a dialect becomes a language are 
not specified. Dialect is a new concept, Billing argues, and it today connotes 
the fact that “not all speakers of a language speak the same way” (1995:31). 
Their difference is not specified, as it is not easy to decide if two languages are 
different or they are two dialects of the same language. Haugen has suggested 
that, “a dialect is frequently a language which did not succeed politically” in 
becoming a language21. Thus language is a very important element of national 
identity, much more so than it is for ethnic identity; an ethnic dialect may not 
‘succeed’ politically or even be absorbed and forgotten. Whole ethnic groups 
can ‘disappear’ like this.
Last, we should refer to sports. Sports are a very important component of 
education because they involve physical exercise and could thus be an 
indispensable aspect in the process of sublimation, in the diversion of drives 
towards socially constructive ends. For example, according to Langman, 
American superbowl is a substitute for actual territorial competitive violence, 
“a simulation of phallic aggression and male combat” (2001:201); through this
21 Haugen, ‘Dialect, Language, nation', American Anthropologist, 68, 1966, quoted in Billing, 1995:32.
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simulation it can act as to displace violence and move the ‘battle’ in the 
football field (p.205-6). Similar was the idea, and implementation, of the 
Olympic Truce in 8th century b.c., which was been put in force seven days prior 
and after the Olympic Games where the athletes could compete with one 
another in sports.
It seems, however, that the efficacy of sports as a replacement of violent 
conflict is contested by views that envisage their contemporary practice as a 
preparation for the battlefield in the name of a national cause. Billing locates 
sports in those processes that constitute the daily banal preparation of nations 
to sacrifice for their ‘causes’ and are at the same time bearers of nationhood 
(1995:124). Indicatively, athletes have been reported as saying about a sport 
event that “when your country needs you...you cannot say no”, or that “this 
was a do-or-die situation. The tour had to be saved” (in Billing, 1995:124), thus 
articulating a warfare rhetoric. Indeed, it is evident in international 
contestations that identification with the national team comes as a natural 
outcome and, also, victory becomes a matter of national pride, particularly 
when the other national team is that of an ‘everlasting enemy’. After the end of 
the (contemporary) Olumpic games, for example, each nation counts its 
national successes while the gold medals confer a symbol of national pride -or 
humiliation. I can still remember the speaker on the radio saying, when a Greek 
athlete won the gold medal in weight-lifting in 2000, that ‘today all Greeks are 
golden champions with him... ’.
These images are largely transmitted through the mass media22. As 
Billing concludes from a survey on newspapers’ rhetoric, “personal sacrifice in 
the cause of the nation was applauded on the sports pages” (1995:124) and 
constituted a major part in nationalistic rhetoric. Similarly Lasch describes 
what he calls ‘the cult of victory’, meaning that the “mania for winning has 
encouraged an exaggerated emphasis on the competitive side of sport...” 
(1980:103). Lasch ascribes this exaggerated emphasis on the media, which in 
the pursuit for profitable topics have connected spectatorship with violence and
22 We shall refer to the mass media right below, but let us make this reference here in direct connection 
to the issue of sports.
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competition. In such a context, where sports are used as an additional way to 
appeal to the co-nationals and transmit nationalistic values, sports are 
incorporated into the process of national identification; in Hobsbawm words, 
they are “a medium for national identification” (1983:300)23. Thus, sport 
activities in school cannot be indifferent to the wider context and values 
praised in the wider society. At the same time, however, sports function in this 
way both during and beyond education.
Mass Communication Media
By media of mass communication we mean the media that transmit news 
and information, and offer entertainment as well; we refer here to radio, 
newspapers and television24. The mass media act mostly as reminders of 
nationhood, but they also influence individuals and groups further to a large 
extend. That happens because they convey meanings to a large population and 
reference points for the nations. The mass media are nationally focused, no 
matter how internationalised their means of transmition and organisation are. 
Not only because they ‘speak’ a national language, but, as Smith argues, 
because through them “the world is largely seen through the lens of one’s 
nations state” (1995a:93). For example, “Britons Killed” was the headline of a 
British newspaper when an airplane crashed in Taiwan and more than a 
hundred people were killed or injured, only four of them being British25.
“Propaganda and advertising transmitted by mass media... have the real 
aim of mobilising narcissistic needs and offering means of narcissistic
23 For analyses on sports and their role and transformation since the late 19th century see Hobsbawm, 
1983:288-303, Billing, 1995:123-7, Lasch, 1980:100-123, andLangman, 2001:201-8.
24 I will refer only to these media here and not to the Internet because, first, these are the ones widely 
transmitted up to now and the ones that exert the widest influence, and second because the internet has 
been used a means of information and communication in adolescence and beyond until now and so, as it 
is not used by very young children, its influence is less determinative than that of other media (earlier 
images and internalisations are most determinative in later life, as it has been argued). A third reason why 
we shall not refer to the Internet is that it has an international character and, also, it is highly ‘egalitarian’ 
in the sense that each one can create a site of his/her interest while access to it is as easy to everybody as 
access to a governmental site etc. So, there are significant particularities of the Internet that have not been 
subject to adequate scientific research, let alone from the specific perspective of this thesis.
25 Evening Standard, November 1st, 2000.1 shall refer in more detail and present certain relevant data 
regarding the national orientation of the mass media in chapter 6, pp.233-23 9.
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gratification”, writes Parin (1988:127), particularly connecting it with 
consumerism, on an individual scale. On the national scale, mass media offer 
narcissistic gratification by using a nationalistic language that appeals more to 
the sentiments of the co-nationals: the media transmit dramatised images and 
organise the national imaginary through distance. Ethnocentrism and 
‘patriotism’ are standard rhetorics used in the ‘News’, for instance (Demertzis, 
1996:335-7). Billing writes: “Anderson is surely correct in stressing the 
importance of newspapers in the reproduction of nationality. They operate 
directly through their messages, stereotypes and deictics, rather than by setting 
up the possibility of what Freud called ‘secondary identification’, or a 
perceived feeling of similarity” (1995:125). Secondary identification, however, 
is initiated before one reads newspapers: a feeling of similarity is already 
perceived, which is the reason why newspapers can transmit their stereotypes 
so easily.
Another important issue is that the mass media (particularly television) 
exert great influence upon individuals. This is not so because individuals are 
passive receivers of the television images, but mainly because the media have 
the power to make the selection of the issues for discussion and to impose them 
on the public sphere. Citizens today are largely under the influence of the mass 
media and submitted to their power. To the extent that the ‘agenda setting’ is 
decided with criteria of appeal and easy reception by the public -leaving aside 
political and economic criteria- their content is mainly national, while it can 
occasionally be nationalistic. Of course, as Demertzis argues, their influence 
can be a matter of circumstances, such as the international contingency, the 
media’s competition, their status (private or state controlled), the influence of 
nationalism on public culture, etc (1996:377). In any case, however, they exert 
great influence and largely contribute to the formation and, particularly, 
maintenance of nationality. This is the reason why politicians today use the 
media, particularly television, to address the nation.
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Elite and M ass Manipulation
By the term ‘elites’ we refer to intellectuals and politicians. The role of 
elites in the construction and reproduction of nationhood is an issue largely 
discussed: the critique that originates mainly from scholars of the modernist 
strand has orientated the contemporary discussion towards the direction of 
considering nationhood as the outcome of a deliberate action of mass 
manipulation. This has often been the case, indeed, particularly in current 
politics; as studies have proliferated, there is a wide field of knowledge about 
the ways to mobilise people. However, there is an aspect of that matter that is 
largely ignored, and it should be useful to refer to it -although this does not 
mean that the aspect of deliberate manipulation is of less importance. The 
additional aspect is that the elites themselves are often strongly identified with 
the nation, and their promotion of nationhood is not always a deliberate action 
but their effort to promote and secure their nation and their national identity.
To begin with, it is both reasonable and predictable that the elites 
regulate much of the ‘nation-states’ functions and apparatuses; they are those 
who have the means, the education and the position to do so; they, by 
definition, influence people and politics. It is the elites, particularly the 
intelligentsia, Smith argues, “who guard and run the cultural and educational 
institutions... they do so not just in terms of their material and status interests, 
but as an expression and embodiment of the identity, unity and autonomy of 
the people of the nation, who are generally represented by ethnic intellectuals 
and professionals who direct the nation’s cultural policies and authenticate its 
heritage, culture and symbols on behalf of ‘the people’” (Smith, 1995a: 100). 
They are also the ones who were first inspired by the nationalistic ideal and 
gave birth to the ideology of nationalism; it is the role of the intelligentsia to 
systematise mentalities and culture, and thus ‘produce’ ideologies, the ideology 
of nationalism included26. Elites have a weight in shaping national identities, 
but they are also influenced by previous perceptions of national identity 
themselves. As historians and intellectuals search in their past to find their 
origins, their perceptions and ideas pass on to wider strata of population.
26 On the transformation of mentalities to ideologies see Lipowatz and Demertzis, 1994:66-69.
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Archives, for instance, that historians use today are biased to some extend and 
are products of nationalistic predilection: in a study on ‘Libraries as a Locus of 
Cultural memories’, Traister shows that, the materials available for study are 
themselves a construction, a selection made prior to historians (1999:220).
Nationalistic rhetoric is evident in contemporary politics, and it is uttered 
in a way that is largely organised and planned in advance, independently of 
whether the politicians are themselves nationalists or not. Today all rulers, 
including dictators, claim ‘national legitimacy’ for their governance. There is a 
whole set of professional advertisers and image makers who know how to 
appeal to people and are, thus, indispensable to the politicians, even if they are 
themselves sometimes biased and subject to nationalistic and other stereotypes. 
Yet, the psychological factor is always determinative for an extreme 
nationalistic rhetoric to be influencing, although circumstances have to match 
as well. For example, people will react eagerly when the national image is 
threatened, because the national image corresponds to the good image of 
oneself. Similarly, when the good image is damaged, people are led into 
depression and inhibition. Le Pen’s nationalism has taken advantage of such 
depression and inhibition, as Kristeva (1993) stresses the example. The 
national image can be most commonly hurt when national pride is hurt. 
“National pride”, Kristeva argues, “is comparable to the good narcissistic 
image of the child” (1993:37). National pride gets hurt when a shameful event 
occurs; and, “shame easily turns to anger” (Billing, 1995:101). Anger is 
directed against those who caused the suffering, the enemies. A scapegoat is 
not difficult to be found: Le Pen’s scapegoats are the foreigners. Certainly, not 
many people have followed Le Pen thus far, but in certain contexts his rhetoric 
can become more widespread and successful27.
So, my argument is that there are certain cases that elites are influenced 
by nationalism while it is also true that nationalistic rhetoric and stereotypes 
are used deliberately. Nationalism and nationalistic rhetoric seems to have 
become a constantly used means of manipulating propaganda, particularly in
27 For example, in a context of great uncertainty and insecurity such extreme political positions may 
become the receivers of despair, as it will be argued in chapter 6.
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serving the personal interests of politicians through manipulation of their ‘own’ 
people, even when they do share the same national identity. That happens 
because, ‘playing the patriotic card’ has proved to be a valuable weapon of 
political propaganda. At the same time, however, it would be inconsistent to 
believe that the elites can (always) escape the influence of nationalistic 
messages and manipulate them with composure in order to achieve its political 
or economic goals, since these messages find fertile ground in the unconscious 
desires of every individual.
*  *  *
To conclude, national and ethnic identities are different in their potentials 
and dynamics, although they originate in the same type of groupings and the 
process of identification with these groups is qualitatively similar. The main 
reason is that national identity is also a political identity. Through the state, 
national identity is preserved, advocated, enhanced, and occasionally 
manipulated, while it acquires additional strength because of the transformed 
structure of the state in modernity. National identity is not invented as such, but 
its strength and spread are created and, to some extend, imposed. In the shadow 
of such dynamics, the potentials of ethnic identity are either to strive in order to 
become national identity (that is, for an ethnic group to become national state), 
or to remain marginalised or oppressed; that is, to be recognised or to be 
absorbed. In the era of nationalism, however, ethnic groups are more likely to 
strive towards recognition as a minimum guarantee for their existence, due to 
the widespread influence of the political ideology of nationalism.
Nationalism has changed the political arena and has thus mobilised 
people’s identifications and loyalties. As a sentiment is a large-scale 
systematised loyalty. By large-scale we mean that it has transferred loyalty 
from local communities to much bigger ones, to societies that it ‘dresses up’ as 
big communities. It has altered localism and regionalism to nationalism. Not 
that people today lack their narrower affiliations, towards their native town or
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village for instance. In reality, these attachments are equally strong 
sentimentally28. These local attachments have been formed in a fluid way, but 
they are very strong because they constitute the familiar environment of birth 
and belonging. Simultaneously, people learn to be equally attached to their co­
nationals -even if they have never met. So, while people are attached to their 
‘private homeland’ because of the perceptions they have about it and about its 
inhabitants, they also become artificially attached to the wider perceptions and 
peoples of their nation. Thus, a Parisian and a southern French peasant are 
sentimentally united in an imagined way. Their common identity is national 
identity. In that sense, nationalism is a large scale and systematised 
localism/regionalism.
Why has Nationalism Appeared in Modernity?
So, what are the reasons for the emergence of nationalism in modernity? 
This is a huge question and its full account would probably require another 
thesis in itself. Nevertheless, the development of my previous argument has 
inevitably raised this question because, since nationalism has existed before as 
a sentiment, the question rises as to why has it only appeared as an ideology 
and a movement in modernity? So, what I intend to do is to briefly present the 
arguments already offered by well-known scholars in the field, and to briefly as 
well present my argument. The existing arguments will be briefly presented 
because this is a task already accomplished by other analysts29: besides, this is 
not intended to be an elaborate presentation of the existing bibliography on the 
subject, neither a full critical assessment of them. I have examined nationalism 
to the extent that it was necessary for the analysis of national identity; however, 
the reasons for its occurrence in the modem era cannot contribute significantly
28 The Eurobarometer survey has a question measuring the degree of attachment of the citizens of the 
European Union towards their country, their town/village, their region, and Europe. The responses have 
shown that, people feel attached by 89% to their country, 87% to their town/village, and 86% to their 
region [and 56% to Europe]. These are the results of Eurobarometer 51, Spring 1999, p.8, but the 
percentages remain similar throughout the 1990s.
29 For a summary and critical assessment of the answers provided to the specific question of the 
emergence of nationalism in modernity see Hutchinson, 1994, chapter 1 (particularly pp. 19-26), and 
Hastings, 1997, chapter 1.
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to the further understanding of national identity and, thus, they will not be my 
focus. As it was indicated, it will only be referred to because it has risen as a 
question from my previous argumentation.
Gellner (1993) in his controversial yet influencing study on nationalism 
places its founding causes on industrialisation. The transition from stratified 
agrarian societies to the mobile industrial ones required a new and bigger 
labour force whose training had to be generic. This required an educational 
infrastructure so large that only the state could organise it. Thus, state and 
culture had to be linked. In a quite similar way, Hobsbawm (1990) argues that 
nationalism was necessitated by capitalism, which created the need for a mass 
population in a specific territorial and political unit speaking the same language 
that would be the fuel of capitalism. Two more developments largely 
contributed towards the creation of the nation, according to Hobsbawm: the 
democratisation of politics along with the attribution of voting rights to a mass 
of people, and the creation of the modem state along with its increasing ability 
to influence and mobilise the people. This last development is connected to his 
argument that nationalism was an efficient way used by the rising bourgeoisie 
in the capitalist system to unite separate parts of the people .
Some of the elements that appear in the analysis of Gellner and 
Hobsbawm are central causal factors in other analysis of the emergence of 
nationalism. The appearance of the modem state is on the focus for Breuilly 
(1993), for whom nationalism is a form of politics that seeks to exercise or is 
already exercising state power. It is the state’s inadequacies that generate 
nationalism, he argues, either through nationalist movements that try to capture 
state power, or through the use of nationalist arguments by the state in order to 
justify its policies. On the other hand, Anderson focuses on capitalism, though 
in connection with it’s “vemacularising thrust” (1991:39)31. Capitalism, print, 
and human linguistic diversity were the catalysts in creating national 
consciousness: capitalism assembled vernaculars and “created mechanically
30 This must also be connected with his argument that since 1870 politicians and analysts discovered the 
importance of ‘group psychology’ because of the advanced studies of anthropology, social psychology 
and psychoanalysis. So, they realised that “whatever held human collectivities together it was not the 
rational calculation of their individual members” (Hobsbawm, 1983b:269).
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reproduced print-languages capable of dissemination through the market” 
(Anderson, 1991:44), thus giving fixity to a language and a means of 
communication for diverse and separate people. This is, however, his argument 
about the emergence of national consciousness and not about nationalism, 
leaving their relation in fluidity. For example, we can infer from this that, as 
these conditions generated national consciousness, it was this national 
consciousness that gave rise to nationalism; but this does not fit with his 
argument that nationalism created the nations. Similarly, Hastings refers to the 
reasons that contributed to the rise of national consciousness, but he does not 
fall into this contradiction because he does not confine nations in modernity 
and he places the first nations in the Middle Ages. He actually argues that in 
the early period nations produced nationalisms as they grew self-conscious, 
while in the later period the process was reversed in several instances. Hastings 
also argues that nations grew “out of certain ethnicities, affected by the literary 
development of a vernacular and the pressures of the state” (1997:11). The 
production of a literature and, particularly, the translation of the Bible, have 
been central in Hasting’s analysis for the development of national 
consciousness. This is a meeting-point for Hastings and Anderson.
Other factors are stressed as well, like the end of religious community 
and dynastic realm, the impact of warfare in the shaping of ethnicities, the 
impact of the French Revolution, etc. One of the analysts that initially stressed 
the intellectual impact on the formation of nationalism is Kedourie (1994). 
Kedourie argues that it was the Enlightment and its intellectual influence that 
largely contributed in the formation of nationalism, particularly the impact of 
Kant’s ideas. The logic of Kant’s doctrine is that the aim of man is to be free, 
autonomous and self-ruling. As the famous slogan later put it, Kant believed 
that “self-government...is better that good government” (Kedourie, 1994:22); 
this had the impact of placing the right of self-determination on the top of 
moral and political values, at any cost. Kedourie describes that post-Kantian 
philosophers deduced from this the idea of the state as being higher than any 
individual, and that the coming together of the two would be the realisation of
31 Anderson also asserts that nationalism is an American invention (see p. 191).
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individual freedom. Thus, eventually Kant’s doctrine resulted in Fichte’s 
postulation that ‘True individual freedom can be secured only in a state which 
regulates to the minutest detail the life of its citizens” (in Kedourie’s words, 
1994:31). So, Kedourie ascribes the responsibility for the emergence of 
nationalism to these intellectual developments.
All of the aforementioned arguments are, to a larger or lesser extent, 
correct while, at the same time, they cannot be applied in every case. An 
indicating example is the one of industrialisation: nationalism has emerged in 
many instances before industrialisation, and that leaves unexplained many 
cases where a nationalistic movement had already achieved its goal of 
establishing a national state while the society was still based on agrarian forms 
of production. Yet, an answer to the emergence of nationalism would be more 
accurately given if we separated its initial emergence and its secondary 
‘reproduction’. Nationalism first made its appearance in Western Europe and 
North America in the late 18th century and it was soon spread and had achieved 
its goals (meaning that it established national states) there. This same period 
and area was characterised by huge social, political and economic changes, 
which accounted for the ‘transition’ to modernity. These changes include 
industrialisation and capitalism, state-organised education, the development of 
print literacy and the transmission of certain vernaculars into universal 
languages, and the spread of electoral democracy along with mass politics. 
Which of the above was more or less a determinant can be a matter of further 
investigation, as well as whether nationalism was provoked or just coincided 
with any of the above changes.
From my study on the subject thus far, I believe that the development of 
print languages and literacy and the emergence of the modem state are of 
particular importance for nationalism at its initial stage. On the one hand, print- 
languages created a cohesive field of communication larger than the locality 
and rendered the members of the given language-group imaginable (the 
importance of language both as a distinctive barrier and as a defining element 
of similarity and identification has already been stressed). On the other hand, 
the state, along with democratisation and mass politics, had to justify its power
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over all these people by claiming to speak on their behalf, to represent them, 
while it also had to unite the different and even conflicting interests of those 
people and groups. These two factors combined accounted for the transference 
of local and regional affiliations to greater ones, to the states, to national states. 
Thus, the nation would necessarily claim to be ruled by its own people, to have 
a state representative of its power.
“Nation formation is a process, not an occurrence”, as Connor argues 
(1994:219), and in the process the preconditions for its appearance have 
changed. Since the initial emergence of nationalism in the West, nationalism 
has spread and influenced the conduct of politics elsewhere -or perhaps 
everywhere. We can say that its subsequent occurrence elsewhere was to a 
large extent the outcome of its first emergence in the West. Two points support 
this argument. First, after the establishment of the national state in Western 
Europe and North America, nationalism as the right of self-determination was 
the political norm, intellectually sustained and positively evaluated. Second, 
the developed countries of the West were the most powerful in every respect 
and could influence and, even, impose, their politics and ideas upon other 
countries. Consequently, nationalistic politics were transferred to the 
‘periphery’ in various ways; through the impact of nationalism on elites that 
had acquired western education; through the support of the Western national 
states to movements seeking national self-determination; through the indirect 
impact that these dominant countries had by setting the norm; or through their 
direct policies in colonised counties. For example, France, Britain and Russia 
largely supported the movement for national independence in 1821 in Greece, a 
movement initiated by intellectuals with mainly Western education, in the 
territory they claimed to constitute their national state. This is one of the many 
cases where nationalism emerged in a non-industrial country. Another example 
is Rwanda’s ethnic conflict, which has been created by the subjective 
interpretation and manipulation of the Hutu and Tutsi, which the Belgian 
colonial state defined as two distinct and opposing ethnic groups, although they 
were two distinct social and productive classes in direct contact and
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interdependence32. Thus, the emergence of nationalism in the West was to a 
large extent a determinant for its subsequent appearance, its ‘secondary 
reproduction’ and success under different circumstances.
When Does Nationalism Actively Manifest Itself?
A general claim of the previous chapter(s) is that human psychology is 
predisposed to nationalistic-as-chauvinistic attitudes and that nationalism has 
found a fertile ground within human psyche, which is partly the reason for its 
great success. Partly, however, because nationalism has only been to the fore 
for a couple of centuries, and it has not manifested itself always and with the 
same activeness. As it was argued in the previous section, nationalism did not 
come to the fore before certain essential social, economic and other conditions 
were met. Now, we should provide some explanations as to why, within the era 
of nationalism, it occasionally becomes an active force and occasionally 
remains in a state of latency. The question, therefore, is what triggers the 
release of an actively aggressive nationalism as opposed to a mildly expressed 
one, and the shift from national identity to ‘nationalistic identity’? Why do we 
see some nations acting more nationalistically than others, or the same nation 
becoming actively nationalistic in a certain period throughout its history? It has 
been mentioned that the trigger can be certain ‘particular circumstances’, but 
this is a statement left unexplained. So, now we should refer in more detail to 
those circumstances that may give rise to nationalistic exaltations.
The Particular Circumstances
There are events that provoke big and direct changes in a society and, 
therefore, the society’s reaction, a reaction that can be a nationalistic one. 
These circumstances may be of economic, political, social, historical, or
32 For a brief overview of this case see Castells, 2000b: 105-114.
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individual nature. Many of them are interrelated and it is often difficult to 
distinguish between, and they can emerge simultaneously. However, the 
direction of the reaction is difficult to be predicted as the same event can 
provoke contradictory reactions. Thus, the analysis of similar past historical 
events is useful for the prediction of the possible reaction of a given society.
Economic circumstances mainly refer to major economic changes and 
crises. The economic situation in combination with the direction of possible 
economic changes and reforms is very important for the feeling of security of 
the people. In general, we can expect that severe and long-lasting economic 
uneasiness will generate frustration and sense of insecurity, which is a trigger 
for reactionary manifestations. The advancement towards capitalist economy, 
for example, initially gave rise to new elites who eventually advocated the 
creation of the national state. Economic reforms and the widening of the 
economy, however, have often posed a threat and provoked the fearful 
reactions of economic actors such as shopkeepers, small merchants, etc. 
Labour migration is another determinant of such reactions, easily combined 
with xenophobia, especially when the unemployment rate is high. Much 
depends, as Breuilly says, on the capability of the urban economy to 
accommodate, educate and employ its population: “competition for such 
resources, especially when they are scarce, is a major ingredient in creating and 
sustaining communal conflict” (1993:23).
Political circumstances vary from war, political and/or party system 
collapse, limited participation of a certain ethnic group (when there are more 
than one), the level of political participation and commitment to democratic
‘X'Xvalues and methods , feelings of disdain against politicians in a democratic 
system, to external threats and/or interventions, and international 
contingencies. An unfair or humiliating treaty signed after a war is most likely 
to generate anger to a nation and, thus, put the foundations for future conflicts, 
as the example of post WW1 Germany most characteristically stresses. In 
addition, nationalism is very often generated as a reaction to a -real or
33 That is, commitment not only in democratic values but also in democratic methods used in order to 
defend and strengthen these values.
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perceived- threat or to the nationalistic demands of neighboring groups, as was
ththe case with Magyar nationalism. Magyar nationalism (in the mid-18 
century) was the response of a culturally dominant group to attempts at reform 
by the Habsburg government. These reforms were seen as a German threat to 
the Magyar position; this in turn promoted nationalistic response from 
subordinate groups, like the Croatians and the Rumanians34. As for external 
threats and interventions, their direct impact is well known and there are many 
such examples, like the support of the French and the British to resistance and 
separatist movements within the Ottoman Empire, which strengthened them 
and helped towards their success. The external influence can, also, be more 
indirect but equally or even more influencing: such was the example that the 
German and Italian unification set in the nineteenth century by establishing the
35national state as the norm and initiated conflict in Europe and elsewhere .
Social circumstances refer to the composition of society, whether social, 
ethnic, religious or other, and to changes that have a general impact upon this 
society or to any particular group within it. I do not refer to any necessary 
relationship between particular social and economic groups and nationalism, 
because such relationship has not proved to exist, as Breuilly argues36. I rather 
refer to the collaboration between different groups as opposed to polarisation, 
the involvement of religion to state’s affairs and jurisdiction, etc. Social 
circumstances are the least distinguishable and independent of all the others. 
For example, discrimination against a minority group constitutes a social 
determinant that can generate nationalistic reactions, but it is usually combined 
with economic discrimination. However, an immigration influx can provoke 
reactions and social upset irrespective of the economic implications it may 
have. Religion is also a determinant that can be included in the political 
circumstances too, as it is a form of politics, but it is also a social determinant 
to the extent that it is a means of socialisation for many people. Thus, reforms 
aiming at secularisation of a traditional religious society may offend the
34 On the Magyar case see Breuilly, 1993:125-131.
35 In Breuilly, 1993:379, where he discusses the influence of certain nationalisms beyond their countries.
Japanese nationalism is also one of them.
36 See Breuilly, 1993, chapter 2.
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religious sentiments of the believers and provoke their reaction to these 
reforms, as was the case with Muslims in the Ottoman Empire in the early 19th 
century. Religion in Northern Ireland is a distinctive barrier between the 
Protestants and the Catholics, but it has generated (or has been generated by) 
other social and economic disparities (better jobs for the Protestants for 
example).
Social circumstances also include the cultural characteristics of a society, 
such as education, mass literacy, the development of civil society etc. As with 
an individual, the more educated the population of a nation is, the more 
difficult should it be to engage into an offensive nationalism. However, there 
are examples that indicate that this is not necessarily a condition and, so, the 
level of education cannot account as a determinant of the reluctance or not to 
engage into a nationalistic conflict when the feeling of national identity is 
threatened. Perhaps, an active and developed civil society, characterised by the 
interest and participation of the citizens into public affairs, could prove to be a 
positive mediator and discussant when a crisis occurs37.
Another factor that determines the development of active nationalism is 
the historical context within which it develops. The historical context, like the 
cultural characteristic, differ from the other circumstances in that they do not 
give rise to a conflict immediately, they do not have a direct outcome. They 
rather set the foundations upon which later conflicts can develop. Thus, the 
conflict between Greece and FYROM over the name ‘Macedonia’ did not 
occur as suddenly in the 1990’s as many thought: it had started as a dispute 
between Greece and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (because it 
named one of its provinces ‘Macedonia’) after the second world war, but it was 
not further stressed at that time because of Western pressures over Greece, in 
an effort to support Tito’s Yugoslavia and his remoteness from the Soviet 
Union. As soon as Yugoslavia broke into pieces, the dispute with the newly 
emerged state (re)appeared. Historical contexts show that people will respond 
to nationalism as long as the message conveyed is relevant to their history, if it 
thus meets a felt.
37 This determinant is both a political and social one.
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Last, we should to refer to the individual circumstances, meaning the role 
of persons in the development of nationalism, and more specifically the role of 
elites and the role of leaders. The role of elites in generating nationalism is 
largely discussed, as it is the intellectuals that are the conveyors of ideologies 
in general, but also those who have very often given rise to nationalist 
movements. What is less discussed is the important role a certain leading 
personality, usually charismatic, plays in mobilising a nation. It was Gandhi, 
for example, who transformed an elitist, Congress-based nationalism into a 
popular, mass-based anti-colonial nationalism in India. It was Hitler who 
transmitted a strong, heroic image and gained support to a party without having 
any concrete policy. I am not asserting that it was, in these and other cases, the 
role of the leader alone that generated an active nationalism, but that their 
presence was of determinative importance, while assisted by the occurrence of 
other circumstances as well.
These are the economic, political, social, historical and individual 
circumstances that can become the trigger in transforming a mild nationalist 
into an extreme one (and vice versa), or generate an aggressive nationalism or 
an active liberation movement. In general, these circumstances refer to any 
external occurrence that would provoke internal uneasiness, meaning situations 
that may alter peoples’ psychological balance by posing a threat, or altering the 
familiar circumstances to an unknown and uncertain situation. Fear and 
uncertainty is a major threat to social and political stability. Usually, the 
occurrence of just one of the particular circumstances is not enough to provoke 
extreme nationalistic reactions, while in most cases there is a combination of 
circumstances behind an unforeseen event. Let me stress the example of Nazi 
Germany, because it is very characteristic in combining most of the 
aforementioned circumstances.
Germany had suffered a heavy blow after its defeat in the First World 
War and a bad economic setback both because of the war and because of the 
Peace Treaty of Versailles (June 1919), which left no ground for the 
development of the German economy. Both the defeat and the humiliating 
treatment after the settlement were a stigma for the Germans. Fascism begun as
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a response to the threats posed from the Left, threats more perceived than real, 
though, as the left was fragmented between the socialists and the communists. 
Although most political parties of the Weimar republic were committed to 
parliamentary democracy, the Germans were eventually disappointed by them 
for three main reasons: first, many decision areas were left outside 
parliamentary control (to the army and police, employers and trade unions); 
second, the lack of a party representing the Protestant, the conservative and the 
non-working class created a political vacuum; third, there was fragmentation, 
not only within the Left but among the rest of the political spectrum, which 
was partly responsible for the lack of collaboration against the fascist threat. 
Within that context, the two contingencies of the depression of 1929-30 and of 
the involvement of Hitler into politics, which followed the public 
disappointment over parliamentary effectiveness, were decisive for the German 
support for the fascism. This was not so mush a support for the nazi party, as it 
had no schedule or program and it initially addressed even to the working 
class; it was rather a desperate option. As Breuilly argues, the nazi party “... 
was the beneficiary of the failure of other parties, ...a single party unattained by 
power, with a strong looking leader...that led voters to it” (1993:298)38.
Thus, we can see how these particular economic, political and individual 
circumstances were synthesised in the German case and gave this disastrous 
historical example known to everybody. No less relevant is, at the same time, 
the centrality of racism in favour of the Aryan race and against the Jews (and 
Romas, homosexuals, and communists, though to a lesser extent) in German 
nationalism. Racism and anti-Semitism were part of Hitler’s stance even before 
he came into power , but they were also ‘embraced’ by many Germans who 
actively engaged to this dehumanising ‘final solution’. It is important to add an 
additional element about the historical context of this case. In his study about 
invented traditions, Hobsbawm refers to the second German Empire and its 
founding acts, which attempted to stress its continuity with the first Empire and
38 Most of the information on Germany is taken from the comprehensive historical study of Breuilly, 
1993:291-307.
39 His racism and Anti-Semitism was already expressed in his book Mein Kampf. Consequently, these 
views were not a convenient ideologisation of an appealing propaganda, but were views that had strongly 
appealed to Hitler himself.
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the historical links between Prussia and Germany that brought them together in 
the new Empire in 1871. These attempts, however, could not be historically 
sustained, so two devices were used: the use of a secular national enemy, and 
“the concept of conquest or cultural, political and military supremacy” 
(Hobsbawm, 1983b:274). To the extent that these devices were used at the 
founding moments of the second German Empire, they constituted a basic 
perception of the German national identity. Hitler appealed exactly to these 
perceptions with the use of, actually, two secular and internal enemies (the 
communists and, mainly, the Jews), by stressing the racial superiority of the 
Germans, and by appealing to military ethos. The psychological appeal this 
propaganda had upon the, frustrated and disappointed, Germans is obvious, for 
reasons stressed in the previous chapters.
Particular Circumstances and the Particularity o f  Each Case
These are the circumstances that can provoke nationalistic eruptions as 
outlined above. Yet, they can be of relative help in arriving at a conclusion of 
when and how a certain type of nationalism (mild or militant, passive or active, 
etc.) will emerge. To begin with, each of these circumstances does not 
necessarily provoke a nationalistic reaction. The political vacuum created by 
the lack of representation for certain groups in Germany contributed in the 
development of extreme nationalistic (and racist) politics, but this was not the 
case in Italy, where nationalistic groups failed to fill in effectively the political 
vacuum created by the political breakdown in 1848. Secondly, even when these 
circumstances do provoke a nationalistic reaction, it is difficult to know in 
advance the direction it will take. For example, we saw that economic changes 
towards a capitalistic economy, on the one hand, created a new elite supporting 
these changes and, on the other, provoked the reactions of the small merchants 
and shopkeepers who were threatened by such changes. Thirdly, and most 
importantly, these particular circumstances as a whole are too vague and 
general to provide a sort of ‘typology’ for the emergence of nationalism, in the
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sense that they include almost every social, political, economic or other 
condition so that they lose their specificity.
So, can we be more specific about these particular circumstances? The 
answer is negative as long as we discuss the emergence of nationalism in 
general and not in connection to a specific case-study. Conversely, we can be 
very specific about which particular set of events provoked what reaction and 
when, but only when we examine and analyse a particular case. Yet, the 
attempt at generalisation is derived from the conclusions drawn from specific 
cases: it is through the analysis of case-studies that we draw certain general 
conclusions and arrive at a broader account of ‘particular circumstances’ that 
generate nationalisms. These, however, are not exhaustive and do not consider 
exceptional cases. They can be useful points of attention when examining the 
emergence of nationalism in a particular country, but they can be misleading if 
used in order to apply them ‘generally’, to explain or predict nationalistic 
eruptions in a broadly valid theory that will aspire to become a typology. So, in 
such a theoretical account of the reasons that can generate nationalism, this 
seemingly lack of specificity does not correspond to a lack of precision. The 
most concrete conclusion can be that, in circumstances that provoke feelings of 
threat and uneasiness among the people, one has to be cautious about the 
direction that a reaction to these feelings may take, and about the alternative 
outlets that might become the receivers of disappointment, as retrogressive 
reactions are most likely to be advanced or provoked by such feelings and/or 
their manipulation40.
This last remark stresses the importance of fear and uncertainty in 
creating defensive reactions. These feelings provoke uneasiness and 
unpleasure, and they can turn out to be the foundations for anger. Another 
important, similar factor, that was briefly referred to a few paragraphs above 
but should be rather emphasised, is the role of humiliation and hostile or even 
unfair treatment by other nations. As stressed with the example of Germany, a 
humiliating treaty signed after a war can leave its ‘mark’ on the collective
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unconscious of a nation and become the source for aggressive reactions in the 
future. Yet, the determinant of humiliation does not only refer to the specific 
historical point of warfare and its termination with a treaty. It also refers to 
negative perceptions, images and attitudes that may be widely articulated on 
behalf of a nation or a group of nations against another (group of) nation(s). 
Such perceptions -that often come as projections of the negative aspects of 
those who convey them and thus sustain their own positive self-image- enrich 
nationalistic discourse of the ‘cont erupted’ nation/region with rejection and 
repudiation of the ‘conveyors’ and create a self-image in reaction to them. In 
his analysis of nationalism, Isaiah Berlin (1990) examines the role of “wounds” 
and “collective humiliation” (p.245) in the manifestation of nationalism. As he 
argues, “to be the object of contempt or patronising tolerance on the part of 
proud neighbours is one of the most traumatic experiences that individuals of 
societies can suffer. The response, as often as not, is pathological exaggeration 
of one’s real or imaginary virtues, and resentment and hostility towards the 
proud, the happy, the successful. This, indeed, characterised much German 
feeling about the west, more especially about France, in the eighteenth 
century” (p.246)41.
The negative inscriptions in the collective unconscious of a nation can 
become at any time the foundation of aggressiveness, the basis upon which 
future nationalistic manifestation will develop -as is also the case with fear and 
uncertainty. As Langman argues, “the denial of loss of respect and dignity can 
foster shame and humiliation and this, in turn, may trigger rage, anger and 
violence in the attempt to ameliorate a loss of self-esteem” (2001:197). Yet, we 
cannot be very precise as to the exact reasons that provoke these feelings in 
each given period and place, even less so as far as the effect of a nationalistic
40 If, for example, there is no political party to receive and accommodate the frustration of a given social, 
political, religious or other group, then it is more likely that this group will become subject to 
manipulation by non-parliamentary forces.
41 Ressentiment is the term Greenfeld (1992) borrows from Nietzsche and Scheler to describe the 
“psychological state resulting from suppressed feelings of envy and hatred (existential envy) and the 
impossibility of satisfying these feelings” (p. 15). Ressentiment is caused through a contact that generates 
feelings of inferiority to one of the contactors, for any reason. Greenfeld argues that “ressentiment not 
only makes a nation more aggressive, but represents an unusually powerful stimulant of national 
sentiment and collective action...” (p.488); however, he connects this feeling more with mobilisation to 
aggressive warfare in what he calls ‘collectivistic nations’ than in ‘individualistic nations’ (p.488).
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reaction of such feelings is concerned. As argued above, there are particular 
circumstances that account for the active manifestation of nationalism, but we 
cannot know in advance the conjunction and the contingency of events. 
However, we can safely argue that feelings of humiliation and resentment, fear 
and uncertainty, can be easily exaggerated when they combine with other 
particular circumstances -or contribute in the exaggeration of forthcoming 
circumstances- and they can very easily become subject to manipulation by 
aspiring nationalist leaders. Nationalism, along with any kind of group- 
chauvinism (racism being the most common) is an expected reaction to 
unforeseen developments and circumstances when they combine with present 
or past traumatic experiences, for nationalism pledges to restore the ‘right way 
of things’. “Hence”, writes Berlin, “the value of a real of imaginary rich 
historical past to inferiority-ridden peoples, for it promises, perhaps, an even 
more glorious future. If no such past can be invoked, then its very absence will 
be ground for optimism” as it has to be achieved in the future (1990:247).
Let us stress a recent example in which the negative perceptions 
conveyed appear to be a decisive determinant in the support of nationalistic 
reactions: the Bosnian Serbs. Armakolas’ study on the Bosnian Serbs has 
concluded that the huge involvement of the “global constituency” was 
determinative for the actual struggle and for the Serbian identities. Armakolas 
defines as “global involvement” not only military action (or inaction) but also 
the thousands of people and NGOs that “became involved indirectly through 
fund-raising, networking, organising activities and transmitting information 
relevant to the conflict”, the media, the books written and academic debates as 
well as “cyberspace appeals” (2001:50). As Armakolas argues, all these 
“global actors” put immense pressure for active involvement in the Yugoslav 
war, but at the same time projected on it their own perceptions and biases: they 
saw the conflict as a naturally violent Balkan history, and the Serbs as 
primitive and less civilised; they projected an essentialist idea of separate Serb, 
Croat and Muslim ethnic identities; they indiscriminately blamed Serbian 
aggression for the conflict; and they “projected their image and values” (p.61) 
to the conflict. Similarly, Sorabji argues that, global involvement was largely
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constitutive of the conflict: “the exclusionist projects advanced by nationalist 
leaders had initially received little support among the population5 . Their turn 
in attitude seems to have been a combination of their feeling that the western 
images were totally negative about them, their perception of injustice and 
indiscriminate accusation on behalf of the western world, their exclusion from 
the remaining Yugoslavia after its break-up, as well as the ‘either-or5 
dichotomy of their leadership. In a defensive reaction, the Bosnian Serbs 
excluded the others and found refuge in a strong ‘nationalistic5 identity, while 
“the Great Serbian project was developed as a ‘remedy5 to the ‘dangers5 
presented to the Serbs being left outside the remaining Yugoslavia after the 
break-up of the federation55 (Armakolas, 2001:59).
As we can see from the example of Bosnian Serbs, a number of 
circumstances resulted in the catastrophic and aggressive nationalism of the 
Bosnian Serbs. One of these circumstances that should be emphasised was the 
false-dilemma posed by their leadership (an extreme nationalistic line that 
actually posed the dilemma, ‘You are either with us or against us5), which 
combined with the extreme negative perceptions of the others about the Serbs, 
thus leaving no room for mediation and internal accommodation for the 
feelings of resentment. If we take the example of Germany under 
consideration, the permanence of Germans resentment of the West since the 
eighteenth century along with their developed feelings of superiority (probably 
developed as a remedy for their perceived inferiority), and the results that they 
had for both Germany and Europe, we can anticipate, and certainly not be 
surprised if the Serbian anti-Westernism and humiliated pride, as well as their 
perceptions of unfair and biased treatment, come to the surface again with an 
active manifestation. What is also interesting to emphasise on is that the 
erupted conflict in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s offered the occasion, or alibi, 
to, what Armakolas calls, ‘global actors5 to project their negative images, their 
justified or unjustified perceptions, and their biases. This process originates to 
the never-ending need to sustain and verify the positive image one has for 
oneself and one's group; this unconscious negative identification is
42 Sorabji, Cornelia (1993): ‘Ethnic War in Bosnia?’, Radical Philosophy, 63, pp33-35. Quoted in
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indispensable for the (positive) group identification and unity, as argued 
elsewhere43. This seems to be the meaning in Bauman’s view that there is an 
apparent symmetry between friends and enemies, in the sense that the one 
cannot exist without the other; yet, this symmetry is an illusion for “it is the 
friends who define the enemies” (1990:143).
So, it seems that the determinant of humiliation and resentment, fear and 
uncertainty is the most concrete conclusion we can make about conditions that 
generate nationalism. However, this determinant concerns mostly the 
emergence of actively nationalistic reactions and the swift into aggressiveness, 
that is nationalism as a defensive reaction or group-chauvinism. In that sense, it 
is not sufficient to answer the emergence of nationalism as an ideology and a 
movement. In addition, the conditions that provoke these feelings cannot be 
specified. So, while this is still a psychological determinant that results from 
other particular circumstances (political, economic, social, etc), these 
circumstances cannot be identified with precision in relation to their outcome.
Some general remarks can be made, of course, mainly when analysing 
nationalism within a given area with certain similarities and/or within a given 
period of time, when a comparative study is taking place. For example, it is 
accurate to stress the differences between the type of nationalism that was 
developed in Western and Eastern Europe, based on previous comparative 
analysis on the formation of the national state in Western and Eastern Europe 
respectively. However, variations within them should be accounted with care. 
For that reason, after comparatively assessing certain cases of separatist 
nationalisms in the developed national states, Breuilly argued that the only 
generalisation we can make is the extremely important role played by 
economically advanced or advancing regions in the development of such 
nationalisms; beyond that, other generalisations do not apply, as the political 
situation, the cultural appeal and the methods used by nationalists vary 
significantly (1993:334). The distance between terrorist tactics of the Basques
Armakolas (2001).
43 In chapter 1, p.24-7, chapter 2, pp.59-60, 65-69; see also, Freud (1921:129), Volkan(1988), and Klein 
(1988) on projective identification.
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and the parliamentary methods of the Quebecois cannot be ‘generally7 
explained, but only specifically.
Breuilly has argued that, in a world of ‘nation-states7, particularly in the 
developed world, “the conditions for the emergence of [nationalist] movements 
have largely cease to exist77 (1993:400). Breuilly means by nationalism the 
efforts at capturing the state, and not the sentiments aroused through 
identification with the nation or nationalistic rhetoric. Even thus defined, 
however, his argument is undermined by the emergence of nationalisms in 
various parts of the Western world, nationalisms that claim either for autonomy 
within the state or an independent state and cannot be neglected as 
‘exceptions7. In addition, according to his central argument that nationalism is 
a form of politics engendered by the structures and policies of the modem state, 
we can see that these structures and policies have not ceased to exist. On the 
contrary, as Breuilly himself argues, nationalism has lost its specificity and is 
applied more eagerly and indistinguishably from other sort of policies. 
Moreover, he stresses that in other parts of the world, as in Eastern Europe, 
there are still the conditions that initially generated nationalism, and these are: 
“the combination of regional disparities in political influence, political elites 
able and prepared to oppose the present state, the non-involvement of much of 
the population in other, non-nationalist forms of politics, and the existence of 
plausible cultural and/or institutional characteristics for a regionally based 
opposition77 (1993:398). These are only some of the conditions that have 
generated nationalism, but not all of them; as shown throughout the various 
case-studies presented in his book, this is also the reason that we cannot make a 
typology of such conditions and their outcomes. Also, the contingent facts of 
the presence of a charismatic nationalist leader or of an international economic 
crisis are not considered in the outlined conditions. Last, but not least, some of 
these conditions still exist in developed national states (like Britain and 
elsewhere).
*
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No nationalism is predestined to develop or succeed. There are 
conditions that apply to each case, the combination of which is often unique. 
Analysis of each case must be based on examination of its particularities along 
with its trivialities. Some hypothesis and predictions can be made about future 
nationalisms, not based on explanatory models (at least not alone), but based 
on the rigorous knowledge of the whole context within which a situation is 
evolving -on which one may apply a general theory. Also, good knowledge of 
history is indispensable, as it is through historical comparisons that one can 
arrive at the safest conclusion possible. To conclude, three points need 
particular attention. First, the aforementioned particular circumstances are ones 
that the analyst must have in mind while studying a case as general guidelines, 
as points of attention, but not as concrete explanations. A second central point 
is that in most nationalisms there is a reference to a common enemy, a 
reference not marginal but central. This reminds us that the particular 
circumstances constitute part of the explanation, while the other part rests on 
human psychology44. And third, that the existence, prevalence and success of 
nationalism further generate nationalism itself.
It is a general difficulty as far as political and social events are concerned 
to make specific predictions. The problem is that there are not laws or specific 
requirements that, when fulfilled, will result in this or that reaction. On the 
other hand, however, it may be sometimes feasible to examine the likelihood of 
certain trends and/or to define a number of alternatives in the effort to create or 
avoid a phenomenon. This can only be possible if all the possible variants be 
examined, meaning psychological, political, economic, cultural and other. An 
additional variant that is indispensable in such a process includes the 
examination and analysis of similar occurrences in the past, which would 
provide with already existing paradigms. That, of course, does not mean that 
we shall be able to predict a specific event with precision. It means that it may 
be feasible to identify existing trends in the process of events and, with the
44 The analysis of the psychological appeal of nationalism was more concrete than that of the social, 
economic, political and other conditions. This is not because the former is more important. It is rather 
because of the universality of the human characteristics that facilitates their concrete analysis, while the 
particularity of each case of nationalist appearance does not leave much ground for a general 
argumentation.
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study of the particular circumstances that characterise this case, to identify 
some potential in the making, some future dynamics -which can also suggest a 
number of policies that one should apply.
PART THREE 
National Identity in the Era of Globalisation
In the third and last part of this research we shall examine and analyse national 
identification and its prospects in the current era, the era of globalisation. In the 
previous two parts, and particularly the second part, we explored the dynamics of 
national identification in the era of nationalism, the properties of nationalism that can 
transform national identity into a ‘nationalistic’ identity, and the circumstances under 
which nationalism and national identity manifest themselves in more reactionary 
ways. Yet, it is widely asserted that contemporary living has been largely affected by 
another process, namely globalisation. The era of globalisation is a process 
characterised by changes in many domains of human life, and also by ambivalence in 
the direction of that change, meaning that it has both negative and positive aspects 
and consequences. It is also producing new forms of conflict and political change 
both within and between nations, while it is estimated to have an influence upon 
people’s identities, and on national identities in particular. For these reasons, a 
complete analysis of national identity could not avoid an analysis of the 
consequences of globalisation on its formulation and strength.
The third part of this thesis will be divided in three chapters. In chapter 5 we 
shall provide the working definition of globalisation that will be used in this analysis. 
In chapter 6 we shall explore the changes and possible dynamics of the national state. 
To do that we shall first analyse the state and the debate about its apparent 
transformations in the era of globalisation, and then we shall examine whether there 
are changes regarding its mechanisms that produce national identification. Thus, we 
shall analyse national identity in its relation to the conclusions drawn regarding 
national states under the influence of globalisation. In the last chapter we will 
analyse the particular circumstances that make globalisation a source of insecurity 
and anxiety for the people, and examine the potentials of national as a form of 
collective identification within that context.
C H A P T E R  5:  D E F I N I N G  G L O B A L I S A T I O N
The debate on globalisation is a huge and a very significant one, but also 
a very recent one. The very term ‘globalisation’ is only recently used: for 
example, the British Library of the Political and Economic Science (the library 
of the LSE) has 492 titles containing the word ‘globalisation’, only five of 
them being between 1988-9, and the rest published from 1989 onwards. So, 
titles on globalisation have been published since 1989 at an accelerated pace, 
indicating the rapid growth of interest in, and the importance of this new 
subject. Indeed, globalisation is today one of the most commonly used 
keywords in a range of related disciplines and sub-disciplines (economics, 
sociology, political science, as well as international relations, cultural studies, 
etc.), but also very frequently uttered and referred to in everyday use, by 
politicians, journalists, managers, etc.
Globalisation has many and diverse meanings, and various aspects that 
one can focus on. In addition, despite its recent introduction in our scientific 
and everyday vocabulary, the discussion on globalisation includes issues that 
have long preoccupied sociologists, political scientists, and other scholars. For 
these reasons, a brief and complete definition of globalisation is difficult to 
provide. In order to overcome this difficulty, we shall first proceed with a brief 
review of the debate on globalisation, followed by a definition of the 
framework of reference that will be used in this study as far as globalisation is 
concerned. So, we will start with a brief summary of the debate and the 
definitions proposed, while concentrating on its most important aspects. Then, 
we will provide the working definition on globalisation that will be used in this 
analysis. As in the case of nationalism, this will not be a ‘globalisation is...’ 
sentence, but rather a section where we shall outline the definitional 
characteristics of globalisation that will serve as the definition on globalisation 
for the rest of the thesis.
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The Globalisation Debate
It is rather odd, in the first place, to talk about the analytical field of 
globalisation, because globalisation is a process relevant to most, if not all, 
human experiences and activities. As Nederveen Pieterse argues, we can 
conceive of ‘globalisations’ in the plural because we have so many 
globalisations as we have disciplines, and they are all relevant (1995b: 45). This 
multidimensionality is partly responsible for the complexity in systematising 
the arguments; yet, both multidimensionality and systematisation are 
prerequisites for the complete analysis of a process that covers so many aspects 
of political and social organisation.
There are various ways to categorise the assorted arguments on 
globalisation and the definitions proposed by scholars in the field1. At the same 
time, there is a dispute about the very differentiation between globalisation and 
internationalisation2. At present, in order to proceed in the delineation of the 
basic arguments that characterise the debate and clarify what we mean by
1 One of the usual categorisations used is between sceptics and advocates. A good summary of the debate 
that follows this division is made by Held and McGrew (2000): they divide between the main fields of the 
debate -definitions, power relations, cultural issues, economy, inequality, and global order- and analyse 
the arguments of both the sceptics and the globalists of each aforementioned field. Nevertheless, it is 
usually the case that scholars are not either sceptics or globalists, in the sense that some could agree with 
globalists as far as the economy is concerned, for example, and with sceptics as far as culture is 
concerned (i.e. Castells). Other scholars follow a categorisation of the debate according to the model or 
approach used. Sklair (1999) describes the debate according to four main approaches: the world-systems 
approach, the global culture approach, the global society approach, and the global capitalism approach. 
The first is mainly economic, the next two are cultural and quite similar, while the last one, which is also 
Sklair’s argument, has economic foundations while distinguishing between the economic, cultural, and 
political sphere. These three spheres are analysed by Halliday too, who reviews the arguments about 
world politics under the headings of Hegemonic Optimism, Liberal Reform, New Anti-Imperialism, and 
‘New Middle-Ages’ (2001, chapter 3). Beck (2000, chapter 1), on the other hand, divides theorists into 
two groups, according to the number of dimensions used in their analysis. The first group includes those 
who identify one dominant dimension of globalisation as central (i.e. Wallerstein’s school concentrates on 
capitalism, Rosenau, Gilpin, Held, etc concentrate on international politics and the challenge to the 
national state, etc; the second group is comprised by those who suggest that globalisation is based on a 
complex set of causes and fields (Robertson, Appadurai, Albrow, Featherstone, Lash, Urry, etc).
2 The two terms are not always differentiated and, occasionally used interchangeably. Thus, a number of 
globalisation theorists make the case for the necessity of distinguishing between the two, often from a 
different angle though. Hirst and Thompson (1999) for example contest the whole notion of globalisation 
on the basis that there is nothing specifically and distinctively global in contemporary economy and 
society, and argue that the term international can better define our age. On the other hand, others try to 
emphasise the differences of the ‘global’ and the ‘international’ condition in order to argue for the new 
era of globalisation that we have entered. Castells (2000a: 101), for example, talks about the ‘global 
economy’ as distinct from the ‘world economy’ (which has existed since the sixteenth century), while 
Sklair (1999:323)argues that inter-nationalisation should be referred to with the hyphen to emphasise its 
foundation on the system of nation states, and thus make the distinction with globalisation that is not.
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globalisation, we will proceed with the presentation of classic definitions of 
globalisation and the most widespread arguments and views. We shall
i
categorise the definitions into those that are one dimensional and economic, 
and into those that are multidimensional. That is for two reasons: first, the vast 
majority of the one-dimensional approaches are economic; and second, the 
economic arguments are usually confronted or questioned by scholars that are 
placed within the second category of multidimensional approaches.
Economic Approaches
The approaches that are solely or predominantly economic focus on 
capitalism and the free-market as their object of analysis and, also, as their 
object of criticism in most cases. As capitalism is not a new system, these 
approaches usually hold the view that globalisation is long predated and they 
tend to lay emphasis upon the similarities with previous times of an open 
international economy, which a number of theorists identify as more open and 
integrated than today’s system. The very idea of a globalised economy is 
generally contested, arguing that there is rather a ‘trilateral’ organisation of 
worlds’ economic activity, between the three core blocks of Europe, the 
Americas, and Japan (or the Asia-Pacific).
The first reference to economic approaches on globalisation is most 
commonly made to the famous work of Immanuel Wallerstein and World- 
Systems Theory (which has developed more like a school of thought than just a 
theory). According to Wallerstein, every society is placed within one system, 
the capitalist world system, which is characterised by three elements: one 
single market and the principle of profit maximisation, facilitation of the 
market forces by many states, and by surplus based on exploitation, not 
between two classes, but among three layers. These layers are the ‘core’, the 
‘periphery’, and the ‘semi-periphery’. Countries are distinguished according to 
an international division of labour that places them in each of these layers. 
Thus, the core countries, which are North America and Western Europe, are 
those that have historically exploited poor countries of the periphery, like
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Africa and Asia, and the semi-periphery, like Latin America and East Asia; the 
‘core’ countries ‘play’ the others against one another, as they move their 
factories from the periphery to the semi-periphery and vice versa according to 
criteria of wage and raw material prices, that is criteria of profit. So, the theory 
continues, this system produces, apart from wealth and prosperity (mainly in 
the ‘core’ countries), poverty and inequality, and it also generates conflicts. 
Wallerstein does not use the word globalisation in his theory, which was first 
introduced in the mid-seventies, but he refers to ‘world system’ and ‘world 
capitalism’, or to the universal and the national as the distinction between the 
worldwide and the particular3. Nevertheless, his focus of analysis is no less 
relevant to the debate on globalisation and, therefore, is regarded as a classic in 
the globalisation literature.
Another significant economic approach is that of Hirst and Thompson 
and their book Globalisation in Question (1999), in which they actually put 
globalisation in question. For them too, globalisation is the same as the 
international capitalist economy, an economy not unprecedented but based on 
the modem industrial economy that became generalised from 1860 onwards. 
This economy, they argue, is actually less open in some respects than the 
economy of La Belle Epoque. They also argue that the Third World remains 
marginal in terms of investment and trade, and that the world economy is 
concentrated on the G3 ‘countries’ (Europe, North America, and Japan). Hirst 
and Thompson object to the widespread claim that today’s global markets are 
beyond regulation and control, arguing that the G3 retain “the capacity... to 
exert powerful governance pressures over financial markets and other 
economic tendencies” (1999:2). Their work is concentrated on the economic 
dimension of globalisation because, as they argue, it is a precondition for other 
consequences on culture and politics. Lastly, they criticise the economically 
founded argument that globalisation is an accomplished and unavoidable fact 
and that it is ungovernable, on the grounds that this argument ignores and 
further diminishes the political choices and governance attempts that 
politicians can make to regulate world economy.
3 See Wallerstein, 1991.
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The view that globalisation means the creation of a ‘global free market’ 
and worldwide capitalism is also held by John Gray (1998), who dedicates 
much of his analysis to the Great Transformation period in England, between 
1870 and 1914. Nevertheless, he does so for different reasons than those for 
which Hirst and Thompson examined the same period (La Belle Epoque). Gray 
does agree with Hirst and Thompson in their criticism over the ‘hyper­
globalisation’ theories4 and the implications these views have on politics5, but 
he argues that they neglect the fact that in the last two decades the world has 
become less governable, and that the extend and scale of the economy’s 
transformation renders globalisation indeed unprecedented. Gray’s analysis 
involves an attempt to compare contemporary free-market with a period 
characterised by laissez-faire and draw some conclusions about it. He draws 
two significant conclusions. First, that “laissez-faire must be centrally planned. 
...it is not a gift of social evolution”; it is rather the outcome of a process of 
political engineering, “...whose outcome we can know in advance” 
(1998:16,17). This leads to his second important conclusion: as the Belle 
Epoque resulted in severe social instability and turbulence, the same can be 
safely expected from globalisation. As he argues, the incorporation of the 
world’s economies into a single global free market is “a Utopia that can never 
be realised; its pursuit has already produced social dislocation and economic 
and political instability on a large scale” (1998:2). What he also considers as 
unprecedented is the social breakdown that is already apparent in advanced 
societies.
If globalisation is equated with capitalism, then what is distinctive about 
it? Let us have Leslie Sklair answering that question. First of all, globalisation 
is a capitalism that is continuously spreading to more and more countries of the 
world. Today’s global system, Sklair (1999) argues, is based on transnational 
practices. These can be distinguished in three spheres, each characterised by a
4 The term ‘hyper-globalisation’ theories is used by Held to refer to the enthusiastic and supporting 
theories of every aspect of globalisation, such as expressed by Ohmae (1990) and Reich (1991). For a 
critique on these theories see Perraton, Goldblatt, Held and McGrew (1997): ‘The Globalisation of 
Economic Activity’, New Political Economy, Vol.2, No 2, 257-77. Also, for the criticism of Gray on 
Hirst and Thompson, see Gray (1998), pp.63-67.
5 In that they provoke further disappointment and also offer an alibi for the lack of political initiative to 
regulate market economies in favour of social benefits.
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major institution: the economic sphere, characterised by transnational 
corporations, the political sphere, characterised by a transnational capitalist 
class, and the cultural sphere, characterised by the ideology of consumerism. 
The transnational capitalist class is made up of four groups: ‘"those who own 
and control these corporations, their allies in the state (globalising bureaucrats) 
and in political parties and professions (globalising politicians and professors), 
and consumerist elites” (1999:334). Thus, a second distinction of globalisation 
is that, membership in the capitalist class is not restricted to those who own the 
means of production. And thirdly, the relative autonomy of the state to 
dominate and control the capitalist class is reduced.
Most economic analyses of globalisation share the common characteristic 
of putting capitalism at the centre of their critique. These are not the sole 
economic analysis of globalisation, however, but those that concentrate 
predominantly on its economic dimension. Other economic analyses are based 
on multidimensional approach. So, there are many who argue that the global 
market is rapidly expanding, world trade is higher than ever before, and 
electronic money and capital flows are unparalleled. Also, that the excess and 
scale of transnational transactions have rendered the nation state obsolete, and 
point towards intensifying integration between countries. Some are reluctant to 
use the term ‘capitalism’, even though they do not oppose the view that 
economic globalisation concerns capitalism, but rather prefer more neutral 
terms, such as ‘global economy’. In addition, and this is the main difference, 
they base their arguments equally on cultural, social and political criteria. 
Actually, this is a common, and to some extent the main, criticism exercised 
against ‘economic dimension theories’: that they are monocausal and overlook 
other important aspects of globalisation. Let us examine some representative 
‘multidimensional’ arguments.
M ultidimensional Approaches
Under the heading of multidimensional approaches we will consider 
arguments that look both on the economic and other dimensions, independently
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of the weight they put on each one of them. That is not to say that economic 
approaches ignore these other aspects for, as Hirst and Thompson argue, they 
focus on the one that is more important or determinative for the others. It is 
rather that multidimensional approaches actually include more that one 
dimension in their analysis as basic. So, Giddens (1999), for example, argues 
that globalisation is not only economic, but also cultural, political, and 
technological (including the communications revolution), and Beck (2000) 
concentrates on the international, economic, ecological, globalised labour 
cooperation or production, and on the cultural dimensions of globalisation.
Most commonly, the two dimensions emphasised are the cultural and the 
communicational (including technology revolution); in reality, the latter has 
largely influenced the former. The conception of a global culture has its origins 
in the famous idea of the world as a ‘global village’ that McLuhan expressed in 
the 1960s6. This idea was influenced by the rapid growth of communication 
technology and particularly the capacity of the media to transmit the same 
images everywhere in the world simultaneously. Economic globalisation and 
homogenisation is accompanied by a globalisation of culture, it has been 
widely asserted. Yet, the critics of this view use the word ‘MacDonaldisation’ 
so as to indicate that the world is not becoming one-world, but a single 
commodity-world. Featherstone (1990) argues that there can be no global 
culture but only global cultural flows. At the turn of the century, we can safely 
remark that the homogenisation thesis has lost a lot of ground, or has been 
moderated by arguments that there is a global culture marked by diversity 
rather than uniformity (Ulf Hannerz, 1991).
Electronic communication and media have been transformative for the 
economy too. According to Castells, the current technological revolution was 
an essential tool for the global restructuring of capitalism; it took place from 
late 1970s onwards, and in the process it re-shaped capitalism. “In the new, 
informational mode of development the source of productivity lies in the 
technology of knowledge generation, information processing, and symbol 
communication” (2000a: 17). It is indicative that in the US, the key industries,
6 In his work Understanding Media: the Extensions o f Man, New York: Mecmillan, 1964.
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finance and information technology, had an average annual growth of 10.4% 
during the 1990s, five times the growth rate of the whole economy; Internet
7 'industries were at the core of it . Thus, he names the new economic system 
‘informational capitalism’, and the society ‘information(al) or network 
society’8.
Communications technology has largely influenced additional 
developments and important debates, such as the ‘global awareness’ debate, 
whether it refers to ecological cultural issues. Robertson, for example, stresses 
the importance of awareness and consciousness that the world has become a 
single place. He defines globalisation as the “compression of the world and the 
intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole” (1992:8), thus 
focusing on the two key terms of interdependence and consciousness. In a quite 
similar way, Giddens defines globalisation as “the intensification of worldwide 
relations which link distinct localities in such a way that local happenings are 
shaped by events occurring miles away and vice versa”9. Electronic 
communication and media are also the medium for the communication between 
the ‘landscapes’ that Appadurai identifies. Appadurai distinguishes between 
five interrelated dimensions of global cultural ‘flows’: ethnoscapes,
mediascapes, technoscapes, finanscapes, and ideoscapes. These ‘landscapes’ 
constitute what he calls ‘imagined worlds’ (extending Anderson’s phrase), 
meaning “multiple worlds which are constituted by the historically situated 
imaginations of persons and groups spread around the globe” (1990:296). 
Without the media, these landscapes would be unimaginable.
There are more issues that have preoccupied to a large extend the 
scholars in the field, such as the role of multinational and transnational 
corporations, the debate on ‘glocalisation’ (that is the distinction between the 
global and the local), etc. Not to mention on of the most prevalent debates that 
concerns the nation state and its future. These will be referred to in the sequel, 
as the argument will develop. However, it would be useful to end this outline
7 See data in Castells, 2000a: 148-9.
8 Castells explains the distinction and the use of terms ‘information’ and ‘informational’ in 2000a: 100.
9 Giddens (1990), The Consequences o f  Modernity, Stanford Univ. Press, p.64; in Robertson, 1992:141.
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with a reference on the timing of globalisation and the various views about its 
precedence.
The views about ‘when’ globalisation came to the fore vary according to 
the definition one holds of globalisation. For Wallerstein, for example, the 
whole process was initiated in the 16th century, when the capitalist system was 
being bom. Hirst and Thompson see the origins of a genuinely international 
system in the 1870s, when the first and qualitative change took place in 
communications and technology10. A number of scholars relate globalisation 
with modernity. Giddens considers globalisation to be a consequence of 
modernity, which is ‘inherently globalising’, but he nevertheless argues that it 
appeared in the 60s. Beck too places it in ‘late-modemity’, while Robertson 
believes that globalisation long pre-dates modernity, as there are texts about the 
coming together of the world since the second century B.C., but he analyses 
recent developments, which have only recently managed to bring the world 
more physically together. Demertzis argues that “the debate on globalisation is 
not radically different from the debate about modernity and post-modemity, 
and, in that sense, the changes that occurred at the turn of the 1990s do not 
constitute a swift in the paradigm, at least not according to Kuhn’s definitions 
of ‘change’ and ‘paradigm’”11. On the other hand, Castells argues that the 
informational society is distinct from the industrial one, and that globalisation, 
initiated in the late 50’s, had already altered the society with the technological 
revolution of the 70’s. In most views, however, what seems to be the 
underlying idea is that, while globalisation has a long history, it is in the last 
decades that it develops new forms and impetuses (Hall, Halliday, Robertson, 
Beck). Its peculiarity lies in the density, scale, scope and extend of the changes 
that occurred in the last two-three decades of the twentieth century. There is no 
much disagreement, however, as to ‘where’ globalisation first emerged: 
globalisation was initiated by western counties in general, and the United 
States in particular.
10 Hirst and Thompson (1999:9) argue that it was in the 1870s that the qualitative technological change 
took place; that is the change of a trading system where goods and information were moving by sailing 
ship to one that they moved by steam ships and electricity.
11 My translation from Demertzis, 1996:262.
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Definition of Giobalisation
“Globalisation does not supersede and displace everything that preceded 
it. As well as recognising social innovation, we must have regard to the evident 
continuities in social and cultural life” (Robins, 2000:197). This qualification 
Robins makes is proper and should be recalled when we discuss globalisation 
as any other process that deeply affects societies12. Let me then proceed by 
identifying the definitional characteristics and the main aspects of 
globalisation, and clarify the meaning of this process. The following will be my 
working definitions on globalisation in order to proceed to the analysis of 
national identity.
Many of the dimensions of globalisation that have been argued for are 
indeed part of the complex and diverse scenery of this process. Some of those, 
however, are more important, or have the capacity to shape and significantly 
affect other aspects connected to globalisation. It is those dimensions that we 
shall refer to in the attempt to define globalisation. Those dimensions are two: 
the economic, and the civilian. The economic dimension is the most important 
as it has been the driving force of globalisation, and the one that has deeply 
affected the other domains (political, social, cultural). The civilian dimension 
concerns the citizens, as individuals and as part of social groups. It is not an 
autonomous dimension, like economy is, in the sense that it has been 
influenced significantly by the economic, and other dimensions. Yet, it has 
become so significant within globalisation in the last decade as to deserve a 
place in defining it, and it is also very important to the extent that it is often 
organised in opposition to economic globalisation. Let us see these two 
definitive dimensions of globalisation.
12 The view that globalisation is a process can be mediated or accepted according to the way one defines 
globalisation. Due to the complexity that surrounds globalisation, it is often regarded as both a process 
and an accomplished fact, in the sense of an already established living reality. Beck (2000), for example, 
argues that globalisation is indeed a process, but also that we are already living in globality. Beck 
distinguishes between globalism, which is the ideology of neoliberalism, globality, which means that “we 
have been living for a long time in a world society” (p. 10), world society, a boundary-free society of 
“multiplicity without unity”, and globalisation, which is the process of the transnational transcending the 
national.
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Economic dimension
Globalisation, in its economic dimension, is the unprecedented spread of 
capitalist economy worldwide, the diffusion of the free market to more and 
more places in the world. The basic criterion in the process of economic 
globalisation is the maximisation of profit. The capitalist criterion continues to 
apply within countries, but it is also applied globally. Within a country with a 
capitalistic economy, the ‘periphery’ of the working class depends on the 
capitalist class. This, by analogy, happens to the global capitalist system, where 
a country today has two choices: either conform to the rules of the game, or to 
be totally isolated. The globalised capitalist economy is the outcome of central 
planning and political engineering, as Gray (1998) argues. Liberalisation of the 
economy could not have been expanded without the necessary regulation on 
behalf of individual actors -the states- nor without withdrawing the barriers 
that states have put to world trade for the protection of their countries. So, 
although the extent and scale of the transformation of the global economic 
system may be unprecedented, its governance is not impossible as it has been a 
process facilitated through political measures and regulation. Indeed, the 
citizens are less protected, as the patterns of global inequality indicate, and 
their consensus for these policies drops continuously. As both Wallerstein and 
Gray argue, global capitalist economy can only generate intense conflict and 
uneasiness in the midst of its realisation13.
Thus, economy is the engine force of globalisation. But, hasn’t economy 
always been the locomotive of a society? Indeed, but societies have 
traditionally been regulated through economic, social and political criteria; 
thus, societal evolution has been a continuous ‘bargaining’ and compromise 
between those three. This is the reason why power has always been divided and 
distributed between economic, social and political actors. Yet, as Demertzis 
argues, “globalisation is instrumental in the asymmetrical (re)structuring of 
power relations” (1996:304). In the recent restructuring of power relationships, 
not only do we see the prevalence of economic factors, but also an increasing
13 For the most part my following analysis on the economic dimension of globalisation accedes to the 
views of Hirst and Thompson, Gray and Wallerstein as outlined in the previous paragraphs.
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distance from their ‘civilian casualties’. Economy is becoming an increasingly 
dominant and ‘autonomised’ dimension regulating societies. It is exactly this 
uneven balance, this asymmetry, that has provoked social dislocation and, 
therefore, conflict. Beck argues that, the balance of power of first modernity 
has now ended, and it has now become “the independent realm of economic 
action” (2000:4). How has this become possible?
The reason for the pervasiveness of the economic over the social and 
political elements of the societal constitution is the ideologisation of 
globalisation. To the extent that the ideologisation of globalisation has 
‘boosted’ its economic (that is its main) dimension, we should extensively refer 
to it. As an ideology it is often referred to as ‘globalism’ (Beck, 2000, 
Robertson, 1992), and it is in brief the ideology of neo-liberalism. The term 
‘globalisation’ became widely articulated simultaneously with its 
ideologisation since 1989. When the Soviet block collapsed, its opponents 
celebrated the victory of liberal capitalism, which was praised as the only 
viable system, and postulated the rule of the free market on a global scale. At 
the same time, socialists and social-democrats, left-wingers, as well as 
supporters of the Soviet Union were left in embarrassment and bewilderment 
by these unexpected events, which forced many of them either to passively 
accept the celebrations, or to be convinced and accede to the neo-liberal 
ideology14. Thus, the spread of the free market rule naturally followed the 
celebrations. The task was not very hard, considering that Thatcher’s and 
Reagan’s administrations had already paved the way towards the removal of 
barriers to free trade and further liberalisation of the economy. What was 
further claimed under the globalisation heading was the deregulation of 
domestic economies and of welfare states on the grounds that they could no 
longer be afforded if the state wanted to be competitive in the global capitalist 
market: competitiveness became the new principle so as to serve the criterion 
of profit, the basic criterion or economic globalisation. What was going to be
14 Thus, for example, the widespread rhetoric about the end of ideologies (i.e.Fukuyama), the 
inapplicability of the left-right division (Giddens’ Third Way is the most mild and reputable among them), 
or the lack of alternatives in the politics adopted (mostly claimed by politicians).
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globalised -more accurately, further internationalised- thereafter was the 
capitalist economy.
Huntington accurately remarks that the argument of the overenthusiasts 
about the ‘end of history’ and the universal victory of liberalism, that prevailed 
after USSR’s collapse, suffers from the ‘single alternative fallacy’: “it is rooted 
in the Cold War assumption that the only alternative to communism is liberal 
democracy and that demise of the first produces the universality of the second” 
(1996:63). In addition, one might argue, the argument of the overenthusiasts 
also neglects the role of contingency in history. Certain contingent events 
always happen, events not predestined to happen but with catalytic 
consequences in the root of history, like the emergence of important historical 
figures. For example, “...the world, and societies, would have been very 
different if Gorbachev had succeeded in his own perestroika”, as Castells 
argues (2000a: 18), which means that many more factors account for the 
collapse of the SU than the failure of ‘communism’ and the consequent 
superiority of liberal capitalism. This, and other contingencies have often been 
interpreted as a structural transformation in the international economy, as Hirst 
and Thompson argue15, and have contributed to the ideologisation of 
globalisation.
Let us see another aspect of the ideologisation of globalisation. 
Globalisation is most often described as interdependence, or growing 
interdependence (Sklair, 1999, Halliday, 2001, Castells, 1997, Giddens, 1999). 
Interdependence, though, was the term used in the 70s and 80s to describe 
similar processes to economic globalisation. For example, Keohane and Nye in 
their book Power and Interdependence, published in 1977, describe their 
contemporary debate between the ‘modernists’, who argued for the creation of 
a ‘global village’ and the eclipsing power of the nation state, and the 
‘traditionalists’, who considered the above view ‘globaloney’ and argued about 
continuity in world politics. This debate is almost identical to the one taking
15 Hirst and Thompson extensively refer to changes in the international economy in the 70s and their 
confrontation by politicians towards a certain direction, i.e. with the abandonment of exchange controls; 
see 1999:14-16.
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place in 2001 (except from the implications of the SU collapse), and the usage 
of interdependence is similar to that of globalisation. Keohane and Nye argue 
that, apart from the use of interdependence as an analytical concept (of the 
major changes of the features in the international regime), the word was also an 
‘analytical device’, employed by publicists and statesmen. ‘Tor the statesman, 
eager to increase the number of people marching beneath his banner, vague 
words with broad appeal are useful”, they have argued (1977:6). The two 
authors stress the revealing example of the United States: “during the Cold 
War, ‘national security’ was a slogan American political leaders used to 
generate support for their policies”, such as economic and political structuring 
of the ‘Free World’, support for alliances and military interventions, etc 
(1977:6). Yet, as the security threat slackened, foreign economic competition 
and domestic distributional conflict increased, the descriptive accuracy and 
symbolic power of national security as related to military concerns declined. 
National security was soon joined by another symbolic rhetoric: 
interdependence. “Political leaders often use interdependence rhetoric to 
portray interdependence as a natural necessity, as a fact to which policy (and 
domestic interest groups) must adjust, rather that a situation partially created by 
policy itself’ (1977:7, emphasis added). This new rhetoric, Keohane and Nye 
argue, however contradictory, had been used along with ‘national security’ to 
legitimise US presidential leadership in world affairs.
The parallels with today’s use of globalisation are more than obvious. As 
we can see, words are rarely innocent: they always infer a meaning. King
(1991) makes a very interesting remark on that matter. The notion of the word 
‘global’, he argues, is much more neutral than that of the word ‘world’. The 
Oxford English Dictionary, for example, includes half a page for ‘globe’ and 
four pages for ‘world’; linguistically, for instance, globe is a limited 
connotation referring to the earth or terrestrial globe, while world refers to 
humankind, human society, or it is used in theories, and infer a more specific 
symbolism. Hence his conclusion that “...the language of the debate forces 
positions and pre-empts particular options. The over-generalising sweep o f 
globalisation submerges difference at the local, regional or national scale”
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(1991:12, emphasis added). Exactly because language is an important signifier, 
I have chosen to keep the term ‘globalisation’ when I refer to its ideologisation 
(instead of ‘globalism’ for instance)' in order to show that, first, it is itself a 
conveyor of ideology and, second, that its (ideological) articulation goes hand 
in hand with its widespread implementation.
Beck (2000) is quite clear about the implications of globalisation’s 
ideologisation. “Globalism”, he argues harshly referring to the ideology of 
globalisation, “is a thought-virus...Its main article of faith is not that people 
must engage in economic behaviour, but that everyone and everything...should 
be subordinate to the primacy of the economic. [...] Neo-liberalism is high- 
politics which presents itself as wow-political...” (2000:122). But, he continues, 
“economic globalisation is not an automatic, mechanical process; it is a 
thoroughly political project involving transnational players, institutions and 
discourse coalitions...which pursue a neoliberal economic policy” (2000:123). 
So far so good. However, Beck seems to have fallen under the sway of the 
most influential fallacy of globalisation as ideology because he accedes to the 
view that globalisation is irreversible, “...the new globality cannot be 
reversed”, he claims (2000:11). The same claim is made by Castells who, 
notwithstanding the fact that he also considers global economy as “politically 
constituted”, he is reluctant to support the view that it can be “politically 
undone”: “this is because the global economy is now a network of 
interconnected segments of economies...Once such a network is constituted, 
any node that disconnects itself is simply bypassed” (2000a: 147). Hirst and 
Thompson have criticised that view, and its adoption by many politicians, as 
the “pathology of overdiminished expectations” (1999:6), that is due to the 
overenthusiasm of analysts and politicians in “overstating the extent of the 
dominance of world markets and their ungovernability” (1999:6).
As we saw, globalisation also means growing interdependence, a term 
introduced as an analytical term in the 70s and 80s and meant, according to 
Halliday, the “vulnerability of the society to events in another” (2001:10). But, 
Halliday continues, “this was an illusion of the few, very few, societies that had 
not been affected...by colonialism and the politics of the 19th and 20th centuries:
204
for over 90% of the world...this experience of vulnerability was not new” 
(2001:10). This brings us to the Westernisation view. Globalisation as 
Westernisation means that it is a concept and a process initiated by the West, 
and not that it concerns only the West, for it has affected many parts of the 
world. In that sense, and through its connection to modernity, globalisation is 
seen as Westernisation16, or even Americanisation17. There are other views, 
however, that moderate the Westernisation thesis by pointing to its ‘western’ or 
‘anti-western’ bias.18. However, globalisation has been initiated by western 
countries, which provoked its farther spread.
As a spread of the western economic system and values to the world 
(economic mainly, such as consumerism), globalisation has been largely 
perceived as homogenisation. But this has largely to do with the celebrations of 
the neo-liberals (neo-conservatives in the US). Such celebrations are 
declarations like those that the US president Bush made before the Genoa 
summit of G8 in 2001: “What some call globalisation is in fact the triumph of 
human liberty stretching across national frontiers”19. This points to both 
cultural, and politico-economic homogenisation. Such views express a 
“Western arrogance”, in Huntington’s words, and are based on the assumption 
that economic development will have a homogenising effect and will produce 
the same social and cultural patterns everywhere; “but, modernisation does not 
equal Westernisation” (1996:63), as the examples of Japan, Singapore and 
Saudi Arabia demonstrate. Political and economic homogenisation has been 
attempted indeed, as globalisation spreads into more and more countries, 
leaving the non-capitalist ones in the margin. In its march, however, it creates
16 According to Giddens, “globalisation today is only partly Westernisation” because the world is 
becoming “increasingly decentred” (1999:16).
17 According to Castells, the US is “the main globaliser” (2000a: 142).
18 Appadurai argues that, equally or more worrisome than Americanisation may be Japanisation for the 
Koreans, or Russianisation for Soviet Armenia or the Baltic countries, and he points to the fact that, “for 
politics of small scale, there is always a fear of cultural absorption by politics of large scale” (1990:295). 
Another relevant view is that through globalisation “we are slowly becoming aware that the West is both 
a particular in itself and also constitutes the universal point of reference in relation to which others 
recognise themselves as particularities” (Featherstone, 1990:12 referring to Sakai (1988): ‘Modernity and 
its Critique: the Problem of Universalism and Particularism’, South Atlantic Quarterly, 87:3).
19 BBC News Online, 19/7/01.
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huge problems, because it does not take into account country differences and 
peculiarities 20.
To conclude, by economic globalisation we mean the further 
internationalisation of capitalist economy, a process thereby ideologised and 
thus included in the public realm of the domination and homogenisation 
discourse that characterises much of modernity. As a process it has given 
prevalence to the economic over the social and political dimensions. The 
uniqueness of globalisation lies in two characteristics. The first is that the scale 
of its expansion globally, and its implementation and/or articulation in most 
countries in the world are unprecedented. The second has to do with 
technological revolution. The advancement of technology has boosted 
economic transactions since the 19 century, but the new technological and 
communications revolution has facilitated the rapid spread of capitalism. It has 
even transformed it, according to Castells who uses the term ‘informational 
capitalism’ in order to show the informational character of the ‘new economy’ 
and its transformation into a distinct economy from the industrial one, which 
“does not oppose its logic, [but] subsumes it through technological deepening” 
(2000a: 100). This has as an outcome the deeper isolation and economic 
retardation of those countries that are technologically backward.
Civilian Dimension
The civilian dimension concerns the understanding and appropriation of 
globalisation by citizens, both individually and collectively, and the 
(re)determining of their visions and actions by it. This aspect of globalisation is 
based primarily on the communicational and organisational capabilities of 
people and, secondarily, on the content of their organisation and 
communication. Here, again, communication technology has played a 
significant and transformative role on this aspect of globalisation. The
20 Gray (1998) and Hall (1991a) argue that globalisation has been able to spread because of the 
differences in several countries, because capitalism needs a contradictory terrain in order to expand, and it 
exploits these differences in its march. That, however, does not mean that it leaves the terrain unaltered or
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information technology revolution -initiated to a large extent from military 
concerns21-, had unintended consequences over society, and provoked new 
forms of social interaction and change22, ranging from consumers movements 
that could encourage corporations to meet ecological and democratic standards, 
to Chiapa’s Zapatistas, or Seattle protesters against World Trade Organisation 
in December 1999. Thus, it is not so important whether the movements are 
nationalistic, religious, consumerist, liberating or cosmopolitan; it is rather 
their ability to inform and receive information and to organise on a world-wide 
scale that matters.
Civilian globalisation means global awareness. Global awareness is a 
consequence of the everlasting necessity of knowing what is around us, what 
affects our lives and determines our (re)actions. In the era of globalisation, 
however, what surrounds and affects us tends to be the whole world: for 
example, citizens in Europe are today much more sensitive to an ecological 
disaster in China. That process does not erode particularities, but enlarges the 
point of reference for the citizenry, renders it less narrow and encompasses the 
most of the world. That does not only indicate that the world is more 
interdependent, but also that the citizenry is a lot more conscious of its 
interdependence. This has only been possible because of the new 
communications technology. In reality, civilian globalisation is global only to 
the extent that these new technologies are spread and used; more accurately, 
civilian globalisation applies particularly in those places that communication 
technologies are widely diffused and used by the population. So, civilian 
globalisation is very advanced in Western Europe and North America in
equally differentiated. This view, however, has opened another debate, about the future of capitalism after 
its full expansion, if the very differences that facilitated the spread of capitalism disappear.
21 The Internet originates from the United States Defence Department Advanced Research Projects 
Agency and its initiative to create a system of communications that would be comprised of many 
autonomous centres. This was part of the Cold War defence initiatives and their aim was to prevent the 
destruction of American communications in the case of a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. That would 
be possible by making a communications system that would not have one controlling centre and thus 
would be able to operate, even following a nuclear attack, because this system would function with 
different types of radiowaves that would not be affected by a possible nuclear explosion. See also on that 
matter Castells, 2000a, pp. 6-7, 45-53.
22 New forms of social interaction and change, which Castells has argued that one should expect because 
of the linkage brought into cultural and production forces because of informationalism. See Castells 
(2000a), p. 18.
207
general, while still in an embryonic phase in Africa; or, it can be very advanced 
among high professionals in China’s commercial centres, while still embryonic 
among the less educated Chinese of the rural areas. Civilian globalisation has 
the potentials to concern every citizen of the world, but in reality it concerns 
only those regions that are technologically (and economically) developed or 
developing.
An example that best illustrates civilian globalisation is that of the anti­
globalisation movement(s). To begin with, there would not have emerged such 
movements if it weren’t for economic globalisation and new communications 
technology and civilian globalisation. Globalisation has provided a common 
reference point for all those groups that, for various reasons, feel threatened, 
and this has rendered reaction a possible alternative. New communications 
media have provided the means for communication and interaction between the 
scattered -geographically and ideologically- protest groups, and have united 
them symbolically in a movement, whose sole common reference is opposition 
to economic globalisation -whatever globalisation means for each one of these 
groups. So, these anti-globalisation movements are an expression of 
globalisation itself: economic globalisation has provided the reasons for these 
movements and their reactions to exist, and civilian globalisation has provided 
the means to organise against the economic aspect of globalisation. Robertson
(1992) argues that these movements are an aspect of globalisation because they 
are encapsulated within the globalisation discourse. An additional reason is that 
they can be and they largely are organised on a global scale. “Electronic 
communication makes possible what has previously been excluded: namely, 
active, simultaneous and reciprocal contact between individuals across all 
frontiers...” (Beck, 2000:105). These movements create their Internet sites for 
their information and communication, they exchange experiences and views in 
real time, and they have a solidarity that, however loose, is (or can be) for the 
first time experienced on an international scale and to that extent. These are 
movements that use the media developed within the process of globalisation, 
and also have the potentials to organise on an international scale. That is 
another aspect of them: to organise on an international scale means to organise
208
on a globalised scale, meaning in advanced globalised countries and regions. It 
is not a coincidence that the first anti-globalisation protest took place in the 
West Coast of the United States, in Seattle, and it spread thereafter in 
(Western) Europe. These parts of the world provide the necessary equipment 
and education in order to be able to use the high technology needed to 
organise23.
Globalisation has produced global awareness and increased contacts, 
physically and, mostly, symbolically and potentially. This has led many 
scholars to see or anticipate an emerging ‘world society’ or ‘global culture’. 
There are certain strands of this view. An initial, yet vaguely articulated view, 
that was pointing towards greater unification and homogenisation on a global 
scale, has lost ground because of the wider acceptance and empirical remark 
that globalisation also involves localisation and that “globalisation produces 
greater contact between people but it can also produce greater 
misunderstanding” (Halliday, 2001:12). Another, more substantiated view is 
that, “there is now a world culture...marked by an organisation of diversity 
rather than the replication of uniformity” (Hannerz, 1990:237), rather called 
“global cultures in the plural” (Featherstone, 1990:10), or ‘creole’ and ‘hybrid’ 
cultures (Hannerz, 1990, Nederveen Pieterse, 1995b), as there can be no 
unified global culture. However, this is not the first time in human history that 
there exist ‘global cultures in the plural’, nor is it the first time that people (in a 
lesser scale, of course) and scientists are aware of this fact. In addition, to talk 
about ‘creole’ or ‘hybrid’, mixed cultures, is certainly a tautology because 
cultures have been ‘a mixture of cultures’ all along (as Nederveen Pieterse 
[1995b] acknowledges too). Last, but not least, I would like to refer to the 
similar view that Hall (1991a) and Beck (2000) hold in relation to the mass 
media. Hall argues that there is a ‘global mass culture’ spread through film and 
advertising, the epitomy of which is satellite television (199la:27), while Beck 
talks about ‘place polygamy’ (2000:72-75), thus meaning the multilocation and 
inner mobility of individuals as a result of their exposure to the media
23 In addition, in the Western word, where such movements first emerged, societies are more affluent and 
provide their members with the means to think beyond the limited issues of nourishment and
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influence (meaning, their being able to conceive of themselves in other, remote 
places). There is much truth in these two views to the extent that the media are 
indeed powerful and capable of transforming one’s perceptions. However, it is 
an exaggeration to argue that they can create a global mass culture. Media are 
to a large extent conveyors of biases and stereotypes that can least point 
towards a unified cultural space. Culture is an attribute of people, formed 
through multiple sources, the media being only one of them. Also, common 
culture needs common experiences, which just watching CNN or the Dallas on 
television cannot create. Let me invoke Habermas on this, who argues that “a 
substantive collective identity for world society is neither possible nor 
necessary; universalist participation in global communicative action is the 
maximum attainable”24.
So, civilian globalisation refers to the citizens, their possibilities to 
conceive of the world and their potentials to act globally. Yet, the content of 
these actions and reactions can be both universal and particularistic, such as 
claims for ecological regulation or nationalistic retreats respectively. Either 
way, globalisation provides the means to a movement or group of citizens to 
both gain sympathy or hostility worldwide. Also, in relation to economic 
globalisation, civilian globalisation comes as a response, either negative or 
positive, but always determined by it. There are other aspects of globalisation 
as well, and some of them will be mentioned in direct reference to the 
following analysis on national identity.
*  a  *
So, these are my working definitions for the rest of this analysis. 
Globalisation is the term used as a result of ideologisation to express the spread 
of neo-liberal capitalism in more areas of the world. It is also the increasing
accommodation. So, ecological concerns, anti-capitalism mobilisation and issues related to equal 
distribution of wealth globally logically appear in these societies first.
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global awareness of the interdependence of each part of the world and the 
capacity of the civilians to communicate and organise with no territorial or 
temporal barriers. Both economic arid civilian globalisation have been boosted 
because of the technological revolution, which provides the means to conceive 
the ‘global’ in the first place -to make the global conceivable not only for the 
intellectuals, cosmopolitans and mobile executives, but also and for the first 
time for the citizenry. Although technological revolution has been of primary 
importance to globalisation, it has not been included to the definition of 
globalisation, because the change in technology and communications signifies 
a change in the modes of production and information transmition, while
A C
globalisation signifies the ideologisation of interdependence and the 
ideologisation of the ‘victory’ of liberal capitalism. Globalisation, however, is 
a process that is rapidly and continuously altering the society that we live in. 
We do not live in ‘globality’, a society shaped by globalisation: we are in the 
midst of major changes that are still going on and we don’t know yet how the 
picture will be like when the dust falls.
24 In Robertson’s words; 1992, p.74, from Habermas (1974): ‘On Social Identity’, Telos, 7. Further 
analysis of the mediation of cultures in the era of globalisation, with particular reference to the influence 
of the mass media will be made in the next chapter, pp.233-239.
25 Some additional elements that result from or explain the ideologisation of globalisation will be further 
introduced in the context of national identity in the next two chapters.
C H A P T E R  6: G L O B A L I S A T I O N ,  THE
N A T I O N A L  S T A T E  A N D  N A T I O N A L  
I D E N T I T Y
Having defined the current framework of analysis, globalisation, we can 
now analyse national identity within it. To the extent that the national state has 
been the object of national identification and/or aspiration, our analysis of 
national identity should begin with the issue of the national state and its fate in 
the process of globalisation. So, having answered the question of the 
psychological foundations of national identity, and having examined it in 
relation to nationalism, we should now examine its prospects in the era of the 
specific historical time of the end of the twentieth century that is globalisation.
The question whether the speed of economic and political changes has 
weakened the national state is directly relevant and so it will be addressed. The 
state is, historically and ideologically speaking, the goal of nationalism, the 
object of desire of nationalistic aspiration. Therefore, if the state were to wither 
away then the content of nationalism -as an ideology and a movement- would 
have to change significantly or, alternatively, replaced by another 
concept/ideology that would most accurately fit the new circumstances. In 
addition, the state has been important in organising and systematising the 
existence and living of nations. However, the question should be divided in two 
parts. First, whether the modem state apparatus has been weakened in its most 
important functions. Second, whether its mechanisms of national identification 
have been weakened, either independently or as a result of the weakening of 
other functions of the state. Thus, we shall first analyse the state component of 
the national state in general, and then the national component of the national 
state, that is the state as national state and its function in ascribing national 
identities.
Before we proceed I would like to explain the reason for this explicit 
division between the state in general, and its function as a national state, as a 
regulation of a national group. The reason for this division is that in the
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relevant debate there is no such distinction made, at least not explicitly, and the 
reference is made to the national state in general (in most references, the object 
of analysis is the ‘nation-state’). Certainly, what is meant or indicated is the 
state in modernity, which is terminologically equated with the national state. 
For example, in Held and McGrew (2000) it is made clear that what is under 
discussion is the state, the modem ‘nation-state’. The conclusions drawn, 
however, from the debate about the modem national state should not be 
extended to national identity without specific connection to the mechanisms of 
the state that provoke national identification. The state in modernity may be 
characterised by its (claims to) organisation of a specific cultural group and 
maintenance of its interests, but this must not lead by definition to analogous 
considerations about national identity drawn from the sole analysis of the state 
in the era of globalisation. It is often argued that the weakened state in the era 
of globalisation has as a direct result the weakening of national cultures and 
identities (see the debate in Held and McGrew, 2000), but this argument is not 
accompanied by any specific connection to the mechanisms that generate 
national identification, with the sole exception of the reference on the mass 
communication media. Therefore, an analysis of those mechanisms in the era 
of globalisation is needed. We shall begin this chapter with the debate about 
the functions of the modem state in the era of globalisation1.
1 Our analysis of the state in the era of globalisation will be as basic and brief as possible, as it is a huge 
debate itself and cannot be wholly embraced at present -let alone that it contains aspects that are not 
directly relevant to the issue of national identification. More emphasis will be given to those aspects that 
facilitate the current analysis, and the subsequent section that will directly deal with the mechanisms of 
identification of the national state and, thus, the fate of national identities.
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The Modern National State2 in the Process of 
Globalisation
The issue of dismantling the state is (considered by many to be) at the 
core of globalisation, and it is a significant part of the whole globalisation 
debate. Beck (2000) for instance considers that, among the various views on 
globalisation, this issue is a ‘common denominator of globalisation’ (p.20). 
The debate has been determined to a large extent by those who argue that the 
process of globalisation brings with it the end, or the serious weakening, of the 
national state; Beck even identifies the “escape from the categories of the 
national state” (2000:1) as a defining characteristic of globalisation. Based on 
the perceived strength of global market forces it is argued that ‘nation-states’ 
cannot provide effective governance (Horsman and Marshall, 1994), and that 
they are mere ‘municipalities’ of the global system while their continuing 
existence is in serious doubt (Ohmae, 1990). Some views go even as far as to 
argue that nationalism will eventually fade away, along with national identity 
and nationality (Reich, 1991). On the other hand, those who object to these 
views argue that, the modem national state is still the major regulatory force, 
however undermined its monetary and fiscal policies may be, and that the 
changes have been politically initiated (Hirst and Thompson, 1999, Gray, 
1998). Also, the state is the only locator of welfare provision and of institutions 
that provide the necessary conditions for social existence and still the only 
representative body of collective will (Mann, 2000, Smith, 1995a). Last, there 
are always those who stand between the two opposing views and find 
appropriate arguments in both strands and believe that, while the national 
state’s powers are diminished, it is still a, more or less, significant player in 
world affairs (Castells, 1997, Robertson, 1992). Robertson (1992) and 
Nederveen Pieterse (1995b) in particular argue that the nation state’s formation 
and prevalence in the 19th and 20th century has been a process of globalisation 
itself, not a process contrary to it, and that while it seems to be weakened in the 
present phase of globalisation, this is not a one-dimensional process (as the
2 In this section about the state I will refer to the ‘modem national state’, thus indicating that I refer to the 
state within modernity, where it is defined as a national state as stressed above.
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uprising of nationalism for example indicates)3. Overall, the position of the 
national state at the centre of sociological inquiry is being reconsidered.
We shall follow with the main arguments and counter-arguments of this 
debate, classified into specific categories according to their content. The main 
categories that will be referred to in this debate are the economy, warfare, the 
environment, and government and sovereignty4. The selection of these 
categories is made based on the prevailing debate that questions the continuing 
efficacy of the modem state to keep its prevailing role around them (with the 
exception of government, an issue largely ignored). The selected categories 
also encompass those aspects that mostly characterise the modem national 
state, that are indeed the most important functions of the state by definition, 
and should thus be involved in an analysis of the state. Thus, through these 
categories we can directly answer the argumentation about the weakening of 
the modem national state. Moreover, this classification will provide the 
additional advantage of specifying the topics of globalisation debate that we 
have not yet been referred to, and thus offer a whole outlook of it.
Economy
The argument that the modem national state is eventually rendered 
obsolete by the economic changes that globalisation has provoked is the most 
common, not only among the so-called ‘hyper-globalisation’ theorists but also 
by others who may stand more critical against globalisation but nevertheless 
agree that the economic function of the state has been severely weakened (i.e. 
Beck, 2000). One of their basic arguments is that the state cannot make any 
macro-economic planning -if  it can do any economic planning at all- because 
the globalised economic forces are very powerful and capital is mobile and 
beyond national control or location. Much of the discussion is about 
transnational corporations (TNCs) that, in their search for comparative
3 In Robertson, 1992:57-8, and Nederveen Pieterse, 1995b:49.
4 The issue of the effect of new communication technology is basic in this debate, but it will be referred 
to in the next section, as it is most relevant to the issue of national perceptions and identities.
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advantage globally, are indifferent to frontiers, institutions or regimes. Some of 
these corporations are even stronger than several states: in 1996, only 70 out of 
200 countries had a GDP larger than $10 billion, while the annual sales of the 
400 largest TNCs of the world had more than $10 billion earnings5. Another, 
related argument concerns the welfare state. Welfare provisions, which provide 
and sustain states’ stability and cohesion, cannot be sustained any more, first 
because states have to cut their expenses in order to become more competitive, 
and second because they have diminished revenue from TNC’s taxation, 
although the latter conveniently use the expensive infrastructure of wealthy 
countries. Two forces matter in world economy, according to Ohmae (1990), 
global market forces and TNCs, and neither can be subject to effective public 
governance.
These are in sum the arguments for the dismantling of the modem 
national state. These arguments have been subject to strong criticism. If we 
leave aside the issues of whether there is tmly global economic activity, and 
the accuracy of the distinction between MNCs and TNCs6, a significant and 
related to this thesis issue is the argument that economic globalisation has been 
promoted and supported according to national interests. Castells argues that, 
‘Tor the main globaliser, the US government, an open integrated global 
economy works to the advantage of American firms, and American based 
firms, thus of the American economy. [...] Clinton and his economic 
team...worked hard to bring the liberal trade gospel to the world, applying US 
economic and political muscle when necessary” (2000a: 142). Similarly, China 
and India “saw in the opening of world trade the opportunity to...build the 
technological and economic basis for renewed national power” (2000a: 143, 
emphasis added). It is also important to note at this point that the state
5 In Sklair, 1999:324. The first data is from World Bank’s Development Report, and the second from 
Fortune Global 500,1996.
6 These are important issues in the globalisation debate but not directly relevant at this point. For the first, 
see Mann (2000) and Hirst and Thompson (1999), who argue that economic activity should be rather 
characterised as ‘trilateral’ and not global since over 85% of world trade is concentrated in Europe, North 
America and East Asia. Mann also argues that “capitalism retains a geo-economic order, dominated by 
the economics of advanced nation-states” (2000:139). As for the second matter, some scholars contest the 
use of the term TNC; Castells, for example, argues that TNCs belong more to the “world of mythical 
representation (or self-serving image-making by management consultants) than to the institutionally
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maintains its centrality as a player in the economy, even though diminished: in 
OECD countries, for example, states’ assets account for about 40% of total 
GDP (Halliday, 2001:7).
As far as the welfare state is concerned, it has been threatened by the 
expansion of capitalist economy because of the reduced income in the states’ 
budget, and because of their cutting of expenditures in order to become more 
competitive. The German example is indicative: “since 1979 corporate profits 
have risen by 90% and wages by 6%. But revenue from income tax has 
doubled over the past ten years, while revenue from corporate taxes has fallen 
by a half. It now contributes a mere 13% of total tax revenue, down from 25% 
in 1980 and 35% in I960”7. At the same time, the most commonly uttered 
phrases by politicians are competition, cost-cutting and adjustment to the new 
reality. Does that render the state feeble? On the one hand, it is broadly argued 
that the state has lost a lot of its power and its capacity to provide its 
“fundamental component of stability and legitimacy” (Castells, 1997:254), the 
welfare state. Yet, on the other hand, it has not lost its significance, since its 
citizens claim from it to guarantee the necessary conditions for their well­
being. So, citizens ask their governments to protect them and, to the extent that 
they do not correspond to this claim, they may face fierce social disturbances 
and turbulence that can jeopardise their power. This is a political decision that 
governments have to make. The question is, have governments lost their 
power, or have they ‘surrendered’ power as they have chosen to implement the 
politics of economic globalisation?
That brings us to the argument that the modem national state is unable to 
exercise effective economic governance in the era of globalisation. This view 
about the non-govemability of the new global economy by the nation state is 
also questioned. There are various counter-views concerning that matter, but 
they all have a common denominator; the observation that the global free 
market is politically constituted. As it has been mentioned before, a number of
bounded realities of the world economy” (2000a:208). Nevertheless, the term has been -and is now- 
broadly used and has thus become part of the globalisation context. See also on this debate Sklair (1999).
7 Interview of Andre Gorz, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 1 August 1997, p.35, quoted in Beck, 
2000:6 .
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authors argue that the present and the previous phase of an open international 
economy (that of 1870-1914) require state intervention “on a most ambitious 
scale” (Gray, 1998:7)8 Gray also argues that states “will remain decisive 
mediating structures which MNCs compete to control” (1998:76), and that 
their function as to seize control over natural resources is a prerequisite for 
economic growth9. The argument supported in this thesis is consistent with that 
of Gray and Hirst and Thompson on that matter.
We should add to the above the argument that the question of whether 
economic globalisation undermines the state is a political and not an economic 
issue. It is an issue that has to do with the traditional dilemmas of international 
relations and power/domination issues10. This is related to the observation that 
the ‘choice’ as to whether a country shall liberate its economy is not 
unrestricted: rather, the choice to “stay out of the system” is penalised. Yet, the 
burden of such penalties is not a natural free market choice, but an imposition 
by other countries and/or institutions, which have an already established
8 Hirst and Thompson relate this issue to the mythologisation of globalisation, which has spread the 
unjustified view that globalisation is ungovernable. See on that matter Hirst and Thompson, 1999:268- 
269, and Castells, 2000a: 137-147.
9 Gray draws the analogies from his comparative study on the open international economy of 1870 to 
1914 -an era created through state centralisation and regulation that ended just when the state had been 
vitally weakened- and contemporary period. The three key measures that decisively contributed towards 
free market in Britain during the first period were, his argument continues, the removal of agricultural 
protection and establishment of free trade, reform of the poor laws, and removal of controls of wages -all 
measures that weakened the control and protection of the state, but initiated by it.
10 Castells’ view might be illuminating regarding that matter. As he argues, “the mechanism to bring in 
the globalisation process to most countries in the world was simple: political pressure either through 
direct government action or through imposition by the IMF/World Bank/World Trade Organisation. Only 
after economies were liberated would global capital flow in. The Clinton administration was in fact the 
true political globaliser [...] putting direct pressure around the world, and instructing the IMF to pursue 
this strategy in the strictest possible terms. The goal was the unification of all economies around a set of 
homogeneous rules of the game. [The outcome of this process was economic crisis in many areas]. In 
most cases, after such crisis, the IMF and the World Bank came to the rescue, but on the condition that 
governments would accept IMF’s prescriptions for economic health. These policy recommendations (in 
fact, impositions) were based on pre-packaged adjustment policies, astonishingly similar to each other, 
whatever each country’s specific conditions; [...] Even the large economies of very important countries, 
such as Russia, Mexico, Indonesia, or Brazil, were dependent on the IMF’s approval for their policies. 
Most of the developing world, as well as the transition economies, became an economic protectorate 
under the IMF -  which ultimately meant the US Treasury Department. The power of the IMF was not so 
much financial as symbolic. [...] Credit given by the IMF meant credibility for global financial investors. 
And withdrawal of the IMF’s confidence meant, for a given country, becoming a financial pariah. Such 
was the logic: if a country decided to stay out of the system (for example, Alan Garcia’s Peru in the 
1980s) it was punished with financial ostracism -  and it collapsed, so verifying the IMF’s self-fulfilling 
prophesy” (2000a: 140-141).
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opinion about the way international market should function11. So, these 
‘established opinions’ about the way the market should function are in fact 
political ideologies, and the necessity to comply with their rules is rather 
political than economic. It is indicative that those countries that face such 
economic burdens also face political burdens; rejection from the so-called 
‘international society’ is such an example12.
To conclude, globalisation is not an interest-free process; it has been 
actively (that is, ideologically, economically, politically, militarily) promoted 
by the US government, and to a lesser extent by Britain, and by ‘international’ 
or ‘world’ organisations, whose decisions are determined by the ideological 
standpoint of their strongest members. For this, and the above reasons, 
economic globalisation is a political process too. It is politically initiated and 
necessitated by the economic and political centres of powerful nation states 
that aim at maintaining and expanding their dominance and interests13. The de­
politicisation of societies and the prevalence of economics is a highly political 
project, conveniently supported by the rhetoric and debate of the dismantling of 
the national state. The reason is that, as Benjamin Barber argues14, in a world 
of increasingly globalised economy, trade, and division of labour, what 
remains least globalised or is under shrinkage are the democratic institutions, 
human rights and liberties, the welfare system and the protection of the 
citizens: these remain the field of the states’ responsibility, where states 
obstruct or control the uncontrolled predominance of the market forces -at the 
normative level, of course.
11 Indicatively, one of the obstacles against this ‘liberalising’ trend that countries had, namely the 
imposition of tariffs on imports, is detected and penalised by the World Trade Organisation.
12 For example, the agreement signed between China and the US in November 1999 on a series of 
measures that would liberate and open the Chinese vast and underdeveloped economy, was welcomed by 
many US and WTO officials as a positive effort of the China Republic to join the international family. In 
reality, China came closer to international society through the agreement that it would remove or diminish 
tariffs and export subsidies and would provide major opportunities for US companies in agriculture, 
industrial goods, automobiles, telecommunications, Internet services, banking and finance, in exchange 
with US support for its joining the WTO12.
13 As Castells argues, “the global economy was politically constituted”, enacted by governments and 
international institutions in order to preserve and enhance the interests of their states (2000a: 147).
14 From an interview at the electronic journal Boiler, re-published at Eleftherotypia newspaper, 
18/11/2001, Simiomatario Ideon, p.36.
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Warfare
The issue of warfare is another field where it is argued that states’ 
sovereignty is limited. The end of the Cold War has been the hallmark of a new 
era in world politics. One of the features generally emphasised in the aftermath 
of the Cold War (while concerning the post-WW2 period in general) has been 
the augmenting interdependence and the subsequent declining decision power 
of the national states to go to war. The monopoly of means of violence has 
been a fundamental feature of the state since the Treaty of Westphalia, and the 
exercise of its power to warfare has been the ultimate expression of its 
sovereignty. Now, it is broadly argued15, national states cannot easily exercise 
that power and they are more dependent on each other. Many reasons have 
been given to account for that, such as the impact of new technologies or the 
dissolution of the two military blocks, but the main reason generally 
emphasised has been the development of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, I 
would argue, states have always been dependent on each other to a certain 
degree and that has not prevented them from going to war. Even in the 
contemporary era, where states are even more interdependent, they do not 
refrain from using their military forces when deemed necessary. I will 
elaborate my argument in juxtaposition with the view that Hirst and Thompson 
(1999) present on this matter, which also delineates the broad argument that 
states have lost their power to warfare16.
Hirst and Thompson develop a broadly articulated argument as far as 
warfare is concerned. Its main features are three. Firstly, that “nuclear weapons 
drove war out of international relations between advanced states” (1999:264) 
or at least have made it a lesser option. That is because the use of nuclear 
weapons holds the threat of mutual destruction and is thus “making war 
impossible” between nuclear powers. This has lead to mutual agreements, 
which have the effect of granting to each other powers of inspection and
15 See indicatively, Castells, 1997:262-5; Hirst & Thompson, 1999:263-5; Beck, 2000:134; for a more 
balanced view on the issue of warfare in the era of globalisation see Halliday, 2002, chapter 4.
16 I have chosen to do so because Hirst and Thompson’s general argument is in favour of the continuing 
existence, significance and power of the national state, while on the issue of the warfare they take the 
contrary view; also, because their argument on warfare summarises the respective arguments on that 
matter, and because I have mostly agreed on their arguments thus far.
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supervision and relinquish a significant degree of sovereignty. Secondly, 
however, this does not guarantee a peaceful world: “Lesser states” will 
continue to fight one another. Advanced states will be threatened by terrorism. 
Revolutionary movements will continue to arise...” (1999:265). Thirdly, at 
least the advanced states have lost the legitimation and the ability to mobilise 
to war. According to Hirst and Thompson, “the liberal state, claiming to live 
peacefully with its neighbours...could claim great legitimacy if attacked...These 
legitimations are gone, and with them whole classes of provision for ‘national’ 
needs justified by the possible contingency of war: ‘national’ industries, health 
and welfare to promote ‘national efficiency’, and social solidarity to unite rich 
and poor in a common struggle”; also, “governments are unlikely to have the 
occasion to call on the lives and property of their citizens for war. They will no 
longer be able to mobilise their societies... Without war, without enemies, the 
state becomes less significant to the citizen” (1999:265, emphasis added).
The use of nuclear weapons can indeed produce mutual destruction if 
employed by two or more nuclear powers, as Hirst and Thompson argue, and 
we must also agree that without enemies the state loses much of it coherence 
(for reasons explained in chapter 2). Unfortunately, however, actual warfare is 
by far the strongest prerequisite for enemies to exist: its threat can equally 
provide enemies. The United States did not go to war with the SU, yet the latter 
was their biggest enemy, and it did provide legitimacy for a number of 
‘national policies’. When the SU collapsed, the US did not remain short of an 
enemy: terrorism, or even the uprising China, easily replaced communism and 
served equally as an enemy, justifying the ‘national necessity’ of the Anti- 
Missiles System. The enemy can be real or perceived but it is effective and 
invoked in both cases. Also, the view that advanced states have lost the 
legitimacy and capacity to mobilise to war is a kind of self-delusion. In the last 
decades of the 20th century, the most developed and liberal states of the West 
have been engaged in several wars, although these were taking place outside 
their territories and posed no threat to them; yet, they did go to war, they did 
mobilise and legitimise, and they did gain support for military action (i.e. 
Nicaragua, Falklands, Gulf, Serbia/Kosovo wars etc.). Last, the view that
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‘lesser countries’ are still engaged in warfare, while not being accurate, places 
conflict ‘there’, in the periphery (real and symbolic periphery) and distances 
‘us’ from ‘them’ and their horrible deeds. Thus, it comes as a projection, that 
also justifies ‘our’ use of violence while not considering it warfare.
To conclude, although nuclear powers have agreed to reduce their 
weaponry, there are more countries now that possess or anticipate the 
possession of nuclear weapons, like India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, etc. 
At the same time, the advanced countries (the EU for example) have tried in 
the last few decades to drive war out of their frontiers, but they are still 
involved in warfare -directly or indirectly. In addition, states’ decision to go to 
war is the outcome of many factors. One factor is the real strength of the 
countries involved. In that respect, small states have always had diminished 
power in making that decision -a  factor certainly independent from 
globalisation. Another interesting factor is the internal situation of the smaller 
state. As Keohane and Nye argue, “the smaller state may have greater internal 
political unity than the larger one” (1977:19), or it may be more willing to 
suffer; still a factor indifferent to globalisation. These are the so-called 
imponderable factors, yet the ones that determine facts in several occasions and 
leave us astonished.
En vironm ent
The environment seems to be in jeopardy as it is now facing severe 
problems, such as global warming, the ozone layer, pollution of rivers and sea, 
deforestation etc. Yet, national states are unable to save it because, as it is 
argued, they are powerless. Indeed, this is true, but we should like to make one 
qualification: each nation state is powerless, each one alone. This means that 
nation states in conjunction have the power to make an ecological turn, and 
they are the major actors that can do so. Some of them have realised the 
necessity to conceive what the global interest is, which is their interest too. 
Some others have not. For example, while Japan took the initiative for the 
Kioto agreement, the world’s largest producer of the greenhouse gases blamed
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for global warming, the US, has refused to sign it (although it was already 
parochial), on the grounds that it would jeopardise the US economy and its 
national interests. At the same time, other newly industrialising countries fail to 
restrict their gas emitions and thus continue to pollute the planet. Or, similarly, 
France implemented its atomic bomb testings in the mid-90s, but well away 
from ‘home’, in the South Pole Sea.
Citizens and NGOs have proven highly informed and sensitive about the 
environment, and they exercise pressure and control whenever they can. In the 
case of the environment, the civilian dimension of globalisation is very strong, 
not only because of the sensitivity of the people but also because of the 
effective means that communication technology has given to their organisation. 
However, although pressure is directed towards modem national states, it does 
not undermine them. Pressure is directed against states because it is them that 
have the capacity to change regulations, to sign treaties and exercise control for 
their implementation. Intergovernmental, non-governmental and other pressure 
groups are trying to convince states’ governments to proceed with the 
regulation needed, and to persuade them that “global concerns are in the 
national interest” (Mann, 2000:144). And as Mann argues, these (along with 
other identity politics) strengthen the national state and undermine their 
importance.
Government and Sovereignty
In sum, there is an issue that the ‘globalists’ do not touch upon: the issue 
of politics. There is considerable discussion about the threat posed by 
globalisation on the national state, about transnational, or international, forces 
that alter its form and dynamics, about new and powerful pressure groups and 
NGOs, whose number has increased significantly, and so on. Nevertheless, 
they fail to touch on a sensitive issue. Who takes responsibility over people’s 
lives? Who will exercise politics if the national state is dismantled? And, also, 
whom are all these pressure groups, that are supposedly diminishing the state’s 
power, trying to put some pressure on?
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Globalisation does not provide an alternative for government, at least for 
the moment17. The national state holds the law enactment and law enforcement 
power, nationally and internationally, and it holds the means to provide and 
sustain social cohesion. As Smith argues, “the national state remains the only 
internationally recognised structure of political association” (1995a: 104). Since 
1991 more than 18 new states were recognised, after a period of general 
refusal. Indeed, as Smith argues, it is the behaviour and effectiveness o f states 
that has been challenged\ not the national state as a norm (1995a: 105).
A significant function of the national state that guarantees a large degree 
of territorial control is “the regulation of populations”: as Hirst and Thompson 
remark, states have a central role in being responsible for a given territory and 
the population that habituates it (1999:256-257, 275). It is exactly on behalf of 
this population that they regulate, control and cooperate with other states in 
order to mutually guarantee the lives and prosperity of their population. This is 
a function of the national state that globalisation has not altered. The European 
Court of Justice and its intervening capacity could be considered as an 
exception, moderated though by the fact that the European Union’s countries 
themselves have conceded certain powers to it. This feature of national states 
to regulate their populations brings us to the issue of sovereignty.
Sovereignty, it is argued, is a characteristic of the states that is lost, or 
moderated, in the new globalised era. Held (1989), for example, argues that 
sovereignty, as the capacity of the states to set goals and exercise legal and 
actual control and autonomy, as the capacity to achieve goals once set, is 
limited. That is because states’ power faces certain gaps and disjunctures -  
mainly posed by the world economy, hegemonic powers and power blocks, 
international organisations, and international law- that render the boundaries of 
domestic politics blurred. According to Castells, contemporary national states 
have been de-powered by themselves, while “nation-states have lost their 
sovereignty because the very concept of sovereignty, since Bodin, implies that
17 Although technologies could raise issues about a more democratic and directly participatory democracy 
within or even beyond the existing types of government, the debate is restricted on whether ‘nation-states’ 
are able to govern the current affairs, thus creating a vacuum of governance. The rising debate about 
‘global governance’ has not yet provided with an answer or with an alternative for the state.
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it is not possible to lose sovereignty ‘a little bit’: this was precisely the casus 
belir (1997:304). In the 1990s, he argues, “nation-states have been 
transformed from sovereign subjects into strategic actors...” (1997:307), and 
they now have to cooperate with each other.
The above is true, but not as a new development provoked by 
globalisation in the last two decades; unless we coincide globalisation with the 
whole of modernity or the emergence of the state. Most states had never had 
such sovereignty as described above. During the Cold War their decision­
making was constrained by the NATO and Warsaw alliances; as far back as the 
early 19th century, the very constitution and future of several newly emerging 
states following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire was dependent on the 
decisions of the Great (European) Powers of that time; and there exist many 
more similar examples. So, as Hirst and Thompson remark, “it is time the old 
Bodinian view of sovereignty was buried, along with the conceptions of 
exclusive governmental powers on which it is based” (1999:235). Perhaps, this 
perception of sovereignty was part of the Great Powers’ view of themselves, 
but most states have long experienced not only the need for cooperation but 
also the imposition of decisions that concern them but would not otherwise 
make by themselves. In addition, states’ cooperation has always been a 
prerequisite for the very existence of states and for the concept of sovereignty 
itself, which depends on ‘external’ consensus, like in the Treaty of Westphalia, 
and was always dependent on international agreement(s). Therefore, 
sovereignty has always been limited and interdependent. In Smith’s words, “it 
is a mistake to imagine that the national state has ever been as sovereign and 
independent as it likes to portray itself’ (1995a: 120-1).
An additional aspect of this issue is that the discussion about states’ 
sovereignty is ‘case-specific’, meaning that it has relevance only in specific 
contexts. In particular, if the western and other long established national states 
can discuss or implement the ‘passing out’ of their (perceived) sovereignty, this 
is by far the case in other parts of the world where the realisation of a nation 
state is still an aspiration, or only a newly realised one. Some nations, or “much 
of the world” as Mann argues (2000:139), have not yet acquired their own
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state, while there is not any indication that they will stop desiring one. 
Nationalism has not withered away; on the contrary, there are a number of old 
nationalisms that have not been settled, either liberating (i.e. Palestinian) or 
expansionary (i.e. Indian and Pakistani), as well as a number of relatively new 
nationalisms, mainly secessionist (i.e. Basque, Taiwanese, etc). For them, the 
debate over giving up ‘some’ sovereignty has no point of reference: it does not 
concern them. While for the developed world, the discussion about the demise 
of the modem/national state could have a substance for the future, and a point 
of reference as well, this is not so for other parts in the world. So, if our context 
of discussion is the ‘global’ and not the EU or the West, we may not be able 
yet to engage in such discussions.
*  *  *
So, is the nation state really weakened? Mann addresses a harsh but not 
unfair criticism on those “enthusiasts” who, “with little sense of history, they 
exaggerate the former strength of nation-states; with little sense of global 
variety, they exaggerate their current decline” (2000:146), and he argues that 
there are today trends that both strengthen and weaken them, while identity 
politics actually strengthen them. Perhaps we can argue that the harried 
argumentation that the national state will fade away is deeply influenced by the 
modernist claim that national states and national identity are modem 
phenomena; those changes that deeply affect modernity and its structures are 
then easily seen as affecting the national state too. But, such views ignore or 
neglect the importance of pre-modem ethnic ties and the existence of ethnic or 
national-like collectivities in pre-modem times. Analysts who acknowledge the 
existence of pre-modem ethnic ties argue that the national state and national 
identity are not going to wither away18. In general, Mann is right that both the 
former strength and current decline of national states have been exaggerated. 
The national state has not been rendered obsolete: it is rather in embarrassment
18 For example, Smith, 1995:116, and chapter 5 in general.
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because of such claims coinciding with rapid changes and the (re)appropriation 
and (re)allocation of new roles.
Even though there is not specificity in the argumentation that connects 
the demise of the national state with the respective demise of national identity, 
as we have seen the modem national state has not been rendered obsolete. On 
the contrary, it is in the medium of immense pressures, either coming from the 
citizenry towards a more effective regulation of their lives, either coming from 
capitalist groups, countries and interests. Either way, the pressure indicates the 
centrality of the state in organising and regulating the spheres of social, 
political and economic activity, including its centrality in the deregulation of 
national economies. So, the argument about the demise of the modem state as a 
result of the changes associated with globalisation (changes that are to a large 
extent real) is not sufficiently substantiated. Let us now turn to the directly 
relevant issues of national identities, identification mechanisms of modem 
national states, and the strength of nationalism in the context of globalisation.
Globalisation’s Effects on Identification 
Mechanisms of the National State
We were preoccupied with the modem state, the national state and its 
power as the process of globalisation goes on. So far we examined the effects 
of globalisation on the main functions of the state as a regulator of a given 
territorial, economic and administrative area. We should now proceed in 
examining possible effects of globalisation on the state as a regulator of a given 
cultural ‘space’, as a provider of national identification. So, we shall consider 
whether globalisation has affected the identification mechanisms of the modem 
state with the nation, that is those mechanisms that render the modem state a 
national state and also facilitate, sustain and/or enhance identification with it. It 
is important to address this issue because, if those aspects of the national state 
that generate and sustain identification remain unaltered (or even if they are 
strengthened), then it is indifferent from the perspective of national identity
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whether the state has been weakened in some other aspects19. At the same time, 
the issue of nationalism and its relationship with globalisation cannot be absent 
from this analysis, as nationalism is the force behind the very creation of the 
national state in modernity.
The basic argument that will be elaborated at present is that the 
identification mechanisms of the national state have not been weakened by 
globalisation and, hence, there is no reason to expect a decline in the 
significance of national identities -taking under consideration of course the 
previous analysis, according to which the modem state was not been rendered 
obsolete or seriously undermined. On the contrary, there are reasons to expect 
the strengthening of national identities because nationalism is still a powerful 
force within globalisation and, also, the rhetoric about the dismantling of the 
national state is likely to generate reactions towards its defence. This will be 
elaborated in twofold argumentation. First, that the national state remains the 
main object of identification and the main provider of group identity, of 
national identity. Second, that globalisation may itself help sustain and even 
enhance national divisions and ethnic classifications.
Identification Mechanisms of the ‘G lobalised’ National State
The first argument is that national identity is no less powerful than it has 
been before globalisation. National identity has been organised by the national 
state, which has been both a ‘state’, meaning the institutional and 
organisational constitution of a given territory and population, and a ‘nation’, 
meaning the sentimental bonds that link individuals together in a relationship 
of belonging. To the extent that the state holds and retains the means to bring 
national identification and to ascribe these sentimental bonds to the population 
of its territory, there is no reason to anticipate the weakening in significance of 
national identifications. Of course, this argument is directly relevant only to
19 In that sense, there will prove to be a wrong connection of the state’s decline in general and national 
identity’s decline as well. Nevertheless, even though wrongly put, the examination of the actual decline of 
the strength of the state was important to the extent that it did not ignore a vaguely articulated 
argumentation.
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those cases where the state actually refers to one nation or even a vast national 
majority within it. However, this limitation directly nullifies the claims that the 
weakening of the national state will bring forth a respective weakening of 
national identities. Firstly because, since the national state has not been 
weakened in overall, as argued in the section above, and if, in addition, its 
mechanisms that provoke identification have not been weakened (as will be 
argued), there is no case for such claims. Moreover, the very fact that these 
claims essentially concern those ‘real5 nation-states (meaning nation-and-state- 
in-one), which are minority cases as we have seen20, in combination with the 
fact that national identities have been prevalent forms of collective 
identification in the course of modernity nonetheless (that is, although these 
national identities have not been organised and regulated by a state), proves the 
fallacy of the claims in the first place. The connection of the existence or 
strength of the national state with the need or strength of identification with a 
nation in the era of modernity -which is an era where nationalism and the norm 
or self-determination in a national state prevails- is thus misleading and it 
disregards the reality of national identification, meaning the fact that national 
identities have been also formed irrespective of the actual systematisation and 
facilitation of a modem national state21. In that respect, the very argument that 
national identities will follow the weakening and repudiating path of national 
states is put in a wrong context in the first place: it is founded on a theoretical 
assumption that is empirically invalid, namely that national states are really 
‘nation-states’.
So, the applicability of the examination of identification mechanisms of 
the national state in globalisation’s context is limited because this argument 
directly refers to national identities as ascribed and systematised by the state;
20 As it was mentioned in chapter 4, p. 147, in 1970 the 9,1% of states were totally homogeneous while 
18,9% had the 90% of the population belonging to one ethnic group (see Connor, 1994:29-30).
21 In chapter 4 it was argued that the change from ethnic to national identities is due to nationalism and 
the existence of the national state. The modem state is directly connected with the national identities that 
it systematises or even creates. Nevertheless, the additional prevalence of nationalism, which renders a 
national state an aspiration and national/ethnic identities a self-conscious reality also explains the fact that 
national identities can also become powerful even though not systematised by a state. In that respect, we 
could refer here also to identification with an ethnic group as, in the context of modernity and the 
aspiration to national self-determination, ethnic groups and identities are being resignified as nations and 
national identities, often irrespectively of the existence of a national state.
229
thus, it cannot adequately correlate to the question of the possible weakening of 
national identities in general. Despite this limitation, however, it is not 
superficial to examine it even if it does not refer to majority cases. On the 
contrary, it has the merit of explaining those while it is also relevant to other 
cases, where there are more than one national groups within the state but it tries 
to systematise them around one prevalent or one umbrella identity (i.e. British 
identity). So, has globalisation affected the identification mechanisms of the 
national state? We need to clarify here that by identification mechanisms of the 
national state we do not only refer to mechanisms o f the state, that is 
mechanisms that are controlled and/or organised by the state, but also to 
mechanisms that function within the context of the national state and provoke, 
sustain or remind national identity. For example, the mass media are not 
necessarily controlled by the state, yet they function as identification 
mechanisms in the given national contexts that they operate. So, by 
identification mechanisms o f the national state we rather mean identification 
mechanisms that function in the context of the national state, whether state 
controlled and regulated or not.
In chapter 4 we referred to “education, the mass media and the elites as 
the main providers and/or manipulators of people’s national identity”22. So, let 
us examine these three and their possible weakening because of globalisation. 
Education, to begin with, provides the same reference points and retain its 
mechanisms of children’ socialisation through identification with the national 
state as it has been doing until now. Language, first and foremost, which is the 
most significant internal and external classificatory characteristic, remains 
‘national’. Certainly, increased contacts or the use of the Internet may have 
rendered English language an indispensable tool for people in both 
communication and work internationally. This, however, does neither 
undermine national languages nor their centrality as signifiers of national 
identity because it is merely a tool while its complementarity cannot put 
‘mother tongue’ in question. Even in such cases as the Netherlands, where the
22 Chapter 4, p. 156 (under the title ‘National and Ethnic Identity’).
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English language is officially recognised, this bilingualism has not resulted in 
weaker national identities23.
Furthermore, history teaching is primarily oriented on the course of the 
nation, and secondarily on international events -which are also emphasised 
according to their relevance or closeness to the ‘neighbourhood’ of the nation, 
that is to the countries surrounding it or relating to it more closely (politically, 
economically, etc). For example, the 1998 guidelines of the Greek Pedagogical 
Institute for history books, stressed among its aims that children must “develop 
a positive attitude towards the preservation of their national heritage” 
(1998:14), learn the important events of the Greek history as well as elements 
of the histoiy of other civilisations, and learn about the history of Hellenism 
and place it within the context of the global history24. Similarly in Germany: 
Falk Pinkel reports in his book The European Home: Representations o f 20th 
Century Europe in History Textbooks 25 that, in German textbooks, the 
proportion of national history is between 40-70%, depending on the context of 
the book, while the rest concerns ‘European’ and global history alike 
(2000:39). The same applies to most countries of the EU: as Pingel remarks, 
while Europe in general and the EU in particular occupy indeed more place in 
education, it is taught as a wider context within which to regard national 
history26. As these examples indicate, the national element remains the central
23 National attachment is no less strong for the Dutch than it is for the rest of the European Union 
citizens. In the Eurobarometer survey, they have responded that they feel very or fairly attached to their 
country by 80%, when the EU average is 89% (EB 49, Spring 1998, p.41); also, the 86% feels very or 
fairly proud for their nationality, while the EU average is 83% (EB 52, Autumn 1999, p. 10).
24 Let alone that these guidelines are part of the rewriting of history books with a more European and 
international orientation, as part of the project ‘Learning and Teaching About the History of Europe in the 
20th Century’” (Recommendation 1283 (1996), on history and the learning of history in Europe).
25 Falk Pingel (2000): The European Home: representations o f  2(fh century Europe in textbooks, Council 
of Europe Publishing. The book is written in conjunction with the Georg Eckert Institute for International 
Textbook Research in Braunschweig (Germany), and a number of scientists and researchers around 
Europe, and it is part of the work done during the project ‘Learning and Teaching About the History of 
Europe in the 20th Century’”, funded by the EU. In line with the project specifications, the book examines 
the content and methods of history teaching in European countries, and proposes the need to modernise 
history books according to contemporary pedagogic views with the use of new technology, and to the 
values history textbooks must disseminate. However, the additional impetus of the book is to research on 
the existence of a ‘European’ idea in history books and to make recommendations on how to promote 
such an idea.
26 In general, history textbooks are oriented according to the historical context and development path of a 
country. For example, in FYROM (a non-EU country which is recently involved in nation-building) 
textbooks show an evident preoccupation with the issue of nation-building and the creation of national 
identity.
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point of reference, not only within the context of globalisation but also within 
the wider ‘European’ environment (in which national states strongly cooperate 
with each other and, also, concede certain aspects of their sovereignty).
Last, visits to national museums, and -active or passive- participation in 
national celebrations and anniversaries have been part of children’s education, 
as analysed in chapter 4. These celebrations not only remain to be part of what 
Billing calls ‘flagging’ of the nation, but they are even more relevant as more 
and more national states have involved them in the second part of the twentieth 
century. The reason is twofold: first, new ‘nation-states’ have emerged during 
the twentieth century and, second, even older national states have recently 
employed them (i.e. China initiated its first Grand National Day parades in 
1949). So, almost every national state currently organises such activities, as 
indicated elsewhere27, while schools play an active role in them, and 
simultaneously there is a trend that more and more national states engage in 
such activities. This should not be explained as a result of globalisation, 
however, although it coincides with it, but as a result of nationalism and the 
tendency towards uniformity among national states that wish to implement the 
practices of other, established national states. To conclude, the function of 
education as national education, as analysed in chapter 4, has not been altered 
in the late 20th century: the national orientation of education is an aspect barely 
touched by globalisation.
Secondly, we should refer to the elites, meaning politicians and 
intellectuals. As far as the politicians are concerned, their main concern is to 
appeal to their electorate, which is national, and to serve national interests. 
Even when they refer to regional or international alliances, they do so on the 
grounds of national interest. We have seen the example of the US president 
Bush who resigned from the Kioto agreement on the grounds that it would 
jeopardise the American economy; also, the UK Prime Minister Tony Blair 
justified his support for Europe and the euro on the grounds of British
27 See chapter 4, p. 158-9. The data presented is selected in 2002.
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interests28 -these two examples are used here because they are examples of the 
two most ‘globalised’ countries and the most active supporters and promoters 
of globalisation (liberal capitalism has been an integral part of their political 
tradition). Thus, there is no indication that globalisation has altered the national 
focus and/or references of politicians. Similarly, globalisation does not seem to 
significantly alter the focus of intellectuals, whichever this focus has been. This 
means that, while there are intellectuals that are nationalists, or nation-centric, 
there are others who advocate cosmopolitanism. This trend to see the world 
from a wider perspective than one’s own locality is not unique in the era of 
globalisation, as cosmopolitanism is a concept apparent in every historical 
period (also referred to as universalism or humanism). Certainly, as 
globalisation is on the focus, a more global and universal outlook is under 
discussion and has come to the fore again. Yet, this has also been accompanied 
by the reverse trend among them, that is to stress the dangers of globalisation 
or to fear about the fate of national distinctiveness.
Nevertheless, there is one change that accompanies globalisation, a 
change concerning both politicians and intellectuals -although the latter to a 
lesser extent. It is that globalisation is discursively used to an excessive extent 
in connection to almost every rhetoric. So, when politicians employ unpopular 
policies, they tend to justify them as a necessity provoked by globalisation, 
thus using it as an alibi. We refer here to ‘alibi’ because, as argued in chapter 5, 
a number of unpopular measures implemented were the result of the spread of 
the free market economy, which is a political choice and not a necessity: thus, 
the claim that a number of policies are ‘necessitated’ because of globalisation 
serves so as to avoid political responsibility for their political choices. In 
addition, to the extent that these policies were regarded as necessary or 
justified as such, this is part of the ideologisation of globalisation. At the same 
time, a large number of intellectuals mention globalisation as a threat to the
28 “...the very reason why we should be there in Europe as a leading player is because we are in fact a 
strong country, a great country that is doing well, and us being at the centre of Europe is part of that. [...] 
the reasons why we are in principle in favour of joining the euro are because if  the euro is successful and 
if it is in our economic interests to join then it is going to be good for British industry, for British jobs, for 
British investment”; from the press conference of the prime minister at 20th of June, where PM Tony Blair 
began by briefing journalists on the Seville European Council.
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national state and to national culture and identity. This change, however, does 
not weaken national identification. On the contrary: on the one hand, it renders 
globalisation an alien, threatening force and, on the other hand, it provokes 
anxiety and uneasiness for ones’ familiar environment and for one’s very 
identity. But, a real or perceived threat to identity is more likely to provoke the 
need to identify more strongly than to abandon it. That is because globalisation 
does not provide an alternative object for identification, and thus sense of 
belonging, and furthermore a threat to identity is perceived as a threat to one’s 
personality, which obviously necessitates its defence29. In that sense, 
globalisation may have caused some changes, however minor or subtle, in the 
behaviour and perceptions of elites, but certainly not in a direction that 
weakens national identity.
The mass media have been left last in this analysis, as I would like to 
make a particular reference to them. The reason is that, in the relevant 
bibliography regarding the weakening of national identities the mass media and 
new communication technologies are analysed as the major determinants in 
such a weakening. Hence, my extensive reference to them.
N ew  Communication Technologies
The argument that state sovereignty is limited incorporates into the 
debate the new communication technologies. New communication and 
information technologies have brought significant changes in the ways of 
communication, image transmission, and organisation of our way of living. 
They have themselves shaped and influenced several aspects of globalisation, 
particularly the civilian dimension, and have brought the world into more 
intense contact, or at least they have provided the means for that. It has been 
argued by several scholars that these technologies have loosened states’ control 
over their territory and also that they have changed people’s perceptions and, 
through cultural contacts, have brought some level of cultural integration or
29 Some further analysis on the subject of possible reactions to such perceptions of threats will be made 
in the next chapter.
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cultural fluidity: thus, that national cultural homogeneity, a feature of cohesion 
and stability within the national states, is undermined (Nederveen Pieterse, 
1995b, Hall, 1991b). Yet, we might say that there is a misunderstanding not 
only as far as the ‘global’ distribution of these technologies are concerned but 
also regarding the implications of new technologies. On the one hand, 
developments in technology do not concern the whole of the globe but only 
certain parts of it, as the new technologies are widely spread in specific 
segments of the world30. On the other hand, the strength and new capacities of 
communication and information have been exaggerated towards one direction, 
and the typical loss of control over the media has been confused with the loss 
of any control over them31 -let alone that the loss of states’ ownership and 
direct control over the media is indeed a fact only in those countries that can be 
characterised as plural democracies. So, the term ‘globalisation’ and the 
relevant debate about new communication technologies and the weakening of 
the national state can be applied and answered only for those areas that new 
technologies are widespread and the term can be applied (mainly OECD 
countries).
While these issues are interesting and important in the globalisation 
debate, we should now focus on the issue strictly related to this thesis, that is 
the national orientation of news and information transmitted. As it will be 
argued, irrespectively of the media’s interdependence with or independence 
from politicians, national issues or events of national interest are at the 
forefront of television, radio, or the press. The bulk of information has been 
mediated through the perceptions of one’s nationality32, which guarantees
30 According to 1999 UNDP report, 91% of all Internet users are in OECD countries, which account for 
one fifth of the world’s population, while South Asia, home of 23% of the world’s population, has less 
than 1% of Internet users (2000:343).
31 The direct and official control of governments over the sources of information and communication 
cannot always be applied indeed. Yet, they often exercise an influence to each other that can be crucial 
and beneficial for both sides (i.e. unofficial coalitions of radio and, mainly, television stations with 
political parties and/or the government). At the same time, however, there are no doubt independent 
journalistic sources that chose to escape coalition with states. There is one aspect of the new 
communication and information technology that really escapes state’s control and it provides the means 
for its actual control on behalf of its citizens: the Internet. Nevertheless, there is no yet indication as to 
whether the Internet creates or alters the interests of peoples and nations or it simply facilitates each one 
to search for what he/she is interested in. My argument is, however, that both trends (to state-coalition, 
and to independent journalism) are not new, and certainly not initiated by globalisation.
32 See the section Mass Communication Media, in chapter 4, p. 163.
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appeal and thus profit for the media corporations, and this has not changed in 
the era of globalisation. While this may be quite obvious to everyone having a 
television at his/her living-room, for example, I will present an elaboration of 
data collected for a specific survey.
On the 20th of March 2002 the state-owned television channel NET (New 
Greek Television) broadcasted in their weekly programme ‘Protagonistes’ a 
survey on the quality level and content of the television ‘News’ from the 
biggest private and state-owned channels in nine countries . While the 
programme concerned the quality of the television ‘News’ in these countries, 
they also referred to the content of the news transmitted. The data collected 
shows that that the content of the ‘News’ in these countries was on average 
68% national, 20% international, and 12% general, where general refers to 
scientific findings and international anniversaries (like Women’s Day). 
Although this data is enough to show the clear precedence of the national news, 
I would like to add a few qualitative remarks. First, as the general theme on the 
8th of March was dedicated to women, in most cases the reference was on 
women of a famous woman of the national state that the channel operated. So, 
for example, the French TF1 presented the wife of the Prime Minister Jospin, 
and the Italian RAI1 presented the festivities for the day in Italy. Second, any 
general or international or athletic event was accompanied by a specific and 
extended reference when there was a ‘national’ presence. So, the short 
reference of the French FR2 to the Para-Olympic games of Salt Lake City (0.16 
min) was accompanied by an extensive one to the French athletes participating 
(2.09 min). Last, in several instances the percentages of national and 
international issues can be misleading, as the time given to each of them is not 
proportionally analogous. For example, while the 50% of the topics of the 
German ARD were international, only 38% of the total time of the ‘News’ was 
given to them. From these remarks it becomes clear that the overall data
33 The countries are, Germany, France, Italy, Sweden, UK, Russia, Turkey, USA and Greece. The survey 
was made on the 8th of March 2002 (which is also Women’s Day). I should remark that the programme 
‘Protagonists’ is well reputable for its accuracy, and the survey was analysed by relevant professors and 
analysts. The journalists of this programme were so kind as to give me all the details of their findings, so 
that I could check myself on the evidence and compare them with their interpretations and analysis. Based 
on this evidence is my current analysis.
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showing 68% for national issues is the most moderate calculation: if we would 
add to them the ‘general’ topics as well or if we considered the time dedicated 
to each issue the proportion would be much less in favour of international as 
opposed to national topics.
So, media messages are subject to the contexts of perception, contexts 
that are mainly local/national. Of course, there is a trend towards an oligopoly 
of the media ownership, as the 1999 UNDP report demonstrates34, which could 
delineate a trend towards uniformity. But, let us not forget that the owners of 
the media are persons with personal interests too, as well as biases. In Smith’s 
words, even in free, liberal countries where media are not controlled by the 
state, “the world is still largely seen through the lenses of one’s national state” 
(1995a:93). This is because people have identified with their national state long 
before they search for news and information through the media; thus their 
interest lies primarily in what is ‘theirs’: that applies to both journalists and the 
audience.
Furthermore, as we saw in chapter 4, the media constitute a medium in 
the process of identification with the nation; there is no indication thus far that 
this has changed, or that there is a trend towards changing this. The argument 
that “the globalisation/localisation of media and electronic communication is 
tantamount to the de-nationalisation and de-statisation of information, the two 
being inseparable for the time being” that Castells expresses (1997:259) still 
lacks the adequate theoretical or empirical support. The two are not inseparable 
in reality, and de-statisation has not been followed by de-nationalisation of 
information in reality: for example, where journalists criticise the state for 
inefficiency, they do so on the grounds that it cannot support the national 
interests. On the contrary, information diffused by private corporations is no 
less nation-centric than before, due to the convenience of appealing to already 
fixed perceptions and sentiments of a specific group. Conversely, private media 
corporations tend to be more nation-centric than state-owned media. Further 
analysis of the data of the ‘Protagonistes’ programme survey mentioned above 
shows that, the total 68% and 20% for national and international topics
34 1999 UNDP Report, 2000:343.
237
respectively in private and state-controlled media shows a significant diversion 
if we separate the two. So, the proportion of national and international topics 
was 76% and 15% for the private television stations and 62% and 25% for the 
state-owned ones respectively. We can infer from the profit-aiming nature of 
private television that the reference to familiar images and to what is ‘ours’ 
seems indeed more appealing and interesting, and the owners of private media 
corporations have followed it as a profit-aiming method.
An additional issue that is directly relevant to this debate about the effect 
of the mass media and new communication technologies on national cultures 
and identities is the issue of the increased contact of individuals and nations 
through the new means of communication and the implications that such a 
contact might have. Although a few indicating lines were mentioned earlier35, 
some further brief remarks are needed. Appadurai’s ‘ideoscapes’ are relevant 
here, for they are flows of images and ideas that transcend boundaries and 
create shared ‘imagined worlds’. Also relevant are the inferred visions about 
greater understanding and integration on a global scale. However, there is not 
enough evidence, today or in history, to support such a view. By referring to 
history I mean that, so long that communication and physical or imagined 
contact was confined to specific, yet large, regions of the world, no greater 
understanding was promoted within these regions. Whether the region would 
be as big as ancient Greece in the 5th century B.C., or the Balkans in the Middle 
Ages, or Europe in the 20th century, understanding, in the sense of cultural 
integration or conflict resolution, was not achieved. By referring to ‘today’ I 
mean that, whilst in the era of globalisation, what scientists actually observe is 
the remarkable resurgence of nationalism and of conflicts that fragment the 
world into pieces rather than uniting the existing ones (Castells, 1997, 
Halliday, 2001). Is there really any qualitative difference that the advocates of 
such a view see in the world under globalisation that makes them believe that 
the quantitative rise of contacts among people is enough to make a more united 
or peaceful world? Or is it just ‘wishful thinking’? Athens was fighting with 
Sparta although in a context of increased communication and contact within
35 In the discussion about the civilian dimension of globalisation, chapter 5, p.205-9.
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ancient Greece; European countries have fought each other in the two world 
wars while in a context of broader European communication; and the NATO 
alliance fought with Iraq and Serbia in the current context of increased contact 
and communication that characterises the era of globalisation. Thus, there is 
evidence that points towards the reverse trend: that, increased contact and 
communication can generate conflict and misunderstanding between very 
distant countries or regions as it renders them less distant than they were 
without intense communication. On the contrary, there is no evidence to 
support the view that cultural interchanges and contacts result in the weakening 
of national identity and cultural distinctiveness (or perception of 
distinctiveness) of individuals.
The famous work of Karl Deutch on Nationalism and Social 
Communication has dealt exactly with the outcome of increased contacts and 
the prospects of integration. When first published, in 1953, he argued that 
increasing contacts between culturally diverse groups were more likely to lead 
to assimilation. As Connor informs us, he finalised this view after expressing 
some doubts in the early 1960s about whether that would lead to assimilation 
or increased antagonism (Connor, 1994:30-35). We do not refer to his doubts 
here in order to devalue his argument36. We rather intended to show that, since 
both arguments can find evidence supporting them, this means that the 
outcome of increased interaction depends on the particular circumstances it 
takes place in. In addition, it should be reminded that, knowledge of each other 
is the prerequisite of both being friends and rivals. Thus, increased contact and 
communication break the walls of indifference and ignorance, and create 
further contact. Whether this contact will create alliances or enmity is not only 
a matter of particular circumstances (history, economy, etc), but also a matter 
of projection of biases and stereotypes. The research of Philipa Atkinson is 
illuminating on that matter.
Atkinson’s research is about ‘Representations of Conflict in the Western 
Media: the Manufacturing of a Barbaric Periphery’ (1999), where she draws
36 This kind of open questioning of one’s own argument that Deutch has done shows scientific 
rigorousness and conscientiousness, that is admirable -even more so because it is rare!
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some interesting conclusions about the representation of foreign countries in 
the western media. First, some media corporations, she argues, are funded by 
the government and thus reflect the state’s policy and agendas, while the most 
are private and usually project news according to the owners’ biases, traditions 
and interests. Second, they reinforce western values, which is partly due to 
their market-driven nature, and to the mainstream culture of the personnel (and 
the owner’s as well). Third, their subjection to the market forces and their 
effort to attract customers has had an impact on the quality: “fashion and 
novelty are the determinants of what becomes news” while the trend is 
“towards directing news to the lowest common denominator” (1999:104). This 
translates into sensationalism and little in-depth analysis. The implications of 
this bring us to the fourth interesting observation that cultures are 
misrepresented. Atkinson stresses two examples. One is that, complicated 
events occurring in the ‘Third World’, like wars and famines, are more easily 
understood as ethnic conflict and drought, thus avoiding the complicated 
political and economic analysis: “this method of journalism... satisfies both the 
necessity for timeliness and interest, and the belief that consumers are 
incapable of understanding anything deeper. It is self-perpetuating as...once 
established...it becomes the easiest explanation...and can be applied to other 
situations” (1999:104, emphasis added). The second example concerns the 
common image held of ‘Third World’ countries, one of “happy peasants tilling 
the land or engaging in simple crafts...with a backdrop of sunshine and blue 
skies” (1999:104). This image is mostly presented through the tourist industry. 
Through these and other examples she draws the conclusion that, stereotypes 
are produced and reproduced, perpetuated or established.
So, to conclude, the mass media broadcast news and information that are 
in their most part nationally oriented -which also means either national or 
international, but with a national interest. It is indicative that the above data on 
the content of the ‘News’ concern in their majority highly developed and 
‘globalised’ countries. Thus, global interest is still inferred in a culturally 
specific context, the national context, and with perceptions that come from 
one’s locality, since the bulk of people spend their lives in their national state.
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*  *  *
I
We can see that the identification mechanisms of the national state have 
not been significantly affected by globalisation, at least not in a direction that 
signifies the weakening of national identities. Indeed, there is additional 
researches and evidence to support this view. Indicatively, Paul Kennedy’s 
introduction to Globalisation and National Identities, a collection of articles 
published after the homonymous conference that took place in 1999 at 
Manchester university, remarks that: “a key theme running through these 
chapters is that in many situations the nation-state and nationalism continue to 
provide a pivotal axis around which individuals and collectivities frame their 
sense of cultural affiliation and feelings of belonging” (2001:1-2). For 
example, in the late 1990s, the Scots voted (in 1999) for their own parliament 
(Books, 2001), the Russians emphasised on a return to traditionally defined 
national identity through Orthodoxy (Danks, 2001), and the Irish experienced a 
“cultural revival” (Fagan, 2001). It is very important to remark that these 
affirmations and reaffirmations of national identities are taking place through 
official-political contexts that are pro-globalisation, political initiatives that try 
to respond positively and to follow the international contingency of the 
globalisation of capitalism. This indicates that nationalism and national identity 
are present and powerful forces in the era of globalisation. As Halliday argues, 
nationalistic protests today can be equally considered as “a revolt against 
globalisation and a component of it” (2001:60).
We can add here one more point in support for the argument that there is 
no reason to expect the strength of national identification to diminish. This 
additional point is rather a critique on Nederveen Pieterse (1995b) and his 
argument that globalisation provides the framework to ‘cultural hybridisaton’, 
which gives each subject the opportunity to avail of the many options offered
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and to draw from multiple sources of identity37. Indeed so, but most individuals 
are located in a territorially specific society and, however mobile, most of the 
sources available to them are territorially, culturally, linguistically and 
economically specific38. So, even if we accept that identity was a purely 
subjective construction, the closer individuals would be to each other (spatially, 
and in terms of societal organisation), the more commonalities we would 
remark on their identities because they would draw from similar cultural, social 
or other reservoirs39. In addition, national identity is already a mixture of 
diverse experiences and heterogeneous cultures that have, nevertheless, been 
synthesised and systematised in one national culture. It does not matter if 
cultures are enriched with new cultural traits: they are still considered national 
identities. Also, cultural and, mainly, consumerist similarities (drinking Coke 
or watching MTV) are profound, but these cannot nullify the -real or 
perceived- national distinctiveness or the process of national identification; 
otherwise, there would be no reason for the British and the Americans to be 
considered different nations and have different identities, for example, as their 
similarities extend even to the linguistic domain. This has been a function of 
each national state: to systematise the diverse cultural attributes of a given 
population and formulate what is called the ‘national culture’. Who is going to 
do the same for ‘world culture’? A ‘world state’? Cultural specificity, more 
accurately cultural entrenchment is interwoven with a particular organisation, 
which is sociologically indispensable, and globalisation does not offer an 
alternative of such organisation.
Furthermore, Nederveen Pieterse considers that globalisation refers to the 
“formation of a world-wide historical field and involves the development of 
global memory, arising from global experiences” (1995b: 52). He confronts 
Smith’s disagreement that world memories, such as wars and colonialism, 
remind us of historic cleavages, with the argument that these can also unite
37 This is also a critique on what Giddens calls ‘life politics’ (1991:214-7), meaning that the individual 
constructs its own identity through a variety of available choices. Castells counterargues that, “reflexive 
life-planning becomes impossible, except for the elite inhabiting the timeless space of flows of global 
networks and their ancillaiy locales” (1997:11).
38 These specificities exist for both collectivities and for individuals within them.
39 We can safely infer that, analysts would then construct larger or smaller divisions to categorise people 
and classify them according to similarities, be they linguistic, racial, religious or other.
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humanity: he argues that, “unity emerging out of antagonism is the a,b,c of 
dialectics. [...] The intimacy constituted by repression and resistance is not an 
unknown notion either, as hinted by the title of the Israeli author Uri Anveri’s 
book about Palestinians, My Friend the Enemy (1986)” (p.52). I think that 
Nederveen Pieterse misconceives the nature of this intimacy. It is a bond that 
sustains the unity of the one group with the hatred of the other. Intimacy here 
refers to familiarity, to the fact that someone is conceivable, and can thus be 
conceived as an enemy too. Thus, intimacy in this context does not refer to 
understanding, sympathy or confidence.
Thus, even if we accept that globalisation renders additional cultural 
references available to people worldwide, that is not enough to make us 
perceive of a global culture and of the weakening of national cultures and 
identities. National cultures have been enriched all along through contact with 
other people and civilisations, however distant or near. The claim that each 
national identity and culture is unique, coherent and pure is certainly 
nationalistic and does not correspond to the truth. Thus, the concept of 
‘hybridity’ of cultures is not new, only that it is emphasised now, and even 
exaggerated, as opposed to the nationalistic perceptions that have long 
prevailed thus far. Two important remarks must be made here. On the one 
hand, each nation perceives its own national identity as unique, coherent and 
pure, however in a way of self-delusion. On the other hand, theorists who 
overemphasise the influence and contact of cultures in the era of globalisation 
and, moreover, establish on this argument the claim about the erosion of 
national identities tend to forget that this is not a new process and yet new 
national identities have been established and sustained.
Nevertheless, it is important to stress this last remark. As argued above, 
the basic identification mechanisms that operate in a national state are not 
affected by globalisation. But, in any case, even if we had witnessed the 
withdrawal of ‘national states’ as a specific kind of organisation and 
systematisation of a group’s living, this would not necessarily mean that this 
kind of identification, which is based on ethnic, local, territorial, national -that 
is familiarity- criteria, would fade away: the psychical structures of
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identification were not founded in modernity, and will not alter with 
globalisation; only their external characteristics, which are case-specific, can 
change. ‘Globality5 does not provide a reference point for identification or 
socialisation of individuals. And, as it has already been mentioned, 
globalisation as yet offers no alternative of social organisation, and it seems 
unlike that it will. Theoretically, the specific form of social organisation and 
identification that the national state represents is not necessarily the only 
alternative; in other epochs there were different types of social and political 
institutions. That means that, even if there was not a ‘national identity5, that is 
an identity as a result of identification with a nation/national state, it is most 
likely that another form of collective identification would emerge (religious, 
ethnic, cultural, regional etc.), which would have many of the characteristics of 
national identities. It is in the specific context of modernity that national states 
have been the prevalent organising structures, and this has not been altered yet. 
The identification mechanisms of the national state only follow the archetypal 
inscriptions one has from childhood, which are also for the bulk of people 
linguistically, territorially, and culturally specific; these have not undergone 
any apparent transformation in their content because of globalisation as the 
national state has been until the end of the twentieth century, and the beginning 
of the twenty-first, the fundamental organisation of collectivities.
Discursive Innovations and Nationalism
Robins argues that one aspect of globalisation is to drive us back to old 
loyalties, national, ethnic, religious or other, because of a “rejection or turning 
away from the turbulent changes associated with global integration55 
(2000:200). That brings us to the second argument that globalisation may itself 
sustain or even strengthen national states (as a norm) and further 
national/ethnic divisions, as well as sentimental attachment to them; in any 
case, it does not show the potentials to diminish them. This argument can be 
supported in two ways. First, it will be argued that much of the perceived 
difference of the era of globalisation and the rest of modernity as far as
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nationalism is concerned is due to discursive/rhetorical innovations that do not 
correspond to respective real or significant changes in the domains of national 
identification. Thus there is no reason or evidence to support the view that 
ethnic and national -that is, cultural- divisions will diminish because of the 
process of globalisation and the new era it signifies. On the contrary, these very 
misconceptions can generate anxiety and thus enhance nationalistic 
potentialities. Secondly, we can further establish the previous indication that 
nationalism is still to the fore and the national state is still and aspiration and a 
normative value, as argued before. This may itself give rise and put some 
strength on national identification, irrespectively of the existence of a state that 
supports and enhances such identification40.
To begin with, the simultaneous trends towards larger and narrower units 
and governmental divisions are considered to be part of globalisation. These 
contradictory and simultaneous trends are seen as repudiating of national 
identity and the national state, and as creating other types of identity, i.e. local, 
regional, ‘hubrid’ or individualised. The use of a distinct terminology is 
indicative of a debate that questions the national state and national identity in 
this globalising era, but this effort towards distinction rather creates 
terminological confusion. For example, what is the meaning of regionalism, of 
the global and local division, of ‘glocalisation’? Why is the EU called a region? 
These are defined as trends generated by globalisation, as aspects of it; the 
global and the local, it is argued, are aspects of the same thing (Hall, 1991a, 
Beck, 2000). This newly employed terminology implies that something new is 
taking place, a division that is unprecedented. However, the terminology seems 
to be more innovative than reality. Let me stress this argument.
National states and national identities are said to be under threat by 
trends towards both larger and smaller governmental collaborations or 
governance and administration, but there is not substantial evidence to support
40 The first argument, that national identities are not expected to be weakened because the identification 
mechanisms of the national state are still strong, referred to cases where there is a state and it supports 
national identification. The current argument rather concerns mostly those cases where there is not a state 
(but it is an aspiration), or the national group is not the prevailing one within the state. Thus, it helps us to 
explain the existence and strength of minority national/ethnic identities but also the potency for 
nationalistic awakenings.
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this view. Greater alliances, to begin with, among states that are trying to 
allocate the benefits and/or control the disturbances of globalisation, such as 
the EU, NAFTA, Mercosur etc, are considered to threaten and undermine 
national states and identities. But, it is not the first time in modernity that 
national states form alliances and coalitions, however typical and 
institutionalised, in order to confront other national states or alliances or to 
correspond to a given situation. These coalitions did not undermine their power 
or legitimacy as national states but, on the contrary, helped sustain them. 
Besides, these past and present coalitions have neither undermined or replaced 
the feelings of attachment towards national states, nor have they provoked 
complementary attachment and feelings of belonging, particularly to the extent 
that they are perceived as occasional and necessitated, but not optional. The 
reason is that realistic calculations cannot generate a sense of identity nor 
overcome already existing ones: we must keep in mind that “whatever held 
human collectivities together it was not the rational calculation of their 
individual members” (Hobsbawm, 1983:269).
The other trend, towards smaller (meaning local) scale governance is 
quite unspecified. On the one hand, some examples offered include large 
metropoles of the world, whose autonomy and cosmopolitan nature is 
emphasised elevating them to the stage of ‘city-states’. Thus, their position 
within a state tends to be neglected. So too the self-identification of their 
citizens. For example, O’Byme presents the portrait of Alex, an activist 
pacifist, who defines himself as a cosmopolitan and yet “profess to have a 
strong sense of British identity” (2001:144). However, this clear and 
conscious41 declaration is interpreted by O’Byme as identification with 
Britishness that “exists solely for the sake of convenience” (p. 151). He draws 
this conclusion because Alex’s permanent residence is London, a multicultural 
locality that connects Alex with the global: being British only provides him 
with the ground for political action and a social structure to locate himself. 
Thus, O’Byme argues that, in Alex’s case we can see “the relationship between 
the local and the global, bypassing the level of the nation-state, [which] is
246
strengthened under globalised conditions” (p. 153). This interpretation, 
however, seems to be provoked by a pre-existing model of explanation and is 
rather inaccurate. Why, for example, would someone ‘strongly’ identify with 
Britain only for the sake of convenience, since London could equally provide 
both a social structure and the ground for political action that Alex (or any 
other activist, like him) would need? Why would he need a local national 
identity anyway if it were only to serve as a structure for political action 
instead of a ‘global identity’? Also, what justification exists for regarding 
London a locality bypassing the national state? Isn’t it the capital of Britain, 
and thus benefiting from the prosperity, technology, economic and socio­
political advantages that this national state has to offer? If London benefits 
more from other British towns and if it is much more multicultural, that is by 
definition because it is the capital, not because of an unspecified ‘local-global’ 
relationship that has the advantage of bypassing the context of its national 
state.
Apart from the examples of large metropoles, small-scale regionalisms 
that are referred to as undermining national states and identities are ethnic 
revivals that aim toward self-determination or towards relative autonomy 
within a state. However, this observable trend toward smaller scale 
identifications does not indicate a change in the type of identities that is 
generated by globalisation, but a ‘regress’ toward smaller, more coherent, 
homogeneous and controllable units, while still of the ‘national state’ type. 
That brings us to the second argument regarding globalisation and the national 
state: these trends, that occasionally threaten the existing national states, do not 
challenge it as a norm42. Existing ethnic resurgences and national conflicts for 
autonomy and/or independence shake and undermine the particular state 
against which the struggle is taking place. But, when this is an effort to create 
one more unified and homogeneous national state, it empowers the notion of it. 
Let alone that, nationalist uprisings could be pointing toward the creation of a 
true nation-state, that is one homogeneous cultural unit -one nation in one
41 As it is inferred from other biographical data presented, such as the interviewee’s education, 
occupation etc.
42 This is also argued above from another perspective; in, p. 148.
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state- that was claimed by nationalism but is implemented only for the 9.1% of 
the world’s national states. These trends towards cultural affirmation are 
present throughout the whole of modernity and are even more apparent in an 
era of global awareness and increased knowledge of the world. The reason why 
they are present is an other characteristic of modernity, namely nationalism, 
and the reason why they are more apparent today is the increased contact and 
rapid information flows that exist in the era of globalisation. Nationalism did 
not withdraw from the scene when globalisation came in; on the contrary, 
globalisation gave it strength and power at the global level. Globalisation 
helped strengthened nationalistic movements in two ways: by providing the 
means for the effective organisation of nationalist movements (i.e. the means to 
communicate with Diaspora groups), and by transmitting information and 
awareness of their existence globally and rapidly. Yet, we need to stress the 
qualification that Castells makes, that contemporary nationalism is not 
necessarily oriented towards constructing a state (1997:30)43.
To recapitulate the argument, as Connor argues (1994:108), regionalism 
is used to refer to two incompatible meanings that involve both ‘transstate” and 
“intrastate” identities, which are supposed to create larger and smaller units 
than the national unit and to undermine the national state and national identities 
alike. Yet, as he points out, ‘transstate’ regionalism refers to collaborations and 
alliances made among national states (i.e.NATO, EU, etc) and ‘interstate’ 
regionalism refers to “intrastate divisions based upon sentimental ties to the 
locale” (p. 108): in this later case, regionalism is improperly used instead of 
nationalism. Similarly, we should not forget that the shape, size, or any other 
characteristic, even contradictory, of existing national states have not deprived 
them of their recognition as ‘nation-states’ throughout modernity. There has 
been an extensive range of national states -ethnically homogeneous or divided, 
big or tiny, democratic or autarchic, etc- that have been equally recognised. 
What is Australia, for example? A country, a continent, or a region? Is China 
more or less a national state than Holland, or Nepal? Since all these differences
43 Castells deduces from this argument that nations are today historically and analytically independent
from the state. However, this does not necessarily follow from the fact that certain nationalisms today
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have been indifferent thus far as to whether a national state would be 
characterised as such, why are current trends towards larger and smaller 
collectivities articulated with innovative terms and interpreted in a way that 
questions the national state? The unification of Germany did not put the 
German national state into question, nor did the fragmentation of the Soviet 
Union into several pieces or the newly emerged eastern European national 
states undermine the national state as a norm.
Thus, we can see that the ‘new trend’ towards regionalisms and localisms 
is not new at all, while the use of different terms to describe nationalism, such 
as regionalism, is misleading. A similar example of improper terminological 
innovation can be found in Robertson and his use of ‘glocalisation’. Robertson 
also argues that nationalism expresses the simultaneity of particularism and 
universalism, being in itself an example of contemporary particularism, and 
suggests that the best way to consider contemporary globalisation is “in its 
most general sense as a form of institutionalisation of the two-fold process 
involving the universalisation of particularism and the particularisation of 
universalism” (1992:102). Thus, however, he describes globalisation and 
nationalism through one another, employing a perplexing terminology that 
describes a process that is apparent in the whole of modernity. Therefore, the 
invention of new terms may in some cases be dysfunctional because it obscures 
the fact that the local and the global have always been aspects of modernity44, 
and have also been apparent within nationalism. This way, historical 
continuities might be obscured.
The employment of innovative language and new terminology indicates 
that the dissolution of the national state and the weakening of nationalism 
could be to a large extent a discursive construction. This innovative language, 
along with the use of globalisation and its predicted sweeping power over 
national states and identities by the elites (mentioned a few pages above), can 
provide one more explanation as to why nationalism is more likely to be
may not require for their own national state, not only because these cases are less common, but because 
their actions and demands are oriented towards a state and are formed in connection with it.
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strengthened than weakened in the era of globalisation. The rhetorical 
indication that the national group is under threat is capable of provoking real 
anxiety to members of national groups. This anxiety could easily be 
manipulated and lead to support for nationalistic or other exclusionist 
ideologies and practices. That is because, as nationalism satisfies the need to 
unite the present with the past and the future45, it may be strengthened so as to 
fulfil the gap individuals may feel as a result of the perceived dissolution of 
their lives’ stabilities.
Indeed, several scholars have pointed to the resurgence of nationalism 
and cultural reaffirmation of groups towards the end of the twentieth century, 
as pointed above (Kennedy, 2001, Castells, 1997, Halliday, 2001, etc). Apart 
from the technological ‘facilities’ that nationalistic movements are provided 
due to the new communication technologies, there are additional explanations 
for that (in regard to the national state and not globalisation in general). The 
basic postulate, established previously in the first and second chapters, is that 
identification is fundamental for the constitution of any personality, however 
stable or ‘pathologic’, and that individuals identify with a collectivity because 
group identity provides with a sense of belonging and security. Familiarity is a 
prerequisite for identification, while territoriality has been the most common 
characteristic of group identification throughout history. Let me repeat a 
quotation here from chapter one: “identificatory thinking is employed for the 
purpose of avoiding what is unpleasurable and obtaining what is pleasurable, 
and it aims at transforming a strange and consequently frightening external 
world into one that is familiar and enjoyable” (Balint, 1945:318). One of the 
threats posed by globalisation in direct relation to the national state is the 
dissolution of it and of the collective identities that accompany it. This 
perceived threat makes individuals either ascribe immense importance on their 
existing national states and national identities, or be prone to support the 
creation of smaller, and more controllable units, particularly if they belong to a
44 Perhaps, instead of presenting them as new phenomena some effort should be put in defining the local 
and the international/global and their meaning, as it has (or whether it has) changed over time and within 
modernity.
45 A need otherwise satisfied by religion. However, where secularism has transformed social 
organisation, nationalism has replaced or complemented religion.
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minority cultural group. Indeed, such reactions have already been observed 
during the 1990s, and many scholars argue that globalisation is characterised 
by the return of cultural reaffirmations. Hall, for example, argues that “when 
the movements of the margins are so profoundly threatened by the global 
forces of post-modernity, they can themselves retreat into their own exclusivist 
and defensive enclaves. [It is] the refusal of modernity which takes the form of 
a return, a rediscovery of identity...” (199 la: 3 6).
Within this context, national identities have not been challenged by any 
other form of collective identification. In the network society, Castells 
observes, “societies tend...to retrench themselves on the basis of identities, and 
to construct/reconstruct institutions as expressions of these identities” 
(1997:306). This can be explained as a defensive attempt individuals make in 
order to preserve or relocate their primary identities. In such an effort, and as 
long as nationalism is still to the fore, the (re)emergence of ethnic/national and 
local identities does not come as a surprise. Let us not forget the discussion 
over the outcomes of increased cultural contacts: they can produce greater 
assimilation on the one hand, and increased antagonism on the other. The 
outcome is determined by a combination of particular circumstances each time 
that has to be examined. The evidence thus far has indicated a trend towards 
increased ethnic and national conflict and fragmentation of existing 
collectivities, even within member states of the European Union (Castells, 
1997, Gray, 1998, Beck, 2000, Smith, 1995a). Yet, as this ‘was not fated to 
happen’, there must be reasons to explain it. My hypothesis is that the 
increased contact and awareness of differences brought by globalisation was 
not accompanied by those developments that would render it a positive 
process, a process with positive implications for people and collectivities alike. 
So, to some extent, increased contact became a threatening condition in itself. 
In that sense, we need to examine nationalism not as a component of 
globalisation but as a reaction to it. Thus, we need to look at the implications 
and consequences of globalisation in general in order to understand what it 
means for the people. That means, to understand the threats that globalisation 
poses, other that the (perceived) threats is poses for the national state in
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particular, and to look at the negative conditions accompanied by globalisation 
that provoke regression and closeness. That will be our concern in the 
following chapter: to identify the particular circumstances of globalisation, and 
to examine the prospects of national identity within that context.
C H A P T E R  7: N A T I O N A L  I D E N T I T Y  I N THE  
ERA OF G L O B A L I S A T I O N
This chapter begins from the exact point where chapter 6 concluded. Let 
us begin by briefly summarising the main arguments of the previous two 
chapters. Globalisation refers mainly to the liberalisation of international trade 
and the establishment of a global capitalist economy. This trend is neither 
unique nor historically unprecedented. However, because of the new 
communications technology, it has coincided with an accelerated pace and 
intense contact on a wider scale and, also, it has acquired new dimensions and 
characteristics, like the emergence of the ‘civilian’ dimension of globalisation. 
At the same time, its wide spread, implementation and articulation is a result of 
its ideologisation. So, we have specifically confined globalisation in the last 
two decades, when the term was initiated anyway. Globalisation was 
marshalled in the late 1970s and in the 80s by the US, primarily, and British 
governments, and it was spread to the EU and then to the rest of the world 
since the late 80s at an accelerated pace. It was the outcome of certain reforms 
politically initiated, like the deregulation of domestic economies for the sake of 
productivity and competitiveness and the removal of barriers to free market, 
which gave precedence to economic criteria with disregard to criteria of social 
interest and peace. These developments gave rise to an extensive 
argumentation about the national state, emphasising its ‘powerlessness’ and 
often predicting its demise. Yet, these arguments are often a huge exaggeration 
of reality, enhanced by the ideologisation of globalisation. The national state is 
not powerless; it has ‘conceded’ some power in certain respects (on the control 
of capital, i.e.), but it is even strengthened in some others (as a legislating and 
executing power, as provider of security etc). It is not the only player in the 
international chessboard, but it certainly is a primary one.
One of the functions of national states, and the one that makes them 
national states to begin with, is the organisation of cultural/national groups 
within their jurisdiction and their claim to act for their interests. So, they
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systematise citizens’ identification with their national group, which ultimately 
guarantees support for the national state as well. These mechanisms of states, 
and within states, that produce and enhance national identification have not 
been undermined in the era of globalisation, as the previous analysis has 
shown. Furthermore, there are indications that within globalisation nationalistic 
aspirations and movements will be empowered, while the very discourse about 
the undermining of national states is more likely to strengthen identification 
with them that the other way round. In that respect, there is no evidence to 
support the claim that national identities will eventually fade away in the era of 
globalisation.
In the current chapter we will directly address the prospects of national 
identity in the era of globalisation, not in relation to the debate about the fate of 
national states, but in relation to its potentials as a prevailing collective 
identification under the influence of globalisation in general. This issue 
concerns the need for identification with a collectivity that will fulfil 
individuals’ needs and unconscious desires (as they were specified in the 
previous chapters), and with the fate of identification with the national 
collectivity as individual perceptions and realities undergo certain 
transformations during the process of globalisation. So, the attempt is to 
understand the particular circumstances that constitute the era of globalisation 
and to proceed with a more direct analysis concerning national identity, its 
general trends, changes and dynamics in the era of globalisation. Here, the 
general risks posed by globalisation and the possible reactions to it will be 
addressed.
The Particular Circumstances of Globalisation
The process of globalisation and the use of new technologies have 
brought the world into unprecedented contact or, at least, they have provided 
the potentials for that. This contact makes people aware of both their 
similarities and differences, but whether it will bring greater understanding or
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animosity is not preordained. The outcome of increased cultural, social, 
political and economic interaction depends on the overall conditions that 
characterise this interaction and on whether they have a positive or negative 
effect in people’s lives. That is, the outcome of increased interaction will be 
determined by the particular circumstances of globalisation. Certainly, 
changes in any of the cultural, economic and socio-political circumstances 
cannot be welcome by everybody, and it is most common that while some may 
benefit and welcome them, some others react and to oppose the changes. 
However, the overall conditions, or changes, associated with globalisation1 -  
either because they are provoked by it or because they have coincided with it 
due to an immense ideologisation that resembles mythologisation- concern 
most of the conditions of life, affect almost everyone in the world, and have in 
most cases a negative or degrading impact. For these reasons, globalisation in 
general is perceived as a negative and threatening situation. So, the need for 
security and protection has been enhanced and, as existing collectivities are 
particularly significant as providers of shelter, national identification, or similar 
types of identification, can be expected to become stronger. Let me elaborate 
this argument in detail.
The 1999 UNDP report lists a number of threats created by or associated 
with globalisation: financial volatility and economic insecurity, job and income 
insecurity, health insecurity (i.e. AIDS), cultural insecurity (i.e. cultural 
imperialism), personal insecurity (i.e. criminality), environmental insecurity, 
and political insecurity (i.e. conflicts, civil wars). These are determinants and 
circumstances that characterise globalisation or are simply connected with it. 
Some of them are new while some are not unprecedented in nature but only in 
scale and global awareness. I will concentrate on those that are considered to 
be the major ones and are mostly referred to in the relevant bibliography. These 
are: inequality, economic insecurity, cultural threats, environmental risks, and 
global awareness of threats (information risks).
1 Associated means that these changes and developments that will be referred to are included in the 
debate on globalisation, despite the fact that no all of them are provoked by it, but have simply coincided 
with this period. Here we are concerned with globalisation in general and not in particular reference to the 
national state.
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Inequality
The figures of global inequality are well-known, so we can restrict 
ourselves to the most indicative ones. According to 1999 UNDP report, the 
OECD countries, which account for almost the 20% of the world’s population, 
had in 1999 the 86% of world GDP and the 82% of world export markets, 
while they received 58% of Foreign Direct Investment; the same percentage for 
the 20% of the world’s poorest countries was only 1-1.5%. Halliday, argues 
regarding these figures that “herein lies the delusion suggested by the very term 
globalisation [because] the world, controlled by few states is oligarchic” 
(2001:66). Moreover, apart from inequality there is growing inequality, with 
accelerating concentration of wealth at the very top. The poorest fifth of the 
world saw its income share falling from 2.3% to 1% in the last 30 years, while 
the richest fifth’s increased from 70% to 86%. At the same time, the world’s 
200 richest people more than doubled their net worth from 1994 to 1998, while 
the income of the richest 358 billionaires exceeded the combined income of 
countries with 45% of the world’s population.
We can observe increased inequality patterns within countries as well. 
For example, in the 80s and early 90s, the number of families that fell below 
the poverty line increased by 60% and 40% in the UK and the Netherlands 
respectively (Castells, 2000b: 82). Nevertheless, at the same time, there is data 
showing that intra-country inequality has decreased in some countries; China 
and Chile are two such examples of successful reduction of poverty, the former 
due to high economic growth and the latter due to effective democratic 
administration (Castells, 2000b:81). Yet, such examples are a minority of 
successful structural changes and particular circumstances; as Castells argues, 
while the evolution of intra-country inequality varies, the general trend is 
towards increasing intra-country inequality. This trend is more prevalent in 
developed countries, where poverty was largely increased in most of them. The 
reason is, according to Castells, that “during the 1980s and 1990s most 
governments gave priority to techno-economic restructuring over social 
welfare” (2000b:82). For the same reason, he argues, the US, which is the 
largest and most technologically advanced economy, displays the most blatant
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and substantial increase in social inequality, polarisation, poverty and misery. 
Indeed, inequalities are widening within countries but, at the same time, they 
are wide and still widening among countries: for example, the poor or unskilled 
citizen of the US or UK “will enjoy far better material conditions of existence 
(including 20 more years of life) than will his/her counterpart in Brazil or 
India” (Mann, 2000:139). There is another reason as well, which is held 
responsible for both intra-state and inter-state increase of inequality and 
poverty. It is that, as Castells argues, the logic of this global, informational 
system is such that it relentlessly incorporates or excludes people, groups, or 
countries according to their relevance to it and it creates an uneven 
development not only between North and South but also “between the dynamic 
segments of society everywhere, and those others that risk becoming irrelevant 
from the perspective of the system’s logic” (2000a: 2).
Those excluded -people or territories- run the risk of shifting to a 
position of ‘structural irrelevance’, by which Castells means that, once 
considered irrelevant, they face additional difficulties to access the system 
again2. Avenues creating structural irrelevance are unemployment, illiteracy, 
poverty, homelessness, mental or other illness, and so on. Following this 
argument we should ascribe additional weight to another aspect of inequality, 
that is access inequality. Access inequality is inequality that refers to the 
inability of individuals or groups or regions to incorporate into the market 
system and economic globalisation, and to the uneven distribution of means 
that would combat this inability and would guarantee a better living. Education 
and health are probably those aspects of access inequality that express the most 
severe and devastating consequences. The reason is obvious: without education 
and information one stays out of the system, and without health one ‘stays out’ 
of life.
Information, knowledge and communication are the tools for equal 
access and productivity in the era of globalisation, and are mainly concentrated 
to the fifth of richer countries. So, in 1998, OECD countries possessed 74% of
2 This is a process that creates the ‘black holes of informational capitalism’ from which one cannot 
escape; in Castells, 2000b: 165-7.
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world telephone lines while the bottom fifth had 1.5% of them. The vast 
majority of Internet users (91%) are also concentrated in OECD countries. 
Internet users are also divided by gender, education and income divides: 30% 
of them have a university degree, a proportion that increases to 55% in Russia, 
67% in Mexico, and 90% in China. Most users are young and men, while 
income is a determining factor: a computer purchase would cost the average 
Bagladeshi 8 years income, while the 90% of Internet users in Latin America 
come from upper income groups3.
Similarly in education. In 1993 only 10 countries accounted for 84% of 
global research and applied expenditures, and possessed 95% of US patents. 
Also, during the 1990s, 50% of PhD research in science and engineering in the 
United States were granted to foreign nationals; the half of them did not return 
to their home country. This, according to Castells, “is a matter of the inability 
of their countries of origin to attract them, rather than an indication of the 
closed nature of the science system” (2000a: 124). However, what does this 
inability show if not the fact that only a few countries of the world can equally 
participate in the so-called process of globalisation? How else can we explain 
that only 13% Japanese and 11% South Koreans stayed in the US (as Japan and 
S. Korea are technologically very advanced), while the same proportion was 
88% for Chinese and 79% for Indian PhD graduates? Lastly, the academic 
research system may be open to all, as Castells stresses (2000a: 125), but it is 
dominated by those countries that have the best institutions, research funds, 
and the best publishing and occupational capabilities. As in many other 
occasions, while the academic system is potentially/theoretically free, open and 
international/global, the flow of knowledge and information is actually limited 
to where money flows.
Many of the above inequality patterns have unpleasant implications on 
health as well. First and foremost, the worst hygienic conditions are apparent in 
the poorest areas: in the mid-90s, 33% of the developing world’s population 
made a living with less than a dollar a day; about the same percentage were not
3 All figures are from 1999 UNDP report, and from Castell’s study of the same report (2000a, pp. 124-5, 
377-8), unless otherwise indicated.
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expected to live more than 40 years. Also, 95% of HIV cases are in the 
developing world, and the medicines that rich, developed countries produce are 
too expensive for them. While these countries lack the research facilities and 
infrastructure to do research on the problems that their societies face, a number 
of companies sell them their expired medicines and other goods that are 
controlled or banned in industrial counties; that provokes Giddens to say that 
the ‘global village’ is rather a ‘global pillage’ (1999.16). Also, for nine 
countries in Africa the world is not moving forward but backwards: their life 
expectancy is estimated for the year 2010 to have returned to the level of 
1960s, by 17 years loss.
The unanticipated fact is that the above inequality patterns exist while 
statistics show an overall improvement of health, education and income 
conditions over historical standards in the past three decades -except for 
former SU and sub-Saharan Africa. This “mixed record of development”, 
argues Castells, “conveys ideologically manipulated bewilderment in the 
absence of analytical clarity” (2000b: 69). What this means is that this overall 
improvement could be articulated as it stands (meaning without further 
analysis) to suggest the beneficial application of ffee-market for the world’s 
standards of living. However, the detailed analysis of the indicators or 
inequality, polarisation and poverty (as they were analysed above, and will be 
further analysed below) shows the uneven distribution of the overall 
development and the appropriation of the benefits by proportionally fewer 
people in the era of globalisation.
Economic Insecurity
Another, still financial, particular determinant that characterises 
globalisation, and directly concerns it, is economic insecurity. Economic 
insecurity has two aspects. One that concerns financial volatility of both states 
and individuals alike, and is derived by the fact that the international economic 
system has the capacity to revalue and devalue individuals and states according 
to their relevance to the global capitalist production. The other aspect concerns
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labour and the newly shaped conditions of extreme economic insecurity. 
Figures from OECD report of summer 1996 show a rise in the world’s output
i
by 17%, but at the same time rise of the poor by 20% (Beck, 2000:153). In 
Europe, unemployment has been left at about 11% for over a decade. New jobs 
have been created by the new informational economy but, at the same time, 
others have diminished or disappeared. The main reasons for this are three. 
Firstly, technological innovation renders full employment policies impossible 
as, for example, automatisation sacrifices certain jobs and whole occupational 
categories (i.e. typists). Secondly, the labour force has been significantly 
increased as more and more people are now looking for a job (i.e. women). 
Thirdly, because the wages paid are very low and the cost of living has been 
increased in the last decade, the additional jobs created are to a large extent 
captured by the same people, who have or are looking for second or third jobs.
At the same time, labour is fragmented and individualised while capital is 
becoming increasingly coordinated (Castells, 2000a: 506-7, Beck, 2000:152-4). 
On the one hand, capital is global and is globally synchronised, while on the 
other hand labour remains local and is locally deregulated. This has only 
become possible because the ‘mediator’ between the two, the state, has 
withdrawn its mediating role or has even oriented it towards the capital, 
perhaps as part of the effort to attract investments and become more 
antagonistic. As the French sociologists Michel Pingon and Monique Pingon- 
Charlot (2001) argue in their survey titled ‘The Last Social Class’ (La Demiere 
Classe Sociale)4, the French entrepreneurial class and their collective 
representative body, ‘Medef, are arguing against any public control and 
regulation to the productive process and the labour bargaining, which has to be 
done between two partners, the corporation and the worker, ‘individually’. 
However, at the same time, while they claim for such an extreme 
individualism, they express their demands collectively and they claim and 
enjoy the states’ protection and regulation. A consequence of that trend that is 
apparent with the globalisation of capitalism has been, for example, the
4 Their article was published in September 2001 in Le Monde Diplomatique. It can also be found at:
http://www. monde-diplomatique.fr/2001/09/PINCON/15603.
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weakening of worker dismissal laws in France, as well as in the United 
Kingdom and other countries as reported in 1999 UNDP report (2000:344), 
while welfare provision responsibility is transferred back to individuals. 
Another consequence is that, employers implement “flexible labour policies 
with more precarious work arrangements” (1999 UNDP report, 2000:344) 
while individual worker contracts (as opposed to the collective labour 
bargaining) are less secure and stable. These conditions put additional strain 
and insecurity on individuals and families. Hence Beck’s description of the 
new labour situation: “in individualised types of existence, people have to 
accept individual responsibility...for things that used to be treated by the 
community as a class destiny rather than a personal one” (2000:153).
As it is usually the case, economic insecurity cannot but provoke political 
instability. Beck argues that democracy came in Europe and North America as 
‘labour democracy’ and it was based on employment, and gainful employment. 
To the extent that global capitalism dissolves those values on which its 
development was based, it “undermines its own legitimacy” and it puts 
everything at stake, even democracy. The reason is that, as Beck argues, “only 
people who have a home and a secure job, and therefore a material future, are 
or can become citizens for whom democracy is a living reality of their own 
making. The simple truth is that without material security there is no political 
freedom and no democracy” (2000:62). We can understand the weight of 
Beck’s argument if we take into consideration that all statistical data and trends 
point towards a diminishing material security in the world today, while there 
are already indicators of social instability and uneasiness.
Cultural Threats
Globalisation is widely perceived as bringing cultures in unprecedented 
contact because of the loosening of borders and barriers. However, in that 
respect, globalisation has not been any different from internationalisation. 
Rather, globalisation is bringing about one specific culture with the form of 
cultural imperialism: consumerism. Consumerism appears to be the
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foundational and sustaining culture of capitalism as a system while, also, in 
most of the examples of cultural closeness and interaction that are used in the 
relevant bibliography the key-words used are names of well-known brands, 
such as Me Donald, Benneton, Coca-Cola. There are other examples used as 
well, examples that go beyond the mere reference to product brands, but do not 
go beyond the description of the ‘choice’ to eat stir-fry and buy curry 
ingredients everywhere, and wear ‘ethnic-style’ cloths.
By cultural imperialism we refer to the domination and expansion of one 
particular culture. In the era of globalisation, the dominant culture is 
consumerism but it is also the political ideology of neo-liberalism. Certainly, 
we must always distinguish between cultures and political ideologies. But, this 
is exactly our point here: to lay attention to the fact that cultural imperialism 
cannot be separated from political or economic imperialism, and emphasise on 
the fact that the leading ‘globalising’ countries express a discourse that merges 
them together. Thus, consumerism, the free market, liberalism, prosperity and 
democracy are all mingled together and presented as one culture. Of course, 
long-standing political traditions constitute in the end part of a country’s 
culture; this means that for Americans, for example, consumerism is indeed 
part of their culture. Nevertheless, cultural imperialism is exactly that: the 
imposition of the whole ‘pack’ of few countries’ long-standing traditions as 
globalisation’s necessity. This cultural imperialism is manifest in the fact that, 
through its immense ideologisation, the process of globalisation is identified 
with the above ‘one culture’ and it is largely promoted. This presentation of 
‘one culture’ through cultural imperialism is complementary and simultaneous 
to another function of ideologisation of globalisation: namely, the presentation 
of globalisation and ‘its culture’ as inevitable developments.
As argued elsewhere5, however, the substance of the economic 
dimension of globalisation is that it politicises the economic aspect of public 
living, that it gives prevalence to the economic dimension above all else. This 
is indeed manifest in ‘cultural’ imperialism. When we discuss imperialism we 
mean primarily an economic process, an attempt of a nation or a region at
5 Chapter 5, p.203.
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expanding its economic profitability. Such economic profitability is always 
backed up by military and political means, and very often by cultural or 
ideological imperialism. Consumerism, in our case, is the ‘cultural’ 
determinant that advocates a mode of life that is consistent with the economic 
dimension of globalisation, that is the expansion of free market. Thus, 
consumerism is not a cultural threat but the derivative of a political and 
economic one.
Environmental Risks
The issue of the threats posed by environmental degradation is one of the 
prevalent topics in the discourse on globalisation -although it is not directly 
connected with it. The interest on the environment has been very deep ever 
since the late 1960s, and has become a passionate concern as the number and 
strength of environmental movements show. It would be superfluous to analyse 
the problems that the environment faces as they are well known: the ozon 
layer, greenhouse effect, decreasing biodiversity, air, land and water pollution. 
It is necessary to stress, in contrast, the profound unwillingness of political 
leaderships to accept responsibility and sacrifice present economic benefit for 
future viability. In 200 years, since the industrial revolution, the mode of 
development and consumption followed by only a fragment of the world has 
provoked such damage that it is threatening the quality of living at present and 
the viability of the earth in the future. There are several trends which point 
towards a pessimistic view, such as the failure to ‘convince’ the world’s largest 
producer of greenhouse gasses to sign the agreement on the gas reduction, the 
implementation of nuclear tests by states as diverse in ecological conscience as 
Pakistan and France, the threats to extinction for several species of the flora 
and fauna, and so on. At the same time, there are intense pressures and 
concerns about the environment, as expressed in citizens’ mobilisation and 
interest on the issue. There is also the context o f ‘sustainable development’ that 
the UN has established is a serious effort to put some political pressure towards
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the protection of the environment, and other initiatives by governments and 
NGOs6.
We should remark that environmental problems are not a consequence of 
globalisation. Nevertheless, it is due to the civilian aspect of globalisation that 
they have come to the fore and preoccupy more people and groups 
internationally. Also, they are often referred to in connection to globalisation, 
which gives the false impression that they, too, are included in the ‘misdeeds’ 
of globalisation.
Global Awareness o f Threats (Information Risks)
Last, as new communication technologies have largely transformed (or, 
in other cases, are beginning to transform) societies and their modes of 
production, they largely constitute a determinative characteristic if the era of 
globalisation. The issue of communication technologies is huge by itself; our 
reference to it as a particular determinant of globalisation will be made in 
regard to certain dangers that they entail. To begin with, global awareness of 
threats refers to the perception of the threats described above by all, or 
potentially all, individuals. Global awareness is not a ‘threat’ in itself. The 
threat exists in the simultaneous, intensified, and globally synchronised 
appearance of globalisation’s risks, which is even terrorising to the extent that 
it presents a reality with lack of stability in any aspect of it. Global
6 In relation to the attitudes towards the environment of different civilisations, the following is 
interesting. In a research about the role of myths, Joanna Overing (1997) studied the myths of Piaroa, an 
Amazonian tribe, and compared them with the respective myths of the Enlightenment and the societies it 
has influenced. She studied myths because they reflect a community’s perception about itself, remind it of 
its identity, and have potency over social and political matters. According to the understanding of power 
in Enlightenment myths, she argues, human beings were ascribed the right of sovereignty over nature. 
“Power over nature, over the inanimate and the wild, was established as a natural right of humankind. [...] 
In myths of the right of domination, human beings alone were given the gift of reason. It became 
therefore their obligation to control nature, all those things of the wild” (p. 18). In contrast, the Piaroa 
myths consider the domination of nature as dangerous because “it was the increase in the capacity to use 
the earth’s resources during mythic time that led to the unbridled passions o f  avarice, vanity, arrogance 
and pride” (p. 18, emphasis added). For Piaroa, there is no distinction between nature and humanity. They 
cannot dominate, neither be dominated by any other agency: “the best that human beings can do is to 
achieve equal relations in their often dangerous dealings with beings of other spaces and times”. This 
survey is referred to here for the exact same reason that Overing justifies the choice of her study. 
Because, the study of mythic schemes is essentially important as “people and nations act in accordance 
with such myths” (p. 18, emphasis added).
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consciousness of globalisation and its threats, along with its benefits, has been 
possible because of the world-wide circulation of information. So, the role of 
information is of utmost importance, along with the problems of who holds, 
manages and transmits information.
As with everything that is involved in human life, information too has a 
positive and a negative side. On the one side, the flow of information, and non­
controlled information, has given more freedom to individuals to do research, 
to discuss and organise, and the means to verify news transmitted to them. The 
basic means for this function is currently the Internet. The other side of 
information is information distortion. The huge and rapid flow of information 
makes its effective elaboration more difficult and demanding. One of the 
reasons is that it often becomes difficult to know the source of information. 
This also facilitates the uncontrolled spread of rumours and myths, a spread 
that is even more dangerous as it happens so rapidly and broadly. A further 
consequence of this is also the growing distrust felt for any information, and 
the formation and susceptibility to conspiracy theories.
In addition, television, newspapers and radio have acquired such 
enormous power (the Fourth Power) that they need to be subject to some 
control themselves. This is true particularly about television, which also 
happens to be the main source, and the most powerful one, of information, 
entertainment and transmition of images around the world. Giddens argues 
that, while television has been a democratising force, it has also demolished 
democracy by nullifying the prospects of dialogue. It does so through a 
relentless trivialising, and personalising of political issues” (1999:78). 
Television is itself dependent on the advertising companies and has a market 
driven nature. In addition, because of the critical role of the media of 
communication and information, politicians use them to communicate their 
messages to the public. Thus, political discourse has been absorbed in the 
media discourse and the rules of audio-ratings; as a result, “leadership is 
personalised, and image-making is power-making” (Castells, 2000a: 507). Last, 
as it was mentioned in the previous chapter, the media intensify and contribute
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toward standardisation of biases and cultural stereotypes (Atkinson, 1999, Said, 
1978).
These are neither totally new developments not is the critique over the 
media an aspect of globalisation. Some of them are new while some others are 
intensified in the contemporary era. For example, the increasing involvement 
of television and its delineation of political discourse is an older phenomenon 
that is now at its peak, at least in the developed world. Information distortion 
can be discovered much easily today than before because of the diversity and 
multiplicity of information sources. Yet, exactly because the sources are too 
many, too much information must be effectively handled while messages can 
be conflicting or include myths and rumours. In that respect, managing this 
vast amount of information requires special skills and capacity that only 
specialised professionals or highly educated people have. If we bear in mind 
the education inequalities mentioned above, we can understand that the 
effective management of information is an issue at stake. Last, it should be 
repeated that, as globalisation and its threats have become a subject of 
everyday reference and broad articulation, the very perception of them in 
general can provoke a sense of uneasiness or exaggerate the threats posed.
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Reactions and Psychoanalytic Explanations
For all these reasons outlined above, the era of globalisation is perceived 
as a threatening era, while it doesn’t embrace all but it affects all. So, 
globalisation has coincided with or, as Giddens (and others) argues, “is the 
reason for the revival of local cultural identities in different parts of the world” 
(1999:13). In reality, the revival of local identities has been an outcome of 
nationalism by definition. It thus seems that globalisation has provided the 
reasons for the revival of nationalism and the intensification of already existing 
trends, or that it has not provided the solutions needed so that these 
nationalistic reactions and sentiments would be undermined. Apart from the 
widely referred instances of ethnic revivals and/or conflicts that claim for a 
separate national state or for relative autonomy (i.e. Scotland, Catalonia, 
Quebec, Taiwan, and several ethnic conflicts in Africa and Central Asia), there 
are many cases in the 1990s that show the strengthening of national identities 
of established national states. The Russian leadership, for example, has 
returned in the late 1990s to an affirmation of Russian identity through the 
traditional discourses of blood and soil and the Orthodox church, although it is 
increasingly approaching the West. This attempt has found fertile ground in the 
Russian people who feel “humiliated and degraded” because of the 
“pauperisation of the majority of the population” following the transition to 
liberal market economy in the early 1990s, and the widespread belief that they 
were ‘fooled’ by westernising elites and the West itself, which was 
‘represented’ by the IMF and WTO (Danks, 2001:44). However, it is important 
to note that such reaffirmations of national identities have not occurred solely 
in connection to failures to economic modernisation. Fagan’s study on Ireland 
shows a reassertion of Irish national identity and culture in the 1990s, 
combined with an “economic boom” and “outward-oriented growth” at the 
same time (2001:115). So, she argues, increased cultural confidence in 1990s 
Ireland has drawn some possible lines between “increased economic 
performance and greater cultural self-confidence... [which] apparently 
contradicts the notion of cultural globalisation as a new form of cultural 
imperialism that enfeebles national identity” (2001:113). Not that these trends
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are unique or have been generated because of globalisation: many nationalisms 
existed before, and they are the sole outcome of nationalism. Nevertheless, in 
the era of globalisation, these have not been weakened but, on the contrary, 
sustained or even strengthened.
In relation to the perils posed by globalisation, a common reaction of 
those who are excluded from the global capitalist system or are aware and fear 
of globalisation’s risks and increased contacts tend to turn towards their 
particular identities in order to find shelter and meaning in a familiar 
environment7. Globalisation presents a threatening world, whose basic 
characteristic is the lack o f familiarity. Familiarity is an indispensable 
psychological condition for identification and for a sense of security. It has 
extensively been argued so in the beginning of this thesis, while the lack of 
familiarity has been briefly connected with the resurgence of nationalism in the 
previous chapter8. However, the importance of the issue and its centrality in 
both the causes of ‘identity regression’ and, therefore, in envisaging of possible 
solutions, render it an issue that requires some repetition. Familiarity is the 
basis of identity because the process of identification is impossible with 
someone or something that is alien and thus unimaginable -the unimaginable 
cannot even constitute the basis for negative identification. It is also, for similar 
reasons, a prerequisite for the sense of belonging, which is a fundamental need 
in the service of the pleasure principle: the sense of belonging satisfies both the 
love-drives, through the sentimental bonds created among people within a 
group, and the self-preservation drives, through the shelter provided by familiar 
faces, images etc. Familiarity is thus the prerequisite in order to constitute an 
identity, to find our place in the world, to find our friends and rivals, to begin 
to know and discover more. Unfamiliar circumstances make individuals uneasy 
and cautious about the unknown as such; let alone when one faces 
circumstances that are both unknown and presented as threatening. This fear 
pushes individuals back to what is familiar, to what constitutes their identity.
7 Other reactions to the problems and threats of the era of globalisation are the increasing migration 
movements and the political mobilisation against aspects of globalisation in an effort to achieve a 
qualitative change in the overall global conditions (i.e. movements for the more equal distribution of 
wealth globally, for the protection of the environment, etc). I will refer to those separately in the sequel.
8 In chapter 1, p.27, and chapter 6, p.249.
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This can take the form of regress to primary identities, which can signify the 
reaffirmation of one’s own identity and stability, or it can signify a reactionary 
rejection of the new era. Certainly, the distinctive lines are very subtle, and the 
transfer from one condition to the other is a matter of the particular 
circumstances that shape the profile of a country.
Negpogaeo’s study reveals that, in the case of Thailand, its intense 
contact with the external West, representing the global in this case, was enough 
to facilitate the rearticulation of Thai national identity in the 1990s in 
relation/juxtaposition to the western cultural images and perceptions, even 
though the perception of the West in Thailand was historically free of hostile 
biases due to the absence of colonialism: “representations of...white Westerners 
have reinforced the dichotomy of Them/Us in the construction of Thai 
identity” (Nedpogaeo, 2001:111). According to Nedpogaeo, this reaffirmation 
of Thai cultural identity occurred in the context of creative adaptation of the 
country in the global environment. Quite similar is the case of Ireland, 
according to Fagan (2001): there has been an Irish cultural revival 
simultaneously with Ireland’s augmenting opportunities in the era of 
globalisation. What, then, explains this new emphasis on national culture? One 
aspect of the answer is that increased awareness of the others through increased 
contacts can also produce greater awareness of ‘ourselves’ and ‘our’ 
distinctiveness9. Another aspect is that, the issue of culture is an issue of 
identity. Intense ‘confrontation’ with a culture, for example, whichever this 
culture may be, provokes interrogation or agony about the future of one’s own 
culture, which ultimately means one’s identity. This interrogation is part of the 
emerging need to understand one’s own culture and identity and the 
possibilities posed through contact with the new culture that intensively comes
9 One could logically interrogate why this ‘increased awareness of the others’ cannot be equated with or 
lead to ‘familiarity with’? The answer is not only psychological but also political. For example, in the EU 
there is an increased contact and cooperation in every domain, and the initial fears and reactions to it have 
been tamed to some extent, for the moment at least. Certainly, every effort has been put by the political 
and intellectual elites towards peaceful coexistence. This political commitment is veiy important in 
producing familiarity. However, familiarity is not very easy to achieve, as the same example shows: 
according to data derived from the Eurobarometer surveys, it is evident that national identification has not 
been diminished in each member state of the EU. In any case, increased contact between already 
entrenched and delineated groups is more likely to enhance the perception one has about their 
distinctiveness, for it is taking place within that very context.
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to the fore; it is a ‘negotiation’ of the two. Nevertheless, as in the context of 
globalisation this increased cultural contact is accompanied with other 
discourses and realities, such as the fate of the national state and identity, or 
with the felt weakness to influence things that concern individuals’ lives, then 
the ‘negotiation’ is most likely to be interrupted or fail. The logical outcome is 
the strengthening of one’s own position -in our case, of national identities. 
Thus, national identities can be strengthened significantly even when a country 
positively adapts to globalisation and tries to be located in the changing 
environment.
The strengthening of national identity is most certainly the outcome of 
regressive reaction in turbulent and humiliating situations, as is the case of 
Russian identity. This is usually the case when a national state is seriously 
threatened or excluded by the ‘global’ capitalist system10 -let alone when it 
used to be a superpower. This puts national identities in a position where 
‘negotiation’ with external reality is violently interrupted before its very 
beginning. Globalisation then seems to leave them at the margins. Thus, in a 
seemingly reciprocal, but defensive and highly narcissistic reaction, individuals 
and collectivities psychologically disconnect from the system too, they reject it 
and repudiate it - ‘if you don’t want me, I don’t want you too’! In an 
unconscious attempt to retain narcissistic perfection, they repudiate this 
external reality, which has excluded them in the first place. Thus, they deny the 
frustrating rejection or ineffective incorporation and compensate for it with 
strong identification with their group. The most exclusionary and strong 
national identities are likely to emerge from this process, identities that will 
tend to emphasise on their purity, uniqueness, and perhaps superiority exactly 
because -and when- they are formed through such a process. We should again 
mention here the example of Nazi Germany; a Germany humiliated and 
excluded in the aftermath of the First World War, whose manipulation by 
Hitler was based exactly on his elevating rhetoric of superiority and uniqueness 
(though not as a result of globalisation). This process of narcissistic rejection is
10 We refer here to the failure of the Russian economy in the midst of its transition to liberal capitalism
and its sudden dependency on Western agencies, such as the IMF, following the USSR brake-up.
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typical of narcissistic identification: this way, strong national identities are 
provoked by globalisation, which remains the point of reference. In that 
respect, positive identification with the national state, and negative 
identification with ‘globalisation’ are the outcome of narcissistic identification, 
which has as its aim the avoidance of unpleasure reality. In addition, because 
this is a reaction, which is a defensive response to their initial exclusion and 
the outcome of negative identification, individuals and groups can become very 
hostile to whatever may comprise -objectively or in their perception- 
globalisation. The reaction can range from the apparent rise of nationalistic 
sentiments and national struggles, to terrorist activities against the perceived 
enemy. As Beck argues, “the compulsion to self-activity and self-organisation 
can suddenly turn into despair, perhaps also into dumb rage” (2000:154). The 
destructive force of Nazi Germany still remains an indicative example of 
Beck’s words.
So, the re-appropriation or emphasis on primary identities as reactions to 
specific threats of globalisation is defensive. They have not emerged for the 
first time in history either: as Jenkins and Sofos (1996) argue, rapid economic 
modernisation in the 1880s was combined with the emergence of right-wing 
nationalism. Then, international insecurity provoked mass migratory 
movements and national introspection. Similarly today, while national 
regression is one largely discussed effect of globalisation, migration is 
currently another significant effect of it. Migration too raises issues about 
identity and boundaries’ crossing. So, it could not be absent from an analysis of 
the reactions to globalisation.
Disappointment and misery have always led many people to search for a 
better future through migration, but recent data show an increase in the number 
of immigrants by the end of twentieth centuiy11. Migration is often connected 
to the mobility aspect of globalisation, and to the remark that people are today 
more mobile and can move to wherever they want to work and live. Appadurai, 
for example, presents a quite pleasant reality of ‘people on the move’ by
11 According to Castells, while the legal records estimated 84 million immigrants in the 1975, the number 
increased to 130-145 million by the end of the 20th centuiy (2000a: 130).
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equally including “tourists, migrants, refugees, exiles, guestworkers, and other 
moving groups” (1990:297) in his ‘ethnoscapes’. However, we should not 
confuse the international business elite of frequent-flyer cosmopolitans and 
professionals or tourists with immigrants. Immigrants’ mobility comes mostly 
out of despair, while they have additional and fundamental differences from 
tourists and professionals, most important of which that they are poor and 
usually discriminated against. Another view is that immigrants verify the 
western model by desperately wanting to live in a western country. Fukuyama 
expresses this view by arguing: “the central question raised by Huntington is 
whether institutions of modernity will work only in the west, or whether there 
is something broader in their appeal that will allow them to make headway 
elsewhere. I believe there is. [...] Proof lies also in the millions of developing 
world immigrants who vote with their feet every year to live in western 
societies. The flow of people moving in the opposite direction...is by contrast 
negligible”12. Such arguments do not hold the whole picture right though. First 
of all, migration is not a free choice but, in most cases, an act of despair. When 
someone lives in extreme poverty and decides to leave in a search for 
something better, this is not a ‘vote’ for the West, but a rejection of hunger and 
misery. At the same time, the globally transmitted images of the West as an 
affluent society make it a pole of attraction. The picture of the ready-to-sink 
boats with their holds jam-packed with wretched human beings, who have 
given their last penny just to board away (this is a frequent picture in countries 
surrounded by sea) is a picture of an escape. It does not show a choice to live 
in another country, but a desperate attempt to abandon one on the grounds that 
‘it cannot get worse’.
Immigrants who abandon their national state do not necessarily abandon 
their national identity; let alone that there is evidence pointing to the contrary. 
This is indicated by a large number of third generation immigrants in Germany, 
Britain, France and other western countries, who not only retain their
12 In the British newspaper The Guardian, 11th of October, 2001. His article titled ‘The West Has Won: 
Islam can’t beat democracy and capitalism. We are still at the End of History’ came as a response to the 
arguments that, the events of 11th of September 2001 in New York and Washington proved Huntington’s 
theory right, and his respectively wrong.
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‘original’-ancestral-parental identity (the identity that is inherited13), but also 
have recently begun to emphasise on and reassert it (Castells, 1997:20). It is 
also indicated by the concentration of immigrants in towns or regions within 
towns, in nationally/ethnically gettoed communities. Another indication is the 
existence of Diaspora groups, groups who retain their ‘original’ national 
identity as an additional identity although bom and bred away from the 
‘fatherland’: there is no evidence that globalisation has mediated the feelings 
and -dual- identities for these groups.
The other side of the coin of immigration is racism and xenophobia. The 
entrance of immigrants in national states -which, however internally diverse, 
perceive themselves as homogeneous and unitary- often triggers xenophobic 
sentiments and reactions against the ‘intruders’. Although immigrants are 
accused by the host-population that they ‘steal’ their jobs or that they are 
morally vicious and generally ‘dangerous’, in reality they basically decompose 
the narcissistic image of unity that groups hold for themselves. Racism and 
xenophobia closely relate to the unconscious characteristic to replace the 
external with physical reality. As pointed out previously14, the unconscious 
tends to deny external reality and to replace it by an illusion of wholeness and 
completeness. This denial to admit that there is something lacking within it has 
several implications, as in racism where the Other is blamed for every 
deficiency and incompetence and, by projection, people ascribe to others all the 
unpleasant characteristics of themselves. This is why there is always a 
scapegoat in history, who takes the blame for everything and relieves the rest 
of the community/society from unpleasure and guilt.
Indeed, xenophobia and increased racism have been identified as one of 
the problems western societies face today, which has, in its turn, given rise to 
the far right (or kept it going). Such xenophobic sentiments are also apparent in 
countries with third generation migrants, like Germany, the Netherlands and 
Denmark. As Castells argues, there is a “transformation of the ethnic make-up 
of Western societies” (2000a: 131) which triggers xenophobic reactions: for
13 See the reference on national identity as non-voluntary, inherited identity in chapter 3, p.95-96.
14 See, chapter 1, p. 19.
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example, many so-called immigrants are bom in Western Europe (second and 
third generation immigrants), but the word is actually used for the (even 
discursive) discrimination of minorities. In the era of globalisation, 
immigration and, consequently, racism and xenophobia are more likely to 
become more prevalent reactions. There are already estimates of increased 
migration movements worldwide at the end of the twentieth century; several 
authors point to this problem, which is unlikely to diminish in the near future 
because poverty and growing inequality, not to mention wars, will continue to 
produce migration (Castells, 2000a, Hirst and Thompson, 1999). It seems like a 
vicious circle: globalisation enhances uneven development, thus inequality, 
thus migration, thus racism on behalf of the host countries, and often racism (as 
a defence reaction) on behalf of the immigrants who are not accepted in the 
lands o f ‘milk and honey’15.
Thus, we can see that migration, like nationalism, is both a reaction to 
and a component of globalisation: it is a tendency apparent throughout 
modernity, and before that, and it is also enhanced as a reaction to the process 
of globalisation. We should not consider migration as a defence reaction 
though, but rather as a reasonably calculated action to escape misfortune: it is 
well-thought off and not unconscious or reactionary. It is an individualised 
move towards personal development and amelioration or an escape from 
poverty or war that goes beyond the defensive retrenchment to psychological 
stabilities. Yet, however individualised migratory reaction may be, the need 
for familiarity and sense of belonging finds its expression in the gettoed 
communities of immigrants in host countries or simply in their formal or 
informal groupings. Migration is just one re-action to these trends but it is also, 
a peaceful one, if we do not take under consideration the reactions that it then 
provokes in the host countries. Nevertheless, the number of migrants is a small
15 People living in western countries, should not forget that the picture of misery some other countries 
portray is not a picture of failure as opposed to our picture of success. If we really want to think globally, 
we should understand that ‘our’ prosperity and ‘their’ misery is interrelated, are the two sides of the same 
coin: if it were not for the one, there would not exist the other. Maybe then the immigrants’ arrival in 
western countries would provoke less xenophobic and racist reactions.
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fragment of the population; the bulk of people stay in their locality16 and, for 
them, a way out of a threatening, unknown reality, a reality that cannot be 
ignored either because it affects them, provokes a psychological need to return 
to the stable realities of their lives.
Migration is an example of individualised and calculated re-action to the 
real threats of poverty and war -which also shows that extreme and pathologic 
reactions are not the only ones available. Another individual and logically 
calculated re-action to globalisation is made by political mobilisation in 
political and social movements. The difference of these movements with 
immigration is that, while both come as an individual calculation and 
estimation of future possibilities, the former aim at changing the conditions that 
create this threatening environment and the latter aim at a personal escape from 
these conditions17. So, migration is an individual action individually 
implemented, while political mobilisation is an individual action collectively 
implemented, in the sense that it has to be put in practice through the 
organisation of all those individuals who wish to take this initiative. Such 
political mobilisation has become apparent in the late 1990s with the so-called 
anti-globalisation movements18, and with (International) Non-Governmental 
Organisations whose number is increasing since the 1980s. Again, like 
nationalism and migration, political movements are both a component and a 
reaction to globalisation. Political movements have always been an aspect of 
modernity, but the new communications technology, which is a fundamental 
characteristic of the era of globalisation, has significantly contributed to their 
increasing numbers and international organisation. Also, economic 
globalisation as well as other problems and threats associated with this period 
have provoked the rise of oppositional movements who seek economic, social 
and political reforms (ecological organisations included).
16 The legal reports estimate a number of 130-145.000 migrants by the end of the 20th century (Castells, 
2000a:p.l30), which is about 2% of the total 6 billion population. Of course, there is a number of illegal 
migrants which is unknown.
17 There are more differences, of course, most important of which that they are comprised by different 
categories of people. The majority of immigrants comes from very poor countries while political 
mobilisation is mainly organised in wealthy countries.
18 Which are not essentially anti-globalisation, but constitute an aspect of globalisation, as argued in 
chapter 5, p.207. They are rather ‘anti-economic globalisation’.
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What is then the case with those activists as far as their identity is 
concerned? Have they repudiated their national locus and, perhaps, identified 
with ‘the world’? Is a local/national identity less a need for them or have they 
managed somehow to find familiarity with the world as a whole? Before 
answering these questions, we should refer to an indicative example that was 
mentioned earlier on19 but from a different angle. Alex, the activist interviewee 
in O’Byrne’s research is presented as a young well-educated man who lives in 
London, works for Amnesty International and has traveled and lived abroad, 
and defines himself as ‘citizen of the world’. At the same time, “he professes to 
have a strong sense of British identity” (2001:144). According to O’Byrne, 
Alex “adopts an interesting strategy which allows him to identify with such a 
common humanity at the political level, whilst accepting an identification with 
his nation at the cultural level” (p. 142): he identifies pragmatically and 
culturally at the national level, and politically at the world level, as he 
identifies with the concerns and interests that all individuals have around the 
world (identification with human beings). Thus, Alex has constructed a classic 
universalism, but “from within the boundaries of the nation-state” (p. 144).
I have referred to the example of Alex not as a representative case of 
cosmopolitanism20 but as an illustration of my argument that evolves around 
familiarity, around the sense of belonging and security. A sense of familiarity 
and identity is a prerequisite to discover the unknown, to approach the global, 
meaning that one has to find first his/her place in the world before he/she 
discovers the world. People cannot be citizens of the world, in the sense that 
the globe is too big to provide with a sense of familiarity and belonging. For 
that reason, a perception of identity and, thus, stability in someone’s life is 
important in order to envisage and approach other cultures and civilisations. 
Thus, the reaffirmation of identity is a reassurance that this identity, as a 
fundamental stability, is still there; this, apart from being a defensive reaction, 
can be the necessary reassurance in order to confront the unknown realities of 
‘the world’, and make them known as well. In that sense, national identity as a
19 Chapter 6, p.245.
20 O’Byme refers to Alex as a classical cosmopolitan, but since no data indicating that he is a 
proportionally representative case is mentioned, there is no substantial evidence so as to use it as one.
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particularity is essential for the expansion of universalism. One cannot even 
begin to conceive of other cultures and different worlds without a cultural 
identity of his/her own.
Thus, identity, national identity in the era of nationalism, is the 
foundation, the first steps in a long staircase: without them, one cannot climb 
upwards, to universality. However, globalisation seems like an earthquake that 
destroys the first stairs, even the whole staircase. Why is that? To the extent 
that globalisation poses a -real and perceived- threat to existing identities and 
realities, it poses severe obstacles to the possibility of universalism -  
universalism as humanism, as an understanding that all human beings have 
something in common, their humanity. That is because it jeopardises or 
destroys the foundations upon which universal thinking can be based: a sense 
of belonging and identification through familiarity. To the extent that within 
modernity, the era of nationalism, identities are mainly constructed through 
identification with the national state, national identities are the main 
expressions of identification and sense of belonging. Consequently, 
cosmopolitanism cannot be based on the dismantling of national identities but 
on the securing of them.
So, on the one hand, the development of political mobilisation is initiated 
by a logical re-action to specific aspects of globalisation. On the other hand, 
however, the process of identification is not nullified when one undertakes 
political action on a national or international scale, but remain an important and 
continuously evolving process that must not interrupted. There are 
psychological characteristics that function as a pedestal to any reaction, and in 
this case involve the elements of threat and of the struggle against evil. These 
characteristic are to some extent apparent in any collective mobilisation and 
devotion. However, the active involvement in INGOs and political movements 
encompasses three dangers. First, there are movements that are reactionary or 
nationalistic in essence and, yet, they find coverage under the wide title of 
‘anti-globalisation’ movements. For example, in demonstrations organised 
(like in Genoa in July 2001) a number of religious or nationalistic groups can 
equally find expression, even though differing from other groups like ATTAC
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or ecological organisations, as these protests functioned as an ‘umbrella’ which 
could embrace everyone. This further obscures the distinction between them.
I
Second, these movements and organisations run the risk of regressing to a type 
of psychological reaction when they look at globalisation as a whole and thus 
demonising it. Demonisation obscures rational thinking and action, which then 
fails to distinguish between good and bad aspects of globalisation. An 
indicative, yet quite ‘innocent’ example is the very term ‘anti-globalisation’ to 
movements that not only use the facilities of the era of globalisation but also 
essentially think globally in terms of allocating the benefits of development 
worldwide, diminishing inequality or saving the planet from ecological 
catastrophe. Thus, they equate every aspect of globalisation with its economic 
one. The third peril posed is the reverse to demonisation: it is the idealisation 
of globalisation and its equation as universalism/cosmopolitanism/humanism. 
We shall refer to this one in more detail as it can alone initiate extreme 
reactions of a regressive type.
The idealisation of globalisation is manifested in its designation as a 
positive process by definition, and results in biased analysis for that reason. For 
example, the Thai and Irish strengthening of identity are analysed by 
Nedpogaeo and Fagan respectively as creative adaptations to globalisation. For 
that reason, the reinforcement of us/them dichotomy in Thai identity is 
interpreted as ‘negotiation of the global’ or example of ‘glocalisation’ 
(Nedpogaeo, 2001:111), while Irish cultural revival is interpreted as “resisting 
and feeding of global culture”, or accompanied with conclusions such as 
“Ireland is something ‘invented’ by the new cultural globalisation” (Fagan, 
2001:123). In that way, globalisation becomes a criterion in itself as to whether 
national cultural revival will be considered a positive or negative development: 
so, the strengthening of national identities in Russia on the one hand and 
Thailand and Ireland on the other hand is evaluated as regressive and 
progressive respectively according to the adaptation of these countries to 
globalisation, which ultimately means effective economic performance.
Similarly, there are quite a few views that equate globalisation with 
cosmopolitanism and global values. Giddens (1999) is a characteristic
example. Globalisation, he argues, is characterised by constant change, cultural 
contact and complexity, among other things. This is connected with two other 
remarks. First, that the “active, reflexive citizenries” produced by the new 
communications are dissatisfied by the old orthodox established democracies 
that are remote from the flood of change (p. 73). Second, that “cosmopolitans 
welcome and embrace this cultural complexity” (p. 5). These, along with his 
claim that globalisation “is the way we now live” (p. 18), automatically classify 
globalisation as the new and progressive process, and ascribe to it extra value 
through its connection to cosmopolitanism and global values. Yet, such views 
usually have another nuance. Giddens argues that, one basic impact of 
globalisation is the “clash between a cosmopolitan outlook and 
fundamentalism” (p.48). Fundamentalism, he asserts, is new and has arisen as a 
response to globalisation; moreover, it “is the enemy of cosmopolitan values” 
(p. 50). “The battleground of the twenty-first century will pit fundamentalism 
against cosmopolitan to le r a n c e while cosmopolitans welcome cultural 
diversity, “fundamentalists find it disturbing and dangerous” (p.4-5, emphasis 
added). And he elaborates further his reasoning: fundamentalism poses the 
question to modernity whether we can live without something sacred, and 
Giddens answers that we can’t. “Cosmopolitans...have to make plain that 
tolerance and dialogue can themselves be guided by values o f a universal 
kind...We should be prepared to mount an active defence of these values 
wherever they are poorly developed or threatened. Cosmopolitan morality 
itself needs to be driven by passion. None of us would have anything to live for 
if we didn’t have something worth dying for” (p. 50, emphasis added). In this 
clash, “we can legitimately hope that a cosmopolitan outlook will win out” 
(p.5, emphasis added).
With an exaggerated emphasis we could say that, if we shift the two 
poles (of fundamentalism and cosmopolitanism), we might be able to cite the 
above passage as a polemic of a fundamentalist movement. If we skip the large 
issue of who defines these universal values and with what criteria, and also 
who are ewe’ that have to fight for these values, we should remark that the use 
of word ‘tolerance’ along with a rhetoric of ‘clash’, ‘battleground’ and the like
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is a contradiction in terms: the word ‘tolerance’ should rather be accompanied 
with a description of those ways that can promote respect and understanding. 
This means that support for tolerance can best be effective if it is made in a 
tolerant way rather than with rhetoric of warfare. What is more important is 
that the above passage quoted is neither accompanied by a definition of these 
values that are worth of cosmopolitans’ devotion nor by an attempt at 
understanding the reasons that make fundamentalism exist, in the whole of the 
study. The objection raised to Giddens’ view, therefore, is not so much an 
objection on that one must be prepared to fight i f  needed,’ in defence of 
tolerance and freedom (as Voltaire’s tradition on, Western at least, societies 
holds). It is rather an objection on the lack of analysis of the reasons that 
generate and promote fundamentalism, since it is the reasons that one has to 
‘fight’ in the first place. Also, it is an objection on the inferred obviousness of 
the content of these ‘universal values’, a content that is neither described or 
explained in his book while an active defence of them is called upon. Yet, these 
clarifications and explanations are necessary in order to show a tolerant 
attitude, at least an intention of tolerance in the first place.
By stressing this I rather wish to point to the fact that, just as devotion to 
the national or religious ideals can regress to nationalism and fundamentalism, 
so too cosmopolitan ideals can become subject to a cosmopolitan 
fundamentalism. The claim that cosmopolitan values are ‘worth dying for’ is 
similar to the claim that nationalists make, only that they put the ‘nation-state’ 
instead of ‘universal values’, for which they also think that have an obvious 
legitimacy. In that sense, cosmopolitan fundamentalism can emerge as a 
regress from the logical reasoning of global activism or cosmopolitanism. This 
is a constant peril that emerges from any king of ideologisation. In the case of 
cosmopolitan fundamentalism, for example, the enemy is usually identified as 
the national/ethnic unit, which is ascribed all responsibility for wars and 
catastrophes. This, along with the rhetoric that national states have no place in 
the new era, develops the concept of ‘righteous intervention’ on the 
local/national, as the latter is the ‘evil’. The article of Segell (2001) moves in 
that direction: Segell claims that we now live in the era ‘after’ the nation-state,
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and that there exists a global civil society which can use military force to 
“reinforce global values” (2001:133). This civil society uses “transnational 
armies”, such as the NATO, EUROCORP (a French-German-Belgian force) 
and similar military forces that have the legitimate right to operate because 
they express transnational values. So, he argues, as there are no longer 
economic borders between nation-states, civil society “can no longer tolerate 
armed forces patrolling along borders that have long since ceased to exist...” 
(137). The definition of these inter-national alliances as ‘transnational’ is one 
point for dispute, as is also the existence and ‘globality’ of this ‘global civil 
society’. The other point is the absence of tolerance of this ‘global civil 
society’ for national states, for Difference in general.
It was indicated above that the idealisation of globalisation and its 
equation with ‘cosmopolitanism’ could alone provoke nationalistic reactions. It 
is very important how an ‘aggressive’ intervention can provoke the contrary 
reaction from the one desired. This happens when the perception of ‘global 
responsibility’ that INGOs and ‘global’ actors hold transforms to a demand of 
change in a given situation without regard of the local conditions and in a less 
than tolerable way. In such cases, non only these actors project their own 
biases and perceptions on the others but, also, they can thus provoke a 
reactionary defence on behalf of the community or nation in question. This 
might be the outcome when there is absence of the understanding that tolerance 
requires. Understanding of the fact, first and foremost, that this so-called 
‘global civil society’ mainly comes from countries that have long established 
an identity, a national identity to be accurate. Giddens (1999), for example, 
holds the view that cosmopolitanism has to stand against the efforts of 
fundamentalists of any kind to prevent or oppose the inevitable march of 
globalisation, which is bringing the world together. Is this a view of the ‘globe’ 
as a whole, or is it ideologically specific? Let us invoke a passage from 
IgnatiefFs book, Blood and Belonging (1993) that refers to cosmopolitanism 
but directly relates to the last argument.
Cosmopolitanism is the privilege o f  those who can take a secure nation state
for granted. Though we have passed into a post-imperial age, we are not in a
281
post-nationalist age [...] The cosmopolitan order of the great cities -London,
Los Angeles, New York, Paris- depends critically on the rule-enforcing 
capacities of the nation state. When this order breaks down...it becomes 
apparent that civilised, cosmopolitan multiethnic cities have as great 
propensity for ethnic warfare as any Eastern European country. [So,] 
cosmopolitans like myself are not beyond the nation...In that sense alone, I am 
a civic nationalist, someone who believes in the necessity of nations to provide 
the security and the rights we all need to live cosmopolitan lives. At the very 
least, cosmopolitan disdain and astonishment at the ferocity with which people 
will fight to win a nation state of their own is misplaced. They are, after all, 
only fighting for a privilege cosmopolitans have long taken for granted 
(1993:9).
The rhetorical and easy repudiation of the national dimension should not 
be disconnected from the fact that the stability and security of the national state 
is taken for granted for the cosmopolitans of the developed world, or that 
international mobility and contact is a prerequisite for a successful career for 
many of the professionals and academics that hold similar views. Also, the 
imposition of ‘universal values’ that are culturally specific does not always 
indicate an acceptance of cultural complexity, but rather an effort to transform 
an unknown reality according to the prejudices and models one holds. This is 
not to equate cosmopolitanism with cosmopolitan fundamentalism, but to 
emphasise on the fact that it can also become subject to ideologisation and 
rhetorical manipulation. The same applies to the political opposition to 
globalisation: when it demonises globalisation it may apply the same rhetoric 
or even methods as nationalism/fundamentalism.
The French sociologist Denis Duclos (2001) analyses the reactions to 
globalisation not in relation to the threats it poses but in relation to the 
everlasting and unresolved problem of the universal prospect. In his article 
‘Will Globalisation Unite the World?’21 he argues that globalisation carries 
with it the prospect of a world that will unite all human beings (which is 
otherwise known as universalism, humanism, cosmopolitanism etc). This
21 ‘La Globalisation Va-t-elle Unifier le Monde?’, Le Monde Diplomatique, August 2001, pp. 14-15. 
Also, in http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2001/08/DUCLOS/15541
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prospect is both attractive and frightening: it is a deeply narcissistic desire, to 
obliterate Difference, but it is also an intense anxiety as to whether we can 
erase the Other. By erasing the Other, we erase ourselves, our differences, and 
that creates the anxiety of us been absorbed in a suffocating Whole. For that 
reason, Duclos argues, this prospect has always, in combination with economic 
recessions (as in 1880, 1929, etc), led to fierce mobilisation, and obsession 
with the particular/local22.
The above certainly relates to views about globalisation as ‘one- 
worldism’. It refers to the misunderstanding of cosmopolitanism as the upper 
value, instead of its perception as a rejection of the belief that there is an upper 
value that must be equally important to everyone. So, 
globalisation/cosmopolitanism as a regression to a holistic perception of the 
world is subject to the analyses made to any holistic perception of the world, 
like nationalist holistic perceptions23. Instead, the world (or the global) should 
be understood as the inter-national, as a relationship between very diverse 
national (or any other local) entities that have the right to be diverse as long as 
they do not jeopardise -by the use of violence- the different existence of the 
other. This is the prerequisite for further understanding, as these localities are 
the providers of shelter and identity that are so indispensable for individuals if 
they are to begin to sentimentally approach the world in its totality. The issue 
at stake is not whether the perspective will be national/local or global, but 
whether it will be fundamentalist/intolerant or not. In the era of globalisation, 
however, we need to take under consideration Marty and Appleby’s remark in
22 The wish to obliterate Difference is foremost a denial of the inner Other, the unknown self. It is also an 
expression of narcissism to the extent that it always looks to unite humankind by assimilating the others 
into one’s own image, into a humanity characterised by one’s own universal truth. This, in the end, is not 
a desire to obliterate differences, but a desire to replace them with one’s own ‘sameness’. The reaction to 
this, on the other hand, is a similar attempt to deny Difference, but in a reversed way: by projecting, by 
dismissing my internal Other and replacing it by an external Other, an enemy. This visibility reassures 
individuals that they have managed to retain an imaginary unitary self, free of differences, free of 
otherness. These two trends are the two sides of the same coin.
23 Keeping the analogies in mind, we may consider the relation of cosmopolitan fundamentalism and 
cosmopolitanism similar to ‘nationalistic identity’ and national identity: cosmopolitan fundamentalism 
thus resembles a ‘nationalism ’ of the global (the term ‘nationalism’ in inverted commas signifies that it is 
not used as an analytical term with all the specificities of nationalism but rather as a metaphor).
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their study on fundamentalisms that, “the strange new world that is unfolding
at the century’s end is producing new possibilities for fundamentalisms”24.
]
Globalisation as a Political Ideology
In order to understand globalisation better and to apprehend the ways it 
can generate reactions or be a reaction itself (as in civilian globalisation) it 
would be useful to make here a synopsis of the ideologisation of globalisation. 
It is because of its ideologisation that I have confined it to the period starting in 
the mid-1980s25; neither the free market system nor the information revolution 
are so recent, but this so recent process of ideologisation, that is still under 
way, has given them new impetus and character. Under the heading of 
globalisation a number of changes and events have been initiated, intensified or 
justified. These changes were very significant at both the political and the 
intellectual level, but the implications were most intensively manifested at the 
economic level. It would be superfluous to repeat the economic problems 
associated with globalisation. I would rather like to refer to the political and 
intellectual level because here lays the uniqueness of the process. This means 
that, neither neo-liberal ideology nor the problems associated by the 
implementation of the ffee-market are unique. Yet, for the first time they have 
not appeared as a political choice but as a necessity and an almost natural 
development.
The recent developments both at the political and intellectual level are 
quite diverse, while the most characteristic of them have already been referred 
to in chapters 5 and 6. Let us succinctly recapitulate the most indicative, 
starting with the political ones. One is the embarrassment and bewilderment 
felt by many politicians and intellectuals alike after the fall of the Soviet 
Union, a feeling that was mostly provoked by the victory appraisals on behalf
24 Marty & Appleby (1991): Fundamentalisms Observed, Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, p.xii; 
quoted in Scott, 2001:96.
25 Globalisation as a political ideology could be developed as a third dimension of globalisation. 
Nevertheless, because it is a very recent process, I have chosen to leave it out of the definition of 
globalisation, although ascribing to ideologisation the necessary importance.
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of its opponent alliance, and less due to the belief that the Soviet Union was the 
illustration of socialism or communism. Second, in the midst of this 
bewilderment most countries started the implementation of neo-liberal politics 
with the opening of markets and the elevation of ‘competition5 to the main 
criterion for political, social and economic initiatives alike. These two 
developments resulted in a rhetoric that explained or justified these politics as 
inevitable necessities in the context of lack of alternatives -ideological or 
practical26. Third, at the intellectual level, there is lack of terminological 
precision as to the definition of globalisation; while this could be quite normal, 
as many sociological terms are difficult to be defined because of the 
complexity of the phenomena they are trying to specify, the problem is that 
many analysts tend to include everything under the heading of globalisation 
whether they define it or not. For example, immigration to Israel (Berthomiere, 
2001), defensive reactions of eastern Germans after German unification 
(Hogwood, 2001), and the reconciliation of victims and abusers in South 
Africa after the Apartheid regime (Stanley, 2001) are all equally treated as 
examples and characteristics of globalisation. This renders these analyses self- 
confirming as they leave nothing outside the ‘global5. Fourthly, there is, at the 
same time, huge terminological confusion due to the use of innovative 
language to describe contemporary events whether they are new or not. So, the 
NATO is described as a ‘transnational force5 (Segell, 2001), nations5 alliances 
and ethnic revivals are called regionalisms and localisms, new terms are 
introduced, such as ‘hybrid5 cultures or ‘glocalisation5, and a number of terms 
are replaced by others (chain with network etc), including ‘international­
isation5 that is replaced by ‘global-isation5.
This ideologisation is also apparent in certain visions of globalisation as 
the force that will unite the whole world and render it a global village.
26 Here lays another peril of globalisation: this is the absence of alternative politics. In the name of 
globalisation and because of its ideologisation in many states political parties implement or propose a 
program that seeks to adapt to globalisation by adopting it, that is by implementing neo-liberal policies. In 
EU member states, and the EU as a whole, for example, this was manifest during the 1990s, although the 
majority of governments were coming from the centre-left. When this happens, left-wing critique or 
reactions to globalisation cannot find a parliamentary way-out or they cannot be satisfied by moderate 
political claims that seek to accommodate globalisation. In these situations there is an obvious peril that 
people will be attracted by extreme reactionary parties or by non-parliamentary groups.
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Probably connected with this vision is the argument that fixed particularistic 
identities and stable cultural communities have no place in this ‘new’ world. 
The claim that national states and national identities will be rendered obsolete 
and even disappear has gained much support within the last decade of the 
twentieth century. However, the constant rise of old and new ethnic/national 
struggles and national/cultural revivals is also part of the era of globalisation. 
These struggles and revivals are incorporated in the vague context of 
‘regionalisms’ and ‘localisms’ due to the ideologisation of globalisation, which 
provokes a holistic view of the world that coincides with its envisaging of 
national states and identities as the ‘bad’, the obstacle to the realisation of such 
a view.
The effort and anxiety to explain the world as a unitary and integrated 
whole is characteristic of ideologies, as it was argued about nationalism in 
chapter 3. The argument about nationalism as a political ideology can be 
applied to globalisation as well: “Nationalism is a political ideology that 
creates and sustains mobilisation with three basic ideological mechanisms: 
generalisation, naturalisation, and identification. [...] Through generalisation, 
the particular appears as universal, as general, and the interests of a group 
appear as public interests. [...] Naturalisation is a mechanism by which the 
social and the political appear natural, given, unchosen. [...] Naturalisation is 
closely connected to legitimation, a fundamental function of ideologies, for 
what is natural becomes automatically excused, justified and, in the end, 
legitimised. The third mechanism, identification, makes the ideology 
unconsciously internalised and formulates individual and collective identities. 
When nationalism is internalised, national identity is ascribed to the individuals 
who, thereafter, tend to identify -wholly or partially- their interests with their 
nation’s and naturally act out for their defence. According to Breuilly, there 
exists in the modern world a general need for identity expressed as a general 
need for ideology, and he stresses that, “nationalist ideology is a particularly 
powerful response to this need” because it is both abstract (in the ways of 
achieving its goals) and repudiating of the depersonalising character of 
modernity (1993:381-2)”.
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Globalisation as a political ideology functions with these three 
ideological mechanisms as well. Through generalisation globalisation is 
presented as having universal validity and acceptance and, when it is not, this 
is due to retrogressive attitudes that deny its ‘inevitable’ march. Moreover, the 
interests of a particular group, of neo-liberal free-marketers, are presented as 
global interests. Naturalisation is apparent in the view that globalisation is 
inevitable and widespread in every part of the world, and that the so-called 
‘global civil society’ has obvious legitimacy. Identification, too, manifests 
itself in the ‘global values’, ‘global citizenship’, and the ‘obvious’ legitimacy 
of the latter to be mobilised in defence of these values against their ‘enemies’ 
worldwide; Breuilly’s words as quoted above find a clear expression in 
Giddens’ view that, life is not worth if we have nothing to fight for while, 
simultaneously, he identifies globalisation with universal values 
(naturalisation). Certainly, we cannot expect that identification with ‘global 
values’ can create a form of collective identity, at least not of the type of 
national identity. The main reasons are two. First, because the ‘globe’ is both 
symbolically and pragmatically27 too vast and vague a place to become the 
provider and regulator of primary identities, that is to offer the organisation and 
the familiarity necessary so that a ‘global identity’ becomes a primary identity. 
As argued regarding nationalism28, the modem state had a decisive role in 
providing the means to organise and systematise a given population and ascribe 
to them a common identity. Second, because these values can be incorporated 
into the value system of individuals and collectivities like other ideologies do 
now, which, however, do not undermine the form of collective identification 
that national identities present. For both these reasons, it is more likely and 
practically feasible that ‘global values’ enrich the discourse and contexts of 
contemporary identification rather that undermine or substitute them.
Globalisation’s similarities with nationalism, as both political ideologies, 
are manifest in the psychological reactions they can generate and the fact that 
they can provoke, or facilitate, psychological regression by offering an alibi a
21 Pragmatically means in practical terms, that is territorially, linguistically, in terms of organisation and 
systematisation of common living, etc.
28 Chapter 3, p.52.
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legitimate excuse for the expression of hostility (verbally or actively). For 
example, globalisation does offer a holistic view of the world and a prospect 
for the future. In addition, identification with it, or with the global values, can 
become regressive as both its idealisation and demonisation indicate. In short, 
globalisation and the ‘global’ have certain similarities with nationalism and the 
national: both infer the possibility for constructive and destructive
manifestations and, most importantly, they both can be -and have been- 
manipulated by elite groups towards a certain goal.
The Prospects of (National) Identity in the Era of 
Globalisation
Within the context of globalisation, the context of current politics, what 
is the future of national identity? What is the future of identity, of collective 
identification, in general? We have analysed the prospects of identification 
with the national state thus far and have indicated a few more directions that 
identity can follow as a reaction to globalisation. Following the above analysis 
of the responses to globalisation in general, as well as the previous analysis on 
nationalism (which is still a prevalent force), we should try to provide an 
answer to this -fundamental for this research- question. The prospects of large- 
scale collective identification in the current era are mainly two: either that 
national identity will remain the primary identity, or that the national state as a 
source of primary identification will run the risk of being replaced by another 
provider of group identification (such as religion). In either case, the basic 
characteristics of identity will not differ in essence from those of national 
identity, as described in chapter 4.
Before we analyse these two prospects it is important to address and 
justify the lack of an alternative prospect, an alternative to both national and 
religious identities, meaning an alternative to this kind of collective 
identification that is characterised by all those traits described in this thesis. 
More specifically, the question is whether there is a prospect for individuation
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29or for ‘individualised’ identities, such as consumer identities . Individuation, 
to begin with, is always a choice: it is not excluded as one, but it is not 
specifically stressed because it is usually followed by few people. 
Individuation does not need a specific reference ‘in the era of globalisation’ 
because it has always been a choice of critical minds against every ideological 
power structure30. Indicatively, individuation has been a choice for certain 
people who refused to acquire the ‘nationalistic’ identities attributed to them 
and criticised their countries for nationalistic or militaristic propaganda; 
individuation has been a choice in the era of nationalism and it will not stop 
being one in the era of globalisation or any other ‘era’. The question about 
consumerism and consumer identity, on the other hand, is an important 
discussion but is not relevant to our point of discussion of collective and 
national identification, although it is relevant to globalisation in general. I
*
would leave aside this issue as irrelevant to the discussion on the potentials of 
collective-as-prevalent identification because of current indicative evidence. In 
the most notable examples of our contemporary age where there is a very 
strong and deeply entrenched consumer culture, the examples of USA and the 
UK, there is no indication that national feelings and identities are less strong 
than they are in other countries: on the contrary, consumerism is considered to 
be part of the customs and values of these two national states. In that sense 
consumerism too cannot undermine or substitute national identification but be 
integrated in the identity perceptions of a given nation . So, let us move to the 
two stronger potentials for collective identification in the era of globalisation.
29 Let me clarify that I do not equate individuation with consumer culture as, for example, the former 
would most likely present a critique on the latter. I have included both only as responses or alternatives 
that can be chosen of followed by individuals alone, and they are far from offering a group identity.
30 For example, Marxists who have severely criticised the soviet federation of USSR, or pacifists who 
deny to serve the military, etc.
31 On the contrary, as Castoriadis (1999) argues, in capitalistic societies the collapse of traditional -and  
supporting for the individual- communal values resulted in the rallying of individuals around religion, 
nation, or race, in a search for identity.
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National Identity as Primary Identity32
Firstly, people are most likely to reaffirm or hide behind their existing 
identities; for a large part of the world this means their national identities, but 
for those that there has been another source of identification, for example 
religious, that should remain so. There is a general, yet precise, reason for that: 
in a world that is changing so rapidly, certain points of stability are those that 
continue to provide meaning. In Hall’s words, “identities ought to be stable 
points of reference which were like that in the past, are now and ever shall be, 
still points in a turning world’ (199la:22, emphasis added). National identities 
are identities that guarantee a psychological continuity in between time, 
because nations are (presented as) everlasting entities, in the past, present, and 
the future. In addition, the importance of the national state will be even greater 
as provider of security, because it is still the only prevailing entity and norm in 
the era of globalisation that can provide a shelter, at least psychologically. In 
circumstances of insecurity, nationalism makes a greater psychological appeal 
too, and the symbols of national identification, the patria primarily among 
them, acquire intense significance.
So, national identity has the potentials to be even stronger in the era of 
globalisation. As it has been argued, it is not necessary that national identities 
will be pathologic and exclusionary, as they can be the reference points that 
will facilitate the departure towards an external orientation to the world. This is 
a potential, of course. Unfortunately, however, there are serious doubts that this 
will happen as a reaction to the current international age. National identities 
tend to regress to ‘nationalistic identities’ in periods of crisis, when the 
‘normal’ rhythms of life are unpleasantly disturbed. Also, pathological 
reactions usually accompany economic crises and recessions. So, nationalism, 
as a sentiment and ideological discourse, is provided with fertile ground on 
which to develop. For example, in Europe there is already great concern about 
globalisation, accompanied by great hostility against the increasing number of 
foreigners who try to enter it. Foreigners have always been ‘suitable’ receivers 
of hostility. Even more so now that people are more in a need for a scapegoat,
32 This section is mostly a recapitulation of the relevant argumentation presented thus far.
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something more apt than ‘globalisation’ to blame for unemployment, for 
cultural threats, etc. For many, the need for a stable national state may coincide 
with a ‘pure’ one, and foreigners are obstacles to purity. It is certainly no 
coincidence that the xenophobic and even racist, but certainly exclusionist, 
rhetoric won people’s sympathy and brought the respective parties into 
Austria’s and Denmark’s government in the late 1990s; nor its it coincidence 
that the EU is implementing the harshest laws against migrants, refugees and 
asylum seekers, thus creating a ‘fortress Europe’ in the beginning of the 
twenty-first century. At the same time, rational thinking is surrounded by too 
many fundamentalisms at the moment (national, religious and global) that 
mainly fight each other (as Giddens described) but leave no much fertile 
ground for moderate, rational activity.
Another possible and already existing trend is the uprising of nationalism 
as a movement, meaning the mobilisation towards creating more unified and 
homogeneous national states, or simply recognising ethnic and national 
identities and groups with relative autonomy within states. The case of the 
Basques on the one hand, and the case of the Scots on the other are only two of 
the many existing examples. These are trends towards more solid and stable 
national identities. As it has been argued, they do not undermine the national 
state as a form of collective organisation, but they undermine their respective 
national states. Beyond the domestic reasons that account for the evolution of 
each case, these nationalisms can be explained by the two existing and 
prevalent ideologies. The one is nationalism, which is still on the fore and even 
more strengthened on an international scale. The other is globalisation, as it has 
been subject to intense ideologisation. One aspect of the dominant rhetoric of 
globalisation concerns the national state and its fading away. To the extend that ^  
the rhetoric about the decline of the national state continues and, furthermore 
prevails as a public concept (apart from, and because of, being an intellectual 
and political concept), people will search back for national, ethnic, local 
identities, so as to fill the emerging vacuum. This search will be based on the 
model of national identity and the reaction will be an extreme nationalistic one, 
as the current examples and trends indicate. This is most likely to be made in a
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context of panic. According to Freud (1921:125-6), panic arises when a group 
disintegrates or is under threat, real or perceived. This is expressed in collective 
fear, which is analogous to neurotic anxiety: disintegration of the group or a 
threat to its integration can provoke identity crisis, which ultimately means loss 
of security, certainty and sense of belonging. Thus, it is a disaster for the 
individual. For that reason, we can expect this anxiety to provoke regressive 
reactions. At the same time, however, there is also realistic anxiety, anxiety 
connected with a real and not perceived danger. If we take into account the 
observed threats connected with economic globalisation, we can see that both 
types of anxieties can be generated in the current context33.
Recall o f  Religious identity?
The second prospect for national identification is that it could lose its 
primacy to another form of identification, namely religious identification. This 
again depends upon the rhetoric of the nation state’s decline or upon its 
possible actual weakening, in combination to the fact that nationalism is a 
secular religion, in the sense that it uses a similar rhetoric and it serves similar 
needs. In that sense, if the national state fails to provide a stable source of 
identification and organisation of the group’s life, then another affiliation will 
be searched for. This search can be directed to more coherent and 
homogeneous national states, but it can also take refuge in religion. A refuge in 
religion would not need to replace the national state, as religion is a 
fundamental component of many national identities, and this increases the 
likelihood of such a prospect. However, these trends are also determined by the 
history and the particular shaping circumstances of a region. Collective 
assimilations are related to pre-existing categorisations, as Smith argues, and to 
their historical depth and continuity.
Religious fundamentalism could potentially replace nationalism (as 
national fundamentalism), as the rhetoric of the two is similar, let alone that the 
one borrows its fundamental features from the other; authenticity, inspiration,
33 On realistic and neurotic anxiety we referred in chapter 2, p.69-70.
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capacity for interpretation, but also the rhetoric of chosen nation, holiness of 
the motherland, etc, that are used in religious fundamentalism too. The 
following passage is indicative of their similarities: “fundamentalisms are 
selective. They may well consider that they are adopting the whole of the pure 
past, but their energies go into employing those features which will best 
reinforce their identity, keep their movement together, build defences around 
its boundaries, and keep others at a distance...”34. Also, “fundamentalism 
stresses community as a source of strength, an expression of solidarity and a 
resource for use” (Scott, 2001:82). Thus, community (whether religious or 
national) can be a source of strength in circumstances that individuals perceive 
themselves as weakened in controlling their lives and their shaping conditions.
We already have examples of re-emerging religious fundamentalisms. 
Scott (2001) argues that in the post war period there is a rise of fundamentalism 
of all religions, particularly Islamic and Christian, a rise that has astonished 
sociologists of religion who thought that modernisation and secularisation had 
rendered religion marginalised and individualised. These fundamentalisms, she 
argues, are retreatist and regressive, and not radical and revolutionary 
(2001:81). Let us first refer to Islamic fundamentalism. According to Castells, 
Islamic fundamentalism has re-emerged largely as a reaction to globalisation 
and the simultaneous devaluation of the nation state. In his words, ‘"the 
explosion of Islamic fundamentalism seems to be related to both the disruption 
of traditional societies...and to the failure of the nation-state to accomplish 
modernisation, develop the economy, and/or to distribute the benefits of 
economic growth among the population at large” (1997:17)35. Religious 
fundamentalism became also appealing among Muslim youth bom in countries 
like France, Germany and Britain who became frustrated and disappointed due 
to social exclusion and discrimination. Thus, several factors contributed to the 
displacement of national community as a sentimental priority by umma, the 
community of believers; the failure of the national state was one of them. Its
34 Quoted in Castells, 1997:13, from M.Marty & S,Appleby (eds), Fundamentalisms Observed, Chicago: 
Chicago Univ. Press, 1991, a project on fundamentalisms by the American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences.
35 For an analysis on religious fundamentalism and the particular cases of Islam and American 
Christianity see Castells, 1997, pp. 13-27; also, Scott, 2001.
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failure, however, is not enough to explain its repudiation. It is also important to 
note that the national state was not a long established form of political 
organisation, while also it was seen as a western imposition. In addition, the 
1970s were for the Muslims the beginning of the 14 century of the Hegira, as 
Castells points out, “a period of Islamic revival, purification, and 
strengthening” (p. 14). As we can see, all these factors coincided to provoke the 
rise of religious fundamentalism among a number of Muslims. All these events 
together account for the ‘particular circumstances’ that have extensively been 
referred to as contributing to an important historical event, the knowledge of 
which is absolutely necessary when we attempt to analyse, or predict, historical 
events.
In a similar way we should envisage the emergence of Christian 
fundamentalism in the US. Castells (and Scott) describes this too as a retreatist 
movement “aiming at constructing social and personal identity on the basis of 
images of the past and projecting them into an utopian future...” (1997:25), 
which presents family as the earthly heaven from where one can “pray God to 
return them to the state o f innocence where they could be content with 
benevolent patriarchalism under God’s rules” (p.27, emphasis added). Castells 
explains these movements as a reaction against the fear and uncertainty 
provoked by globalisation and the crisis of patriarchalism. Indeed, the 
psychological appeal of patriarchalism and the unconscious dynamics of the 
claim towards a ‘return to the state of innocence’ (return to the ‘womb’) are 
very strong. However, why this particular one was the reaction in the US and 
not elsewhere cannot be wholly explained by globalisation but by the traditions 
and the myths of this society. In that respect, it is essential to remark the 
following: “Christian fundamentalism is a perennial feature of American 
history” (Castells, p.21) and it is closely connected to the American militia 
(who are also uprising); in addition, since the early 1990s the Americans were 
‘deprived’ of their basic enemy, communism, which was replaced by Islam to 
some extent; lastly, a fundamental myth in American tradition is the so-called 
‘American exceptionalism’, the belief that they would find in the US the 
‘promised land’, a heaven in earth (it was in the US and by Christianity that the
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very term ‘religious fundamentalism’ was initiated, having conversion at its 
heart).
Huntington emphasised, and predicted, that increasing interactions will 
“intensify civilisation consciousness and awareness of differences between 
civilisations and commonalities within civilisations” (1996:4), thus pointing to 
the one trend towards larger affiliations. He mainly defined those larger 
affiliations according to religious characteristics, thus pointing to the fact that 
future confrontations will be among religious camp. However, these larger 
affiliations are to large extent larger categorisations, most commonly 
externally applied and connected with the (reasonable) fact of the ‘extemar 
bypassing of internal and subtle differences. Let me be more explicit about 
that. Huntington stresses the example of a person, who is considered a Catalan 
in Spain, a Spaniard in Europe, a European in America, and a 
European/Westemer/Christian in the Middle East. The broader categorisation 
is used by and to the ones who are not aware of the inner divisions. So, if 
someone introduces himself as a Rwandan, a name ‘we’ have never heard 
before, we will most likely recall him as an African. Such broad categorisations 
externally focus on similarities, while neglecting the differences. In the 
‘interior’ of such broad categorisations, however, people are more aware of 
their differences and divisions. Within ‘interiors’ and when they are 
particularly big and diverse, there exists the likelihood that differences will be 
emphasised. His prediction, however, remains a strong likelihood if a number 
of conditions are met in the future, external categorisation being one of them.
Generally, there are not many regions that the national state seems likely 
to be replaced as a major source of identification by religion. Yet, this remains 
a possibility while, also, religion could be reasserted within the boundaries of 
existing national states. This would be a combination of the two main prospects 
for (national) identity that have just been described. This is consistent with the 
strength of nationalism, the existence and potency of religious affiliations, and 
with the similarities that nationalism and religious fundamentalism express.
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* * *
The process and reactions described must in no way be exaggerated. 
Identification is a long process, and changes affect it continuously but slowly. 
Yet, this is a reason why the national state should not be presented as 
threatened: because it is the source of identification for many people, and a 
continuum for national identity. Thus, the demise of the nation state would be a 
direct threat for individuals, whose life and future is connected with it. If an 
effort towards new identifications is made under the present circumstances and 
the impact of globalisation, they will be constructed with fear as a component 
of it. And, fear, is not a good guide in any action.
CONCLUSION
So, we have reached the end of this study upon the nature, strength and 
dynamics of national identity. A study that went through individuals and their inner 
psyche, individuals as members of groups and collectivities and, at the same time, 
through political ideologies and historical processes. The single individual and its 
conscious and unconscious mental functioning has been at the core of understanding 
and explaining the dynamics of collective identification. This is not to claim that 
psychoanalytic explanations of national identity make historical and political ones 
redundant but, on the contrary, that they offer an additional insight and a deeper 
comprehension to the latter. For example, the appeal of the ‘Golden Age’ or the 
boundaries’ construction of ‘us’ and ‘them’ have been often emphasised in many 
researches on nationalism; yet, the explanation of these phenomena, the answer 
‘Why?’ they have such a potency, is a step further in their full comprehension. 
Psychoanalysis does not explain any particular nationalist phenomenon (alone), but it 
does explain the human propensity to develop the kinds of sentiments and 
dispositions manifested in national identification.
Identity construction is an individual experience but socially mediated. The 
process of identification begins with the infant’s birth and continues thereafter. It is 
initiated as a defence mechanism in the service of the pleasure principle, as the infant 
tries to avoid frustration and preserve its narcissistic image, but it also provides an 
outlet for the love drives. Identification at this first stage of life takes place only with 
familiar images and persons; this is a characteristic of identification that we can 
observe in later life as well, and in fact occurs as a prerequisite for identification. 
Identification with parents and parenting persons is the first and most important 
identification in someone’s life, it is highly constitutive of his/her personality and to 
a large degree determines later identifications. This is the personal history of a 
person, whose processes and circumstances of identity construction are unique and 
constitute an individual experience. At the same time, however, each individual is 
located in a given historical, social and political environment. So, his/her experiences 
and choices are largely determined by it. History and the sociopolitical environment
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are inscribed to the child initially by its parents and later, in a more systematic way, 
through the social environment. Yet, even through parental identification, which is 
personal and unique, one internalises the social perceptions of his/her parents and 
their environment, their super-ego, that introduce him/her to a specific social order. 
In that sense, personal experiences are also social ones, and the choice of identity is 
socially mediated and/or determined. Thus, identification is closely linked to the 
concept of socialisation. In that sense, the idea that, in the era of globalisation, one 
can make a free choice from multiple sources of identity overlooks the social and 
political structures within which each individual is placed and which sociology has 
considered indispensable thus far, independently of whether these structures would 
be national or other.
National identity is the identity one acquires through identification with the 
nation. Emphasis is laid on the national state, however, because, as it has been 
argued, it is the state that accounts for the major difference between national and 
ethnic identity. According to the modern definition, a nation is an ethnic group that 
has found political expression in a state or has consciously aspired to do so. So, 
national identity is not only a social identity, but it is also a political identity, 
influenced by the aims and context of the modern political ideology of nationalism. It 
is nationalism that has rendered national identity a ‘nationalistic’ identity and has 
given it the particular caracteristics that it manifests with such potency and, 
occasionally, ferocity. That is because nationalism has signified the nation with new 
qualities and aspired goals, and national identity has been resignified by it. For that 
reason I have defined national identity as the outcome o f the constant process o f 
identification with a nation, and the sentiments aroused by this identification. The 
characteristics and content of national identification are defined by the object of 
identification, which is the nation.
National identity need not be by definition such a strong and prevalent identity 
as it has been throughout modernity. This has been the outcome of its systemic 
organisation and cultivation, and its manipulation too, by the state apparatuses. 
However, as it has been shown, this kind of organisation and identification that is 
based on familiarity criteria is not new in history. On the contrary: sentimental 
affiliations based on territorial and linguistic criteria, as well as religious and cultural 
ones are known to us since the Homeric epics. These affiliations are also manifest
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today in peoples’ sentimental attachment to their particular birthplaces and 
‘homelands’ within their own national states. These affiliations resemble ethnic ties 
in that they are sentimentally important even though not systematised. This clearly 
indicates that the criteria upon which nationalism has emphasised are not new or 
manufactured but rather represent age-old criteria of collective identification, 
unsystematic though. Criteria clearly derived by the human psychological need to 
identify with a familiar group and delineate its borders against other groups.
Apart form understanding the human propensities and political circumstances 
and ideologies that make nationalism and national identity so prevalent within 
modernity, individual psychology can also help us understand the reasons of 
conflicts and reactions to specific events. It does so through the acknowledgment and 
study of the unconscious drives -the aggressive drives in particular- and the need to 
construct a unitary perception of one’s self through the projection of unwanted and 
undesired images to the others. When applied to collectivities, this need explains the 
construction of so powerful and hostile divisions of ‘us’ and ‘them’, and the creation 
of enemies may nevertheless be very similar to one’s own group. An other important 
way to understand conflicts is through the study of individual reactions to traumatic 
events. There are certain events in the life of an individual that are of particular 
importance in the development of his/her personality, or may even constitute 
traumatic events. Traumatic events tend to be repressed from memory, but make 
their appearances into consciousness with symptoms. Certainly, neither all of the 
potentially traumatic events will become so in every individual, nor a similar event 
would be equally traumatic for different persons. The likelihood of reactions depends 
on the ability of each individual to accommodate these events, and his/her potential 
psychic strength to cathect a given amount of pressure, frustration or anxiety. The 
same by analogy applies to nations. There is a number of events in their history that 
are significant or even tragic. These historical events have the potential of becoming 
collective traumas and generate pathologic reactions (symptoms). Such events 
remain in the common memory of a nation through historical or mythical narrative 
and become part of the collective unconscious of a nation through time. At the same 
time, except from marginal cases, past events cannot be experienced as traumatic in 
the present if someone does not ascribe importance to them. Here lays the 
importance of leaders in managing to manipulate a whole nation and its history: by
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emphasising on a past event and presenting it as traumatic or fundamentally 
important they can manage to influence a nation, provided of course that other 
particular circumstances favour such a process.
In the course of this analysis it has been argued that the distinction between 
benign and malign types of nationalism is inaccurate and thus misleading. That was 
not an attempt to treat all manifestations of nationalisms as uniformly reactionary or 
regressive; it was rather an attempt to emphasise on two important points. The one is 
that nationalism by definition creates boundaries and distinctions and, because the 
unconscious drives work in that direction as well, it can easily take exclusionary or 
any other extreme form. Indeed, as much of the evidence indicate, the history of 
nations is full of instances where a relatively peaceful period is followed by a violent 
one, and so on. The second point is that one must be cautious as to the definition 
used to describe others and to the implication of present politics in such definitions. 
An aspect of this is the projection of nationalistic feelings to other nations and 
regions, to the periphery as Billing argues, and the attribution of benign or ‘civic’ 
types of nationalism to ‘our’ nation. Another aspect is that political circumstances 
and balances determine to a large extent the definition of historical events. For 
example, a movement that once might be called liberating can in another context and 
period called nationalistic or secessionist. For that reason, political analysis must 
always take under consideration historical and political circumstances, which can 
help keep a critical perspective upon political contingencies.
Critical analysis and consideration of political contingencies is necessary when 
studying any historical period. It is particularly important when studying one’s 
contemporary period, too, so as to complement for the lack of distance from the facts 
that are under analysis. Globalisation, for instance, is not simply recent: it is 
contemporary. In the vast bibliography on globalisation, where historical 
developments have been kept under consideration the perception is usually more 
balanced. Hence the effort to keep these criteria under consideration when defining 
globalisation, so as to accurately identify the context of analysis and locate national 
identity within it. There have been several obstacles to the desired analytical clarity 
in regard to globalisation, though, due to a number of interrelated developments 
connected to the ideologisation of globalisation. These characteristics include the fall 
of the Soviet Union and the subsequent political, economic and ideological
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developments, the perception of the national state as being at the dusk of its history, 
and the wide terminological confusion and lack of specificity in regard to the 
definition of globalisation. These developments resulted in a rhetoric that explained 
or justified the politics of globalisation as inevitable necessities in the context of lack 
of alternatives -ideological or practical.
It has been often asserted that globalisation will erase nationalism from the 
world. However, its very evolution as a kind of ‘nationalism’ itself proves the 
argument wrong; because, by replacing nationalism with globalisation-as-ideology 
one does not repudiate fundamentalist thinking but only alter the terms of discussion. 
This only shows the prevalence of ‘nationalism’. Nevertheless, the prevalence of 
nationalism is manifested in practical terms too. Nationalistic movements continue to 
be mobilised around the world, while nationalistic sentiments and discourses in 
established national states are far from negligible. Also, national states continue to be 
an aspiration and a norm, as well as the only existing form of collective organisation 
at the moment. In addition, they remain the main organisers of collective 
identification. National states may have been weakened in some of their economic 
functioning, but this has been part of their own political initiatives and not the 
outcome of an uncontrolled and fluid globalisation process. At the same time, those 
mechanisms that systematise identification with the national state are equally or even 
more powerful as they have been in modernity, including forces that are independent 
from the state (like the mass media, that are even more nationally oriented). Finally, 
pressures posed by the civilian initiatives for reforms, even for ‘global’ reforms (i.e. 
ecological issues), are posed to national states, thus empowering them.
So, national identities have not been weakened in the era of globalisation. On 
the contrary, there is evidence pointing to cultural revivals and reaffirmations of 
identities in many cases and, at the same time, the overall conditions posed by 
globalisation indicate that national identification and nationalism is more likely to be 
strengthened than diminished. How can one make such predictions? The likelihood 
of a process can only be estimated if a multidimensional approach is applied. For 
example, political analysis of the current situation and trends is necessary to define 
the state of the art; psychoanalysis then describes the individual feelings and 
perception of a given situation, as well as the unconscious dynamics that work for or 
against a given reaction; and, historical sociology is indispensable in informing us
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about similar cases and reactions in the past, as well as about the particular 
circumstances that shape the overall historical and cultural conditions of a given 
region or nation. Certainly, there are always imponderable factors in history, factors 
that can never be predicted before they emerge and may have a decisive contribution 
to the final outcome (a leader, a natural event etc); these are the conjunctures, the 
contingencies in history.
In the current context, globalisation presents direct threats for individuals and 
collectivities alike. The reasons are multiple and they include: economic recessions 
and growing inequality; financial volatility and the weakening of states’ protection of 
their citizens (i.e. cut of welfare provisions); ecological threats and disasters; rapid 
flows of information and misinformation; cultural threats, including the widespread 
discourse about the dismantling of the national state and the weakening of national 
identities. Some of the above are indeed enhanced as a result of globalisation (i.e. 
economic insecurity) and others by the ideologisation of globalisation (i.e. threats to 
the national state), while others are not directly related to globalisation (i.e. 
ecological threats). Yet, all of the above are used in everyday rhetoric as directly 
connected to the new era of globalisation, which results in its demonisation -as 
opposed to its idealisation, which is the other side of the same coin. Subsequent rapid 
changes and the perception of globalisation as a peril cannot but provoke reactions 
that will point towards the preservation of stable units and identities. That is because 
local identification is much easier to be accomplished, as it is much more immediate 
and familiar. This local identification in the era of nationalism is national 
identification -because the era of globalisation is also an era of nationalism.
There is one issue that should be stressed for the sake of clarity. Since 
identification is a constant process and identities are continuously enriched, why is 
emphasis laid on the importance of stable national identities as reference points in the 
era of globalisation? A basic understanding of national identity involves the remark 
made in chapter 3 that, while two individuals may experience equally strongly their 
national identification, the specific component of each national identity may vary to 
some extent. For example, one Italian may consider Catholicism to be a fundamental 
aspect of being Italian while another may be an atheist, and so on; these differences, 
however, are indifferent to the feeling and strength of national identity for each of 
them. This is the quality of nationalism: to embrace all and to describe no means and
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criteria that define the nation and national identification. So, a regress to ‘stable 
reference points’ that was indicated is not a regress to stable national identities by 
definition, meaning to identities that have been and will remain unchanged, but a
i
regress to the sense of stability that national identities offer because they have been 
‘there’ for long and they are familiar. It should be noted that even this regress to 
existing identities, when it comes as a reaction, does provoke a change in itself 
because it alters the intensity and emphasis of identification in the first place 
(intensity that can make a moderate national identity a ‘nationalistic’ one), and 
because it redefines them with additional elements that come from the reaction to a 
threatening Other (i.e. the redefinition of national identity with xenophobic elements 
as a result of external threats). In addition, when individuals face a threatening 
external environment, as globalisation is largely perceived, then their identities 
become more ‘closed’ and defensive and thus exclude other influences by definition, 
except from oppositional influences. Last, let us not forget that the process of 
identification involves the (selective) internalisation of elements from external others 
that finally shape one’s personality. The earlier this process takes place, the more 
fundamental these elements are in defining one’s self. So, however enriched or 
altered or moderated, pre-existing inscriptions constitute the ground upon which new 
developments can take place.
In general, we must keep in mind that psychoanalysis illuminates the 
discussion on national identities in regard to the mechanisms that shape identities and 
not to their specific content: it answers the ‘how’ and ‘why’ they are formed, not 
‘which’ specific one will it be. Identities are shaped through the constant interaction 
with important others, whether they initially be the parents (initially) or the wider 
social environment and structures (later on). So, ‘which’ will be one’s particular 
identity is defined by the wider social and political context. This is partly the 
meaning of the importance of others in shaping one’s identity. So, in order to 
describe specific national identities we need to look at the historical period in which 
they emerge and to examine the national state and nationalism in question. The 
content of identities can be defined only through an examination of the particular 
political and social circumstances of the given historical time and space.
One last aspect of this analysis that should be stressed in the concluding 
remarks is that of sublimation, a process by which the aim of a drive is diverted to
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another one. As it was explained in chapters 2 and 3, the initiative for the drives to 
strive for their satisfaction is desire, which stands at the core of every drive. 
Individuals cannot escape their nature, that is their unconscious drives, but they can 
certainly mediate them. This is the meaning of sublimation: the objects of desire can 
be shaped or socially mediated. However, when we refer to the sublimation of 
unconscious drives of collectivities such as nations, the notion of sublimation 
becomes mainly theoretical and practically utopian. Individuals have the tendency to 
regress to infantile fixations and seek for instinctual satisfactions. So, as Freud has 
argued, drives’ inclination to aggression forces civilisation to such an expenditure of 
energy that “civilisation has to use its utmost efforts in order to set limits to man’s 
aggressive instincts” (1930:302). So, the issue for effective sublimation is to manage 
to direct desire towards less destructive alternatives, and also to make this a 
continuous process and effort that should never be considered as an achievement. 
This requires strong political will and long-term commitment. It is at the level of 
political will and effectiveness that the issue of sublimation is, although not 
theoretically impossible, practically improbable. That is because, the maintenance of 
power has been the first priority for politicians and leading elites, and political power 
has often been employed by leaders so as to satisfy their own unconscious drives and 
desires. People will most eagerly gather and ‘forget’ their internal differences when 
they are in opposition to another group; this is a knowledge that political leaderships 
take advantage of in order to strengthen or maintain unity and/or divert the public’s 
attention from mistakes and inefficiencies of their policies -meaning, not always, but 
very often. It is this practice that has provoked Moscovici to define politics as “the 
rational form of exploiting the irrational substance of the masses” (1985:37). As we 
have seen in the examples of education and sports, in the era of nationalism not only 
have these potential outlets of desire lost much of their effectiveness but, in addition, 
they have been used and exploited for the purpose of nation-building and for 
directing aggressiveness towards specific political ends.
Once more it should be emphasised that it is not national states per se as 
organisations of collectivities that should be blamed for international conflicts and 
misunderstandings, neither is it religion or tradition as such. As we have seen, 
fundamentalist thinking can be applied to diverse aims and, wherever employed, it 
manifests a confrontation-discourse. Also, part of the analysis that proceeded in
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regard to national states can be applied to many instances of our everyday life where 
groups are involved. An analogously similar behaviour to national states and 
nationalism can be found in football teams and their fans: they can be fanatic or not, 
they gather mostly when they ‘confront’ their major ‘enemy’, they can be peaceful 
supporters in one game and fanatic hooligans in another, while the players and 
owners of these teams can tame or exasperate their fans with their actions in the field 
or with respective statements outside it. As far as collectivities are concerned, both 
the inner unconscious predispositions of individuals and their ability to be set free 
more easily when in a group, as well as the behaviour and ‘politics’ of the people 
responsible for the groups’ organisation (i.e. leaders) are extremely important in 
understanding and analysing conflicting situations.
During this research we tried to address the issue of national identity, with 
particular reference to the reasons of its regression to reactionary deeds and politics. 
This was not an attempt to define the particular characteristics that constitute national 
identities but to address the issue of identification with the national state. Through 
this multidisciplinary approach we tried to answer the question of its nature, strength 
and potential, and to go deeper into explaining phenomena that had been identified 
but remained a puzzle as to their causes. During this analysis on national identity a 
number of wider but interrelated phenomena came to the fore and they were 
addressed as well, although to a lesser extent. These phenomena include racism and 
xenophobia, exclusion and discrimination, as well as fundamentalisms, and they 
were related because they have similar psychic predispositions, but also because they 
are all apparent in nationalistic sentiments and discourses, and they can also be 
manipulated by leading groups, whether they be religious, national or ‘global’. 
Certainly, I cannot claim to have exhausted the topics related to national identity. 
There are topics that preoccupied me during this research to the extent that it was 
thought appropriate or necessary, but they appear to be particularly interesting for 
future and more extensive research too. Such topics are: the relation of secularism 
and religious fundamentalism to nationalism, the empirical study of people and/or 
groups that have double or multiple identities, the ‘anti-globalisation’ movements 
and the identities of ‘global citizens’, as well as the content of cultural reaffirmations 
(that is, to examine whether they point to a specific trend towards the creation of real 
nation-states). Other topics that have not been really examined but are nevertheless
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relevant and interesting for future research include: the content of identification of 
the ‘globalisation professionals’ and frequent-flyer cosmopolitans or the examination 
of national identification of contemporary global activists, the impact of 
consumerism as the underlying culture of globalisation, as well as the implications of 
globalisation on democracy.
However, further analysis of these topics would require and should be based on 
the understanding of the nature of individuals and their ‘regression’ potentials when 
they are in a group, that is the psychological and political conditions that are 
involved in group psychology; in that sense, this research is the first step towards the 
further elaboration of these topics. Also, specific cases and empirical examples have 
been involved in this thesis only to the extent that was necessary to clarify and 
illustrate the overall argumentation. The attempt made was to provide the analytical 
framework that can contribute to a deeper understanding of national identities in 
general and illuminate some necessary steps one should consider when studying a 
particular case. During this attempt the steps followed were those evaluated as most 
important, including the analysis of national identity in the contemporary era, which 
in my judgment would render the nature and potential of national identity more apt 
and thus comprehensible. I hope and believe that my study has met its aims and that 
it will contribute to the scientific knowledge and research that is interested in these 
topics.
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